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ABSTRACT 
Volcanic eruptions are powerful natural events which impact strongly on 
society. As human populations grow and expand into volcanically active 
areas, their exposure and vulnerability to volcanic hazards is also increasing. 
Of all volcanic hazards, ashfall is the most likely to impact lifelines because 
of the large areas affected. The widespread dispersal of ash can cause 
large-scale disruption of vital infrastructure services, aviation, and primary 
production. Electric power supply is arguably the most crucial of modern 
infrastructure systems, especially considering the dependence of other 
sectors on electricity to maintain functionality.  
During and immediately after ashfalls, electric power systems are 
vulnerable to a number of impacts, but disruption from volcanic ash-induced 
insulator flashover (unintended, disruptive electrical discharge) is most 
common. This thesis investigates the vulnerability of electric power systems 
to volcanic ashfall by examining impacts to the different sectors of the 
modern power system and exploring appropriate mitigation strategies. 
Analogue laboratory trials using a pseudo (synthetic) ash are undertaken to 
verify the environmental, volcanological and electrical parameters that 
most affect electrical conductivity and therefore the flashover mechanism 
in these experiments. While dry ash is highly resistant to the flow of electric 
current, increasing moisture content, soluble salt load, and compaction 
(bulk density) will reduce this resistance and, in turn, increase the potential 
for flashover.  
Volcanic ash is an acute form of airborne pollution for areas downwind 
of active volcanoes. Results from laboratory experiments in this thesis 
suggest that insulator pollution (volcanic ash) performance (dielectric 
strength) is primarily dictated by (1) the conductivity of the ash, and (2) 
insulator material, profile (shape) and dimensioning. Composite polymer 
insulators tested herein effectively minimise sinusoidal leakage current and 
partial discharge activity and also exhibit higher pollution performance 
when compared to ceramic equivalents. Irrespective of insulator material, 
 IV 
however, the likelihood of flashover increases significantly once the bottom 
surface of suspension insulator watersheds become contaminated in wet ash.  
The thesis investigates the vulnerability (hazard intensity/damage 
ratio) of electric power systems to volcanic ashfall hazards. Identification, 
analysis, and reduction of the risk of ashfall impacts to power networks is 
explored as a part of holistic volcanic risk assessment. The findings of the 
thesis contribute to the readiness, response and recovery protocols for large 
electric power systems in volcanic disasters; which directly affects the 
functional operation and economics of industrial and commercial society. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Volcanic eruptions are spectacular displays of Nature’s raw and irrepressible 
power. An explosive event the size of the Toba eruption, Indonesia, ca. 74 
ka, is perhaps the only kind of natural hazard other than the impact from a 
large near earth object (e.g. an asteroid) capable of causing global 
catastrophe (McGuire, 2006). Comparatively small eruptions, however, can 
still cause widespread disruption, damage and economic and human loss. 
The 1902 eruption of Mont Pelée on the French Caribbean island of 
Martinique is a good example, where a moderate-sized eruption produced a 
flow of hot ash and gases, killing all but two of the capital’s 29,000 
inhabitants (Boudan and Gourgaud, 1989; Witham, 2005). As an estimated 
9% of the world’s population lives within 100 km of a historically active 
volcano (Horwell and Baxter, 2006), increasing global population, 
exponential growth of megacities close to active volcanoes, and stresses 
related to rapid environmental change and globalisation, all contribute to 
the potential for larger and more serious volcanic crises and disasters than 
humans have witnessed in the past (Sparks and Aspinall, 2004).  
The 18 May 1980 eruption of Mount St Helens, USA was one of the best-
documented volcanic events of the 20th century. The deaths of 57 people 
and in excess of US$1 billion in damage highlighted the effects of volcanic 
eruptions on human health, critical infrastructure and primary industry 
(Johnston, 1997). Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), who generates 
and transmits bulk electrical energy across the Pacific Northwest, endured 
numerous impacts to their high voltage (HV) transmission system in the 
weeks following the eruption. Within 10 days of the initial May 18 event, 
BPA experienced 50 ash-related faults on the system, resulting in a total of 
7h 40m in unintended outage time (Nellis and Hendrix, 1980). Of these 
impacts, insulator flashovers (disruptive discharges) were most common. 
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Before and during the eruption, there was a complete lack of knowledge on 
the effects of ashfall on power system apparatus and much anxiety about 
potential impacts (Johnston, 1997).  
Current understanding of ash impacts to electrical infrastructure is 
limited to subjective information collected from volcanic impact 
reconnaissance trips (e.g. Leonard et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2012) and/or 
investigations carried out by power utility companies in the wake of a 
volcanic eruption (e.g. Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Matsuoka et al., 1995). 
Most of the information from historical accounts is anecdotal and refers to 
which element failed, but details of specific damage, reason, length of 
supply outage and corrective measures taken are often limited. Information 
about what changes utility providers make to internal systems such as 
maintenance regimes, asset management, response planning and 
communication processes as the result of the impact of ash on the network, 
are largely unknown. 
Low probability, but high impact, volcanic eruptions have traditionally 
been considered insignificant or beyond the scope of power system risk 
management strategies and practises (Wilson et al., 2009). System operator 
response to volcanic eruptions have been largely reactive, and not enough 
has been done to support research to identify areas at risk, assess this risk, 
and strengthen resilience in the power system.  
1.1 VOLCANIC ERUPTIONS 
Volcanic eruptions can be broadly divided into two types: effusive, which 
produce lava flows and explosive, which yield fragmented material 
(pyroclasts). Volcanic ash can be generated by a plethora of different 
processes (Dingwell et al., 2011) but most efficiently by explosive eruptions. 
The most common ash-generating eruption processes are (after Heiken and 
Wohletz, 1985): 
1) Magmatic: Decompression of rising magma, gas bubble growth and 
fragmentation of the foamy magma in the volcanic vent; 
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2) Hydrovolcanic: Explosive mixing of magma with ground surface 
water; 
3) Phreatic: Fragmentation of the country rock during rapid expansion 
of steam and or hot water.  
Most volcanoes provide some geophysical or geochemical warning of 
unrest, however, despite decades of research, it remains very difficult to 
forecast the beginning, duration or magnitude of an eruption, if at all 
(Tilling, 1995). Volcanic eruptions may last for seconds or decades, and will 
vary in intensity with each eruption. The violence of the eruption is 
primarily controlled by the viscosity of the magma, which is a function of 
silica content, crystalinity, temperature and the content of H2O and other 
volatile species (Heiken and Wohletz, 1985). Volcanic ash particles are 
incorporated into a gas-rich eruption column that may buoyantly rise up to 
50 km into the stratospheric levels of the Earth’s atmosphere (Sparks, 1986). 
Based on these and other eruption parameters such as volume of tephra and 
eruption duration, the Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) is a widely used 
classification scheme for volcanic eruptions, ranging from VEI 0–8, with VEI 0 
the least explosive (Table 1.1). This index is based on both magnitude 
(erupted volume) and intensity (eruption column height) information and 
can be applied both to modern and ancient explosive eruptions. The scale is 
logarithmic, where each successive integer on the scale represents a tenfold 
increase in observed ejecta criteria, with the exception of between VEI 0 
and VEI 1, and VEI 1 and VEI 2 (Newhall and Self, 1982). In general, larger 
VEI eruptions generate more ash, and therefore present the greatest hazard 
to regions with high population densities, developed infrastructure and 
primary industry. 
1.2 ASHFALL 
Although pyroclastic flows and surges, sector collapses, lahars and ballistic 
blocks are the most destructive and dangerous of eruption products (Baxter, 
1990), ashfall is by far the most widely distributed, and the most likely to 
be encountered by the public (Blong, 1996). The fallout of ash is controlled 
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by wind strength and direction, environmental conditions, grain size and the 
height to which the ash reaches (a function of eruption magnitude). In 
general, the size distribution of ashfall changes as the plume travels away 
from the vent; with coarser particles falling closer to the vent and finer ash 
particles carried the greatest distances (e.g. hundreds to thousands of 
kilometres from the volcano).  
Tephra is a general term for volcanic ejecta, and is comprised of 
pulverised fragments of rock, minerals and volcanic glass. These fragments 
are classified by size into ash (particles <2 mm) (Figure 1.1), lapilli (2-64 
mm) and blocks and bombs (>64 mm) (Sparks et al., 1997). Coarse-grained 
ash is defined as that with a mean diameter between 0.06 – 2 mm, whilst 
fine-grained ash has a mean diameter <0.06 mm (Schmid, 1981). However, 
the nomenclature is adapted throughout this thesis to diversify the 
terminology.   
Previous studies suggest that volcanic ash is the most problematic size 
fraction for electrical and other critical infrastructure (e.g. Wilson et al., 
2009; Wilson et al., 2012). Thus, volcanic ash is the focus of this thesis and 
is discussed from this stage forward. The types of minerals present in 
volcanic ash are dependent on the chemistry of the magma from which it 
was erupted, with the most explosive ash dispersing eruptions of high silica 
rhyolite (Heiken and Wohletz, 1985). Volcanic ash is hard (~5 on the Mohs 
hardness scale) and often highly angular. This angularity, together with its 
hardness, makes ash very abrasive.  
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Table 1.1: Volcanic explosivity index (adapted from Newhall and Self, 1982).  
Volcanic Explosivity Index 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
General Description 
Non-
Explosive 
Small Moderate 
Moderate-
Large 
Large 
Very 
Large       
Volume of Tephra (m3) <104 104-106 106-107 107-108 108-109 109-1010 1010-1011 1011-1012 >1012 
Classification Hawaiian Strombolian Vulcanian Plinian Katmaian   
Usual Composition Basaltic Andesitic Rhyolitic 
Cloud Column Height 
(km) <0.1 0.1-1  1-5  3-15  10-25 >25   
Typical Duration (hrs)   <1               1-6            6-12 >12   
Percentage with 
Fatalities 1 2 3 12 31 38 60 100   
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Figure 1.1: Ash particles from the 2009 Redoubt eruption (Alaska, USA). 
Image courtesy of Kristi Wallace (USGS/Alaska Volcano Observatory).  
During explosive eruptions, volatile gases, aerosols and metals adhere 
to ash particles during interaction within the volcanic plume (Rose, 1977; 
Óskarsson, 1980; Smith et al., 1982; Witham et al., 2005) (Figure 1.2). 
Sulphur and halogen gases and associated anions and cations are adsorbed 
onto ash surfaces and dry to become soluble salts. Recent studies propose 
that the formation of soluble halide and sulphate salts is primarily due to 
the acid-mediated dissolution of the ash’s silicate glass and minerals and 
subsequent precipitation at the ash–liquid interface (Delmelle et al., 2007). 
This process leads to the formation of thin deposits of salts on the ash’s 
surface. While dry volcanic ash is non-conducting (Nellis and Hendrix, 1980), 
the fine-grained nature of ash makes it a good retainer of moisture. Once 
attached soluble salts are dissolved into solution, the ash thus becomes 
conductive, making it a hazard to power systems.  
Newhall & Hoblitt (2002) propose that the probability of volcanic ash 
generation from any eruption is 92%; 90% for small magnitude eruptions (VEI 
0-3) and 100% for large magnitude eruptions (VEI 4-7). The composition of 
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volcanic ash and attached soluble volatiles differ between volcanoes, 
between eruptions at the same volcano and even between different phases 
of the same eruption episode. The grain size and thickness of eruptive 
deposits may also be highly variable, between different eruptions and 
within the same eruptive episode. Secondary remobilisation and deposition 
of unconsolidated volcanic products may increase the duration of an 
eruption’s impact for decades afterwards (Wilson et al., 2011). Extensive, 
above-ground, corridor systems of electrical apparatus used in power 
generation, transformation, transmission and distribution are often spread 
out over hundreds of thousands of square kilometres. Thus, ashfall is the 
most likely volcanic hazard to impact power networks.  
 
Figure 1.2: Ash particles adsorb volatile gases, aerosols and metals onto their surfaces. 
These dry to become soluble surface salts and render volcanic ash conductive once 
dissolved into solution by mist, fog, light rain, etc. (from Wilson et al., 2012).  
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1.3 VOLCANIC HAZARDS FROM A RISK MANAGEMENT 
PERSPECTIVE 
Volcanic hazards and their consequences (impacts) are best viewed in a risk 
management framework, where risk identification, risk analysis, risk 
evaluation, and risk reduction are fundamental steps in the process (Blong, 
2000; AS/NZS ISO-31000, 2009) (Figure 1.3). 
 
Figure 1.3: Risk management framework used in this thesis (from AS/NZS ISO-31000, 2009).  
The risk of impact from volcanic hazards hazard can be expressed as a 
function of the hazard and vulnerability (after Blong, 2000): 
Risk = f(hazard x vulnerability) (1.1) 
In the context of volcanology, the term hazard refers to volcanic 
phenomena with the potential to cause loss of life and infrastructure 
damage in a given area (Blong, 2000). Volcanic hazards are of various types, 
and the level of threat to humans and their livelihood depends on the 
vulnerability of the area exposed to the hazard (Table 1.2).  
Vulnerability is the degree to which elements (e.g. people, 
infrastructure, system components, primary production, etc.) can be 
damaged due to exposure to the hazard (Blong, 2000). Thus, risk is the 
probability that damage to components will occur as a result of the hazard.  
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Table 1.2: Effects and extent of the primary volcanic hazards (adapted from Sparks and 
Aspinall, 2004).  
Volcanic hazard Threat to life Threat to property Areas affected 
Tephra and pumice 
fall 
Low except near 
vent; high for 
aviation 
Variable, depends on 
thickness: roof collapse, 
bomb damage, fire, 
etc. 
Local to 
international 
Pyroclastic flows 
and surges 
Very high Very high Local to regional 
Lava flows Low Very high Local 
Lahars/flooding High to moderate High Local to regional 
Gases/acid rain Low to moderate Moderate Local to regional 
The risk management process begins with identifying the risk. In the 
context of this thesis, this step involves identifying all potential volcanic 
hazards within a specified area and characterising their impacts. In addition, 
all the elements (e.g. people, buildings, critical infrastructure, etc.) at risk 
from the hazard must be identified, and the potential for knock-on effects 
impacts, including cascade or common mode failures (AS/NZS ISO-31000, 
2009). It is also important to understand how elements relate spatially and 
temporally to the hazard, and their potential vulnerabilities (Crozier and 
Glade, 2005). Identification is achieved through reviewing previous hazards 
that have occurred in the study area, from literature and geological 
investigations (Kaye, 2008). In essence, this step identifies all factors which 
require further investigation in the risk analysis stage (Crozier and Glade, 
2005).  
The risk analysis and evaluation stages are focussed on developing an 
understanding of the risks (AS/NZS ISO-31000, 2009) so they can be 
compared and ranked. This involves assessing the magnitude and frequency 
of volcanic hazards and the vulnerabilities of exposed elements. These 
assessments are either deterministic or probabilistic or a combination of 
both. Traditionally, deterministic methods have been used in volcanic risk 
assessment, such as eruption recurrence intervals or the maximum expected 
eruption, to assess future eruption risk. However, there is an increasing 
desire for systematic and probabilistic risk assessment to describe risk posed 
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by current or future volcanic events, and to better account for evolving 
eruption histories, incomplete and/or short eruption histories, and 
volcanoes with a range of possible future eruption magnitudes and/or styles 
(Smith, 2004).  
Probabilistic risk assessments are used to determine the probability of 
a hazard occurring and its associated damage from a range of scenarios, 
with limited subjective input. These assessments are better at handling a 
range of hazards, magnitudes and variable hazard frequency/return periods. 
An example of this type of assessment is a Bayesian Event Tree (BET). In this 
assessment all potential volcanic scenarios are mapped out with 
corresponding probabilities of occurrence (Newhall and Hoblitt, 2002). A 
BET illustrates the likelihood of all possible events and typical damage that 
will occur. To determine the degree of damage that can occur in each 
scenario, fragility functions can be incorporated into probabilistic risk 
assessment.  
The vulnerability of different elements can vary significantly (Blong, 
2000). Vulnerability can be quantified by probabilistic risk assessment using 
fragility functions (also known as vulnerability curves) to express numeric 
relationships between the intensity of a hazard and degree of loss, specific 
to each inventory class or sector (e.g. Spence et al., 2005). These functions 
can be developed through the observation, either in the field or in a 
controlled laboratory environment, of critical elements under a range of 
impact conditions and a numerical relationship is defined which best 
estimates the fragility distribution. Few studies on volcanic ashfall hazards 
have utilised fragility functions, mainly due to the lack of quantitative 
damage or loss data. Limited examples include estimating the collapse 
probability of residential buildings from ashfall (e.g. Blong, 2003; Spence et 
al., 2005). Thus, this thesis will look to inform first-order fragility models 
through controlled analogue experiments and thereby extend the capacity 
of contemporary volcanic risk assessment.  
The final step in the risk management process is risk reduction. This 
step is aimed at reducing the hazard and/or the vulnerability of the 
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elements within the affected area. In volcanology, reduction of hazards is 
not always possible and in most cases is very difficult, as they are naturally 
occurring events not easily controlled by humans. Therefore, it is more 
beneficial to focus risk reduction efforts on reducing the vulnerability of 
exposed elements. Vulnerability can be reduced by implementing various 
mitigation actions/techniques/strategies which have been developed 
through the integration of field and laboratory analysis. A number of actions 
may be considered and applied either individually or in combination to 
protect certain elements from impacts (AS/NZS ISO-31000, 2009). It is also 
imperative that decision makers and stakeholders be aware of the nature 
and extent of the residual risk, even after taking steps to mitigate or reduce 
the original risk.  
1.4 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS 
Modern society has become increasingly dependent on a safe and reliable 
electricity supply to maintain national security, the health and welfare of 
communities, and the functionality of other vital infrastructure (e.g. 
telecommunications, transportation, water supplies, wastewater, etc.) and 
primary industry (e.g. agriculture). In the year 2000, the National Academy 
of Engineering in the USA compiled a list of the twenty ‘marvels of science 
and engineering’ that have had the greatest influence on the quality of life 
in the 20th century. The first item on the list was electrification. On a world 
scale, electricity is a vast array of generation, transformation, transmission, 
distribution and utilisation networks. Investment in this industry has a major 
impact on global society, world economy and the environment.  
The basic function of a power system is to supply customers, both 
major and minor, with electrical energy as economically as possible and 
with an acceptable degree of reliability and quality (Billinton and Allan 
1988). There are four main components of the modern electric power 
industry: (1) generation, (2) transmission (e.g. >110 kV by USA standards), 
(3) sub-transmission (e.g. 33 to 110 kV), and (4) distribution (e.g. <33 kV), 
as illustrated in Figure 1.4.  
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Figure 1.4: An example of a modern electric power system. Electric energy is generated at 
a power station (e.g. 13 kV). From here, the voltage is increased (current decreased) and 
the energy transmitted at 400 kV via extra-high voltage (EHV) transmission lines to a 
400/220 kV EHV substation. The energy is then transmitted to a HV substation where the 
voltage is reduced to 66 kV. Sub-transmission lines connect the HV substations to many 
distribution substations located within cities, where the voltage is reduced to 11 kV and the 
energy finally distributed either directly to industrial plants or factories, or to local 
residential and commercial zones. Distribution transformers (ground or pole mounted) 
reduce the voltage from 11 kV to ~400/220 V (depending on the system used) for use in 
homes, shopping centres, and other local loads (adapted from Karady, 2007). 
Generation sites transform the stored energy present in fossil (oil, coal, 
natural gas, etc.), nuclear, and renewable (geothermal fluids, wind, solar or 
water) fuels into electric energy. A typical alternating current generator 
produces a voltage of around 11 to 25 kV. This voltage is increased by a 
step-up transformer (increase in voltage, decrease in current) to facilitate 
the transmission of power over large distances by reducing losses. The 
transmitted power then passes through a ‘switchyard’ which is a facility 
dedicated to feeding power to different sections of the system (voltage is 
neither increased nor decreased at switchyards). Once the power reaches a 
substation located on the edge of a town or city, the voltage is reduced for 
integration into a sub-transmission system where power is fed to many 
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distribution substations (e.g. within cities). At the distribution substation, 
the voltage is reduced again and the power fed into a localised distribution 
system of overhead lines or underground cables. Large industrial plants and 
factories are usually supplied directly by a sub-transmission line or 
dedicated distribution line. Before residential consumption, however, the 
line voltage is reduced to ~400/220 V (depending on the system used) by 
distribution transformers that are commonly mounted on distribution poles 
or in ground placed kiosks.  
1.4.1 Outdoor insulators for HV alternating current (HVAC) 
systems 
High voltage direct current (HVDC) lines are used to transmit large amounts 
of energy over long distances or through waterways. However, a three-
phase AC system (generally, 60 Hz operating frequency in North and much of 
South America and Japan, and 50 Hz in nearly all of the rest of the world) is 
used for most transmission and distribution lines (Karady, 2007). In light of 
this, the thesis focuses on insulators intended for AC systems and apparatus. 
Accordingly, any reference herein to HV insulators denotes those intended 
for outdoor HVAC overhead lines.  
Although line insulators are only a small fraction of the apparatus or 
line cost, line performance is highly dependent on insulator integrity. 
Insulator failure may cause permanent equipment damage and long-term 
outages, and the potential financial losses to power authorities highlights 
the importance of reliable insulator design and selection for all operating 
environments (IEC 60815-1, 2008).  
Insulators come in many shapes, materials and sizes. The first 
transmission line insulators were built with bisphenol epoxy resin in the mid-
1940s (Karady and Farmer, 2007). Generally, the upper part of insulator 
sheds is smooth to allow rain washing and cleaning of the surface. On 
standard or high-creepage (anti-fog) insulators (e.g. fog or bowl profiles), 
the lower part is often corrugated to prevent wetting and provide a longer 
protected creepage path (the shortest distance, or sum of shortest distances, 
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between electrodes measured along the insulating surface). This is 
significant as the performance of insulators for polluted environments is 
most often expressed solely in terms of the creepage distance necessary to 
withstand the polluted conditions under the system voltage (IEEE Std 1313.2, 
1999; IEC 60815-1, 2008). 
The insulator has to withstand normal operating voltages. The system 
voltage is defined as the root mean square (rms) voltage between the 
conductors, also called line-to-line voltage. The voltage between the phase 
conductor and earth, called line-to-earth voltage, is equal to the line-to-
line voltage divided by the square root of three. To account for over 
voltages experienced during switching and changing loads, a +10% safety 
factor is typically applied (Farzaneh and Chisholm, 2009). Thus, a general 
approximation of the phase-to-earth insulator requirement for a 220 kV 
system is determined using Equation 1.2: 
 
   
      
√ 
        (1.2) 
 
The resulting single-phase voltage calculation, together with an 
evaluation of the installation site’s pollution severity (discussed in Section 
1.4.2) and the local environmental conditions, are used to select the 
appropriate profile and number of insulators/discs/units (a function of 
creepage distance) to be used for the line. The performance of an insulator 
is commonly assessed by measuring its dry flashover voltage (Karady and 
Farmer, 2007). By definition, flashover is a disruptive discharge through air, 
around or over the surface of solid or liquid insulation, between parts of 
different potential or polarity (IEEE Std 1410, 2004). Dry flashover tests do 
not cause any damage to the insulators themselves, and as the flashover is 
through the air, insulators are considered self-restoring (i.e. the air’s 
dielectric properties are restored following flashover). For a porcelain 
insulator, the required dry flashover voltage is about 2.5–3 times the rated 
voltage (Karady and Farmer, 2007). 
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1.4.1.1 Ceramic (porcelain and toughened glass) 
Porcelain and/or toughened glass are the most frequently used materials for 
insulators (Karady and Farmer, 2007). Porcelain materials are typically 
made up of varying proportions of clay, feldspar and quartz minerals. For 
glass designs, silica, soda ash, dolomite, limestone, feldspar and sodium 
sulphate are most commonly used (Looms, 1988).  
1.4.1.2 Non-ceramic 
The first non-ceramic (composite polymer) insulators, with fibreglass rods 
and rubber weather sheds, appeared in the mid-1960s. Non-ceramic 
insulators have a dirt and water repellent (hydrophobic) surface that 
reduces pollution accumulation and wetting. Polymeric insulators have been 
increasingly used for both distribution and transmission voltage ranges for 
the last few decades as, in general, the contamination performance of non-
ceramic insulators is better than those of ceramic equivalents (Karady, 
1999; Hackam, 1999; IEEE 1523, 2002; IEC 60815-3, 2008).  
1.4.2 Pollution severity 
Pollution-induced insulator flashover has been a problem since the first 
electric power systems (Baker et al., 2009). The phenomenon has been 
extensively studied (e.g. CIGRE TF 33.04.01, 2000; Farzaneh and Chisholm, 
2009 and references within), as have a number of other airborne pollutants 
which can cause flashover (Table 1.3).  
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Table 1.3: Common types of airborne pollution capable of causing pollution-induced 
flashover on electrical insulators (adapted from IEEE Std 957, 2005). 
Contaminant Source and Explanation 
Salt 
Insulators located near a body of salt water (e.g. sea or ocean) 
are prone to salt contamination from wind-blown spray. Salt 
pollution may also originate from highways or elevated 
roadways where salt is used to melt snow and ice. Substantial 
salt deposits may accumulate during long periods of dry 
weather. 
Cement/lime 
Accumulations of lime or cement easily bond to insulator 
surfaces and often form a hard crust which is very difficult to 
remove. Cement plants, construction sites and rock quarries 
provide sources of ionic-rich contamination in the form of 
cement and or lime (CaCO3).  
Dust 
Earth 
Earth dust arises from agricultural enterprises (e.g. ploughing 
fields), earth moving at construction sites, etc. 
Fertiliser 
Fertiliser dust is emitted from the application of fertiliser 
during farming and from fertiliser manufacturing plants. 
Metallic 
Metallic dust can stem from various mining and mineral 
handling processes. 
Coal 
Coal mining and coal handling operations and industrial 
burning of coal are major sources of coal dust. Soot and fly-
ash resulting from the burning of coal may form compounds 
that adhere firmly to insulator surfaces. 
Feedlot 
Provender dust and earth dust stirred by animals in large 
feedlots can settle on nearby insulators during periods of dry 
weather. 
Smog (combustion 
emissions) 
In urban areas, emissions from combustion automobiles and 
locomotives (e.g. diesel trains) and other industrial activities 
introduce a significant amount of particulate matter into the 
environment and pose a pollution hazard to insulators. 
Chemical 
Atmospheric pollutants from a wide variety of industrial 
chemical processes and aerial spraying of agricultural 
chemicals and fire-fighting chemicals (e.g. borate) can form 
considerable deposits on insulators. The characteristics of 
these chemical contaminants vary widely.  
Defecation  
Bird excrement can create a conductive path between the HV 
conductor and the earthed tower structure leading to ‘bird 
streamer’ flashover. 
Smoke 
Industrial and agricultural burning or wildfires can, with other 
compatible conditions (such as moisture and humidity), cause 
the resulting contamination to accumulate on HV insulators. 
 
Traditionally, power engineers have used quantitative methods to 
measure the severity (potential for flashover) of soluble and non-soluble 
airborne pollutants which accumulate on HV insulators (IEC 60815-1, 2008). 
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1.4.2.1 ESDD 
Equivalent salt deposit density (ESDD), expressed in mg/cm2, is one of the 
most common parameters used to measure the pollution severity on 
contaminated insulators. An internationally recognised standard parameter, 
the ESDD or ‘Solid Layer’ method equates the amount of sodium chloride 
(NaCl) required to yield the same conductivity as the insulator contaminant 
when dissolved in the same volume of water (CIGRE TF 33.04.03, 1994). 
From the conductivity, volume, and temperature of the solution and the 
area from which the sample was collected, ESDD can be calculated. ESDD 
values are typically classified into insulator specific site pollution severity 
indexes provided in international standards, guides or technical brochures 
and/or bulletins, as shown in Table 1.4.  
Table 1.4: General site severity and its definition per CIGRE Technical Bulletin 63 (1991) 
and IEEE Std 1243 (1997).  
Site Severity 
ESDD (mg/cm2) 
CIGRE IEEE 
None 0.0075-0.015 
 Very light 0.015-0.03 0-0.03 
Light 0.03-0.06 0.03-0.06 
Average/moderate 0.06-0.12 0.06-0.10 
Heavy 0.12-0.24 >0.10 
Very Heavy 0.24-0.48 
 Exceptional >0.48 
 
 
 
1.4.2.2 NSDD 
The non-soluble deposit density (NSDD) is another internationally recognised 
pollution parameter that is used to quantify the amount of non-soluble 
matter on contaminated insulators (also expressed in mg/cm2). The 
sensitivity of salt deposit density is higher on insulator performance than 
that of NSDD (Ramos et al., 1993). However, other studies have shown that 
inert, non-soluble pollution can greatly reduce the flashover voltage of HV 
insulators (Ishii et al., 1996; Sundararajan and Gorur, 1996). Insoluble 
deposits do not contribute directly to conductivity but can affect (1) the 
run-off rate of soluble material, (2) the hydrophobicity of the insulator 
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surface, (3) the evaporation rate of the wetted layer, and (4) the local 
electric field strength (Farzaneh and Chisholm, 2009). 
1.5 INSULATOR FLASHOVER 
Insulator flashovers result in power outages that are expensive and 
therefore undesirable. For example, flashover across a line insulator may 
cause a 250 ms trip-out before an auto-reclose system reconnects the 
circuit. This is sufficient time to shut-down a paper machine, resulting in 
hours of down time, possible equipment damage, and up to $50,000 in lost 
production (IEEE Std 1523, 2002). 
Johnston (1997) identified key factors influencing volcanic ash-induced 
insulator flashover (Figure 1.4). Once a volcanic ash deposit becomes 
conductive it provides a path for electric ‘leakage’ current to flow between 
the phase conductor (line) and the ground (earth). This leakage current 
causes a heating effect which dries out parts of the ash layer, giving rise to 
‘dry bands’ on the insulator which interrupt the flow of leakage current. 
The dry bands are bridged by arcs which cause a surge of leakage current. 
Ultimately, the arcs or grow in size to span the whole of the insulator 
surface and a line-to-earth fault occurs (Baker et al., 2009).  
 
Figure 1.5: Factors influencing volcanic ash-induced insulator flashover (from Johnston, 
1997).  
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1.5.1 Flashover mechanism 
Flashover is produced by the application of voltage wherein the breakdown 
(flashover) path becomes sufficiently ionized to maintain an electrical arc 
(IEEE Std 1410, 2004). 
1.5.1.1 Hydrophilic surfaces 
Hydrophilic surfaces attract and retain water molecules (Starov et al., 2007). 
The flashover process around or over porcelain and glass (hydrophilic) 
surfaces is believed to occur in 6 phases (adapted from IEC 60815-1 (2008) 
and Farzaneh and Chisholm (2009)): 
Phase 1: A dry insulator string has been uniformly coated in dry, fine-
grained (e.g. <0.1 mm particle diameter) volcanic ash. As the dry 
contaminant is non-conducting, no sizeable leakage current will flow 
over the insulators’ surfaces.  
 
Phase 2: As moisture gathers on the insulators’ surfaces via absorption, 
condensation or precipitation, the soluble component of the ash 
dissolves, forming a conducting solution through which leakage 
current flows (Figure 1.6a).  
 
Phase 3: The leakage current steadily builds up and, in time, will 
generate enough heat in areas of high current density (e.g. near the 
pin of each cap-and-pin disc insulator in a chain) across the ash layer 
to induce a rate of evaporation greater than the rate of moisture 
accumulation. Prolonged evaporation leads to the formation of dry 
spots (Figure 1.6b). These dry spots offer a much larger resistance 
than the remaining conducting solution, thus almost the entire 
applied voltage falls across the dry spot to create an exceedingly non 
uniform voltage distribution (kV/m) along the insulator string. 
 
Phase 4:  The voltage gradient across the dry zones will subsequently 
exceed the dielectric strength of the surrounding air to cause small 
arc discharges. Further discharging across the dry spots increases the 
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rate of evaporation, which in turn leads to an enlargement or 
coalescence of the dry spot(s) to form a single dry band (Figure 1.6c).  
        
Figure 1.6: Process of flashover across a hydrophilic surface (from Farzaneh and Chisholm, 
2009). 
 
Phase 5: Areas of higher current density result in increased heating 
effects and cause the dry band to increase in size until it becomes 
too wide (critical width) for discharges to exist and a breakdown 
occurs, forming a localised arc across the dry band (Figure 1.6d). This 
causes a surge of leakage current each time the dry bands on an 
insulator spark over.  
 
Phase 6: The arc may migrate laterally along the dry band to an area of 
higher electric field stress (Figure 1.6e). If the resistance of the still 
wet and conductive part of the pollution layer is low enough, the arcs 
bridging the dry bands are sustained and may finally continue to 
extend along the insulator, bridging more and more of its surface. 
This in turn decreases the resistance in series with the arcs, 
increasing the current and permitting them to bridge even more of 
the insulator surface. Ultimately, the insulator surface is completely 
bridged and a line-to-earth fault (flashover) is established. (Figure 
1.6f). 
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1.5.1.2 Hydrophobic surfaces 
A different model exists for hydrophobic (water repelling) surfaces such as 
those on composite polymer insulators or ceramic insulators with a room 
temperature vulcanising (RTV) silicone rubber coating. In summary, 
pollution flashover begins with pollution (e.g. volcanic ash) building up on 
the surface of non-ceramic weathersheds. Wetting produces distinct water 
droplets (as opposed to a film, as is the case on hydrophilic surfaces) (Figure 
1.7a) on the surface and these droplets slowly migrate to the pollutant and 
subsequently dissolve the soluble material in the contaminant (Figure 1.7b). 
These wetted areas coalesce and initiate a leakage current (Figure 1.7c). 
The leakage current dries the insulator surface where areas of current 
density are highest (e.g. near the pin on standard cap and pin insulators) 
and increases surface resistance between wet regions. Electric fields 
between the wet regions increase to form small spot discharges (Figure 
1.7d). With time, the increased arcing activity decreases the hydrophobicity 
of the insulator surface, creating larger wet regions and an intensification of 
discharges (Figure 1.7e). These discharges continue to increase until 
flashover occurs (Figure 1.7f).  
 
Figure 1.7: Development of flashover on a hydrophobic surface (from Karady, 1999). 
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Further information on the flashover mechanism on hydrophobic 
surfaces can be found in Karady (1999), Karady et al. (1995) and Farzaneh 
and Chisholm (2009). However, given the dynamic nature of hydrophobic 
surfaces and the resulting complex interactions with pollutants and wetting 
agents, no generally accepted model of pollution flashover exists for 
hydrophobic insulator surfaces (IEC 60815-1, 2008).  
1.6 ELECTRICAL TESTING PROCEDURES 
Insulator pollution tests have long been used to characterise the pollution 
performance (dielectric strength) of HV insulators. There are three main 
types of electrical test methods (after IEC 60507 (1991) and IEEE Std 4 
(1995)):  
1) Salt-fog tests, where energised insulators are mounted in a 
specialised testing chamber and subjected to a salt aerosol with a 
conductivity ranging from 4,300 to 200,000 μS/cm. 
2) Clean-fog tests, where insulators are pre-contaminated with a salt 
deposit density between 0.03 and 0.4 mg/cm2 and then wetted 
with steam or water aerosol.  
3) Heavy rain tests, where water of a specific conductivity (typically 
100 μS/cm) is applied at a controlled rate for a period of several 
minutes before energising the insulator.  
Previous studies have used variations of the clean-fog test. Nellis and 
Hendrix (1980) performed withstand or up-and-down tests on a number of 
insulator specimens; where a voltage level is maintained for a specified 
period of time (e.g. 1 hr). The voltage is increased by small increments (e.g. 
4-5%) and held for allotted periods of time until disruptive discharge or a 
withstand occurs. If a flashover occurs, the applied voltage is then lowered 
to about 85% of the previous flashover voltage, and the withstand procedure 
continued until a 50% flashover value (indication of insulator performance) 
is determined (IEEE Std 4, 1995).  
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1.7 ASHFALL HAZARDS TO ELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Limited information indicates that electric power networks appear 
particularly vulnerable to disruption from volcanic ashfalls (Nellis and 
Hendrix, 1980; Blong, 1984; Matsuoka et al., 1995; Johnston, 1997; Wilson 
et al., 2009). There has been a general lack of empirical evidence to explain 
the impacts on, and the length of recovery for electric power systems over a 
range of ash contamination severities (e.g. depths, ESDD, NSDD, etc.) and 
ash properties (such as grain size, composition, soluble salt content, etc.) to 
support the development of robust methods for risk analysis and evaluation 
(e.g. using fragility functions). To the best of the author’s knowledge, 
following the 1980 Mount St Helens eruption, engineers from BPA were the 
first to document ashfall impacts to electrical infrastructure and carry out 
semi-quantitative analyses of system vulnerability and insulator flashover 
(e.g. Buck and Connelly, 1980; Nellis and Hendrix, 1980). Blong (1984) 
mentioned other anecdotal instances of power systems impacts from 
ashfalls, however, no quantitative studies were available until 1995, when 
Japanese engineers at NGK (Nippon (Japan) Gaishi (Insulator) Kaisha 
(Company)) investigated the flashover voltage of insulators artificially 
contaminated with volcanic ash from national volcanoes. Whilst these 
studies provide reasonable estimates, they highlight the lack of empirical 
data for effective quantitative risk assessment.  
It is generally accepted that where ash thicknesses are the same, finer 
ash (e.g. <0.1 mm) will cause greater problems than coarser ash (e.g. >1 
mm), as it has greater adherence properties, more easily penetrates 
electrical equipment, and its higher surface area should lead to greater 
electrical conductivity when moist (Wilson et al., 2009). Previous work has 
suggested dry volcanic ash is not likely to cause failure to electrical 
distribution networks (Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Bebbington et al., 2008), 
and heavy rain or wind will wash ash from lines and insulators, eliminating 
the hazard. Thus, in order to reduce the uncertainty surrounding ash-
induced impacts to electric power systems, a systematic assessment of 
these parameters is required to assess the vulnerability (hazard 
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intensity/damage ratio) of specific system apparatus to volcanic ash 
contamination.  
1.8 THESIS GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The ultimate goal of the thesis is to identify, assess, evaluate, and reduce 
the risk of volcanic ashfall impacts to electric power systems as a part of 
holistic risk management practise. Insulator flashover on transmission 
systems is the most common impact during and following ashfalls in the 
world. Although anecdotal evidence and limited experiments provide some 
understanding of flashover processes, a systematic examination of this 
problem has not been conducted to date. Important uncertainties remain 
poorly investigated, such as the effects of different ash compositions, 
textures, and surface coatings on electrical system responses. Ashfall 
thickness (depth) is the common ash hazard intensity parameter used by 
volcanic scientists for damage estimation (e.g. Connor et al., 2001; 
Bonadonna et al., 2005; Jenkins et al., 2009), yet several other physical, 
chemical, electrical, and environmental parameters may determine the ash 
hazard to power system apparatus. As risk managers continue to demand a 
more quantitative approach to understanding the impacts from volcanic 
ashfall hazards, and given the limited understanding for the potential for 
loss of system integrity, this thesis uses empirical data from analogue 
laboratory experiments and available literature to assess the vulnerability of 
essential electric power system components to volcanic ashfall 
contamination and assist the development of mitigation strategies. Ash-
induced insulator flashover is the most common impact, so it is the primary 
focus of the thesis and is addressed with the following objectives: 
1) Identify and review the known impacts to electric power systems 
from volcanic ashfall, develop mitigation strategies, and explore the 
numeric relationships between intensity of ash hazard (e.g. ash 
thickness) and probability of insulator flashover; 
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2) Investigate the physical, chemical, and electrical properties of 
volcanic ash most influential in increasing electrical conductivity and 
therefore the hazard intensity of volcanic ash; 
3) Measure the pollution severity of volcanic ash using traditional 
pollution monitoring methods within the field of electrical 
engineering (e.g. ESDD and NSDD);  
4) Quantify the variables influencing volcanic ash-induced insulator 
flashover and measure the pollution performance (flashover voltage 
and/or dielectric strength) of different HVAC insulators subjected to 
a range of contamination severities;  
5) Analyse precursor sinusoidal leakage current and partial discharge 
activity leading up to insulator flashover to evaluate the potential 
for real-time pollution monitoring (risk assessment) techniques.  
1.9 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The body of the thesis is comprised of five chapters, each one a scientific 
manuscript which has been accepted by, or prepared for submission to, an 
international peer-reviewed journal. Vulnerability of electric power systems 
to volcanic ashfall hazards is approached by reviewing known impacts to the 
three components of the modern power network (Chapter 2). A direct 
resistivity method is presented in Chapter 3 to better understand the 
electrical properties most influential in promoting the electrical 
conductivity (hazard intensity) of volcanic ash. The few studies which have 
characterised volcanic ash electrically (Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Sarkinen 
and Wiitala, 1981; Matsuoka et al., 1995) have focussed on the ash’s ESDD 
and NSDD. Thus, to provide a contemporary analysis of multiple ash samples 
and a review of the techniques’ limitations, Chapter 4 presents the results 
from a suite of ESDD/NSDD measurements. Using the knowledge gained from 
electrical analyses, Chapters 5 and 6 contain the results from flashover 
voltage, dielectric strength, leakage current and partial discharge 
measurements during analogue laboratory power-frequency tests on 
contaminated HV insulators.  
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Chapters 2 to 6 are each preceded by an outline of the intended 
journal for publication, publication status of the manuscript at the time of 
thesis submission, and the main purpose of the manuscript in fulfilling the 
thesis objectives. The methodologies, applications and results described in 
the chapters are direct outcomes of the author's own research, however, 
contributions from co-authors have been invaluable and their input is also 
detailed in the co-authorship forms found after the thesis abstract. The 
content of each chapter and appendix has not been modified from the 
versions accepted or submitted to journals.  
Appendices 1, 2, and 3 are included in the thesis to provide additional 
research content and the primary data which support the chapters, the 
discussion and the conclusions. They also show evidence of wider analysis of 
volcanic ash vulnerability assessment on critical infrastructure.  
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OVERVIEW 
This chapter reviews the known impacts to electric power systems from 
volcanic ashfall hazards and provides system operators and/or decision 
makers with potential mitigation strategies against ash-induced disruption 
of power supply. The manuscript fills a major knowledge gap in volcanic 
impact assessment for electrical infrastructure and, to the authors’ 
knowledge, is the first to provide cleaning advice on how to effectively 
remove ash from contaminated HV apparatus.  
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2.1 ABSTRACT 
Modern society is highly dependent on a reliable electricity supply. During 
explosive volcanic eruptions, ash contamination of power networks 
(systems) can compromise the reliability of supply. Outages can have 
significant cascading impacts for other critical infrastructure sectors and for 
society as a whole. This chapter summarises known impacts to power 
systems following ashfalls since 1980. The main impacts are: (1) supply 
outages from insulator flashover caused by ash contamination; (2) disruption 
of generation facilities; (3) controlled outages during ash cleaning; (4) 
abrasion and corrosion of exposed equipment; and (5) line (conductor) 
breakage due to ash loading. Of these impacts, insulator flashover is the 
most common disruption. The review highlights multiple instances of 
electric power systems exhibiting tolerance to ashfalls, suggesting that 
failure thresholds exist and should be identified to avoid future unplanned 
interruptions. To address this need, we have produced a fragility function 
that quantifies the likelihood of insulator flashover at different thicknesses 
of ash. Finally, based on our review of case studies, potential mitigation 
strategies are summarised. Specifically, avoiding ash-induced insulator 
flashover by cleaning key facilities such as generation sites and transmission 
and distribution substations is of critical importance in maintaining the 
integrity of an electric power system.  
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
Electricity is the ‘life blood’ of modern society (Lawrence, 1988). Increasing 
demand for electricity has been driven by population growth and increasing 
use of electrically powered technologies. Electricity supply is arguably the 
most essential contemporary infrastructure, especially considering the 
dependencies of other infrastructure groups on electric power to maintain 
functionality (Figure 2.1). Given that 9% of the world's population is 
estimated to live within 100 km of a historically active volcano (Horwell and 
Baxter, 2006), and many of these areas are experiencing significant 
population and economic growth, their exposure and vulnerability to the 
impacts of volcanic hazards is increasing (Johnston et al., 2000). Effective 
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disaster risk reduction and infrastructure management thus makes it 
imperative that system operators understand the potential impacts from 
natural disasters and take the necessary precautions to avoid unintended 
interruptions. 
 
Figure 2.1: Schematic diagram illustrating some of the interdependencies between critical 
infrastructure systems (adapted from Rinaldi et al., 2001). 
Although pyroclastic flows and surges, sector collapses, lahars, and 
ballistic blocks are the most destructive and dangerous of explosive eruption 
products (Baxter, 1990; Hansell et al., 2006; GFDRR, 2011), ashfall is the 
most widespread volcanic phenomenon. Volcanic ash is the product of 
explosive volcanic eruptions and is composed of pulverised fragments of 
rock, minerals, and glass (SiO2) with a particle diameter smaller than 2 mm. 
Fine-grained ash (defined here as <1 mm particle diameter), can be 
dispersed large distances by winds. Even in small eruptions, thousands of 
square kilometres may be impacted by ashfalls (Johnston et al., 2000). 
Extensive, above-ground, corridor systems of electrical apparatus used in 
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power generation, transformation, transmission, and distribution often 
stretch hundreds to thousands of kilometres, making them highly exposed to 
such ashfalls. This high level of exposure emphasises the need to understand 
the vulnerabilities of power systems in both proximal and distal locations. 
Volcanic ash can cause disruption to electricity generation and supply 
in the following ways (expanded from Wilson et al., 2009): 
1. High voltage (HV) insulators (porcelain, glass or composite) are 
electrical hardware designed to mechanically support and 
electrically isolate energised lines or apparatus from earthed 
(bonded with the ground) structures such as steel towers or 
wooden poles. During humid conditions such as light rain, fog, or 
mist, wet deposits of volcanic ash on insulators can initiate a 
leakage current (small amount of current flow across the insulator 
surface) that, if sufficient current is achieved, can cause 
‘flashover’ (the unintended electrical discharge around or over 
the surface of an insulator). If the resulting short-circuit current is 
high enough to trip the circuit breaker then disruption of service 
will occur. The presence of leakage current is due to the 
electrical conductivity of the wet ash, which is influenced by (1) 
moisture content, (2) soluble salt content, (3) compaction and, to 
a lesser extent, (4) grain size (discussed further in Chapter 3). 
Ash-induced flashover on or across external insulation (bushings) 
for power transformers can burn, etch or crack the bushings 
irreparably and potentially damage the internal components (e.g. 
windings) of the transformer; 
  
2. Controlled outages of vulnerable nodes (e.g. generation facilities 
and/or substations) or circuits until ashfall has subsided or for 
offline (de-energised) cleaning of equipment. 
 
3. The hardness and angularity of volcanic ash make it highly 
abrasive. Volcanic ash can accelerate normal wear by eroding and 
scouring metallic apparatus, particularly moving parts such as 
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water and wind turbines at generation sites and cooling fans on 
power transformers; 
 
4. The high bulk density of some volcanic ash deposits can cause line 
breakage due to ash loading. This is most hazardous when the ash 
and/or the lines are wet and usually following at least 10 mm of 
ashfall. Fine-grained ash adheres to lines and structures (e.g. 
wooden poles and steel towers) most readily. Volcanic ash may 
also load overhanging vegetation, causing it to fall onto lines 
which can bridge (make contact between) phases (lines) or cause 
line breakage and/or damage to structures. Snow and ice 
accumulation on lines and overhanging vegetation further 
exacerbates the risk; 
 
5. Ash ingress can block air intakes causing a reduction of air intake 
quality and quantity for turbines and cooling and heating, 
ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVA) systems at generation sites 
and substations. This may lead to a reduction in efficiency, 
precautionary shut-down (to avoid damage), damage, or even 
failure. Volcanic ash could potentially abrade, clog, and corrode 
thermal turbines and control systems following ingestion, although 
these impacts have not been recorded. 
This chapter provides an overview of the recorded impacts to power 
systems from volcanic eruptions since 1980 (Table 2.1). We have compiled 
data from existing literature, personal communications with system 
operators during meetings and semi-structured interviews, and field 
observations from around the world to summarise electricity system 
performance following ashfalls and successful mitigation strategies. Given 
the lack of existing data, a fragility function was developed to provide an 
estimate for the likelihood of insulator flashover at different thicknesses of 
wet or dry ash. This study ultimately aims to inform the volcanological, 
hazard mitigation and electrical engineering communities of the potential 
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adverse impacts arising from ash contamination and provide best-practise 
and impact-specific mitigation advice.  
Table 2.1: General information on the nine volcanoes used as case studies within this 
chapter (data compiled from Siebert and Simkin, 2002). 
Volcano Country 
Year(s) of 
Case 
Study 
Eruption 
Volcano Type V
E
I 
Ash Composition 
Mount St Helens  USA 1980 Stratovolcano 5 Dacite 
Redoubt USA 1989/90 Stratovolcano 3 Andesite 
Rabaul Papua New Guinea 1994 Caldera 4 Andesite 
Soufrière Hills Montserrat (U.K.) 1995-2011 Stratovolcano 3 Andesite 
Ruapehu New Zealand 1995/96 Stratovolcano 3 Basaltic-Andesite 
Chaitén Chile 2008 Caldera 4 Rhyolite 
Pacaya Guatemala 2010 Scoria Cone 3 Basalt 
Tungurahua Ecuador 1999-2010 Stratovolcano 3 Andesite 
Shinmoe-dake Japan 2011 Shield 3 Andesite 
2.2.1 Research context 
Over the past 15 years our international research group led by the University 
of Canterbury and GNS Science, New Zealand has aimed to undertake a 
sustained and systematic approach to volcanic impact assessment in critical 
infrastructure (e.g. electricity; see Wilson et al., 2012 for more 
information). Meetings and interviews were carried out with infrastructure 
managers, and operations and maintenance staff at affected facilities. The 
interviews followed an extensive group of prompt questions that were used 
to steer the conversation, and touched upon the main topics of interest for 
research, including: The general impacts of ashfall on the sector; actions 
taken in response to ashfall; ash clean-up operations; emergency 
management plans; and interdependency issues. Interviews were semi-
structured in nature to allow for more open exploration and discussion 
around the various topics that were brought up in conversation. 
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2.2.2 Critical components of a power system 
For this review we have simplified the components of modern electricity 
systems into a) generation facilities, b) transmission and distribution 
components (insulators, lines, towers, poles, low voltage (e.g. <33 kV) 
transformers, etc.), and c) substations and switchyards. 
2.3 DIRECT IMPACTS TO POWER SYSTEMS 
2.3.1 Case studies 
The following section summarises impacts from ashfalls to the three 
aforementioned components of a power system using impact assessment 
case studies carried out on nine eruptions (refer to Table 2.1 for more 
detail): Mount St Helens, USA. (1980); Redoubt, USA. (1989/90); Rabaul, 
Papua New Guinea (1994); Ruapehu, New Zealand (1995/1996); Tungurahua, 
Ecuador (1999-2010); Chaitén, Chile (2008); Soufrière Hills, Montserrat 
(1995-2011); Pacaya, Guatemala (2010); and Shinmoe-dake, Japan (2011). 
The review has been organised by impact type within each sector of the 
modern power system.  
Ideally, we would have provided information on the physical (e.g. grain 
size distributions, particle morphology, etc.), chemical (e.g. bulk rock 
chemistry, soluble salt content, etc.), and electrical properties (e.g. 
conductivity) of the ash found at specific impact sites for each of the 
eruptions. This would allow analysis of properties most likely to lead to 
power system impacts. However assembling this information is extremely 
challenging because: (1) information on properties at the specific locations 
where power systems have been impacted is rarely reported by power 
system personnel. Consequentially, we rely on studies by other 
volcanological authors who have not collected samples at the sites of 
affected power systems or analysed for electrical properties; (2) some 
explosive eruptions examined within this study have durations of months to 
years, making it difficult to sample any one deposit (e.g. Soufrière Hills and 
Tungurahua); (3) samples rapidly leach and immediate weathering following 
deposition makes it hard, if not impossible, to retrospectively sample 
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representative from specific impact-sites; and (4) the exact dates and 
specific locations of impact(s) on long, expansive power system assets are, 
in most cases, unknown. To avoid broad assumptions about the electrical 
properties of the ashes in the following case studies, and in the absence of 
site-specific data, ash thickness has been estimated from isopach maps and 
used here where available.  
2.3.1.1  Generation 
Accelerated wear at hydroelectric (HEP) sites 
The 1995/96 eruption of Mt Ruapehu deposited roughly 7.6 million cubic 
metres of ash on the Rangipo HEP catchment (Meredith, 2007). This caused 
high levels of suspended ash in the Tongariro River. In the seven months 
following the initial eruption, an estimated 5 t of ash had passed through 
the system and approximately 15 years worth of normal wear had been 
experienced by the turbines (Meredith, 2007). Pitting and accelerated 
erosion was experienced by all generation equipment that came in contact 
with the ash-laden water.  
Approximately one year after the eruption, the 120 MW plant halted 
operations to carry out repairs to its two turbines and all auxiliary 
components, causing an estimated loss of generation in excess of NZ$12 
million (Johnston et al., 2000). To combat the effects of erosion and pitting, 
a protective coating was applied to turbine components – runner blades, 
labyrinth seals, wear rings, band seal, cheek plates, and wicket gates. A 
hard coating (tungsten carbide powder) was applied to those components 
considered most critical to the system (e.g. crown, blades, and band seal) 
while a soft coating (polyurethane) was applied to most of the other parts 
of the runner. As of 2007, the repaired turbines had been operating 
efficiently with minimal wear (Meredith, 2007).  
The 156 MW Agoyan HEP faciility, located 5 km east of the city of 
Baños in Ecuador, is the second most important generation facility in the 
country (Hall et al., 1999). Since the onset of intermittent volcanic activity 
from Tungurahua volcano in 1999, very little ash has fallen at the dam site 
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and on the few occasions when ash has fallen at Agoyan, the dam has 
operated normally. However, during October 1999 and August 2006, large 
volumes of ashfall (>100 mm) fell on Baños and the local municipality 
deemed the community risk too great for people to remain in the town. The 
heavy amount of ashfall resulted in the evacuation of Baños residents and 
closure of local utilities, including the dam.  
However, while the dam turbines, generators, and control house are 
located in a zone of low-frequency ash fallout, the Pastaza catchment of 
the dam is often exposed to significant ashfall, leading to significant 
suspended solids in the water and occasionally lahar hazards, which are 
more threatening to the Agoyan HEP than direct ashfall (Appendix 1). Intake 
mechanisms such as wicket gates, turbine covers, and blades are 
particularly at risk of abrasion from the ash-laden water. Severe pitting and 
scouring of the metallic components (Figure 2.2) has accelerated their 
degradation and four turbines have been replaced in the last 21 years.  
To reduce the impacts from the intake of highly turbid water, Agoyan 
has a specially designed floodgate system in place so that the intake flow 
can be diverted away from generation components and directly flushed out 
into the river (Figure 2.2, inset). When there is heavy rain, causing an 
increased risk of ash-laden floodwaters and lahars, the dam operators 
monitor water levels and turbidity, and activate the protective bypass 
system as required.  
Ash-induced insulator flashover 
At Futaleufu (HEP) dam, Argentina (86 km from Chaitén volcano), major 
faults (flashovers) occurred on circuit breaker columns at the facility’s 
control station following 50-100 mm of very fine-grained (<0.1 mm 
diameter) rhyolitic ashfall from the 2008 Chaitén eruption (Wilson et al., 
2012). Flashovers also occurred across HV insulators on the 240 kV 
transmissions lines adjacent to the station, following light rain (estimated at 
2 mm/hour) on 6 May 2008. The intense heat and severity of the arc during 
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flashovers caused several of the insulators to explode and their metal pins 
to fuse, requiring total replacement of the insulators. 
 
Figure 2.2: A severely abraded turbine that was removed from service at the Agoyan 
hydroelectric power plant, which is sited 5 km east of Baños. Ash-laden water filtering 
through the turbines has necessitated the replacement of 4 turbines in 21 years. Bottom 
inset: The Agoyan Dam and its (orange) floodgates are designed to let highly turbid water 
bypass the turbines so as to avoid accelerated wear of generation components. 
To avoid build-up from further ashfalls and wind remobilisation of ash 
deposits, insulators were cleaned at the powerhouse and on the incoming 
transmission lines every 10 days for several months. The fine-grained ash did 
not wash off easily having formed a cement-like paste following wetting and 
drying, even when high-pressure water blasters were used. Generation at 
the HEP dam was unaffected by the ashfall or ash-laden water and remained 
in-service for the duration the eruption. However, when adjacent 
transmission lines were disrupted due to ash-induced insulator flashover, 
generation ceased (Wilson et al., 2012).  
Ash ingress 
On the Caribbean island of Montserrat, intermittent ashfalls from Soufrière 
Hills volcano at the Montserrat Utilities Ltd. (MUL) generation yard (located 
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9 km northwest of the volcano) have to be regularly washed away with 
water to prevent ash ingress (e.g. via wind mobilization) into the diesel 
generators. Ashfall events occur more often in active phases of dome 
growth, of which there have been five since the onset of the eruption in 
1995. Ash is carried to the west by the prevailing wind, but occasionally 
northwest to the inhabited areas, where it can affect the generation yard. 
Air intake filters are changed more frequently using high-pressure water 
blasters every day during and after ashfalls (Sword-Daniels, 2010).  
Controlled shut-down 
Following ashfall during the 2011 eruption of Shinmoe-dake, the Kyūshū 
Electric Power Company (KEPC) initiated a controlled shut-down of the 
Nojiri and the Mizonokuchi HEPs to avoid ash ingress into their turbines. 
KEPC initiated a mudflow (lahar) monitoring programme that culminated in 
a precautionary shut-down of these plants following heavy rainfall on 10 
February. The shut-down effectively avoided ash impacts and the shut-down 
and restart procedures were carried out without problems.  
2.3.1.2  Transmission and distribution system components 
Ash-induced insulator flashover 
The 1980 Mount St Helens eruptions deposited volcanic ash over much of 
northwestern USA, in particular Washington State. The Bonneville Power 
Administration (BPA) transmits bulk electrical energy across the Pacific 
Northwest and experienced several ash-related outages during the eruption. 
BPA reported that, by 28 May 1980 (10 days after the initial eruption) 
approximately 25 momentary and 25 sustained outages had been recorded 
(up to 7h 40m) mainly on 115 kV and lower voltage systems serving customer 
utilities (Blong, 1984). A summary of the flashover incidents reported by 
Nellis and Hendrix (1980) is provided in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: Flashovers on the Bonneville Power Administration system following the 1980 
Mount St Helens eruption.  
Date 
of ash 
fallout 
Date(s) 
of 
impact 
Ash 
received 
(mm) 
Line(s) 
(kV) 
Explanation Comments 
18-May 
18-25 
May 
≤12 ≤500 
Momentary outage on 
BPA’s Lower 
Monumental-Hanford 
500 kV line and 
numerous flashover-
related outages 
reported by customer 
utilities. 
Ash from the 18 May 
eruption fell dry and 
did not cause 
immediate issues. 
Flashovers occurred 
when 7-12 mm rain was 
received over the 1-
week period following 
the initial 18 May 
fallout. 
18-May 
18-25 
May 
≤12 <115 
Numerous outages 
mainly on 115 kV or 
lower voltage systems 
serving customer 
utilities. 
Some incidents 
initiated by ash loading 
on trees which caused 
branches to make 
contact with energised 
lines. 
25-May 26-May ≤12 500 
Paul Allston 500 kV line 
trip-out due to 
suspected ash 
contamination. 
Evidence of flashover 
across a jumper string 
found during a post 25 
May survey. 
25-May 27-May 6-9 69 
Phase-to-phase (line to 
line) flashover 
between two 69 kV 
porcelain post-type 
insulators. 
One insulator exploded 
from the flashover 
while the other 
insulator suffered 
severe burn marks 
from the arc. 
25-May 2-Jun ≤12 500 
Circuits on both Paul 
Allston 500 kV lines 
experienced flashover 
from suspected ash 
contamination. 
Flashovers occurred 
during light rain. 
 
Redoubt volcano, located on the west side of Cook Inlet in Alaska, 
erupted explosively on 20 separate occasions between December 1989 and 
April 1990 (Miller and Chouet, 1994). In December 1989, power outages 
resulting from insulator flashover occurred in the Twin City area, Kenai, 
after receiving ~ 6 mm of ash in conjunction with rain (Johnston, 1997a).  
Falls of ash and mud from the Ruapehu eruption on 25 September 1995 
caused flashovers on Transpower’s HV (220 kV) lines located near the base 
of the volcano (~15 km from the vent). Approximately 3 mm of fine-grained 
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(particles typically <250 μm diameter), wet ash coated the towers, 
conductors (220 kV), and glass insulators east (downwind) of the volcano 
(Transpower, 1995; Cronin et al., 2003). Strain insulators, which are 
oriented horizontally to anchor the ends of a line segment, flashed over. 
This caused voltage fluctuations and problems for electrical equipment 
throughout the North Island. For example, fluctuations in supply tripped the 
emergency power at Wellington Hospital causing non-essential supplies to 
be shed (Johnston et al., 2000). In addition, Transpower's automated 
reclose system, which recloses (reconnects) a circuit after a fault has 
occurred, had to be operated manually during the 1995–1996 eruptions 
because of the repeated ash-induced flashovers with every auto-reclose 
attempt (Wilson et al., 2009).  
Following the May 2008 Chaitén eruption, a 68 km stretch of 33 kV line 
to Futaleufu township, Chile (75 km from the volcano) was coated with fine-
grained (<0.1 mm particle diameter) rhyolitic ash of 20 mm to >300 mm in 
depth in some areas between 2-8 May 2008. Local linesmen reported that 
10-20% of the ceramic insulators suffered flashovers after light misty rain 
between 6-9 May 2008. Following inspections, the lines company decided to 
replace all insulators on the affected stretch of line, as it was too laborious 
to clean or assess damage to each insulator. Many of the insulators that had 
suffered flashover were cracked and exhibited burn marks at the base 
where it screwed onto the supporting metal pin (Figure 2.3). Distribution 
transformers on the circuit were also reported to have suffered flashover 
damage.  
Empresa Electrica de Guatemala (EEGSA) is a distribution supply (≤69 
kV) company that provides electricity to three of Guatemala’s 22 
administrative departments. EEGSA reported numerous ash-related 
flashovers following the May 2010 eruption of Pacaya. Rain during the 
eruption added to the risk of ash contamination of HV equipment, and 
several faults (flashovers) occurred following 20-30 mm of coarse-grained 
ashfall in Guatemala City. Specifically, there were six 69 kV circuits that 
endured continual flashovers despite several attempts to re-close the 
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circuits. Of these, Guadelupe lines 1, 2, and 3 were particularly problematic. 
On 28 May 2010 (the day after the eruption) a 25.88 MW load was shed from 
a 69 kV circuit causing a two-hour long outage (Appendix 2). Despite several 
reports of flashovers on the system, no burning or physical damage of 
transmission equipment was noted, thus no replacement or repair of 
equipment was required. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: a) Fine grained ash adhered to the underside of a 33 kV porcelain insulator in 
Futaleufu, Chile following the 2008 Chaitén eruption. b) Underside of a 33 kV porcelain 
insulator that suffered ash-induced flashover following the 2008 Chaitén eruption. Note the 
brown burn mark (centre-right) from the high intensity arc during flashover.  
Insulator tracking and corrosion 
Leakage current or ‘tracking’ across contaminated HV insulators causes 
burning and etching of the insulator surface. This compromises the 
operational performance of an insulator and, in the case of composite 
polymers, can reduce the rate of hydrophobic (water repellent) recovery 
and therefore the dielectric (insulating) properties of the material (Gutman 
et al., 2011).  
September 2009 to March 2010 was a period of particularly frequent 
ashfall in the inhabited northwestern areas of Montserrat from the current 
Soufrière Hills eruption. During this time a series of ashfalls caused 
flashovers, tracking, and burning of distribution equipment (e.g. insulators, 
surge arrestors, and bushings on pole-mounted transformers) throughout the 
villages closest to the volcano (Sword-Daniels, 2010). Remobilisation of the 
ash on Montserrat has also been a problem since the onset of the eruption in 
a) 
b) 
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1995, especially in and around the Belham Valley area. Tracking along 
insulators due to remobilised (and likely leached) deposits has also been 
observed, suggesting that epiclastic (reworked) ash may be sufficiently 
conductive to initiate flashovers and tracking possibly months after 
deposition.  
Corrosion impacts are typically latent effects that are not noticed on 
Montserrat for several months after an ashfall. As of 2011, accelerated 
corrosion of transformer boxes at Isles Bay Hill (located approximately 5 km 
WNW from Soufrière Hills volcano) has required construction of additional 
wooden housing to shield the transformers from ash contamination (despite 
the transformers being designed to operate outdoors and withstand 
inclement weather conditions). When ash is very fine-grained (e.g. <0.1 mm 
particle diameter), it can penetrate the low voltage (e.g. <11 kV) ground 
and pole-mounted transformer boxes and is able to build up around the 
terminals. This has been known to cause the crutch (terminal) of the cables 
to burn out and/or deteriorate rapidly due to tracking across its surface.  
During the January 2011 eruption of Shinmoe-dake, there were no 
reports of leakage current on KEPC’s 66 kV or 6 kV distribution systems. 
However, the smaller 220 and 110 V distribution systems experienced some 
reports of leakage current and flashovers. KEPC reported that from the 
beginning of the eruption through to 24 May there were 54 public reports of 
corona discharge (electricity leakage with a characteristic crackling or 
arcing sound) and 29 public reports of flashover disruption of lines from the 
local transformer to the customer. The majority of these reported impacts 
occurred at connection points or where the line had been scratched or 
abraded on the insulator’s jacket cover. Over half of the reports occurred 
between 7-10 February 2011 during a period of light misty rain.  
Line breakage 
Following a volcano-seismic crisis in 1983-1984, both Tavurvur and Vulcan 
volcanoes erupted on 19 September 1994, leaving much of the town of 
Rabaul (17,000 residents) covered in heavy ashfall, with 2-3 metres covering 
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the southeastern suburbs (Blong and McKee, 1995; SMEC International 1999). 
PNG Power Ltd. (called PNG Electricity Commission (ELCOM) until 2002) is 
the primary generator and provider of electricity in Papua New Guinea. 
ELCOM’s power supply was shut-down as a precaution at the start of the 
1994 Rabaul eruption (Carlson, 1998). The Rabaul Power Station suffered 
little damage from ashfall, however, the station was decommissioned and 
the diesel generators removed due to the extensive damage to the 
surrounding areas (SMEC International, 1999). Falling trees and buildings 
damaged large sections of the distribution system, including some power 
transformers. 
The same stretch of line that was affected by ash-induced flashovers 
between 2-8 May in Futaleufu, during the 2008 Chaitén eruption, was 
impacted again following heavy snowfall on 18 May 2008. The snow, 
together with the ash, on lines and poles created a significant load, causing 
lines to break and poles to collapse. The 6 mm lines were described as 
looking like ‘20 mm tubes’ with the ash and snow accumulation. In addition, 
ash and snow laden branches collapsed onto lines resulting in further 
damage. In total, approximately 20 km of line and poles required 
replacement.  
Controlled outage 
Following contamination of Transpower’s HV system during the 1995/96 
Ruapehu eruption, affected circuits were de-energised and cleaning of 18 
towers (and insulators) was undertaken on 27 September 1995 by four crews 
each consisting of four men (Transpower, 1995) (Figure 2.4). Three strings 
of insulators were found to have superficial damage (e.g. etching and 
burning) on their glazed surfaces as a result of flashovers. However, these 
insulators were not replaced, as, upon visual inspection, it was determined 
that they had not endured sufficient damage (e.g. cracking or puncturing of 
the discs) to affect their dielectric strength.  
Approximately 50 mm of ashfall was received in Esquel, Argentina (110 
km from the volcano) over the month of May following the 2008 Chaitén 
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eruption. In this time the local municipal utility provider reported no 
damage to the four electricity distribution systems it manages: 132 kV, 33 
kV, 220 V, and a three-phase 360 V. However, several shut-downs of the 
power supply were scheduled to allow cleaning of power transformers, after 
it was found that ash accumulation was creating the potential for flashovers. 
2.3.1.3  Substations and switchyards 
Ash-induced insulator flashover 
Several EEGSA substations received >100 mm of coarse-grained (>1.5 mm 
particle diameter) ash fallout during the 27 May 2010 Pacaya eruption, 
particularly those substations located south of Guatemala City closest to the 
volcano. The EEGSA substations that received the most ashfall were 
scheduled for extensive offline cleaning on 29 - 30 May 2010. However, the 
arrival of tropical storm Agatha on 29 May 2010 hindered the cleaning 
procedure and large amounts of ash remained on substation equipment 
during the early hours of the storm. The combination of ash contamination, 
together with heavy rain from the storm, caused further faulting 
(flashovers) on the system, with several interruptions occurring throughout 
the event (Appendix 2).  
With the passing of Agatha it was found that the rains had sufficiently 
cleaned all substation equipment and none but the Laguna substation 
(located ~5 km from the vent), which received >300 mm of lapilli-sized ash, 
required further cleaning. The power transformers were described by EEGSA 
staff as being the most problematic and difficult apparatus to wash free of 
ash because of the intricate array of cooling fins and sensitive components 
vulnerable to further damage from abrasion or water/ash ingress. As a 
preventive measure, ash was cleaned from transformer radiator fins to 
allow sufficient heat transfer and cooling of the apparatus. 
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Figure 2.4: a) High-pressure de-energised washing of a power transformer bushing at a substation in Ecuador following the 2010 eruption of Tungurahua 
b) A linesman cleans ash from a de-energised 220 kV porcelain strain insulator located ~15 km from Ruapehu, New Zealand. c) Linesmen cleaning de-
energised insulators at a Guayaquil, Ecuador substation after 1-2 mm of fine-grained ash fell following the 2010 Tungurahua eruption. d) Hand-cleaning 
ash from a de-energised 220 kV porcelain strain insulator after the 1995 Ruapehu eruption. Photo credits a) Transelectric, b) Transpower, c) 
Transelectric, d) Transpower.  
a) b) 
c) d) 
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Ash ingress 
Transformer sheds within KEPC substations have open-veined windows that 
allowed ingress of ash to the buildings during the 2011 Shinmoe-dake 
eruption. Windows were blocked off at the time of the eruption, but the 
sheds became too hot several months later in summer, requiring filters to 
be fitted over the windows. At Miyazaki Power Centre, 48 windows required 
blocking and later filtering across 14 buildings. At Miyakonojo, 33 windows 
required blocking and later filtering across 10 buildings. 
Decrease in resistivity of substation/switchyard gravel 
In addition to transmission and distribution system components, ash from 
the 18 May 1980 Mount St Helens eruption covered surface rock in substation 
areas causing a major decrease in the ground resistance once wetted by 
rainfall. This had significant ramifications for step and touch potentials 
(voltages) present at affected BPA substations. Step potential is the 
difference in surface voltage between two points 1 meter apart (the step 
distance) under rated fault conditions, while the touch potential is the 
difference between the earthing grid voltage and the surface voltage at a 
point where someone standing on the surface can touch something that is 
bonded to the earthing grid. A decrease in resistivity of substation gravel 
means an increase in current passing through the body due to the step and 
touch potentials and a heightened risk of electrical shock or electrocution. 
This was identified as a serious danger for technicians entering the area and 
required de-energising and isolation of equipment before cleaning and/or 
repair (Buck and Connelly, 1980; Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Sarkinen and 
Wiitala, 1981; Rogers, 1982). 
Controlled outage 
After each of the 1995/96 Ruapehu ashfalls, electricity generation, 
transmission, and distribution companies routinely cleaned ash from 
affected substations. On 17 June 1996, power supply was disrupted in parts 
of Rotorua city after a powerful flashover occurred across an 11 kV ground 
mounted distribution transformer bushing at a local substation, caused by 
ash and water contamination from a resident hosing ash from the roof of a 
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neighbouring building (Johnston, 1997b). Thus, there was a focussed effort 
to make sure that all of the 11 kV bus-bars and insulators at substations 
were clear and free of any ash before power was restored (Bebbington et al., 
2008). 
Guatemala’s Empresa de Transporte y Control de Energia Electrica 
(ETCEE) manages two large (230 kV) substations that were affected by the 
2010 Pacaya eruption. These stations (Guate Sur and Guate Este) required 
offline cleaning shortly before the arrival of tropical storm Agatha. Cleaning 
involved the sweeping and brushing of ash from substation apparatus and 
surrounding yards. Substation equipment was subsequently washed using 
high-pressure water blasters.  
The city of Guayaquil (Ecuador) received 1-2 mm of very fine-grained 
(<0.1 mm particle diameter) ash during the May 2010 eruption of 
Tungurahua, a rare event for the city. The ash fell during dry conditions and 
no instances of flashover were reported. As a precaution, however, 
substations critical to the continual supply of electricity to Guayaquil were 
cleaned to prevent ash-induced failure of HV equipment. To avoid 
permanent damage to the power transformers from overheating or ash-
induced flashovers, each of the three transformer banks at the Pasquales 
substation had to be taken offline individually while associated sections of 
the yard were cleaned. The substation was re-energised once drying of 
substation equipment (following high pressure water washing) was complete. 
While remobilization of the ash was an inconvenience to substation workers 
for about a month following the initial ashfall, no further cleaning of 
equipment was required and no faults (unintended interruptions of supply) 
were reported (Appendix 1). 
Ashfalls from the 2011 Shinmoe-dake eruption caused no direct 
impacts to KEPC’s transmission lines or substations. However, on 1 February 
2011, KEPC shut-down (de-energised) some transmission substations for 
cleaning. KEPC developed a special hot-stick (insulated pole, usually made 
of fibreglass) with a compressed air line attached for live-line (energised) 
cleaning of ash-contaminated equipment. A specially designed hot-stick 
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connected to a high pressure water line was also developed (based on the 
design used for live-line cleaning of sea salt contamination) but due to the 
uncertain conductivity and therefore potential for flashover at the time, 
they took the precaution of only cleaning when de-energised. The Takaharu, 
Hirose, and Sadowara substations were de-energised while ash was wiped by 
hand from surfaces with a soft rag where practical and high-pressure water 
blasters were used to wash apparatus (e.g. power transformers, insulators, 
circuit breakers, arresters, bus bars, etc.). There was some benefit from 
rain cleaning, but rainfall intensities conducive to cleaning were unclear. 
2.4 ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 
The generation, transmission and distribution, and substation components of 
a modern power system are vulnerable to different and specific ash-induced 
impacts depending on the equipment at each phase of power delivery. A 
summary of the ash impacts on the main components of modern power 
systems is illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
We have chosen to use ash thickness as the most appropriate indicator 
of ash hazard intensity when analysing impacts to power systems. We 
selected it on the basis of its utility for gauging the accumulation of ash in 
the field (important for rapid damage assessment), its common use in ash 
dispersal models (e.g. Connor et al., 2001; Bonadonna et al., 2005), and its 
ease of application compared to other quantitative methods (e.g. the non-
soluble deposit density, NSDD, a procedure used by electrical engineers (e.g. 
Sundararajan and Gorur, 1996)). Whilst there are limitations with this 
approach (e.g. grain size is a key control of ash adherence potential, 
composition is a key control on abrasion, soluble salt load and water holding 
capacity both influence conductivity, etc.), we found no other parameter 
was more suitable. Thus, the following section identifies the most 
vulnerable system components and, where possible, suggests critical ash 
thicknesses for each sector of the modern power system.  
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Figure 2.5: Summary of impacts and management approaches to the a) generation, b) 
transmission and distribution and c) substation and switchyard sectors of the case-study 
power systems following ashfalls. Ash-induced insulator flashover is the most common 
problem arising from contamination of power equipment and therefore poses the greatest 
threat to the reliability of power supply. 
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2.4.1 Generation 
The most common disruptor of power at generation sites is controlled shut-
down of HEP turbines to avoid accelerated wear of submerged components 
such as runner blades, labyrinth seals, wear rings, band seals, cheek plates, 
and wicket gates. Even HEPs designed to cope with large volumes of 
sediment, such as the Agoyan Dam in Ecuador, favour bypass of ash-laden 
waters over continued operation of the plant, which involves the risk of 
damaging their turbines.  
Critical ash thicknesses for HEP sites are difficult to identify since 
every dam is designed differently and the exposure of each component to 
ash may not be the same as the nominal thickness. For example, turbines 
are exposed to suspended ash in the intake waters, the amount of which is a 
function of catchment size, flow rate, rainfall, etc., not just ash thickness 
experienced in a general area. In light of this, further research should focus 
on critical turbidity levels rather than ash thickness before shut-down of a 
generation facility must occur.  
Insulator flashover at generation yards containing step-up transformers 
can cause cascading impacts, as was seen in Futaleufu, Argentina following 
the 2008 eruption of Chaitén. If power cannot be transmitted from a 
generation site due to contamination and subsequent flashover on 
transformation equipment (e.g. insulators and bushings) then the generated 
power cannot be transmitted to other sections of the system.  
We are unaware of any direct ash impacts to thermal power plants. 
However, we highlight that ashfall is a hazard that could cause generation 
disruption or shut-down due to blockage of generator air intakes (e.g. as is 
avoided in Montserrat and was prevented in Japan following the 2011 
Shinmoe-dake eruption) and off-site power resources (e.g. emergency lines 
or generators for back-up power). This is a significant knowledge gap that 
warrants further research. Similarly, some generation sites rely on HVA 
systems to keep sensitive electrical equipment at a maintained temperature 
(e.g. switching equipment and data centres). HVA systems are vulnerable to 
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ash damage (e.g. abrasion of moving parts such as fans), corrosion, and 
arcing of internal electrical components, and air filter blockage, especially 
if air intakes are horizontal surfaces, although these impacts have not been 
recorded. 
2.4.2 Transmission and distribution 
According to our analysis, transmission and distribution systems are most 
vulnerable to insulator flashover from ash contamination. Insulator flashover 
can occur with ash thicknesses as thin as 3 mm (Ruapehu 1995/96) provided 
the ash is of sufficient conductivity. Additionally, if ash is not cleaned from 
insulators immediately following fallout then, with subsequent adsorption of 
moisture (e.g. mist, fog, light rain, etc.), ash will adhere strongly (i.e. 
cement) to all surfaces (making cleaning difficult) and cause latent effects 
such as corrosion and tracking (as experienced on Montserrat). 
Line breakage due to ash loading was observed following several of the 
case study eruptions (Mount St Helens 1980, Rabaul 1994, and Chaiten 2008). 
Ash adherence to lines is highest during wet and freezing conditions, 
although this is a rarely observed impact (Figure 2.6b). Many power 
companies are liable for maintaining acceptable clearance distances 
between trees and power lines on both public and privately owned property. 
Provided these distances are maintained then the power system should 
undergo no issues with ash contamination of nearby vegetation.  
2.4.3 Substations and switchyards 
Immediate cleaning of substation equipment has been used as either a 
reactive or proactive measure against ash-induced flashover in several of 
the case studies presented (Mount St Helens 1980, Redoubt 1989, Ruapehu 
1995/96, Tungurahua 2010, Shinmoe-dake 2011). Ash thicknesses received 
at substations during each of these eruptions have been wide-ranging (refer 
to Figure 2.6c), however, cleaning has commenced with ash deposits as thin 
as 1 mm (Guayaquil, Ecuador following the 2010 eruption of Tungurahua). In 
every instance where cleaning of substations has taken place, insulator 
flashover has been avoided and power companies have been successful in 
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maintaining power supply. This highlights the critical importance of 
substations to the integrity of a power system.  
No existing literature or research has documented impacts at 
switchyards. The lack of sensitive apparatus such as power transformers 
means that ash contamination at switchyards will have a lower probability 
of disrupting power supply. This suggests that switchyards are less 
vulnerable to ash-induced impacts than substations; however, more 
research is needed to verify this claim.  
The only evidence of reduction in substation gravel resistivity comes 
from BPA reports following the 1980 Mount St Helens eruption. However, 
field data collected from CELEC EP (Ecuador) and EEGSA (Guatemala) 
suggest that replacement of contaminated substation gravel is not required 
so long as the ash and gravel mixture displays a resistivity value >3000 Ωm, 
as prescribed by IEEE Std 80 (2000). 
2.4.4 Tolerance 
Instances of tolerance to ash contamination have been noted in nearly every 
case study but are drastically under-reported. From the data it appears that 
many substation components mentioned in this chapter such as disconnect 
switches, bus bars, circuit breakers, capacitors, and metering transformers 
(voltage and current transformers used to monitor power quality) are less 
vulnerable to ashfall than other apparatus highlighted in this study (e.g. 
power transformers). However, the lack of data does not mean that these 
components are completely tolerant to ash-induced impacts but rather 
implies that further investigation is needed to quantify their vulnerability to 
ash hazards. 
2.5 PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT OF INSULATOR 
FLASHOVER 
Our review has shown that ash-induced insulator flashover can occur in all 
sections of a modern power system and is the most common impact from 
ash contamination. Factors contributing to ash-induced flashover are shown 
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in Figure 2.6. Given the interdependencies between electrical, 
volcanological, and environmental factors that influence the likelihood of 
ash-induced insulator flashover, it is difficult to make a reliable prediction 
whether flashover will occur during a particular ashfall. However, from the 
case studies summarised here, simple probabilistic analysis can be 
undertaken to produce a function that estimates the likelihood of a 
flashover occurring causing system disruption. 
 
Figure 2.6: Flow chart illustrating the many variables influencing ash-induced insulator 
flashover (adapted from Johnston, 1997b).  
We have used an event tree to conceptually illustrate the sequence of 
events required for ash-induced insulator flashover to occur (Figure 8). Each 
branch of the tree leads from a necessary prior event to a more specific 
outcome (e.g. from an eruption to an ashfall). Several of the events are 
controlled by external factors, such as conditions at the volcano (eruption 
style), environmental conditions (wind direction and precipitation), design 
of the power system, prior contamination of system components, etc. Such 
information requires input at the time of risk assessment for a particular 
scenario. However, considering the lack of quantified data for events 3-5 
(Figure 2.7), our compiled review dataset of flashovers and tolerances 
allows us to create a fragility function that estimates the conditional 
probability of a flashover occurring for different ash thicknesses. This simple, 
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first-order approach is designed to aid system operators in assessing the 
allowable accumulations of ash before initiating mitigation strategies. 
 
Figure 2.7: Event tree showing the sequence leading up to ash-induced flashover. At 
present, values for the likelihood of each event occurring at each node are not available to 
hazard managers or power system operators. The development of fragility functions will 
help to populate event trees such as this one with more robust data for interpretation.  
In this instance, the limitations in the available data (discussed below) 
means we have chosen to only consider one type of impact (flashover across 
one cylindrical insulator or insulator string), the ash thickness at the time of 
flashover, and the presence of moisture in the ash upon flashover. By 
choosing to simplify in this manner, we focus only on the significant factors 
that dictate whether flashover will occur. However, this approach does not 
account for other influences such as detailed environmental conditions, 
prior contamination (e.g. salt spray), and insulator model, composition, and 
orientation as these are, in most cases, unknown.  
2.5.1 Derivation of the fragility curve 
Fragility functions give the conditional probability of exceeding a specific 
damage state as a function of the intensity of the hazard present (e.g. ash 
thickness). They are typically based on empirical observations of a 
particular system’s or component’s performance at varying levels of hazard 
intensity. For the purpose of this study, fragility functions can be defined as 
mathematical algorithms that relate the intensity of a hazard (e.g. ashfall) 
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with a certain degree of loss or damage (e.g. 0-100%). Few studies in the 
field of volcanic hazards have utilised fragility functions, mainly due to the 
lack of quantitative damage or loss data. Limited examples include 
estimating the collapse probability of residential buildings from ash (e.g. 
Blong, 2003; Spence et al., 2005) and predicting building damage from 
pyroclastic flows (e.g. Baxter et al., 2005). While fragility functions have 
been used sparingly in probabilistic volcanic risk analysis, their usefulness 
has been demonstrated in other disciplines, notably in earthquake 
engineering to determine the probability of building failure at different 
ground shaking intensities (e.g. Rossetto and Elnashai, 2003; Akkar et al., 
2005; Porter et al., 2007).  
We can assume that because insulator flashover is a mutually exclusive 
event and HV insulators are designed to prevent the transfer of electricity 
from transmission and distribution equipment to earthed (bonded with the 
ground) apparatus, insulator flashover can be considered a 100% failure in 
performance. Conversely, instances of tolerance signify 0% failure (Figure 
2.8). 
As this is the first study of its kind to create a fragility function for HV 
insulators exposed to ashfall, and given our limited binary dataset, we have 
selected a logarithmic function to provide an estimate for the probability of 
flashover across a single cylindrical insulator or insulator string at different 
thicknesses of either wet or dry ash. After plotting the data, a line of best 
fit was applied and the resulting curves are presented in Figure 2.9. Results 
suggest that dry ash will not cause flashover but increasing thicknesses of 
wet ash on insulators will increase the likelihood of flashover. The 
generated curves and data trends agree with our observations from existing 
literature and experiences in the field.  
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Figure 2.8: Logarithmic fragility curves showing the probability of ash induced flashover as 
a function of wet or dry ash thicknesses. Data are derived from systems that have either 
experienced flashover or exhibited tolerance to ashfall, or both. Insulator flashover is 
considered a 100% failure in performance while instances of tolerance signify 0% 
failure. However, these data have only been added to this Figure as a guide (i.e. they are 
not plotted); rather, the blue and red fragility curves (wet and dry ash, respectively) 
estimate the probability of flashover based on the discrete end member data points. Two 
anomalous wet samples at 2 and 300 mm (not shown) represent the only two recorded 
instances where wet ash did not cause insulator flashover.  
There are limitations to this approach. Perhaps the most significant is 
the limited available dataset. Despite our best efforts, the field data do not 
acknowledge the many instances of tolerance on a power system during a 
single flashover event. For example, one insulator string may flashover 
while many dozens of strings that receive similar accumulations of ash 
elsewhere on the same circuit exhibit tolerance (do not fail). Furthermore, 
the data often do not indicate whether some of the flashovers occurred 
during the ashfall, or some time after the initial fallout (with subsequent 
rains or humid conditions). These are limitations of the retrospective, 
qualitative data collection methods employed. Nevertheless, the proposed 
model is intended to be a basic tool for volcanic risk assessment and serve 
as the basis for future analogue laboratory tests where more robust data 
can be collected to refine the model.  
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2.6 MITIGATION 
Measures taken by power system operators in the aforementioned case 
studies to manage the risk of ash impacts have been largely reactive. That is, 
operators did not specifically strengthen or design their power systems to 
mitigate ashfall hazards. Throughout our research we found that system 
operators were largely unaware of the potential issues arising from ash 
contamination and, in many cases, were surprised at the onset of problems. 
Warnings from volcanic scientists were either unavailable or unheeded, 
creating a lack of situation awareness. This highlights the need for system 
protocols that emphasise partnership and knowledge transfer between 
volcanic scientists and system operators. With the start of ashfall, the 
majority of power system operators focussed on protecting the critical 
components of the system. It is clear from their actions that generation 
sites and substations are the most important nodes of a transmission and/or 
distribution system.  
2.6.1 Mitigating the risk 
Mitigation actions immediately prior to, during, and after ashfall have two 
basic purposes: (1) preventing or limiting ash entering systems or 
enclosures; and (2) effective and efficient removal of ash to prevent or 
reduce damage. Maintaining system infrastructure in a good state of repair 
and in clean condition is considered the best practise for long-term 
mitigation of ashfall hazards (Wilson et al., 2009). 
There are four strategies to manage the risk of power system impacts 
from ashfall hazards (adapted from AS/NZS ISO-31000 (2009)): 
1) Avoid the risk by deciding not to start/continue with the activity 
that gives rise to the risk. 
2) Remove the risk source. 
3) Change the likelihood. 
4) Retain the risk by informed decision. 
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The following sections provide some key mitigation strategies 
according to each of the four risk management principles. In most cases, the 
suggestions addressed herein consider the range of known ash impacts and 
are based on our current knowledge. Ideally, they should be verified 
through trial before implementation. Further information on the application 
of these methods can be found in Table 2.3.  
2.6.1.1 Avoiding the risk 
De-energisation/shutting-down until ashfall has subsided 
The most effective method of preventing ash-induced impacts is to avoid 
the risk altogether by shutting down, closing off and/or sealing off 
equipment until the ash is removed from the immediate environment. 
However, in many cases this is not practical or acceptable. For example, de-
energising a critical substation (e.g. one that provides the only feed to an 
area) to possibly avoid several thousand dollars of damage to a particular 
piece of equipment may disrupt service resulting in losses of millions of 
dollars. Conversely, if a system operator chooses to retain supply during 
heavy ashfall and a power transformer suffers damage, then both service 
and component losses will be incurred. Thus, it can be safer to de-energise, 
clean contaminated apparatus and bear service losses than to continue 
operating with an unquantified risk. However, the decision to de-energise 
will also depend on the importance of the circuit(s) or apparatus in 
providing power to other critical infrastructure (e.g. emergency supply to 
nuclear facilities, other crucial nodes of the system, water supply, primary 
industry, etc.). In all instances, communication of decision making should 
be made to clients as rapidly and openly as possible to enable them to plan 
for disruptions.  
The difficulty noted in making these decisions highlights the need for 
further quantification of system component vulnerability so that decisions 
made by system operators to mitigate ash impacts are effectively informed.  
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Land-use planning 
Removing the risk source (the volcano) is not a feasible option. However, 
power companies can revise their land-use planning to re-route circuits and 
stations so that they do not lie proximal to or in the typical downwind path 
of a volcano. Whilst this is an extreme and potentially expensive measure, it 
is an effective one that has particular relevance for areas that endure 
frequent ashfalls such as those near Tungurahua or Soufrière Hills. 
2.6.1.2  Removing the risk source 
Live-line cleaning 
Live-line maintenance is a method used by linesmen to clean and/or repair 
power lines without disrupting power to parts of the system and is an 
effective way to remove ash (the risk source) from power apparatus. No 
official cleaning guide or standard exists which outlines the most 
appropriate methods to clean ash from power system components, however, 
the methods employed by CELEC EP following the 2010 Tungurahua eruption 
or KEPC during the 2011 Shinmoe-dake eruption demonstrate the 
effectiveness of simple techniques and routine practises that can be easily 
adopted by any electricity company looking to mitigate ash-induced impacts 
at substations. For live-line cleaning, an appropriate procedure is as follows 
(refer to IEEE Std 957 (2005) for further information on safe and effective 
live-line cleaning practises): 
1) All cleaning personnel should be required to wear a facemask and eye 
protection in addition to any personal protection equipment required 
by the power company; 
 
2) Compressed air cleaning (with or without a non-abrasive component) 
can be used to remove initial large amounts (e.g. >3 mm) of ash. If 
using compressed air alone then a pressure of 210 kPa or less (≤30 
psi) should be applied to avoid a sandblasting effect on glazed 
ceramic surfaces such as insulators and bushings and other sensitive 
equipment. Care should also be taken to avoid blowing ash into other 
parts of the substation or onto lines that have already been cleaned; 
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3) A set of insulated tools for wiping, brushing, and washing ash from 
energised equipment should be devised (e.g. as outlined in IEEE Std 
957 (2005)).  
a. For example, hot-sticks (designed appropriately for the 
component’s rated voltage) fitted with brush heads or rags 
(typically made of burlap) work well for ‘hot-wiping’ ash from 
substation equipment (e.g. insulators, bushings, switches, 
busbars, circuit breakers, etc.); 
 
4) Depending on how strongly the ash has adhered to equipment, low, 
medium or high-pressure (e.g. 1,400 – 7,000 kPa) water blasting 
should be used to thoroughly rinse away any residual ash. If the ash 
has become heavily cemented to insulators then soft-media blasting 
may be an effective alternative (refer to Table 2.3 for more 
information); 
 
5) A routine and continuous cleaning programme should be maintained 
until the threat of airborne ash contamination is over (including that 
of remobilised ash deposits).  
Offline cleaning 
For de-energised cleaning, the following procedure has been adapted from 
methods employed by Transpower (New Zealand), CELEC EP (Ecuador), and 
KEPC (Japan) and from those outlined in IEEE Std 957 (2005): 
1) All substation equipment must be de-energised and earthed prior to 
cleaning; 
 
2) All cleaning personnel should be required to wear a facemask and eye 
protection in addition to any personal protection equipment required 
by the power company; 
 
3) Depending on the state of the ash (e.g. wet or dry) transformer 
bushings and radiator fins should be cleaned by hand using soft rags 
followed by high-pressure washing (see Figure 2.5a);  
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4) Insulators, bus bars, circuit breakers, metering transformers, and 
other critical apparatus should be cleaned by hand in a similar 
procedure as that used for transformers. Extra care should be taken 
to ensure that all surfaces are cleaned, including the undersides of 
insulators. Additional materials, such as wet or paraffin-soaked cloths, 
steel brushes, or steel wool, may be needed for insulators with 
strongly adhered ash deposits; 
  
5) If ash deposits are strongly cemented to ceramic surfaces (insulators 
and bushings) then a mild (and inert) solvent or detergent (e.g. OMYA 
brand products) can be applied and wiped clean using soft brushes, 
rags, paper towels, or non-abrasive nylon pads. Steel wool can also 
be used when other cleaning tools are ineffective, however, caution 
should be exercised to avoid abrading ceramic surfaces and remove 
all metal particles left by the steel wool. No solvents should be 
applied to polymer insulators unless advised by the manufacturer.  
6) CELEC EP noted that contacts on disconnect switches (electrodes) are 
especially difficult to clean and may require scrubbing with a rough 
sponge or nylon pad to remove the contact grease in which ash 
becomes embedded; 
 
7) The substation can be re-energised once all substation equipment has 
been dried using soft rags.  
The above methods can be easily adapted for transmission and 
distribution lines and insulators. Alternative cleaning methods for 
transmission and distribution system components (energised and de-
energised) are provided in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.3: A range of potential mitigation options against ashfall impacts based on the risk management principles outlined in AS/NZS ISO-31000 
(2009) 
RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
MITIGATION 
OPTION EXPLANATION SOURCE 
Avoid the risk 
De-energise 
vulnerable 
circuit(s) 
Shutting down generation facilities and substations until ashfall has subsided is the 
most effective method of prevention against ash-induced failure of power supply 
equipment.   
Land-use planning 
While removing the risk source is impossible in this case, power companies can 
revise their land-use planning and re-route their power system so that it avoids 
close proximity to volcanic hazards.  
Remove the risk 
source 
Fixed spray 
nozzles 
Spray nozzles fixed to structures so that insulators are periodically cleaned with 
water to remove ash before critical volumes can accumulate. 
IEEE Std 957, 2005; 
Cakebread et al., 
1978 
Offline (de-
energised) 
cleaning 
Cementation makes it increasingly difficult to clean power supply equipment, 
regardless of the technique employed. Therefore, controlled outage (offline) 
cleaning should take place before cementation occurs. This may be a particularly 
effective method for power companies located near volcanoes which exhibit 
prolonged activity such as Soufrière Hills, Montserrat (U.K.) and Tungurahua, 
Ecuador. 
IEEE Std 957, 2005 
Live-line (hot) 
cleaning 
Water 
blasting 
Live-line cleaning using low (e.g. 1,000 to 2,100 kPa), medium (e.g. 
2,100 to 2,750 kPa) or high-pressure (e.g. 2,750 to 7,000 kPa) water 
blasters has been an effective pollution removal practise since the 
earliest beginnings of electricity transmission.  
Yasuda and 
Fujimura, 1976; IEEE 
Std 957, 2005 
CO2 pellets 
CO2 (dry ice) pellets are a commonly used nonabrasive component 
for live-line cleaning. In the CO2 cleaning process, the pellets of 
frozen CO2 strike the surface of the insulator, penetrating through 
the adhered contamination layer to the insulator surface. The 
pellet then sublimates into a gas, which blasts the contaminant 
from the surface.  
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Soft-media 
blasting 
Soft abrasive materials such as walnut shells and ground corncobs 
blasted onto the surface of energised ceramic insulators have been 
successful in removing strongly adhered pollution. These types of 
organic-blast media are sometimes mixed with a small fraction of 
limestone to improve performance.  
Self-cleaning 
technology 
Recent studies have investigated the potential of a self-cleaning insulator which 
utilizes an applied voltage to repel dry ash from its surface. Ash can be negatively 
or positively charged and, during the positive or negative half cycle of an AC 
waveform, the force of electrostatic repulsion is strong enough to repel ash 
particles so that the risk source is eliminated at an early stage. 
Mee et al., 2012; 
Wightman and 
Bodger, 2011 
Change the 
likelihood 
System 
redundancy 
Power systems are often designed to withstand the loss of any single component 
(e.g. a large power transformer). When a power system adopts this approach, it is 
said to be ‘N-1 secure’ because it can cope with losing any one of its N 
components and continue to carry the demand load. N-1 secure systems reduce 
the likelihood of ash-induced disruption of supply.  
Berizzi et al., 2000 
Adding more 
insulators 
A proven way to improve the contamination performance of an insulator string is 
to add more discs (units). This increases the creepage distance and therefore the 
flashover voltage of the insulator string. However, there are many limitations to 
this approach, as explained in IEEE Std 957 (2005). 
Farzaneh and 
Chisholm, 2009  
Using insulators of 
appropriate design 
There is a wide variety in the design of insulators used in the power delivery 
process. Depending on the climatic and pollution patterns at a given site, insulator 
materials (e.g. ceramic versus polymer) and profiles (e.g. standard versus 
aerodynamic or fog-type) should be carefully chosen to accommodate the local 
conditions. 
IEEE Std 957, 2005; 
IEC 60815-1, 2, 3, 
2008  
Resistive glaze 
insulators 
Resistive glaze insulators are coated with a semi-conducting glaze which creates a 
continuous leakage current of between 0.7 to 1.0 mA. This leakage current causes 
the surface temperature of the insulator to rise slightly, thereby reducing 
condensation and wetting on the insulator’s surface. 
Al-Hamoudi, 1995 
Booster sheds 
Booster sheds are used to increase the diameter of conventional glass and 
porcelain insulators or bushings and prevent the formation of continuous streams 
of water which might cause flashover during live-line washing or torrential rain. 
Booster sheds may be an effective measure against insulator flashover as they (1) 
Ely et al., 1978; Wu 
et al., 1998; Filho et 
al., 2010 
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act as a barrier to the propagation of discharges initiated during leakage current 
and (2) prevent the underside wetting of insulator sheds more effectively than 
standard insulator types.  
Creepage 
extenders 
Creepage extenders are an alternative to booster sheds and are designed to 
reduce the potential for pollution-induced flashover by increasing the creepage 
distance of post-type insulators (typically found at substations). This improves the 
electrical strength of the insulator, however, creepage extenders are most 
effectively applied on bushings and surge arrestors than post insulators.  
Farzaneh and 
Chisholm, 2009  
RTV coatings 
Room temperature vulcanising (RTV) coatings are a silicon-based application that 
is painted on the surface of HV insulators in heavily polluted areas to prevent 
pollution-induced flashover. The hydrophobic property of the coating causes 
moisture to bead on the insulator surface. The inability of water to form a 
continuous conductive film thus reduces the likelihood of leakage current 
initiation and subsequent flashover. Additionally, solid contaminants are engulfed 
by the mobile molecular structure of the silicone compound, creating a barrier 
between the pollutant (ash) and ambient moisture.  
Kim et al., 1990; 
IEEE Std 957, 2005 
Retain the risk by 
informed decision 
Direct 
conductivity 
analysis 
An alternative to the equivalent salt deposit density (ESDD) analysis, directly 
measuring the electrical conductivity of volcanic ash deposits may provide a more 
robust and rapid electrical characterisation of ash. Data acquired from ESDD and 
or conductivity measurements may have a practical use in tephra modelling and, 
when used in combination, this information could potentially alert system 
operators to the areas most vulnerable to high accumulations of ash and therefore 
those circuits with a high likelihood of ash-induced flashover. 
 
Dust deposit 
gauge (DDG) 
DDGs collect fresh and unaltered ash samples that can be used for electrical 
characterisation analysis (such as ESDD). If ash accumulation levels are gradual 
(e.g. <1 mm per week) then periodic collection and measurement of volume 
conductivity can support system operators in the decision to clean affected 
sections of the system.  
Gutman et al., 2011; 
IEC 60815-1, 2, 3, 
2008  
Dummy rig 
A ‘dummy’ insulator string with a shorter creepage distance (and therefore lower 
flashover voltage) is installed and energised to the same potential as an adjacent 
line. Flashover of the dummy string will occur first and thereby warn operators of 
critical pollution levels. 
IEC 60815-1, 2, 3, 
2008  
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Ultraviolet ray 
(UV) cameras  
Partial discharges initiated during high amounts of leakage current cause the air 
around a polluted insulator to ionise. This ionisation process excites nitrogen 
molecules and creates the emission of ultraviolet radiation. UV cameras that have 
a built-in UV pulse rate counting feature have the potential to serve as a non-
contact, quantitative indicator of leakage current pulse rate and intensity (the 
main precursor to flashover). 
EPRI, 2002; Farzaneh 
and Chisholm, 2009  
Infrared (IR) 
cameras 
Similar to UV cameras, infrared cameras have some ability to measure the 
pollution-induced leakage current. The heat produced from leakage current and 
dry-band arcing (discharges across dry zones created by the heat from continuous 
leakage current) can be intense enough to produce heat signatures which are 
detectable by IR technology.  
Farzaneh and 
Chisholm, 2009  
Real-time 
pollution 
monitoring 
Real-time monitoring of electrical parameters such as leakage current can help to 
identify critical contamination conditions. Measurements are taken directly from 
the problem area and the data are analysed remotely, where system operators can 
decide the appropriate counter-measure(s) to take. 
Richards and 
Renowden, 1997; 
Lannes and 
Schneider, 1997 
Robotic 
monitoring and 
cleaning 
Robotic monitoring and cleaning systems provide rapid analysis of 
polluted/damaged power system apparatus. The ability of a robot to govern itself 
via infrared and visual imaging presents a viable and safe option for preventing 
ash-induced flashover. 
Wu et al., 2009 
 71 
2.6.1.3  Changing the likelihood 
System redundancy 
The probability of two or more independent faults taking place on a power 
system simultaneously is very low (Berizzi et al., 2000). However, to 
account for this low risk (but high consequence) event, power systems are 
often designed to withstand loss of individual lines or elements such as 
power transformers. When a power system adopts this approach, it is said to 
be ‘N-1 secure’ because it can cope with losing any one of its N components 
and continue to carry the demand load. N-1 secure systems reduce the 
likelihood of ash-induced disruption to power supply, however, do not 
consider the far-reaching effects of ash that can cause numerous faults over 
hundreds of square kilometres of assets.  
Insulator modification 
HV insulators designed to operate in polluted conditions come in a range of 
different shapes and sizes and are constructed from several different 
materials (IEC-60815-1, 2, 3, 2008). Depending on the climatic and pollution 
patterns at a given site, insulator materials (e.g. ceramic versus polymer) 
and profiles (e.g. standard versus aerodynamic or fog-type) should be 
carefully chosen to accommodate the local conditions. Adapting the types 
of insulators used in volcano-proximal zones could reduce the likelihood of 
flashover, minimise the effects of tracking and leakage current, and 
ultimately improve system reliability.  
A logical way to improve insulator contamination performance is to 
increase the number of insulators (or length of a single insulator) on a line 
or substation. Contamination flashover performance tends to scale linearly 
with creepage distance so adding three new discs to a string of ten identical 
ones can improve the flashover strength by 30% (Farzaneh and Chisholm, 
2009). However, this approach is not without limitations, including a loss in 
acceptable line clearance distance and the difficulties in changing intricate 
types of insulators such as those found at substations.  
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2.6.1.4  Retaining the risk by informed decision 
Doing ‘nothing’ 
In the case of minor ashfalls, it may be more economical for power 
companies to retain the risk by leaving small deposits (e.g.  3mm) on 
insulators, lines, and structures to be cleaned naturally by rain and wind 
action. The informed decision to leave ash on power hardware should 
depend on the electrical conductivity of the ash, a factor that is largely 
influenced by the amount of ionic content in the form of soluble salts 
present on the ash particle’s surface. In the case of substations, however, 
heightened attention to these facilities with only small accumulations of ash 
(e.g. 1 mm in the case of the 2010 Tungurahua eruption) suggests that 
immediate cleaning is essential to ensuring the safe and reliable provision of 
electricity to society. 
Real-time pollution monitoring 
Real time pollution monitoring can provide some indication of contaminated 
conditions on energised insulators. For example, analysis of leakage current 
and/or partial discharge on contaminated insulators can warn system 
operators of critical pollution levels prior to flashover (Farzaneh and 
Chisholm, 2009).  
A rapid field method for measuring the resistivity (conductivity) of 
freshly fallen/falling ash in space and time would be a useful risk 
assessment tool for power system operators. For example, if conductivity 
values are known before substantial deposits of ash can accumulate (e.g. >1 
mm) then ashfall forecasts can be combined to provide an early indication 
of which facilities and sections of lines may be at the greatest risk of 
impacts, such as insulator flashover.  
Use of the fragility model to forecast flashover 
When opting to retain the risk, there is significant uncertainty about failure 
thresholds. Our fragility model comprises impact data from various different 
eruptions and thus, a range of different ashfalls. The fragility function 
therefore accounts for the many variations in electrical conductivity (and 
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therefore potential for flashover) present in each case-study ash. When used 
in combination with real-time pollution monitoring and an analysis of ash 
electrical properties, a more robust indicator of ash-induced flashover can 
be produced. The addition of near-real time information provided by 
volcanic scientists such as ashfall dispersal (isopach maps) and fall rates will 
further strengthen power system operator decision support.  
2.6.2 Response plan 
Heightened operational readiness, efficient monitoring, and impact 
assessment of any disruption or damage are key elements of good risk 
mitigation practise. Response plans should include procedures to monitor 
warnings from volcano observatories (including notification of eruptions and 
potential ashfalls), reducing or shutting down operations, and accelerated 
maintenance and ash clean-up operations, including access to filters and 
cleaning/disposal equipment.  
Based on the lessons learned from our review, the following response 
plan will aid power system operators in preparing for and mitigating impacts 
from ashfall hazards: 
1) Secure the health and safety of staff. Goggles and masks are essential 
for protection, but so are safe operating procedures, as horizontal 
surfaces (e.g. roads and ladders) can become very slippery; 
 
2) System operators should maintain situation awareness by actively 
monitoring warnings and advice from local volcano observatories or 
relevant agencies to obtain the most up-to-date scientific alert levels, 
eruption warnings, ashfall maps, and forecasts. Operators should 
establish and maintain these connections during non-crisis periods; 
 
3) Prepare a system for cleaning equipment before, during and after 
(e.g. for remobilised deposits) the event. This should include an 
estimate of the number of people and equipment required which can 
be predetermined by the magnitude of the ashfall. When problems 
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arise (e.g. notification of leakage current or corona discharge) a rapid 
response can be made; 
 
4) Monitor the volcanological information from hazard 
scientists/agencies (e.g. ashfall forecasts, isopach maps, fall rates, 
etc.), the power dynamics of the system (e.g. voltage fluctuations, 
leakage current, etc.), and conductivity of the ash (by equivalent salt 
deposit density (ESDD) analysis or resistivity measurements). Based 
on these observations, make informed decisions on whether to 
continue supplying power to vulnerable sections of the system; 
 
5) Implement a mitigation strategy (as detailed in Table 2.3) if the 
benefits of maintaining power supply outweigh the financial 
consequences of de-energising all or part of the system.  
2.7 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
There is need for comprehensive standardised documentation of ash-
induced impacts and cases where preventative measures have been 
employed and subsequent success in maintaining constant supply during 
and/or after a volcanic eruption has been achieved. Knowledge of ashfall 
impacts and mitigation is very limited, so any systematic assessment from 
technical experts is extremely valuable. In particular, it would be useful to 
know the percentage of adverse impact occurrence on the system as a 
whole. For example, in order to better define fragility functions, we must 
know what percentage of insulators flashover on a given stretch of line that 
receives similar thicknesses of ashfall. Identification of those components 
most often affected by ash contamination together with further 
development of cleaning and mitigation strategies will undoubtedly 
strengthen the resilience of electric power systems.  
Further research is needed to design power systems that are resilient 
to ashfall hazards. Proactive and reactive response plans, cleaning methods, 
volcanic and electrical monitoring techniques, and mitigation strategies 
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must be furthered and synthesised to provide adequate decision support for 
system operators. Additionally, ash samples intended for electrical analyses 
such as conductivity and ESDD should be collected from specific impact sites 
to ensure accurate representation of the electrical properties that have 
contributed to the impact. These are vital first steps in working towards 
providing reliable power supply to society during ashfalls.  
2.8 CONCLUSIONS 
We have identified the key sources of risk, areas of impacts, events and 
their causes, and their potential consequences for power systems exposed 
to volcanic ashfall. The following conclusions can be drawn from this study: 
1) Case studies from around the world highlight the vulnerability of 
power systems to ashfall hazards and emphasise the need for more 
robust planning and mitigation strategies against ash contamination. 
Volcanic ash can disrupt power supply in the following ways:  
a. Ash-induced flashover on HV insulators or transformer bushings. 
b. Controlled outages for ash cleaning.  
c. Accelerated wear of HEP turbines (e.g. runner blades, 
labyrinth seals, wear rings, band seals, cheek plates, and 
wicket gates) and moving components at generation and 
substation facilities (e.g. transformer fans). 
d. Ash ingress into HVA systems which can block intakes causing 
reduction of functionality or failure of sensitive electronic 
equipment such as switching and data acquisition systems.  
e. Line breakage, bridged phases, and damage to towers and 
poles due to ash loading directly onto structures or by causing 
vegetation to fall onto lines. 
f. Deterioration of apparatus due to corrosion and degradation of 
insulators from burning and etching caused by ‘tracking’ and 
leakage current (initiated by conductive deposits of ash).  
 
 76 
2) The most common cause of power generation, transmission, or 
distribution interruption arises from ash-induced insulator flashover. 
Dry ash will not cause flashover. Once the ash becomes wet, however, 
the likelihood of insulator flashover increases significantly, prompting 
immediate evasive action from power system operators.  
 
3) We have developed a fragility function for estimating the probability 
of flashover across an insulator at a range of dry or wet ash 
thicknesses. Whilst it has a number of limitations, our model 
represents a first-order approach to probabilistically estimating the 
thickness of wet ash required to cause ash-induced insulator flashover. 
 
4) We propose a number of untried but potential mitigation strategies to 
be used during and after an ashfall. The most effective mitigation 
strategy against ash impacts is shutting down substation and 
generation facilities until the ash has been effectively removed from 
the immediate area.  
a. There are no guidelines for cleaning ash from insulators or 
other exposed electrical infrastructure. This is a key 
knowledge gap. 
 
5) Substations and generation sites have many critical components and, 
as a whole, represent microsystems within a larger power system. 
Future work should therefore look to quantify the vulnerability of all 
outdoor components involved in providing power supply to society.  
 
6) Detailed and standardised reporting of power system failure and 
resiliency during or following ashfall is crucial to improving our 
understanding of the processes of ash-induced impacts and enhance 
the effectiveness of methods used within probabilistic volcanic risk 
assessment.  
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OVERVIEW 
Minimal literature is available on the electrical properties of volcanic ash. 
This, together with the limitations of standardised contamination severity 
assessment techniques motivated the development of a new method to 
comprehensively account for the electrical, physical and chemical 
properties of volcanic ash promoting electrical conductivity. This chapter 
presents results from an electrical resistivity analysis of seven fresh ash 
samples and several ash proxies. 
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3.1 ABSTRACT 
Volcanic ash contamination of high voltage (HV) power networks 
compromises the reliability of society’s electricity supply. Ash-induced 
insulator flashover is a common problem on transmission networks during 
explosive eruptions, which is attributed to the high conductivity (σ) (low 
resistivity (ρ)) of volcanic ash. However, there have been few studies which 
have investigated the electrical conductivity of volcanic ash and how it may 
be influenced by different volcanological and environmental factors. In this 
study we have used a simple and rapid testing method to measure the 
influence of ash composition, grain size, soluble salt content, compaction 
and moisture (water) content on ash conductivity. We also developed 
physically, chemically and electrically equivalent ash proxies to be used for 
current and future laboratory experimentation. Results indicate that dry 
volcanic ash is non-conducting (ρ >1.56 x 107 Ωm), however, the 
conductivity of volcanic ash increases abruptly with the adsorption of water. 
Further increase in conductivity has been observed with increasing soluble 
salt content and compaction. All grain sizes (<32 μm to 1.4 mm) can exhibit 
high conductivity values (ρ <100 Ωm) and therefore have similar potential to 
cause flashover on HV insulators. The methodology development and results 
herein represent a benchmark for in-field testing during volcanic crises and 
for future studies.  
3.2 INTRODUCTION 
Society is critically dependent on a reliable supply of electricity to maintain 
economic activities and the health and safety of communities. As a result, 
consumers demand very high reliability from electricity networks, and 
electrical utility management organisations are commonly bound by 
legislative or consumer/contractual requirements to maintain operations 
during emergency events, including volcanic eruptions (Bebbington et al., 
2008).  
During an explosive volcanic eruption ash is injected into the 
atmosphere and distributed downwind of the volcano. Distribution of ash is 
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controlled by eruption column height, particle size of the ash and climatic 
conditions (especially wind direction and strength and humidity) at the time 
of the eruption (Carey and Sparks, 1986). Even in small eruptions, thousands 
of square kilometres may be impacted by ashfalls (Johnston et al., 2000). 
This is an important consideration, with 9% of the world’s population 
estimated to be living within 100 km of a historically active volcano 
(Horwell and Baxter, 2006). Although ashfalls rarely endanger human life 
directly, threats to public health, disruption to critical infrastructure 
services (e.g. electricity and water supplies, transport routes, waste water 
and communications), aviation, building damage and primary production, 
can lead to significant societal impacts (Horwell and Baxter, 2006; Stewart 
et al., 2006).  
Previous studies have shown that volcanic ash can cause disruption to 
electricity supplies in the following ways (adapted from Wilson et al., 2009): 
1) The accumulation of volcanic ash on HV (e.g. >33 kV) insulators can 
lead to flashover (the unintended electric discharge over or around 
an insulator (Figure 3.1)), which often leads to the disruption of 
service. When flashover occurs on external insulation (bushings) for 
power transformers, this can cause damage to the apparatus and will 
most certainly result in the disruption of power supply; 
2) Line breakages and damage to towers and poles due to ash loading, 
both directly onto the structures and by causing vegetation to fall on 
to lines, particularly in heavy, fine ashfall events. Snow and ice 
accumulation on lines and overhanging vegetation will further 
exacerbate the risk; 
3) Breakdown of substation and generation facility control equipment; 
such as air-conditioning/cooling systems due to ash penetration which 
can block air intakes and cause corrosion;  
4) Controlled outages during cleaning. 
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Figure 3.1: Insulator flashover across three glass ‘fog-type’ units (sheds) contaminated 
with ~2 mm of wet ash. Photo taken in the University of Canterbury HV laboratory. 
Impacts to electrical networks following eight different eruptions have 
been summarised in Figure 3.2. For further information, refer to Wilson et 
al. (2009; 2012). 
 
Figure 3.2: Impacts to HV transmission systems following volcanic ashfall events since 1980 
(adapted from Chapter 2). The most common problem arising from volcanic ash 
contamination of HV equipment is insulator flashover.  
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Of these, the most common impact is insulator flashover. The purpose 
of HV insulators is to ensure the isolation of energised components (e.g. 
conductors/lines) from other transmission apparatus such as steel towers or 
wooden poles. When ash of sufficient electrical conductivity accumulates on 
(contaminates) an insulator it can generate an unintended electrical 
discharge which propagates itself around or across the surface of the 
insulator. This is known as a 'flashover'. Factors contributing to flashover are 
shown in Figure 3.3.  
 
Figure 3.3: Flow chart diagram illustrating the many factors influencing insulator flashover 
(adapted from Johnston, 1997).  
While ample anecdotal evidence exists of ash-induced flashovers 
(Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Sarkinen and Wiitala, 1981; Blong, 1984; Tuck et 
al., 1992; Blong and McKee, 1995; Johnston, 1997; Naranjo and Stern, 1998; 
Wilson et al., 2009), there is remarkably little empirical data available on 
the electrical properties of volcanic ash. This is somewhat surprising as it is 
a key factor in the disruption of electrical transmission systems after 
volcanic eruptions. Current understanding is limited to anecdotal 
information collected during volcanic impact reconnaissance trips (e.g. 
Wilson et al., 2009; Appendices 1 and 2) and investigations carried out by 
power utility companies in the wake of a volcanic eruption. A key study was 
by Nellis and Hendrix (1980) who performed an electrical analysis of the 
volcanic ash that fell on the Bonneville Power Administration transmission 
network following the 1980 Mount St Helens eruption (Washington, USA). 
This pioneering work, however, had a number of limitations, in that it only 
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used one type of ash (1980 Mount St Helens) and did not consider how ash 
characteristics, such as grain size, grain morphology, soluble salt content 
and adherence characteristics, might affect conductivity. 
This chapter presents a method for testing the electrical conductivity 
of ash and explore the influence that moisture (water) content, soluble salt 
content, grain size, compaction and composition have on conductivity. This 
will provide a better understanding of how different properties influence 
the conductivity of volcanic ash. Seven pristine ash samples are analysed. 
However, the logistical and practical difficulties of obtaining freshly fallen 
ash that has not been leached by rain means only limited types and volumes 
of ash are available for analysis by our research group. Therefore a pseudo 
(synthetic) ash has been developed which mimics the electrical properties 
of fresh ash, but can be manufactured to specific parameters to test 
different characteristics, such as grain size and soluble salt load. A 
secondary aim of developing the pseudo ash was to manufacture it in large 
volumes for use in future analogue laboratory tests which analyse the 
vulnerability of power systems to ash contamination.  
3.2.1 Characteristics of volcanic ash 
Volcanic ash is generated by a plethora of different processes (Dingwell et 
al., 2012) but most efficiently by explosive eruptions. The fragmentation of 
magma generates variously-sized particles (pyroclasts) which are released 
into the atmosphere. These particles may be crystallized lava, glass or 
crystal fragments. The types of minerals present in volcanic ash are 
dependent on the chemistry of the magma from which it was erupted, with 
the most explosive ash dispersing eruptions of high silica rhyolite (Heiken 
and Wohletz, 1985). Volcanic ash is hard (~5 on the Mohs hardness scale) 
and is often highly angular. This angularity, together with its hardness, 
makes volcanic ash very abrasive. When volcanic ash is being transported in 
the volcanic plume, complex chemical interactions occur between the ash 
and the magmatic gases leading to the formation of salts on the surface of 
ash particles. The fine-grained nature of volcanic ash makes it an excellent 
retainer of moisture and once the attached salts are dissolved into solution, 
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the volcanic ash thus becomes conductive, making it a hazard to the power 
system.  
It is widely accepted that during explosive eruptions volatiles adhere 
to ash particles during interaction within the volcanic plume (Taylor and 
Stoiber, 1973; Rose, 1977; Oskarsson, 1980; Smith et al., 1982; Witham et 
al., 2005). Mainly sulphur and halogen gases and associated cations are 
adsorbed onto ash surfaces and dry to become soluble salts. Recent studies 
suggest that the formation of soluble halide and sulphate salts is largely due 
to the acid-mediated dissolution of the ash’s silicate glass and minerals and 
subsequent precipitation at the ash-liquid interface (Delmelle et al., 2007). 
This process leads to the formation of thin deposits of salts on the ash’s 
surface. 
According to Witham et al. (2005), the volatile element concentration 
adsorbed to the surface of volcanic ash particles is largely dependent on: 
1) Ash composition; 
2) Type of eruption; 
3) Gas-pyroclast dispersion following fragmentation;  
4) Gas and ash concentrations within the plume; 
5) Particle size and surface area; 
6) Particle geomorphology (e.g. porosity and texture); 
7) Environmental conditions (e.g. wind and humidity); 
8) Amount of hydrothermal interaction at the volcano. 
The volume of soluble salts on ash is thought to be a key parameter 
controlling ash conductivity. When dry, volcanic ash is highly resistant to 
electrical current flow due to the crystalline-solid structure of the salts 
which act more as an insulator than a conductor (Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; 
Sarkinen and Wiitala, 1981; Johnston, 1997; Bebbington et al., 2008). 
However, when moisture is added to the material, these salts dissolve, 
providing an ionic pathway for the free flow of electrons. Finer grained ash 
 91 
(<0.5 mm) will have a larger surface area per-unit-volume, meaning more 
space is available for the adsorption of volatiles. This increase in soluble 
salt content is likely to result in higher conductivity values. Finer grain sizes 
are more likely to be transported further from the volcano and thus over 
larger areas, increasing their likelihood of being deposited on power 
equipment (Blong, 1984).  
No prior study has analysed the influence of volcanic ash compaction 
on conductivity, however, similar studies of soil conductivity suggest that 
increased compaction in fine-grained (clayey) soils leads to an increase in 
their electrical conductivity (Rinaldi and Cuestas, 2002). Within weeks of 
deposition, volcanic ash may experience up to 50% compaction of its original 
volume due to gravitational settling, wetting and drying processes, rain beat 
compaction and vibrations (such as vehicle traffic) (Johnston, 1997; USGS, 
2010). Compacting an ash deposit increases the number of contact points 
between grains which facilitates the flow of electrical current. Conversely, 
compacting an ash deposit reduces the pore space which inhibits the 
infiltration of moisture into the deposit. This, in turn, may reduce the 
volume of water available for to leach ions from the ash's surface which will 
affect the ionic strength (and thus conductivity) of the water. The lack of 
empirical evidence makes it unclear whether this has any significant 
influence on the conductivity of the deposit. This suggests that the 
compaction variable should be an important control whereby compacted ash 
layers will demonstrate different conductivity values than those of 
uncompacted deposits. 
The conductivity of a solid material depends somewhat on temperature. 
In general, conductivity decreases with increasing temperature (Giancoli, 
2000). At higher temperatures, atoms are moving more rapidly and are 
arranged in a less orderly fashion. These atoms are therefore more likely to 
interfere with the electron exchange required for current flow. The effect 
of temperature on the conductivity of volcanic ash is not investigated here, 
as industrial studies on soil resistivity reveal that temperature has a 
negligible influence (IEEE Std 80, 2000).  
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3.2.2 Equivalent salt deposit density 
The few studies which have characterised volcanic ash electrically (Nellis 
and Hendrix, 1980; Sarkinen and Wiitala, 1981; Matsuoka et al., 1995) have 
concentrated on the ash’s equivalent salt deposit density (ESDD). This 
standard method deduces the equivalent amount of sodium chloride (NaCl) 
required to yield the same conductivity as the contaminant (volcanic ash in 
this case) when dissolved in the same volume of water. Table 3.1 shows the 
relationship between site severity description and the corresponding ESDD 
measurement. 
Table 3.1: Site severity index for ESDD (after Karady and Farmer, 2007). Nellis and Hendrix 
(1981) reported that 3-6 mm of Mount St Helens ash exhibited ESDD levels between 0.3-0.6 
mg/cm2, suggesting that volcanic ash has a very high contamination severity (and therefore 
a high potential to cause flashover on HV insulators). 
ESDD 
(mg/cm2) 
Pollution 
Severity 
0-0.03 Very Light 
0.03-0.06 Light 
0.06-0.1 Moderate 
>0.1 Heavy 
The ESDD analysis is typically used in the power transmission sector to 
determine when it is appropriate to commence cleaning of electrical lines 
and insulators in heavily polluted industrial areas. For example, in Malaysia, 
insulator cleaning generally occurs when ESDD levels rise above 0.03 
mg/cm2 (Ahmad et al., 2004). 
Nellis and Hendrix (1980) used the ESDD approach to evaluate the 
severity of contamination on insulators which were affected by flashover 
after being covered by ash during the 1980 Mount St Helens eruption. Their 
study revealed that 3-6 mm of volcanic ash has a pollution severity of 
between 0.3-0.6 mg/cm2, suggesting that the Mount St Helens ash had a 
high potential of causing pollution-induced flashover on HV transmission 
hardware (Table 3.1).  
While the ESDD method is an appropriate measure of the soluble salt 
content of volcanic ash, it does not consider factors such as ash grain 
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morphology, ash composition, chemical composition of attached soluble 
salts, and bulk density. This limits the value of ESDD analysis when 
attempting to better understand which ash characteristics influence 
conductivity and creates the need for a testing regime capable of 
accounting for all influences on the conductivity of volcanic ash.  
3.3 SAMPLES 
3.3.1 Fresh ash samples 
Seven pristine volcanic ashes were used in this study. The volcano, eruption 
dates and compositional information are listed in Table 3.2. All ashes were 
stored in dry conditions within sealed polyethylene bags since collection. 
Non-essential movement was minimised to reduce modification of ash 
properties.  
Freshly fallen volcanic ash loses its soluble content rapidly in the 
presence of moisture (such as rain or wet soil) so the collection of fresh 
volcanic ash must be done shortly after an eruption and adequately stored 
to avoid leaching of the soluble content. The low frequency of explosive 
eruptions and logistical difficulties of collecting pristine volcanic ashes 
meant we only had access to seven ashes (Table 3.2) collected following 
seven different eruptions. Whilst useful to establish the electrical properties 
of these particular ashes, it does not allow in-depth analysis of the 
influence of different grain sizes, soluble salt loads, soluble salt chemistries, 
bulk densities and grain morphologies which can vary significantly between 
and within explosive eruptions, on the electrical properties of the ash. It 
was therefore necessary to develop a pseudo ash which replicates the 
physical, chemical and electrical properties of freshly fallen volcanic ash, 
but could be manufactured to specific parameters.  
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Table 3.2: Sources of the seven fresh ash samples used in this study. Samples were obtained from a variety of locations and cover a vast time range. 
Additionally, four different ash compositions were tested during the resistivity analysis.  
Sample ID Volcano Country 
Duration of 
Eruption 
Date of 
Collection 
# Days Between 
Deposition and 
Sampling 
Approx. 
Distance From 
Source (km) 
Magma 
Composition 
GRIM-11 Grímsvötn Iceland May-11 22-May-11 1 95 Basalt 
EYJA-10 Eyjafjallajökull Iceland Apr-Oct 2010 15-Apr-10 <1 60 Trachyandesite 
SHIL-09  Soufriere Hills Montserrat (UK) Jul 1995-Present 27-Nov-09 <1 7 Andesite 
RDBT-09 Redoubt USA. Mar-Jul 2009 4-Apr-09 <1 110 Andesite 
CHTN-08 Chaiten  Chile May 2008-Present 28-May-08 6 90 Rhyolite 
MRPI-06 Merapi  Indonesia Apr-Jun 2006 27-Jun-06 5 5 Andesite 
RUAP-96 Ruapehu  New Zealand Sep 1995-Jun 1996 18-Jun-96 1 105 Basaltic-andesite 
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3.3.2 Pseudo Ash Samples 
The replication of both soluble and non-soluble pollution for experimental 
use in the electrical industry is not uncommon. Kaolin, tonoko and 
bentonite (among others) have frequently been used in HV insulator 
contamination testing (e.g. Diesendorf and Parnell, 1974; IEEE Working 
Group, 1979; IEC 60507, 1991; Sundhar, 1994; Hernandez-Corona et al., 
1999; Bennoch et al., 2002; Naderian et al., 2004; Gautum et al., 2006). 
Unweathered Stoddart olivine basalt (from Halswell Quarry, Lyttelton 
volcano, New Zealand) (Guard, 1999) and rhyolite Kaharoa tephra (from the 
1314 AD eruption of Tarawera volcano, New Zealand) (Nairn et al., 2004) 
were used in the creation of proxy ashes. Whole rock chemistry is provided 
in Table 3.3. Their low and high silica (SiO2) compositions allowed a simple 
comparison of whether base rock chemistry influences conductivity. Bulk 
samples were crushed using a hydraulic press and subsequently milled with 
a ring pulveriser.  
In order to investigate the influence of grain size on conductivity, eight 
pseudo ashes of different grain size were created. These were created by 
dry sieving the original crushed and pulverised product. Five grain sizes, 
<0.032, <0.1, <0.5, <1, and <1.4 mm, were produced to replicate ash 
deposits with wide particle size distributions. In order to analyse the 
influence of specific particle size fractions on ash conductivity, three 
pseudo ashes were sieved to 0.1<x<0.5, 0.5<x<1, and 1<x<1.4 mm. 
To replicate the interactions at the ash-gas interface and other 
processes occurring between ash and volatiles within a volcanic plume, a 
simplified method of chemical dosing was used to produce soluble salts on 
the surfaces of the pseudo ash. Either sulphuric acid (H2SO4) or common salt 
solution (NaCl) was added to the pseudo ash to replicate the volatiles found 
on fresh ash. These compounds were chosen because of their high 
abundance during explosive volcanic eruptions (Rose, 1977; Delmelle et al., 
2005; Witham et al., 2005; Delmelle et al., 2007). Approximately 15 cm3 
(~20 g) of dry ash was placed in a 30 cm3 plastic vessel. Once the solutions 
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had been prepared to their respective molar concentrations, 5 ml of H2SO4 
or NaCl solution was added to each vessel and subsequently stirred to 
ensure even distribution of the solution throughout the ash. Vessels were 
then placed in an oven at 85 C for a period of two days to evaporate the 
water from the slurry and expedite the formation of soluble salts. After one 
day of drying, a hard crust developed on the ash. To continue the drying 
process, it was necessary to gently break up and mix this crust using a 
plastic spatula to allow underlying moisture to evaporate.   
Table 3.3: Whole rock chemistry for the Kaharoa tephra rhyolite (Nairn et al., 2004) and 
the Stoddart olivine basalt (Guard,1999). Given the different constituents minerals present 
in both pseudo ash rock types, we were interested to see whether whole rock chemistry 
would influence ash resistivity.  
  
Kaharoa 
rhyolite 
Stoddart 
olivine 
basalt 
Wt.% 
SiO2 77.89 47.75 
TiO2 0.1 2.31 
Al2O3 12.56 14.78 
Fe2O3 
T 
1.04 12.28 
MnO 0.06 0.16 
MgO 0.07 7.36 
CaO 0.71 10.32 
Na2O 3.73 3.12 
K2O 3.82 1.16 
P2O5 0.002 0.56 
ppm 
V 4 207 
Cr <3 255 
Ni <3 124 
Zn 29 95 
Zr 89 187 
Nb 7 58 
Ba 941 417 
La 25 19 
Ce 54 62 
Nd <10 28 
Ga 11 20 
Pb 16 3 
Rb 125 30 
Sr 50 610 
Th 12 4 
Y 29 26 
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A range of H2SO4 and NaCl molar concentrations were used, as it was 
unclear how much would be absorbed by the ash, react with the ash surface, 
or evaporate during the drying process. For the moisture content analysis, 
molar strengths 0.02, 0.18, 0.46, 1.81 and 9.19 M of both, NaCl and H2SO4, 
were prepared for the ash dosing procedure. Early results obtained from ash 
dosed with these solutions suggested that molar strengths >0.46 M were 
excessively high, thus the resistivity analysis employs concentrations no 
greater than 0.46 M. Table 3.4 shows the volumes and pH levels of the 
prepared dosing agents relative to their molar concentrations. 
Table 3.4: Volumes, Wt.% and pH levels of the prepared dosing 
agents relative to their molar concentrations. The maximum molarity 
used during the resistivity analysis was 0.46 M while the resistance 
measurements taken during the moisture content analysis employed 
concentrations up to 9.19 M. 
 Volumes Wt.% 
Molarity 
(M) 
pH 
H2SO4 
0.20 ml H2SO4 + 199.8 ml H2O 0.1 0.02 1.74 
2 ml H2SO4 + 198 ml H2O 1.0 0.18 0.74 
5 ml H2SO4 + 195 ml H2O 2.5 0.46 0.34 
19.70 ml H2SO4 + 180.3 ml H2O  9.9 1.81 -0.26 
100 ml H2SO4 + 100 ml H2O 50 9.19 -0.96 
NaCl 
0.21 g NaCl + 200 ml H2O 0.1 0.02 7 
2.15 g NaCl + 200 ml H2O 1.1 0.18 7 
5.38 g NaCl + 200 ml H2O 2.7 0.46 7 
21.16 g NaCl + 200 ml H2O 10.6 1.81 7 
107.41 g NaCl + 200 ml H2O 53.7 9.19 7 
In order to evaluate a more chemically complex acid dosing solution, 
waters from the crater lakes of Mt Ruapehu (central vent; pH 1.12) and 
White Island (pH -0.37) were also used. These waters have been enriched 
with soluble products from the active hydrothermal systems of each volcano 
and contain common volcanogenic elements which might be expected to 
leach from fresh volcanic ash (Table 3.5).  
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3.4 METHODS 
3.4.1 Electrical resistance and resistivity 
This study required a method capable of determining the electrical 
conductivity or resistivity of volcanic ash. Resistivity is the parameter 
derived from resistance measurements of materials, particularly with 
reference to HV systems.  
Electrical resistance is defined as the measure of opposition to a flow 
of steady electric current by a material. Derived from Ohm’s law, the 
electrical resistance of a conductor is: 
 
Table 3.5: Chemistry analysis of White Island and 
Ruapehu crater lake waters. When added to a pseudo 
ash, the diversity of anions and cations present in crater 
lake waters may provide a more realistic simulation of 
the ash-liquid interface within a volcanic plume.  
 Ruapehu  White Island 
Collection Date June/2010 November/2009 
Collection Temp. (C) 31.9 56.5 
pH 1.12 -0.37 
Na (mg/L) 652 16878 
K (mg/L) 96 3433 
Ca (mg/L) 888 4121 
Mg (mg/L) 1044 6631 
Al (mg/L) 367 4830 
Fe (mg/L) 413 7598 
Cl (mg/L) 5527 97374 
SO4 (mg/L) 7945 24789 
F (mg/L) 134 897 
Li (mg/L) 0.81 28 
B (mg/L) 17.5 143 
H2S (mg/L) 1.3 0.03 
Br (mg/L) 10 221 
NH3 (mg/L) 17.7 124 
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R = ρ(l/A) (3.1) 
where:  
R is the electrical resistance of the test sample (measured in ohms, Ω);  
ρ is the static resistivity (measured in ohms per metre, Ωm); 
l is the distance between electrodes (measured in metres, m); 
A is the cross-sectional area of the test sample (measured in square metres, 
m2); 
To better evaluate the electrical properties of volcanic ash, resistivity 
calculations, which are volumetrically independent, provide insight into the 
electrical behaviour of the material in bulk. Rewriting the resistance 
equation gives the resistivity: 
ρ = R(A/l) (3.2) 
Electrical resistivity can also be defined as the reciprocal of the 
conductivity (σ) of a material, typically measured in Siemens per metre 
(Sm) and expressed as: 
σ = 1/ρ (3.3) 
Conductivity is preferred when referring to the chemical composition 
of a material, whereas resistivity is preferred when recording electrical 
values. Given our interest in the ionic content of volcanic ash (attached 
solubles) and considering the standard electrical practise of primarily 
measuring resistivity to calculate conductivity, it is therefore appropriate to 
use resistivity and conductivity interchangeably.  
As an example, if the measured resistance (R) of a volcanic ash sample 
is 5000 Ω, its cross sectional area (A) is 0.0036 m2 (0.02 m x 0.018 m) and 
the distance between electrodes (l) is 0.015 m then following Equation 3.2, 
the resistivity of the ash sample is 120 Ωm and the conductivity is 8.3 x 10-3 
Sm.  
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The resistivity of volcanic ash is measured under varying levels of 
moisture, soluble salt load, grain size and compaction. Because of the large 
number of variables involved in this study, each parameter that is likely to 
influence the resistivity of volcanic ash has been studied individually while 
the interdependencies are discussed in detail.  
The electrical industry is required to provide safe working conditions 
for substation workers by making sure that surface gravel exhibits a 
resistivity >3,000 Ωm (IEEE Std 80, 2000). Following the 1980 Mount St 
Helens eruption, Buck and Connelly (1980) tested the resistivity of 
substation surface rock contaminated with volcanic ash using large scale 
apparatus to find that ash contamination significantly reduced the resistivity 
of switchyard gravel to 80 Ωm in the worst case scenario. We developed a 
resistivity analysis based on this procedure that follows the same electrical 
principles, but at a much smaller scale which is better suited for our 
experiments, given the limited amount of fresh ash available to us.  
We modified the approach of Buck and Connelly (1980) to include two 
electrical monitoring instruments for measuring the resistance of volcanic 
ash samples. A high voltage (1 kV DC) Megger with an output range from 
0.01 to 999 Megohms was used to take the extremely high resistance 
measurements of dry ash. A low voltage (1 V AC rms, 50 Hz) RCL (Resistance 
(R), Capacitance (C), Induction (L)) meter was used to collect more 
accurate data once resistance readings fell below 10,000 Ω. A resistance-
measuring device consisting of vials housing two electrodes was 
manufactured to contain the ash samples and carry out the electrical 
readings (Figure 3.4). The electrodes or connection points consisted of two 
2 x 1.8 cm rectangular aluminium plates, separated by a distance 1.5 cm 
apart and fastened into a fibreglass housing. The vials were fabricated 
specifically for these experiments as they provided an adequate and secure 
space to contain the ash and minimised the potential for sample losses 
during the testing procedure. The same volume of ash (5.4 x 10-6 m3) was 
added to the vial with each experiment.  
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Figure 3.4: a) Electrode dock without vial showing the copper electrodes that make 
contact with aluminium plates on the testing vial. Plate dimensions on the vial are 2 x 1.5 x 
1.8 cm (5.4 cm3). b) Electrode dock with vial ready for testing. A Megger or RCL meter is 
connected to the wire terminals and a voltage is transmitted to the copper electrodes.  
3.4.2 Parameters influencing resistivity 
3.4.2.1  Moisture 
Short supply of the RDBT-09 sample meant the influence of moisture 
content on the electrical resistivity of volcanic ash could only be tested on 
six of the seven fresh ash samples (GRIM-11, EYJA-10, SHIL-09, CHTN-08, 
MRPI-06, and RUAP-96). Only five of the eight pseudo ash grain sizes (<0.1, 
<0.5, <1, 0.1<x<0.5, and 0.5<x<1 mm) were tested during moisture content 
experiments. Due to the importance of maintaining a constant ionic content 
in ash samples, de-ionised water was used to treat the samples as well as to 
clean vials and tools after use. Approximately 0.5 ml of de-ionised water 
was incrementally added three times using a 5 ml pipette. The resistance of 
the ash samples was measured following each addition of moisture. 
When adding water to each ash sample within the testing vial, it was 
difficult to ensure a homogeneous mixture. Thus, mixing was carried out 
a) 
b
) 
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using a plastic stirring needle until moisture was distributed throughout the 
bulk of the sample. As the bulk densities of the pseudo ashes varied based 
on their composition and grain size, three additions of water were found to 
be an appropriate maximum so as to not over saturate the samples. Mass 
was recorded for (1) the initial dry mass, (2) mass after adding initial 
moisture, (3) mass after stirring to account for ash lost by means of 
adherence to the stirring needle, (4) mass after second water addition, (5) 
mass after stirring, and (6) mass after third water addition. These values 
were necessary for the calculation of density and moisture content used 
later in the resistivity testing analysis.  
Volumetric changes were not considered while moisture was added to 
both pseudo and fresh ash samples. Thus, resistivity values were not 
calculated and so resistance values are provided for analysis of the moisture 
parameter. Furthermore, compaction was not applied during this cycle of 
experiments. Hence, resistance values for the moisture content experiments 
are representative of uncompacted deposits of volcanic ash.  
3.4.2.2  Soluble salts 
To test for the presence of soluble salts on fresh ash, we leached soluble 
material from RUAP-96 (as this was the most plentiful ash sample) and then 
placed the leached ash through the resistivity analysis. 5.4 x 10-6 m3 of 
RUAP-96 was added to a 100 ml vial. RUAP-96 was the only ash tested 
because it was the only fresh ash sample large enough to accommodate 
multiple tests. An arbitrary ratio of 1:10 ash:de-ionised water was mixed in 
a rotating agitator for a discretionary 24 hours to simulate natural leaching 
of any soluble content on the ash sample. After the 24-hour period, the 
water was tested for its conductivity using a Eutech Cyberscan PC300 
conductivity meter and the values were compared with previous results for 
de-ionised water. The leached ash was then removed from the vial, placed 
onto filter paper and left in the oven at 85 C until it had dried completely. 
The leached ash was then removed from the oven and placed through the 
resistivity analysis for further comparison against unaltered RUAP-96. 
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3.4.2.3  Compaction 
To examine the influence of compaction on resistivity, a simple compaction 
test was devised. Pseudo and fresh ashes were placed in the testing vials in 
a dry state without applying any compaction and the electrical resistance 
measured. A 4.5 kg (~10 lbs) weight was then placed on top of a compaction 
tool for 3 seconds to compress the dry ash to between 80-95% of its original 
volume, and the electrical resistance measured. This is consistent with a 
lower limit on how much pyroclastic deposits compact in the field (up to 
50% (Johnston, 1997; USGS, 2010). Volumes and bulk densities were 
calculated for the dry uncompacted (loose) and compacted scenarios.  
To analyse the combined influences of moisture addition and 
compaction, a further experiment was conducted on pseudo and fresh ashes 
where approximately 0.5 ml of deionised water was added to each sample 
and subsequently weighed to calculate the moisture content. The water and 
ash were then mixed with a stirring needle to homogenize the sample 
before testing for the uncompacted resistance of the mixture. Compaction 
was again applied to the moistened sample to measure its compacted 
resistance value at 70-80% of its uncompacted volume. Electrical resistance 
readings were taken for the compacted samples and compared to 
uncompacted values. Changes in ash volumes were recorded for both 
uncompacted and compacted scenarios to assist with later calculations of 
resistivity and bulk density.  
3.4.2.4  Grain size distributions 
To analyse the influence of grain size on the electrical resistivity of volcanic 
ash, grain size distributions for all ash samples (fresh and pseudo) were 
determined using a HORIBA Partica LA-950 laser diffraction particle size 
analyser. Each fresh or pseudo ash was sampled two or three times and 
underwent a minimum of five analytical runs in the particle size analyser to 
ensure repeatability of the results. The output values were averaged and 
then plotted graphically to show the distribution curves (Figure 3.5). 
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Figure 3.5: Grain size distributions for a) Fresh ash samples, b) Pseudo rhyolite and c) 
Pseudo basalt. Note the higher proportion of fines seen in the pseudo basalt.  
 
a) 
b) 
c) 
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3.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.5.1 Moisture content 
It has been suggested that volcanic ash becomes conductive only when wet 
(Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Sarkinen and Wiitala, 1981). The average of the 
resistance values for the six dry volcanic ash samples tested during the 
moisture content experiments was 6.64 x 108 Ω. This is an extremely high 
value and confirms the inability of dry volcanic ash to facilitate the flow of 
electrical current. With the first addition of water (Ave. 3.34 Wt.%), 
however, the fresh ash samples displayed a decrease in electrical resistance 
by several orders of magnitude (Ave. ρ = 279,045 Ω) and with each 
subsequent addition of water there was a corresponding further decrease in 
the ash’s resistance (Figure 3.6). After the second and third additions of 
water (Ave. 6.51 and 9.92 Wt.%), the average of the resistance values for 
the fresh ash samples was 79,941 and 30,493 Ω, respectively.  
 
Figure 3.6: Resistance values for six of the seven fresh ash samples showing a general 
decrease in resistance with increasing moisture content (Wt.%). All ash samples show a 
similar trend of reduction in electrical resistance with increasing moisture content. 
However, CHTN-08 stands out as being the most resistant which is likely due to leaching of 
the sample before analysis.  
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High resistance values obtained for CHTN-08 had a large effect on the 
average of fresh ash resistance values. Not including CHTN-08, average 
moisture content becomes 9.1% and average fresh ash resistance drops to 
8,866 Ω. This suggests that the CHTN-08 ash either (1) was partially leached 
after deposition and before collection or (2) the dome collapse from which 
this sample was collected did not release large amounts of gas with the 
event and therefore large volumes of soluble minerals did not form on the 
ash surface during gas/aerosol-ash interaction.  
The average dry resistance value for pseudo basalt was 9.99 x 108 Ω 
while pseudo rhyolite displayed an average dry resistance of 5.41 x 108 Ω. 
These resistance values are not low enough for the transmission of 
significant electrical current. As with fresh ash, results from the pseudo ash 
moisture tests suggest that the electrical resistance is most affected upon 
the first adsorption of water (Figure 3.7).  
Both the fresh and pseudo ash data supports the observations from 
past investigations (Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Sarkinen and Wiitala, 1981) 
which suggest that dry volcanic ash is effectively inert and non-conducting 
until moisture (water) is added and renders the deposit conductive. In the 
case of the uncompacted ash layers, increasing moisture content results in a 
decrease of electrical resistance. This resistance is further lowered with 
increasing soluble salt content and compaction.  
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Figure 3.7: Results from the moisture content analysis which show the trend of decreasing 
electrical resistance with increasing moisture content. Figures 3.7a and b underline the 
influence of grain size on resistance while Figures 3.7c and d highlight the influence of 
dosing concentration on resistance. 
3.5.2 Soluble salt content 
Whilst moisture content is imperative to the initiation of electrical current 
through an ash deposit, attached soluble salts provide added ionic content 
(increased number of electrons for current flow). During the simple 
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leachate test, the much higher resistivity values obtained for leached RUAP-
96 ash compared with the fresh RUAP-96 sample suggests the presence of a 
large volume of readily soluble salts present on the ash before leaching 
(Table 3.6).  
Resistivity values for the seven fresh ash samples are shown in Figure 
3.8 and Table 3.6. Because RDBT-09 displayed the lowest resistivity values 
in both the uncompacted and compacted testing scenarios, it is likely that 
this sample had a higher soluble salt content than the other fresh ash 
samples.  
 
Figure 3.8: Dry and wet (average 8.11 Wt.%) resistivity values for the GRIM-11, EYJA-10, 
SHIL-09, RDBT-09, CHTN-08, MRPI-06 and RUAP-96 ash samples under uncompacted and 
compacted scenarios. The resistivity of volcanic ash decreases with increasing compaction, 
especially once the ash becomes wet.  
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Table 3.6: Resistivity values for the seven fresh ash samples in the dry, wet, uncompacted and compacted scenarios. The average resistivity values for 
the seven fresh ash samples (not including the leached RUAP-96 sample (*)) when wet and uncompacted is 1006 Ωm while the average resistivity for wet 
and compacted fresh ash is 129 Ωm.  
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M
a
ss
 (
g
) 
V
o
lu
m
e
 (
c
m
3
) 
B
u
lk
 D
e
n
si
ty
 
(g
/c
m
3
) 
R
e
si
st
iv
it
y
  
 
(Ω
m
) 
V
o
lu
m
e
  
  
  
 
(c
m
3
) 
Δ
V
o
lu
m
e
  
 (
%
) 
B
u
lk
 D
e
n
si
ty
 
(g
/c
m
3
) 
R
e
si
st
iv
it
y
  
  
 
(Ω
m
) 
 
H
2
O
 A
d
d
e
d
 
(m
l)
 
M
o
is
tu
re
 
(W
t.
%
) 
V
o
lu
m
e
 (
c
m
3
) 
B
u
lk
 D
e
n
si
ty
 
(g
/c
m
3
) 
R
e
si
st
iv
it
y
  
 
(Ω
m
) 
V
o
lu
m
e
 (
c
m
3
) 
Δ
V
o
lu
m
e
 (
%
) 
B
u
lk
 D
e
n
si
ty
 
(g
/c
m
3
) 
R
e
si
st
iv
it
y
  
 
(Ω
m
) 
GRIM-11 4.97 5.40 0.92 6.9E+06 4.80 11.11 1.04 3.5E+06  0.4
8 
8.88 7.5
0 
0.7
3 
1099 5.4
0 
28.00 1.0
1 
142 
EYJA-10 5.16 5.40 0.96 2.4E+07 4.80 11.11 1.08 2.4E+07  0.4
5 
7.97 7.2
0 
0.7
8 
411 5.1
0 
29.17 1.0
1 
80 
SHIL-09 4.79 5.40 0.89 2.4E+07 4.80 11.11 1.00 2.1E+07  0.4
6 
9.53 7.2
0 
0.7
3 
521 4.8
0 
33.33 1.0
9 
52 
RDBT-09 6.90 5.40 1.28 2.4E+07 4.80 11.11 1.44 2.1E+07  0.4
3 
6.28 7.2
0 
1.0
2 
271 5.7
0 
20.83 1.2
9 
51 
CHTN-08 4.86 5.40 0.90 5.0E+06 4.80 11.11 1.01 2.0E+06  0.4
8 
9.02 7.2
0 
0.7
4 
3840 5.1
0 
29.17 1.0
5 
437 
MRPI-06 4.99 5.40 0.92 1.4E+06 5.10 5.56 0.98 7.5E+05  0.5
2 
10.33 7.2
0 
0.7
6 
428 5.7
0 
20.83 0.9
6 
55 
RUAP-96 6.62 5.40 1.23 2.4E+07 5.40 0.00 1.23 2.4E+07  0.4
9 
7.46 7.2
0 
0.9
9 
468 5.7
0 
20.83 1.2
5 
88 
RUAP-96* 6.90 5.40 1.28 2.4E+07 5.40 0.00 1.28 2.4E+07  0.5
4 
7.23 7.2
0 
1.0
3 
5859 5.7
0 
20.83 1.3
0 
1654 
AVE. 5.65 5.40 1.05 1.7E+07 4.99 7.64 1.13 1.5E+07  0.4
8 
8.34 7.2
3 
0.8
4 
1612 5.4
0 
25.37 1.1
2 
320 
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Pseudo ash results indicate a general decrease in resistivity with 
increasing concentrations used in the dosing procedure (Figure 3.9 and 
Table 3.7). For example, wet and compacted pseudo basalt dosed in a 0.02 
M NaCl solution experienced an average decrease in resistivity by 25% when 
dosed with 0.18 M NaCl and tested under the same moisture and compaction 
parameters. With the next added dosage (0.46 M NaCl), the pseudo basalt 
experienced a further reduction of resistivity by 44%. Pseudo ash that was 
not treated with any dosing agent consistently showed the highest resistivity 
values of all the samples (fresh and pseudo), irrespective of the moisture or 
compaction scenarios.  
Tests performed with pseudo ash samples dosed with NaCl generally 
yielded lower resistivity values than pseudo ashes dosed with equivalent 
molar concentrations of H2SO4. There are several possible explanations for 
this observation: (1) the low concentrations of H2SO4 are not strong enough 
to cause sufficient mineral precipitation at the ash-liquid interface, (2) ash 
grains fully saturated by H2SO4 cannot allow for precipitation or bonding 
with the ash surface, or (3) Jacobson (2002) suggests that once condensed 
onto particles, H2SO4 rarely evaporates because of its low saturation vapour 
pressure. Thus, the minerals precipitated from the H2SO4-ash interaction are 
likely less soluble than those produced by a NaCl compound. However, XRD 
analysis of the H2SO4-dosed rhyolite showed that high (>0.46 M) 
concentrations seemed to corrode the ash particles to form a clay 
(mordenite) cement. Pseudo rhyolite dosed with high concentrations (>0.46 
M) of H2SO4 did not dry despite prolonged oven time. Due to its wet state, 
pseudo rhyolite ash dosed with H2SO4 exhibited lower resistivity values than 
anticipated during dry tests. The process of surface dissolution at the ash-
liquid interface may also control the rates of water adsorption (Delmelle et 
al., 2005; 2007) and, given the importance of moisture on resistivity, is also 
a factor that is likely to affect the resistivity of volcanic ash upon deposition. 
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Figure 3.9: Resistivity values for wet and compacted pseudo a) rhyolite dosed with varying 
concentrations of NaCl and b) basalt dosed in varying concentrations of H2SO4. These graphs 
show the trend of decreasing electrical resistivity with increasing soluble salt content. 
Resistivity values for wet and compacted pseudo ashes dosed with crater lake waters from 
Ruapehu and White Island are also shown for comparison.  
Pseudo ash dosed in crater lake water from White Island displayed 
lower resistivity values than those calculated for ashes dosed in crater lake 
water from Ruapheu. The higher pH for White Island crater lake water 
means that a higher number of ions are present within this solution 
compared with the amount of ions found in crater lake water from Ruapehu. 
Hence, this increased ionic content results in a less resistive pseudo ash. 
Resistivity values for pseudo ash dosed in crater lake water from White 
Island was, on average, 24% lower than those dosed in crater lake water 
b) 
a) 
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from Ruapehu. When moistened, pseudo ash samples dosed with Ruapehu 
crater lake water show very low resistivity values despite its pH (1.12) being 
the equivalent of a 0.075 M H2SO4. The unforeseen low resistivity values of 
pseudo ash samples dosed in Ruapehu crater lake water may be due to the 
diversity of anions and cations found in the crater lake waters. Thus, to 
replicate the same electrical resistivity results observed with fresh ash, a 
higher volume of single compound soluble salts (e.g. NaCl or H2SO4) is likely 
required for dosing compared to that needed for a multiple compound 
solution.  
3.5.3 Grain size and compaction 
Previous studies have assumed that fine-grained ash (<0.5 mm) is more 
conductive than coarse-grained (>1 mm) (Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Sarkinen 
and Wiitala, 1981; Bebbington et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2009). All grain 
sizes tested during the dry pseudo ash analysis displayed high resistivity 
values (e.g. >1.80 x 108 Ωm). When analysed under the wet and compacted 
scenario, however, the fine-grained pseudo ash (<0.5 mm) most often: (1) 
had the highest bulk density and (2) was the most conductive (Figures 3.9 
and 3.10 and Table 3.8). 
Conversely, our results from the resistivity analysis of pseudo ash show 
that, in the wet and uncompacted scenario, coarse-grained ash (>1 mm) 
consistently (1) had the highest bulk density and (2) was the least resistive 
(and therefore most conductive) (Figures 3.9 and 3.10 and Table 3.8). 
Coarse-grained volcanic ash deposits (>1 mm) have larger voids or pore 
spaces between grains relative to those in the fine-grained example (<0.5 
mm). This allows faster and deeper infiltration of moisture into the ash 
layer, hastening the rate at which soluble salts are dissolved into a 
conducting solution over a shorter period of time. This will allow for greater 
amounts of electrical current to flow through the deposit. 
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Table 3.7: Average resistivity values for pseudo rhyolite and basalt tested across the range of dosing concentrations. Results show that the electrical 
resistivity of volcanic ash decreases with increasing soluble salt content, moisture content and compaction.  
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UNTREATED 
Rhyolite 5.38 5.40 1.0
0 
2.16E+07 5.2
1 
3.4
7 
1.0
3 
2.08E+07  0.5
5 
9.45 6.8
6 
0.8
6 
137800 5.5
1 
19.6
7 
1.0
8 
1551 
Basalt 6.63 5.40 1.2
3 
2.40E+07 5.0
3 
6.9
4 
1.3
2 
2.23E+07  0.5
4 
7.69 6.7
1 
1.0
7 
44036 5.1
4 
23.4
6 
1.4
0 
319 
0.02 M NaCl Rhyolite 5.23 5.40 0.9
7 
2.40E+07 5.2
1 
3.4
7 
1.0
0 
1.56E+07  0.5
0 
9.81 6.9
4 
0.8
2 
795 5.5
1 
20.0
0 
1.0
4 
191 
Basalt 6.82 5.40 1.2
6 
1.81E+07 4.9
5 
8.3
3 
1.3
8 
2.20E+07  0.5
0 
7.48 6.7
1 
1.0
9 
728 5.2
1 
22.0
3 
1.4
0 
143 
0.02 M H2SO4 
Rhyolite 5.09 5.40 0.9
4 
1.66E+07 4.9
1 
9.0
3 
1.0
4 
1.45E+07  0.4
5 
9.24 6.6
8 
0.8
3 
1636 5.4
0 
18.8
4 
1.0
3 
372 
Basalt 6.86 5.40 1.2
7 
2.40E+07 4.9
9 
7.6
4 
1.3
8 
2.21E+07  0.4
7 
7.08 6.7
5 
1.0
9 
836 5.1
8 
22.8
6 
1.4
2 
184 
0.18 M NaCl Rhyolite 5.21 5.40 0.9
6 
2.40E+07 5.1
4 
4.8
6 
1.0
1 
2.26E+07  0.4
9 
9.75 7.0
5 
0.8
1 
140 5.5
1 
21.3
9 
1.0
3 
36 
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Figure 3.10: Compaction data for wetted a) 0.18 M H2SO4 pseudo rhyolite and for b) 0.18 M 
H2SO4 pseudo basalt. As with the fresh ash samples, pseudo ash displayed a decrease in 
electrical resistivity with increasing compaction in both the dry and wet scenarios. 
Thus, given the trends seen in both the uncompacted and compacted 
situations, we can conclude that the higher the bulk density of the ash 
deposit, the more conductive it will be and that all grain sizes ranging from 
<32 μm to 1.4 mm are capable of exhibiting very low resistivity values (e.g. 
<100 Ωm) (Figures 3.9 and 3.10 and Table 3.8).  
Analysis of the fresh ash supported pseudo-ash findings, where the 
degree of compaction had a greater influence on resistivity than grain size 
alone. However soluble salt load still appeared to be the most dominant 
factor. All fresh ash samples, with the exception of CHTN-08, displayed very 
similar resistivity values when wet and compacted despite the differences in 
other variables such as moisture content, bulk density, and grain size 
distribution (Figures 3.8 and 3.10 and Table 3.6). While CHTN-08 was the 
most fine-grained fresh ash sample and results most often suggest that fine-
grained deposits (<0.5 mm) are the most conductive when wet and 
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compacted, this ash sample was an exception by displaying very high 
resistivity values under the wet and compacted condition. This suggests that 
CHTN-08 contained a low amount of soluble salts and that the volume of 
soluble salts adhered to ash will be dominant in controlling resistivity over 
both grain size and compaction. Further to this point, while RDBT-09 
displayed the highest bulk density and lowest resistivity in uncompacted and 
compacted scenarios, this ash sample did not contain the largest amount of 
fine grains in its distribution and its low resistivity suggests that it probably 
had a higher amount of attached soluble salts.  
When moisture was added to very fine-grained pseudo ash (<32 μm) in 
either the uncompacted or compacted scenarios, the water tended to bead 
on the ash’s surface and the rate of infiltration was very slow (several 
seconds to minutes). High surface tension on the surface of fine-grained ash 
inhibits the infiltration of water and is likely the cause of such hydrophobic 
behaviour (Doerr et al., 1996; 2000). This beading phenomenon was also 
observed in Mount St Helens’ 1980 ash (USGS, 2010) suggesting that fine-
grained compacted ash layers are more resistant to water infiltration and 
may only experience partial adsorption (e.g. only the topmost layers). 
Additionally, in the context of a contaminated insulator, there may be a 
race between moisture adsorption needed to decrease the resistivity of ash 
versus the ability of moisture (e.g. rain) to effectively wash the insulator 
free of contamination.  
A comparison of grain morphologies for the different ash types can be 
seen in Figure 3.11. Volcanic ash grain morphology will directly influence (1) 
the rate of water adsorption and (2) the surface area available for the 
adherence of soluble salts (Delmelle, 2005). It is therefore likely that grain 
morphology will influence the electrical resistivity of ash. Both pseudo and 
fresh ash samples used in this study have very similar grain shapes and micro 
topographies with the exception of CHTN-08, which appears to be highly 
vesiculated.  
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Table 3.8: Resistivity data for pseudo rhyolite and basalt dosed with 0.18 M H2SO4 showing the influence of grain size on resistivity. Results suggest that 
all grain sizes are capable of displaying low resistivity values and are therefore equally capable of conducting significant amounts of electrical current 
given the variety of other controls (e.g. moisture content, soluble salt content, etc.).  
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Figure 3.11: SEM images for a) 0.18 M H2SO4 pseudo rhyolite, b) 0.18 M H2SO4 pseudo 
basalt, c) 0.18 M NaCl pseudo rhyolite, d) 0.18 M NaCl pseudo basalt, e) CHTN-08, f) MRPI-
06, g) RDBT-09, h) RUAP-96. The porosity/micro topography of volcanic ash directly 
influences the amount of surface area to which volcanogenic volatiles can adhere. It is 
therefore likely that ash morphology will have an effect on its electrical resistivity.  
3.5.4 Composition 
Our pseudo ash data suggests that the differences in ash composition have 
little effect on electrical resistivity. Average resistivity values for the 
pseudo rhyolite and basalt are comparable to one another (Figure 3.12), 
indicating that the dosing agents used on the pseudo ash worked effectively 
on either composition. Despite the compositional differences between the 
pseudo and fresh ashes, similar trends suggest that the soluble salt 
component is dominant over ash composition in controlling resistivity. 
However, the inability to dry the pseudo rhyolite suggests that ash with high 
silica content may undergo more vigorous chemical reactions with volatiles 
in the volcanic plume, particularly the sulphates.  
The pseudo ash most analogous to the average resistivity of the fresh 
ash samples is a crushed rhyolite ash dosed with 0.18 M H2SO4 using a 3:1 
(cm3:ml) ash-solution ratio. However, basalt is the preferred pseudo ash 
composition due to its ability to dry rapidly and thus provide realistic 
resistivity values in its dry state. NaCl concentrations between 0.02 M and 
0.18 M represent a comparable concentration to the adsorbed salts found on 
fresh ash and, when applied to a basalt proxy, will be a suitable replication 
g) h) 
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of freshly fallen volcanic ash. This pseudo-ash will be reproduced for use in 
future experiments. 
 
Figure 3.12: Average resistivity values for uncompacted (top values) and compacted 
(bottom values) for pseudo and fresh ashes under the dry and wet scenarios. Each floating 
bar represents a range of likely resistivity values for that particular ash given the variation 
of other controls (e.g. moisture content, grain size, volume, bulk density, etc.). Average 
resistivity values for pseudo rhyolite and basalt are comparable to each other, however, 
pseudo basalt appears to be the most conductive across the majority of dosing 
concentrations.  
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Our characterisation of the electrical properties of volcanic ash is the first 
attempt to fully examine the variables most influential in controlling the 
electrical resistivity (conductivity) of volcanic ash. The following 
conclusions can be drawn from this study: 
1) The resistivity of volcanic ash decreases with: 
a. Increasing moisture content (decreasing Ωm with increasing 
moisture content (Wt.%)); 
b. Increasing soluble salt content (decreasing Ωm with increasing 
molarity (M));  
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c. Increasing compaction (decreasing Ωm with increasing bulk 
density (g/cm3)). 
 
2) Dry volcanic ash is highly resistant to the flow of electrical current. It is 
therefore unlikely that dry volcanic ash will cause ash-induced flashover 
on HV insulators;  
 
3) All fresh ash samples, with the exception of CHTN-08, displayed very 
similar resistivity values when wet and compacted despite the 
differences in other variables such as moisture content, bulk density, 
and grain size distribution. High resistivity values for CHTN-08 suggest 
that this sample was either leached before collection or that there was 
insufficient gas/aerosol-ash interaction to create significant volumes of 
soluble surface material. Results from the pseudo ash analysis show that, 
if wet, the electrical resistivity of volcanic ash will decrease with 
increasing soluble salt content;  
 
4) The risk of flashover is largely independent of grain size. All grain sizes 
(<32 μm to 1.4 mm) can exhibit low resistivity values (ρ <100 Ωm) and 
therefore have similar potential to cause flashover on HV insulators 
provided there is sufficient moisture content, compaction and soluble 
salt content. Our results confirm (1) the potential of coarse (>1 mm) ash 
deposits to display similarly low levels of resistivity as those found in 
fine-grained (<1 mm) values, in either the uncompacted or compacted 
scenario and (2) that compaction is a greater influence than grain size on 
conductivity of volcanic ash. Cleaning of HV insulators should therefore 
take place immediately after deposition to avoid compaction and 
consequent increased conductivity of the deposit; 
 
5) In the uncompacted scenario, coarse-grained (>1 mm) ash may be the 
most conductive due to increased permeability which allows for faster 
and deeper infiltration of moisture into the ash layer, hastening the rate 
at which soluble salts are dissolved into a conducting solution. Very fine-
grained ash (e.g. <32 μm) may display water-repellent behaviour due to 
 122 
the high surface tension of the deposit which inhibits infiltration of 
moisture;  
 
6) Once compacted, fine-grained ash (<0.5 mm) is often the most 
conductive due to the increased number of pathways for the flow of 
electrical current (increased contact between grains);  
 
7) Our analysis shows that the simple dosing method used in this study is an 
appropriate and easily repeatable procedure for the creation of a 
suitable pseudo ash for future use in contamination testing of HV 
transmission equipment. Our results indicate that a pseudo basalt dosed 
with a NaCl solution between 0.02 and 0.18 M will demonstrate 
equivalent electrical properties as freshly fallen volcanic ash;  
 
8) Our method for testing the resistivity of volcanic ash samples is 
appropriate for small volume, in-field analysis and this data is useful for 
electricity and risk managers looking to mitigate the hazards from 
volcanic ash contamination of HV equipment, in particular the issue of 
insulator flashover.  
3.7 IMPLICATIONS 
Currently, there is no standard method used to test the conductivity of 
volcanic ash during a volcanic eruption. Given the lack of instrumentation 
available for rapid analysis of the electrical conductivity found in fresh 
volcanic ash, our method of resistivity analysis is appropriate for small 
volume, in-field applications. The apparatus used in this study are typical of 
those employed for electrical measurements within power companies and 
thus should be easily accessible for rapid measurement at any given time. 
Resistivity measurements taken at the first opportunity during an ashfall 
event would be useful for rapid risk assessment models looking to predict 
the likelihood of ash-induced failure on electric power systems. Avoiding 
insulator flashover in the first instance will prevent potential cascading 
failure elsewhere on the power network and thereby fortify the provision of 
electricity to society.  
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It would be useful to identify resistivity values that are likely to 
initiate sufficient current through ash deposits to cause insulator flashover. 
If resistivity thresholds can be identified, in-field measurements during a 
volcanic ashfall will aid in the safe management of power transmission and 
distribution. This should be a major focus of future work.  
Other research that will contribute to the understanding of the 
flashover phenomenon includes correlation between ESDD and conductivity 
values for volcanic ash. While this has been touched upon in the past (Nellis 
and Hendrix, 1980; Sarkinen and Wiitala, 1981), variable grain size has not 
been incorporated into the ESDD analysis and this study has identified the 
importance of grain size and amounts of soluble salts attached to ash 
particles (a function of surface area). Surface area analysis of volcanic ash 
samples and variations of soluble salts found on volcanic ash, will help our 
understanding of the gas/liquid-ash interaction within the plume.  
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OVERVIEW 
Traditionally, the electrical properties of volcanic ash have been assessed 
using the equivalent salt deposit density (ESDD) analysis. Rapid and cost-
effective risk assessment techniques for volcanic ash contamination on 
electric power system elements are needed to provide system operator 
decision support during ashfalls. Chapter 4 identifies a number of limitations 
in the standard ESDD method for analysing the pollution severity of volcanic 
ash. Accordingly, this chapter suggests an alternative, simpler and more 
rapid approach to measuring the electrical characteristics of volcanic ash at 
the onset of fallout (Chapter 3).   
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4.1 ABSTRACT 
The pollution severity of airborne contamination on high voltage insulators 
has traditionally been quantified by calculating the contaminant’s 
equivalent salt deposit density (ESDD). Volcanic ash is a rare but severe 
form of airborne pollution, and the high conductivity of wet volcanic ash 
(often >1.3 x 10-4 S/cm) can cause pollution-induced insulator flashover. 
This chapter presents the ESDD and non-soluble deposit density (NSDD) for 
four different fresh volcanic ash samples and two ash proxies measured at 
different thicknesses using a standardised plate test. Results show that 
there is a log-linear increase of ESDD with increasing NSDD. Tests indicate 
that a 3 mm thick deposit (NSDD between 158 and 231 mg/cm2) of fresh 
volcanic ash yields an ESDD between 0.02 and 0.7 mg/cm2, suggesting that 
ash can have high contamination severity and therefore potential to cause 
pollution-induced insulator flashover. Whilst the ESDD/NSDD method 
provides direct analysis of the ionic content of a contaminant, the 
procedure is time consuming, cannot accommodate the high NSDD of 
volcanic ash for site pollution severity classification and does not account 
for changes in the contaminant’s electrical conductivity under different 
environmental, chemical and physical conditions. Given these limitations, 
this study proposes an alternative, simple yet more comprehensive 
technique for investigating the electrical properties of volcanic ash by 
means of direct resistivity analysis.  
4.2 INTRODUCTION 
It has long been established that electric power systems are vulnerable to 
pollution-induced insulator flashover and subsequent interruption of service 
(Adler et al., 1948; Lambeth, 1971; Jolly, 1972; IEEE Working Group, 1979; 
Gencoglu and Cebeci, 2008; Baker et al., 2009). Volcanic ash is a rare but 
severe form of airborne pollution. Worldwide accounts have reported 
adverse impacts to power systems from volcanic ash contamination, with 
ash-induced insulator flashover being the most common (Chapter 2). The 
product of explosive volcanic eruptions, volcanic ash consists of two primary 
components: (1) non-soluble, pulverised fragments (<2 mm particle 
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diameter) of rock, minerals and glass (SiO2); and (2) soluble salts which form 
on the surface of ash particles during ash–gas/aerosol interaction within the 
volcanic plume (Witham et al., 2005). These salts supply ionic content to an 
otherwise electrically inert material. The fine-grained nature of volcanic 
ash makes it a good retainer of moisture, and once the attached salts are 
dissolved into solution (e.g. by dew, fog or light rain), the ash becomes a 
conductive electrolyte (Chapter 3). 
Equivalent salt deposit density (ESDD) is a standard International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) parameter for Type A pollution (where 
solid pollution with a non-soluble component is deposited onto the surface 
of an insulator). An industry practise since the 1950s, the ESDD or ‘Solid 
Layer’ method equates the amount of sodium chloride (NaCl) required to 
yield the same conductivity as the contaminant when dissolved in the same 
volume of water. Upon calculation, ESDD values are classified into insulator-
specific site pollution severity (SPS) indexes provided in IEC 60815-1 (2008). 
As a guide for this chapter, however, an example of exposed ESDD levels for 
different pollution severities is shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: ESDD classifications for SPS (after Karady 
and Farmer, 2007). 
ESDD 
(mg/cm2) 
Pollution 
Severity 
0-0.03 Very Light 
0.03-0.06 Light 
0.06-0.1 Moderate 
>0.1 Heavy 
 
The non-soluble deposit density (NSDD) is another standard pollution 
parameter prescribed by IEC 60815-1 (2008) that is used to quantify the 
amount of non-soluble residue on contaminated insulators (also expressed in 
mg/cm2). Previous work suggests that the non-soluble component of 
volcanic ash is a poor conductor (Wright et al., 2009) and the sensitivity of 
salt deposit density is higher on flashover voltage than that of NSDD (Ramos 
et al., 1993). However, other studies have shown that inert, non-soluble 
pollution can greatly reduce the flashover voltage of HV insulators (Ishii et 
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al., 1996; Sundararajan and Gorur, 1996). Insoluble deposits do not 
contribute directly to conductivity but instead convert the smooth surface 
of an insulator into a rough, irregular one which, in turn, can affect (1) the 
run-off rate of soluble material, (2) the hydrophobicity of the insulator 
surface, (3) the evaporation rate of the wetted layer, and (4) the local 
electric field strength (Farzaneh and Chisholm, 2009). 
Whilst most forms of pollution such as salt, combustion emissions, dust 
(e.g. earth, fertiliser, metallic, coal and feedlot), smog, and defecation (e.g. 
bird streamers) have been identified and studied in some detail (CIGRE TF 
33.04.01, 2000; CIGRE WG C4.303, 2008), very little information exists on 
the ESDD of volcanic ash (e.g. Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Matsuoka et al., 
1995; Gutman et al., 2011). This chapter complements the existing 
knowledge of insulator contamination in different polluted environments by 
presenting the results from ESDD tests for four fresh volcanic ash and two 
comparative pseudo (artificial) ash samples. Based on the findings, an 
assessment of the overall suitability of the ESDD method for quantifying the 
pollution severity of volcanic ash is considered. It is intended this will aid 
power system operators to better understand the potentially wide-ranging 
physical, chemical and electrical characteristics of volcanic ash. 
4.3 SAMPLES 
4.3.1 Fresh ash samples 
The low frequency of explosive eruptions and logistical difficulties in 
collecting pristine volcanic ash meant only four ash samples collected from 
four different eruptions were available for analysis. The volcano and 
eruption dates for each ash are listed in Table 4.2. All samples had been 
stored in dry conditions within sealed polyethylene bags since collection. 
Non-essential movement was minimised to reduce modification of ash 
properties. 
Freshly fallen volcanic ash loses its soluble content rapidly in the 
presence of moisture (such as rain or wet soil) so it is imperative that ash 
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collection be carried out shortly after an eruption and the ash adequately 
stored to avoid leaching or erosion of the soluble components. 
Table 4.2: Fresh ash samples used in this study. Samples were 
collected by the authors or provided by research affiliates.  
Sample 
ID 
Volcano Country 
Date of 
collection 
SDKE-10 Shinmoe-dake Japan 2-Feb-11 
SHIL-09 Soufriere Hills Montserrat (UK) 27-Nov-09 
CHTN-08 Chaiten Chile 28-May-08 
RUAP-09 Ruapehu New Zealand 18-Jun-96 
 
4.3.2 Pseudo ash samples 
To augment our limited fresh ash samples, a pseudo ash was developed to 
replicate the physical and electrical properties of freshly fallen volcanic ash 
to test against the fresh volcanic ash samples. 
Unweathered Stoddart olivine basalt (from Halswell Quarry, Lyttelton 
volcano, New Zealand) (Guard, 1999) was chosen as the non-soluble volcanic 
component for our ash proxy. It has been argued that fine-grained ash 
deposits (e.g. <0.5 mm particle diameter) have a higher surface area per-
unit-volume and will therefore contain more soluble material than that of 
coarse-grained deposits (e.g. >1 mm particle diameter) (An et al., 2002; 
Chapter 3). Thus, to investigate whether particle size has any effect on 
ESDD, two different pseudo ashes were created: (1) a predominantly fine-
grained fraction (<0.1 mm) and (2) an ash with a coarse-grained component 
(<1 mm). These were manufactured by dry sieving the original crushed and 
pulverised product. 
Accurate replication of soluble salts found in fresh volcanic ash is best 
achieved using a brine (NaCl) dosing solution with a molar concentration 
between 0.02 and 0.18 M at a ratio of 3:1 (ash:brine solution). Thus, a 0.15 
M salt solution was added to the non-soluble pseudo material to serve as an 
appropriate dosing agent for ESDD tests.  
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4.4 PROCEDURES 
4.4.1 Particle size distributions 
To analyse the influence of particle size on the ESDD of volcanic ash, 
distributions for all ash samples (fresh and pseudo) were determined using a 
HORIBA Partica LA-950 laser diffraction particle size analyser. Each fresh or 
pseudo ash was sampled twice and measured a minimum of five times in the 
particle size analyser to ensure reliability of the results. The output values 
were averaged and the distribution curves are shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1: Grain size distributions for the four fresh and two pseudo ash samples used in 
the ESDD analysis. 
4.4.2 Application of the pollution layer 
Considering (1) the importance of retaining soluble surface salts inherent in 
freshly fallen volcanic ash, (2) the potential for volcanic ash to be deposited 
in large quantities (e.g. >10 mm thicknesses) and (3) the lack of appropriate 
testing standards pertinent to volcanic ash, the pollution layer for ESDD 
tests was applied using dry volcanic ash rather than the flow-on or dipping 
techniques proposed in IEC 60507 (1991) and IEEE Std 4 (1995). 
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Although this made the procedure more difficult and time consuming, 
it replicated a realistic deposit of volcanic ash that was guaranteed to 
retain its soluble salt content. Previous Solid Layer tests on volcanic ash 
(Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Matsuoka et al., 1995; Gutman et al., 2011) have 
not used the plate contamination method applied for ESDD measurements in 
Section 4.4.3. 
4.4.3 ESDD measurements 
The ESDD method used in this study was adapted from the standardised 
procedure outlined in IEC 60815-1 (2008). A simple plate test was devised to 
explore the relationships between ash thickness (the parameter most useful 
to volcanic scientists), NSDD, volume conductivity and ESDD. The plate test 
assumes uniform thickness and complete coverage of the insulator (e.g. top 
and bottom surfaces). A range of accumulations from light dusting (0.5 mm) 
to heavy deposits (10 mm) was investigated. A 10 x 10 cm Perspex plate (0.3 
cm thick) was used for the plate tests. The plate was artificially 
contaminated to measured thicknesses of 0.5, 1, 3, 6 or 10 mm. However, 
the limited amount of fresh ash available meant that (1) only a small 
surface area (10 x 10 cm) was contaminated, and (2) fresh ash samples 
could only be used for plate tests up to 6 mm thick, whereas the pseudo ash, 
which could be easily reproduced, was tested up to thicknesses of 10 mm.  
The entire deposit was carefully collected by brushing the ash into a 
cylindrical, plastic container (diameter: 26 cm, height: 17 cm). 700 ml of 
deionised water (<3 μS/cm) was then added and mixed with the ash to 
ensure complete saturation. Both Nellis and Hendrix (1980) and Gutman et 
al. (2011) suggest that some volcanogenic solubles can take hours to 
dissolve into solution. Thus, while typical ESDD tests for other forms of 
pollution require only 2 mins of saturation time before measurement, the 
contained ash slurry was agitated by hand every 10 mins for a total of 30 
mins to aid the dissolution of attached soluble salts. 
After the dissolution period, the volume conductivity σθ of the water 
(S/cm) at the temperature θ (°C) was measured using a Eutech Cyberscan 
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PC300 conductivity meter. As per IEC 60507 (1991), IEEE Std 4 (1995), and 
IEC 60815-1 (2008), the value σθ was then corrected to a reference 
temperature of 20 °C. 
To ensure reliability of results, three tests were performed at each 
fresh ash thickness. Ample amounts of pseudo ash allowed for six tests per 
thickness. The container was thoroughly rinsed with deionised water and 
then dried with a clean cotton rag before each repetition. 
4.4.4 NSDD measurements 
Non-soluble matter was separated from the ash/water mixture using pre-
dried and weighed filter paper and a funnel. The residuum was dried in an 
oven at 100 °C for 12 hours before NSDD for fresh and pseudo ash samples 
was calculated using the procedure outlined in IEC 60815-1 (2008). 
4.5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.5.1 ESDD/NSDD relationships 
Results for average calculations of NSDD, volume conductivity, salt content, 
and ESDD values for the four fresh ash and two pseudo ash samples are 
presented in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.3. Results show that the ESDD of 
volcanic ash increases log-linearly with increasing ash thickness and/or 
NSDD. This means that increasing accumulations of ash (a function of time) 
on HV insulators will lead to an increase in ESDD and therefore a decrease in 
flashover voltage. 
Despite CHTN-08 often having a higher NSDD, it consistently had the 
lowest ESDD and therefore salt content (average 0.2 Wt.%) of all fresh ash 
samples. These unusually low values suggest that CHTN-08 was either 
leached before collection or that there was insufficient ash-gas/aerosol 
interaction within the volcanic plume to create significant volumes of 
soluble surface salts.  
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Figure 4.2: ESDD vs. NSDD for fresh and pseudo ashes at varying thicknesses. 
Analysis of the pseudo ash results provides further insight into the 
relationship between NSDD and ESDD of volcanic ash. Comparing the two 
pseudo ashes shows that the fine-grained ash (<0.1 mm) consistently had a 
higher salt content (average 3.1 Wt.%) than the coarse-grained comparator 
(average 2.4 Wt.%). However, with each thickness examined, the coarse-
grained pseudo ash (<1 mm) most often had a higher total mass, NSDD, 
volume conductivity, and ESDD. Thus, while the pseudo ashes were created 
from rock of the same chemical composition and prepared using identical 
dosing procedures, the fine-grained pseudo ash had a higher soluble salt 
content despite it having lower NSDD values than that of the coarse-grained 
comparator. This suggests that particle size has an influence on the ESDD 
(and conductivity) of a volcanic ash deposit. However, this and others 
controls (geomorphology, porosity, and chemical composition) are still likely 
to be dominated by the soluble salt parameter (Chapter 3). 
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Table 4.3: Averages for the fresh and pseudo ash parameters obtained during the ESDD 
analysis. SPS abbreviations: VL=Very Light, L=Light, M=Moderate, H=Heavy. 
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1 4.78 44.4 38.6 2.9 0.1 H 
3 26.7 247 162 2.2 0.6 H 
6 57.8 447 313 2.1 1.2 H 
10 95.5 911 518 2.1 2.0 H 
4.5.2 Pollution severity 
Our analysis shows that, for the three ashes which appear to have not been 
leached prior to testing (SDKE-11, SHIL-09 and RUAP-96), only a uniform 
light dusting of 0.5 to 1 mm is required to create heavy pollution severity 
(according to the general classification of SPS in Table 4.1). This is 
significant considering the potential for ash deposits to exceed tens of 
millimetres in thickness during a single ashfall (Chapter 2). An et al. (2002) 
propose that insulator flashover is imminent once ESDD levels reach 0.4 
mg/cm2, suggesting that a 3 mm deposit of either RUAP-96 or SHIL-09 is 
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sufficient in soluble salt content to cause ash-induced flashover, provided 
the ash is wet enough to initiate a leakage current across the surface of the 
insulator. 
Of the fresh ash samples, RUAP-96 and SHIL-09 had the highest 
pollution severities (moderate to heavy), ESDD (0.04 to 1.3 mg/cm2), and 
salt content (average 3.0 Wt.%) across the investigated range of thicknesses. 
Bebbington et al. (2008) found that samples from Mount Ruapehu (RUAP-96) 
contained total salt concentrations typically between 0.4 and 2.1 Wt.%, 
which is between four and twenty times more than was observed in ash 
from the 1980 Mount St Helens (USA) eruption. This agrees with our results 
which showed that 3-6 mm of RUAP-96 had an ESDD between 0.7 to 1.3 
mg/cm2. This value is more than double that of the ESDD found by Nellis and 
Hendrix (1980) following the Mount St Helens eruption, where 3-6 mm of 
1980 Mount St Helens ash yielded an ESDD between 0.3-0.6 mg/cm2. These 
high pollution severity values highlight the danger of ash contamination on 
HV insulators.  
If ESDD calculations for freshly fallen volcanic ash are to be used and 
interpreted by system operators, it is essential that measurements be taken 
during or immediately after deposition to ensure pristineness of the test 
samples. Previous efforts to quantify the ESDD for volcanic ash (e.g. Nellis 
and Hendrix, 1980; Matsuoka et al., 1995; Gutman et al., 2011) have used 
ash that was collected from the environment some time (days to weeks) 
after the initial fallout. It is therefore unclear whether the ash samples used 
in those tests had lost some of their soluble salt content (e.g. due to rain 
leaching) prior to analysis. While the potential for flashover is highest 
during and immediately after deposition, many volcanic ash samples, even 
after long periods of repeated wetting, contain slowly soluble components 
such as sulphate and fluoride compounds that may be extracted over 
prolonged periods of time (Cronin and Sharp, 2002). Thus, ash deposits may 
pose a flashover hazard for days to weeks following an eruption. Cleaning of 
HV equipment should therefore be carried out at the first opportunity to 
avoid the latent risk of ash-induced flashover.  
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4.5.3 Limitations of the ESDD method 
For very high values of NSDD relative to ESDD, there is limited data 
available for IEC 60815-1 (2008) classification of SPS (e.g. the shaded area 
to the top left-hand side of Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3: Relationship between ESDD/NSDD and SPS for the reference cap and pin 
insulator (from IEC 60815-1 (2008)).  
The extremely high NSDD observed in the ashes used in this study 
makes it difficult to classify SPS using the guidelines set out in IEC 60815-1. 
Consequentially, this suggests that the standard ESDD/NSDD analysis is 
currently unsuitable for volcanic ash contamination containing NSDD >4 
mg/cm2. 
If a volcanic ash deposit is sufficiently conductive, it will initiate a 
leakage current on an HV insulator. The presence of leakage current will be 
dependent on the conductivity of the ash, which is influenced by many 
factors. For example, compacted volcanic ash deposits have a significantly 
lower resistivity than uncompacted layers (Figure 4.4) (Chapter 3). 
Laboratory Solid Layer tests, such as the ones carried out in this study, are 
representative of uncompacted deposits of volcanic ash. Results from both 
Chapter 3 and this study show that the RUAP-96 sample is slightly less 
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resistive (more conductive) than SHIL-09 in the uncompacted scenario. 
However, once compacted, SHIL-09, a more fine-grained ash, is less 
resistive to current flow. Moisture content, compaction and particle size are 
important parameters in promoting the conductivity of volcanic ash but are 
not accounted for in the ESDD analysis. Thus, a different means of analysis 
is required to account for the other variables influencing the conductivity of 
an ash deposit. 
 
Figure 4.4: Resistivity values for wet (average 7.8 Wt.% moisture content) compacted 
(lighter shades) and uncompacted (darker shades) fresh (in red) and pseudo (0.18 M NaCl 
Basalt, in blue) ashes (adapted from Chapter 3). 
Large volumes of volcanic ash may be deposited in a very short space 
of time (e.g. several mm/hour), making volcanic ash very different from 
other types of airborne pollution. In the case of Nellis and Hendrix (1980), 
insulators that flashed over from suspected ash contamination during the 
1980 Mount St Helens eruption had to be removed from service, transported 
to a laboratory (being careful not to lose some of the ash deposit while in 
transit), and the deposits carefully collected from the insulator surface 
before ESDD analyses could be performed. In addition, the NSDD component 
of the test demands filtration of the water/ash mixture and several hours of 
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drying time before NSDD calculations can be made. Thus, if the procedure 
cannot be performed on-site, the ESDD/NSDD method requires much time. 
This emphasises the need for a more rapid means of analysis, as decisions to 
initiate mitigation strategies rely heavily on the pollution severity of the ash.  
Emergency power system management requires a rapid means of 
pollution analysis to support sound decision making during volcanic ashfalls. 
Simple evaluations of volcanic ash that highlight gross variations in pollution 
severity with time and space are perhaps more appropriate for rapid 
analysis. As a practical tool for measuring site conditions (SPS) during 
volcanic ashfalls, the ESDD method is insufficient due to the aforementioned 
limitations.  
4.5.4 Alternative analysis 
Given the variability of ESDD and NSDD in volcanic ash with every eruption, 
it is clear that a rapid, in-field testing procedure is needed to quantify the 
electrical characteristics of volcanic ash at the first instance of ash fallout. 
The resistivity analysis developed in Chapter 3 can be performed 
immediately, requires very little time and equipment, better accounts for 
the physical variables which promote conductivity (e.g. moisture content, 
compaction, grain size and whole rock chemistry), and provides a similar 
indication of the pollution severity (primarily a function of the soluble salt 
content) as the ESDD method for freshly fallen volcanic ash. The procedure 
for the resistivity method is summarised as follows: 
 Collect a bulk sample (e.g. >50 g) of clean, unaltered ash from a 
horizontal surface or directly from the fallout (e.g. in a container or 
tarpaulin); 
 Place a known volume of ash into a pre-fabricated and pre-weighed 
testing vial or container with fixed plate electrodes. To prevent 
distortion of the electric field, avoid filling the testing vial above the 
electrodes;  
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 Record the mass of the sample so that moisture content can be 
calculated via loss-on-ignition analysis;  
 Apply a voltage across the sample using an ohmmeter and record the 
resistance. For dry (highly resistant) samples, a high voltage source 
(e.g. >1 kV) may be required to obtain a reading; 
 Using volumetric parameters, calculate resistivity;  
 Perform a compaction test by applying a 4.5 kg (10 lb) weight atop 
the ash sample. Determine the resistance and calculate resistivity for 
the compacted sample; 
 Save bulk and tested samples for additional investigations such as 
chemical (IC PMS, XRF, XRD, etc.) and particle size analysis.  
4.6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A rare but severe form of Type A pollution, volcanic ash can cause pollution-
induced insulator flashover and subsequent disruption to power supply. 
Volcanic ash varies widely in both ESDD and NSDD and therefore pollution 
severity with each new eruption. Results from this study complement the 
existing knowledge on insulator contamination and show that very small 
accumulations of volcanic ash (e.g. 0.5–1 mm thickness) can have high 
pollution severity and thus potential to cause insulator flashover. This is 
significant considering the possibility of many tens of millimetres of ash 
accumulation during a single volcanic eruption.  
Several limitations are inherent in the ESDD method when analysing 
volcanic ash, primarily: (1) the ESDD method does not account for the 
variations in electrical conductivity of the ash under different 
environmental, chemical and physical conditions (e.g. moisture content, 
compaction, grain size and whole rock chemistry); (2) the time consuming 
ESDD method cannot rapidly provide pollution severity information to 
system operators looking to mitigate ash-induced flashover; and, (3) cannot 
provide IEC 60815-1 (2008) SPS classifications for volcanic ash deposits with 
NSDD >4 mg/cm2. 
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It is essential that volcanic ash be collected and analysed at the first 
opportunity to provide system operators with useful information that can 
support the decision to implement mitigation strategies. An emphasis should 
be made on research leading to ‘low-tech’ measuring techniques, which, 
though possibly less precise and sensitive, can be applied locally, easily, and 
inexpensively. The resistivity method developed in Chapter 3 to 
characterise the electrical properties of volcanic ash is a fast, simple and 
comprehensive approach to understanding the potential for ash-induced 
flashover on HV insulators. 
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OVERVIEW 
Volcanic ash-induced insulator flashover is the most likely impact to disrupt 
HV power systems during and/or following an ashfall (Chapter 2). Until now, 
our understanding has been based on the Mount St Helens study and 
anecdotal field observations (Chapter 2). A lack of empirical data on the 
external factors influencing the flashover mechanism has prompted the 
need for a systematic analysis of the subject. Chapter 5 presents the results 
from electrical tests carried out to assess the vulnerability of a range of 
different HV insulators commonly used in New Zealand’s transmission 
system to volcanic ash-induced insulator flashover.  
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5.1 ABSTRACT 
High voltage (HV) station and line insulators used on alternating current 
(AC) systems are vulnerable to volcanic ash-induced flashover, yet little 
quantitative data exists on the environmental, volcanological and electrical 
parameters most influential in reducing their flashover voltage. This chapter 
presents results from clean-fog rapid flashover tests for 5 different 
suspension insulators of either ceramic or non-ceramic construction under 
different environmental and volcanic ash contamination scenarios. Results 
suggest composite polymer insulators have higher dielectric strength 
(pollution performance) than ceramic equivalents under light to heavy 
pollution severities due to their hydrophobic properties. However, all 
insulators tested here perform comparably when critically contaminated (i.e. 
both top and bottom surfaces coated in ash). Based on these and other 
findings, recommendations for best insulator selection and maintenance are 
provided.  
5.2 INTRODUCTION 
The process of insulator contamination, associated flashover and subsequent 
loss of service has been a major problem on electric power systems since 
their inception in the early 1900s (Baker et al., 2009). Volcanic ash is an 
infrequent, but potentially highly disruptive form of contamination capable 
of causing insulator flashover across station and line insulators (porcelain, 
glass or polymeric) (Chapter 2). Of all eruptive hazards, ashfall can affect 
the most people because of the wide areas that can be covered by fallout 
(Blong, 1996). Considering 9% of the world’s population lives within 100 km 
of a historically active volcano (Horwell and Baxter 2006), and the 
increasing reliance of society on electricity to maintain normal operations, 
there is a desire to increase power system resilience to volcanic ashfall 
hazards.  
Most efficiently produced by explosive volcanic eruptions, volcanic ash 
consists of two chief components: (1) non-soluble, pulverised fragments (<2 
mm particle diameter) of rock, minerals and glass (SiO2); and (2) soluble 
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salts which form on the surface of ash particles during ash–gas/aerosol 
interaction within the volcanic plume (Delmelle et al., 2007). These 
attached surface salts supply ionic content to an otherwise electrically inert 
material. Once the attached salts are dissolved into solution (e.g. by dew, 
fog or light rain) the ash becomes a conductive electrolyte and poses a 
flashover hazard to the power system (Chapter 3). 
While the pollution flashover phenomenon has been studied in great 
detail (e.g. Adler et al., 1948; Lambeth, 1971; Jolly, 1972; CIGRE Taskforce 
33.04.01, 2000; Gencoglu and Cebeci, 2008), little knowledge exists on the 
pollution performance of HV insulators subjected to volcanic ash 
contamination. Although anecdotal evidence (e.g. Wilson et al., 2009; 
Chapter 2) and limited experiments (e.g. Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Matsuoka 
et al., 1995) provide some understanding of ash-induced flashover processes, 
a systematic examination of this problem has not been conducted to-date. 
This study presents the results from clean-fog rapid flashover tests for 5 
different suspension insulators subjected to a range of contamination 
scenarios. The minimum flashover voltage and the dielectric strength for 
each insulator is measured and compared against each other. Based on the 
findings, considerations for appropriate insulator selection for ashy 
environments are discussed.  
5.3 PREVIOUS STUDIES 
This study builds on the preliminary research of Nellis and Hendrix, (1980) 
and Matsuoka et al. (1995). These pioneering studies have informed our 
experimental design and parameters.  
Nellis and Hendrix (1980) carried out electrical tests on HVAC 
insulators which flashed over during the 1980 Mount St Helens eruption. A 
range of insulator types (115 kV, 500 kV jumper, 15 kV bus and switch) and 
configurations (suspension, strain, and vee-string) were removed from 
service, transported to a laboratory and subjected to a range of artificial 
wetting conditions (fog, light rain, and heavy rain) and ash thicknesses (3-6 
mm). It was found that wet volcanic ash has a high probability of initiating 
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flashovers when insulating surfaces (i.e. top and bottom of weathersheds) 
are completely coated in ash, and insulator profile and orientation are 
primary controls on pollution accumulation rates, and therefore 
performance. While their findings provide insight into the atmospheric and 
electrical conditions influencing ash-induced flashover, the study had some 
limitations: (1) the state of the insulators prior to ash-contamination (e.g. 
pre-existing contamination, dielectric strength, etc.) was unknown; (2) it 
was unclear whether the ash samples used in those tests had lost some of 
their soluble salt content (e.g. due to rain leaching) prior to analysis; (3) 
specific pollution severities (i.e. equivalent soluble/non-soluble deposit 
densities, (ESDD/NSDD)) were unspecified; and (4) no discussion or advice 
on optimal insulator selection for ashy environments was provided.  
Matsuoka et al. (1995) collected ash samples from several Japanese 
volcanoes for chemical analyses and artificial pollution tests to assess the 
volcanic ash performance of a porcelain standard disc (250 mm diameter) 
suspension insulator and a porcelain long-rod model. The chemical and 
electrical properties (ESDD/NSDD) of each ash sample varied considerably, 
and increasing ash contamination severity significantly decreased the 
withstand voltage of the insulator specimens. The most significant finding 
was that volcanic ash did not reduce the performance of the suspension 
insulator as severely as sea-salt (ocean spray) contamination with equivalent 
ESDD. However, the long-rod specimen displayed withstand voltage 
characteristics almost equal to those found for sea-salt contamination, 
suggesting that differences in uniformity of the ash layer and wetting along 
the insulator surface were mainly responsible for the dissimilarity in results. 
While comparison against sea-salt contamination is a useful design exercise, 
the unusually high NSDD of volcanic ash makes it very different from other 
forms of airborne pollution (Chapters 1 and 4), and is expected to have 
additional implications for the flashover (or withstand) voltage 
characteristics of HV insulators. In addition, Matsuoka et al. (1995) analysed 
only 2 (ceramic) insulator models, did not provide flashover data past 0.2 
mg/cm2 ESDD (except for one outlier at 3 mg/cm2), and did not specify 
important experimental design parameters such as ash contamination 
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thickness, distribution, or coverage of protected creepage distance. This 
study therefore looks to complement existing knowledge on the flashover 
characteristics of HVAC suspension insulators through a comprehensive and 
methodical testing programme.  
5.4 IMPORTANT FACTORS INFLUENCING POLLUTION-
INDUCED FLASHOVER 
This study investigates the main environmental, geological and electrical 
parameters most responsible for reducing the flashover voltage of HVAC 
insulators. The following sections provide rationale for our experimental 
design which has been adapted from those used in earlier volcanic ash 
studies (e.g. Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Matsuoka et al., 1995) and/or 
international technical standards (e.g. IEC 60507, 1991; IEEE Std 4, 1995). 
5.4.1 Creepage and total surface area coverage 
The single most important parameter of pollution performance in ceramic 
insulators is creepage distance (IEEE Std 1313.2, 1999). Nellis and Hendrix 
(1980) suggested that insulator strings and other types of external insulators 
with 30% or more of their creepage distance protected from/clear of ash 
contamination and rain would not initiate large-scale outages. The amount 
of creepage distance covered in wet volcanic ash should therefore be a 
primary control on the flashover voltage.  
The distribution of the contaminant (i.e. the amount of surface area 
covered) has a significant influence on the flashover voltage of an insulator. 
Cherney et al. (1983) found that contaminating just the underside of 
standard-disc insulator weathersheds (higher surface area than the top 
surface) significantly lowered the flashover voltage from that observed with 
contamination applied only to the top surface. As with creepage coverage, 
the amount of surface area covered by volcanic ash is expected to be an 
important influence on the flashover characteristics of the insulators 
selected for this study. 
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5.4.2 Insulator profile, orientation, and material 
The effect of the orientation of an insulator on its flashover performance is 
not subject to simple rules. Several factors affect the influence of insulator 
orientation on pollution performance (after IEC 60815-1, 2008): 
1) Insulator profile and size; 
2) Time taken for maximum pollution levels to build up;  
3) Nature of the wetting process;  
4) Flashover mechanism (e.g. surface flashover or intershed breakdown).  
Nellis and Hendrix (1980) found that, of all orientations tested, the 
suspension (or ‘I’) configuration produced the lowest flashover voltage. 
Anecdotal field observations also suggest that HV suspension (vertical) 
insulators are more likely to flashover during or after ashfalls (e.g. Chapter 
2), and are therefore considered most vulnerable. There have been some 
significant examples where this has not been the case, such as the 1995/96 
eruption of Ruapehu (New Zealand), when several strain (horizontal) 
insulators located near the volcano (~15 km) flashed over from 3 mm of 
volcanic ash and mud contamination (Chapter 2). However, given the 
stronger evidence for the former situation, this study concentrates only on 
the effect of volcanic ash contamination on the flashover voltage of 
suspension insulators.  
High-creepage insulators such as the fog or bowl-profiles generally 
perform better under polluted conditions (IEC 60815-1, 2008), however, 
large, deep ribs on the underside of these profiles can generate vortexes 
which may deposit high levels of pollution on portions of the insulator that 
are difficult to wash (Looms, 1988). Thus, despite the longer creepage path, 
a higher rate of pollution accumulation and greater rate of retention can 
degrade or even reverse the performance that was originally gained with 
extra creepage distance (Farzaneh and Chisholm, 2009).  
Hydrocarbon and silicone greases, and room temperature vulcanising 
(RTV) coatings are widely used to improve the flashover performance of 
ceramic insulators situated in areas of high pollution as they surround 
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contaminants with a monolayer of low-weight silicone polymers which 
imparts hydrophobicity to the pollution layer (Kim, 1990; Cherney and Gorur, 
1999; Jia et al., 2008; Chapter 1). However, considering larger amounts of 
pollution may accumulate on some polymer surfaces than ceramics (IEC 
60815-3, 2008; IEEE Std 1313.2, 1999) and contaminants with high non-
soluble deposit density (NSDD) overwhelm the natural hydrophobicity 
transfer of silicone oils (Rizk et al., 1997), high levels of volcanic ash 
contamination (e.g. NSDD >100 mg/cm2) may reduce the pollution 
performance advantage of polymers over comparable glass and porcelain 
designs.  
5.4.3 Ash conductivity 
Several factors influence the conductivity of volcanic ash (Chapter 3) 
(Figure 5.1). The conductivity of the ash layer will directly affect the 
amount of current flow across the insulator surface, and hence the 
likelihood of flashover. If the layer conductivity of a volcanic ash deposit on 
an HV insulator is sufficiently high, discharges are initiated, propagated and 
extinguished in a process called ‘dry-band arcing’. If an arc grows to a 
sufficient length along the insulator, the remaining air gap will become too 
weak to withstand the line voltage and cause dielectric breakdown 
(flashover) across or around the surface of the insulator (Farzaneh and 
Chisholm, 2009). Results in Chapter 3 showed that the electrical 
conductivity of volcanic ash increases with increasing soluble salt content, 
moisture content, compaction (bulk density) and, to a lesser degree, 
particle size. These are important physical and chemical promoters of 
conductivity which are discussed further in Section 5.5.3.1.  
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Figure 5.1: Flow chart illustrating the primary variables that promote volcanic ash-induced 
insulator flashover (adapted from Johnston, 1997). 
5.5 METHODS 
An electrical testing programme was designed to investigate how increasing 
ash-pollution severity would influence the flashover voltage of HVAC 
suspension insulators. The following sections describe the test facilities, 
insulators, testing procedures, and analytical methods used to assess the 
individual performance of each insulator specimen.  
5.5.1 Test facilities 
Clean-fog rapid flashover tests were performed in the HV laboratory at the 
University of Canterbury (UC). Voltage was supplied from 2 phases of a 3-
phase 400 V supply to a 50 Hz, 400 V/300 kV, 100 kVA test transformer via a 
400 V/0-440 V regulator as shown in Figure 5.2. The short circuit current at 
300 kV rated voltage is 2.5 A. This is limited by the combination of the 
transformer series impedance and the impedance of the supply transformer, 
cable and regulator. Insulators were suspended and isolated from the ceiling 
of the HV laboratory. The top of the insulator string was earthed to 
replicate the configuration of insulators suspended from a transmission 
tower. To prevent unwanted corona discharge, the HV was applied to a 
copper sphere which was fastened to the base of the insulator via a cable 
from the test transformer.  
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Figure 5.2: Schematic diagram of the test circuit.  
Applied voltage across the insulator was measured with a rectifying 
transducer on the LV winding which supplied a meter on the control console. 
This was verified against an independent HV divider probe connected to the 
HV terminal up to 40 kV. The ratio between the voltage at the console 
meter and the voltage present at the HV divider was then used to calculate 
the applied voltage across the insulator.  
5.5.2 Insulators  
Considering the range of insulator designs used in a variety of polluted 
environments (IEC 60815-1, 2008), three ceramic (porcelain or glass) 
insulators of different profile and one non-ceramic (composite polymer) 
insulator, all commonly used in transmission systems in New Zealand, were 
chosen for analysis (Figure 5.3). Additionally, a standard glass insulator 
string was treated with a 0.5 mm layer of RTV silicone rubber coating 
provided by Hebei Silicone Valley Chemical Co. (China) according to the 
foam brush procedure prescribed by IEEE Std 1523 (2002) to investigate its 
effectiveness against volcanic ash contamination.  
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Table 5.1: Specifications for insulators used in this study. 
Material Profile Insulator description Figure 
# 
units 
# 
sheds 
Shed 
diameter 
Dry arc 
distance 
Creepage 
distance 
mm 
Porcelain 
Standard 
disc 
(clevis) 
Cap and pin standard disc insulators are effective 
for use in areas with 'very light' to 'moderate' 
pollution severity, where a long creepage distance 
or modified profile is not required. 
5.3a 3 3 240 617 1026 
Toughened 
Glass 
Standard 
disc (ball-
and-
socket) 
The standard glass disc profile chosen for this 
study has deeper under-ribs than the porcelain 
unit, providing added protection from wetting.  
5.3b 3 3 240 526 1035 
Toughened 
Glass 
Aeroform 
Aeroform, aerodynamic or ‘open profile’ discs are 
typically used in heavily polluted regions such as 
deserts, industrial areas and/or coastal areas not 
directly exposed to salt spray. The aeroform 
profile is especially effective in arid environments 
and has very good self-cleaning properties.  
5.3c 3 3 420 697 1191 
Polymeric 
66 kV long 
rod 
Generally, polymer shed profiles are simpler than 
those of glass or porcelain and the majority can 
be classed as open profiles. However, the 
polymeric specimen used in this study has shallow 
(0.5 cm) under-ribs for increased protected 
creepage distance. 
5.3d 1 6 170 700 1715 
RTV Glass 
Standard 
disc (ball-
and-
socket) 
A RTV coating is applied to standard glass discs to 
create a hydrophobic surface. We wish to 
investigate the coating’s effectiveness against 
volcanic ash contamination.  
5.3e 3 3 240 526 1035 
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a) Standard porcelain b) Standard glass c) Aeroform 
  
 
 
d) 66 kV long-rod composite polymer e) RTV standard glass 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Insulator profiles for the 5 specimens selected for this study.  
 
5.5.3 Procedures 
5.5.3.1 Pseudo ash 
While naturally occurring variations in volcanic ash properties may introduce 
additional effects on the flashover voltage of HV insulators, challenges in 
collecting pristine (e.g. unleached) samples and the large volume of 
material needed for artificial pollution tests made it logistically and 
practically difficult to collect freshly fallen ash for our analysis. Thus, using 
the method developed in Chapter 3, we bulk-manufactured a pseudo ash 
which replicates the chemical, physical and electrical parameters properties 
of freshly fallen ash. The replication of both soluble and non-soluble 
pollution for experimental use in the electrical industry is not uncommon. 
Kaolin, tonoko and bentonite (among others) mixed with a sodium chloride 
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(NaCl) solution have frequently been used in HV insulator contamination 
testing programmes (e.g. Fujitaka et al., 1968; Diesendorf and Parnell, 
1974; Cherney et al., 1983; Gautum et al., 2006). 
Results from Chapter 3 suggest that composition has little effect on 
the electrical conductivity of volcanic ash. Given the use of a basaltic proxy 
in both Chapters 3 and 4, and the large quantities readily available to us, 
unweathered Stoddart olivine basalt (from Halswell Quarry, Lyttelton 
volcano, New Zealand) (Guard, 1999) was maintained as the non-soluble 
volcanic component for our pseudo ash.  
Cherney et al. (1983) showed that the particle size (up to 1 mm 
particle diameter) of non-soluble material has negligible influence on the 
flashover voltage of contaminated HV insulators. Similarly, Chapter 3 
showed that all grain sizes can exhibit high conductivities when wet and are 
therefore similarly capable of inducing insulator flashover. To examine 
whether the particle size of volcanic ash has any effect on the flashover 
voltage of HV insulators, we chose to create two different pseudo ashes: (1) 
a predominantly fine-grained fraction (<0.1 mm) and (2) an ash with a 
coarse-grained component (<1 mm). These were manufactured by dry 
sieving the original crushed and pulverised product. Particle size 
distributions for both pseudo ashes were determined using a HORIBA Partica 
LA-950 laser diffraction particle size analyser. Each pseudo ash was sampled 
twice and measured a minimum of five times in the particle size analyser to 
ensure reliability of the results. The output values were averaged and the 
distribution curves are shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4: Particle size distributions for the 2-pseudo ashes used in this study (adapted 
from Chapter 4).  
To replicate the interactions at the ash–gas interface and other 
processes occurring between ash and volatiles within a volcanic plume, the 
simplified chemical dosing method developed in Chapter 3 was used to 
produce soluble salts on the surfaces of the pseudo ash. ESDD values of 
pseudo ash in Chapter 4 showed that a 0.15 M NaCl salt solution added to a 
3:1 ratio of ash:brine will create an ash with electrical properties which are 
within the bounds of freshly fallen ash (e.g. resistivity values between 200 
and 1,000 Ωm for uncompacted deposits (Chapter 3)). Thus, this 
concentration was used as an appropriate dosing agent for our artificial 
pollution tests. 
5.5.3.2 Application of the pollution layer 
Standardised artificial pollution tests recommend applying pollution via the 
flow-on or dipping techniques (IEC 60507, 1991; IEEE Std 4, 1995). However, 
considering (1) the importance of retaining soluble surface salts inherent in 
freshly fallen volcanic ash, (2) the potential for volcanic ash to be deposited 
in large quantities (e.g. >10 mm thicknesses) and (3) the lack of appropriate 
testing standards pertinent to volcanic ash contamination, the pollution 
layer for electrical tests was applied using dry pseudo ash. Prior studies (e.g. 
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Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Matsuoka et al., 1995) also found that this method 
produces a realistic representation of contamination observed in the field. 
Eruption plumes are dispersed by prevailing winds and volcanic ash can 
be deposited hundreds to thousands of kilometres from the volcano, 
depending on wind strength, ash grain size, ash density, and eruption 
magnitude (Sparks, 1986). Thus, 9 different ash-contamination scenarios 
(Table 5.2) were devised and replicated based on the depositional patterns 
described in existing literature (e.g. Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Blong, 1984; 
Chapter 2) and observations made in the field (e.g. Appendices 2 and 3). 
Contaminated scenarios (described herein as scenarios 4-9) are 
representative of worst-cases, as the entire top and/or bottom surfaces 
were coated as uniformly as possible. Given the lab setting, no wind or 
breeze was present during electrical tests. 
Table 5.2: The 9 different contamination scenarios devised for this study.  
Scenario 
Replicated 
environment 
Wetting 
rate 
(mm/hr) 
Ash 
top 
(mm) 
Ash 
bottom 
(mm) 
Particle 
size (mm) 
1 
Clean insulator in a 
dry environment 
0 0 0 N/A 
2 
Light contamination 
in a dry 
environment 
0 1 0 <0.1 or <1 
3 
Clean insulator in a 
wet environment 
6 0 0 N/A 
4 
Light contamination 
in a wet 
environment 
6 1 0 <0.1 
5 
Light contamination 
in a wet 
environment 
6 1 0 <1 
6 
Moderate 
contamination in a 
wet environment 
6 3 0 <0.1 
7 
Moderate 
contamination in a 
wet environment 
6 3 0 <1 
8 
Heavy 
contamination in a 
wet environment 
6 6 1 <0.1 
9 
Heavy 
contamination in a 
wet environment 
6 6 1 <1 
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For scenarios 2 and 4 – 9, dry ash was applied to the top of insulator 
weathersheds using a small sieve (diameter 10 cm, mesh size <0.1 or <1 
mm). For scenarios 8 and 9, dry ash was applied to the bottom surface of 
weathersheds by first spraying the insulator with a fine mist of water (same 
water source as that used for light rain simulation discussed in Section 
5.5.3.3) and then dusting pre-sieved ash over the surface by hand. By 
alternating between misting and dusting, a relatively uniform ash layer of 1-
2 mm was attained (Figure 5.5).  
   
Figure 5.5: Standard glass insulator specimen before running electric tests for a) scenario 
1, b) scenario 4, and c) scenario 9, (see Table 5.2 for scenarios).  
IEC 60815-1 (2008) suggests that type A pollution (that with a non-
soluble component) such as volcanic ash is best characterised by ESDD/NSDD 
measurements. Similarly, artificial pollution tests most often use ESDD as a 
comparative indicator of pollution severity. Thus, this study uses ESDD as 
the common measure of pollution severity for insulator performance curves. 
To broaden this focus, we also consider other important hazard intensity 
parameters such as ash thickness, NSDD, and % surface area and/or 
creepage coverage. ESDD and NSDD for each scenario (top surface, bottom 
surface and an average of both) were calculated using the pseudo ash data 
presented in Chapter 4.  
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5.5.3.3 Artificial wetting process 
Earlier studies suggest dry volcanic ash is non-conducting and will not 
immediately lead to insulator flashover (e.g. Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; 
Matsuoka et al., 1995; Chapters 2 and 3). Thus, an artificial wetting process 
was assembled to simulate humid climatic conditions. 
Light wetting conditions such as fog, dew, or drizzle are primarily 
responsible for pollution-related flashovers (e.g. IEC 60815-1, 2008; Baker et 
al., 2009). This is supported by Nellis and Hendrix (1980) and ample 
accounts of volcanic ash-induced flashovers from the field (Chapter 2). 
However, Matsuoka et al. (1995) found that, among the various wetting 
conditions, the withstand voltage of insulators contaminated by volcanic ash 
was lowest under simulated heavy rain (e.g. >10 mm/hr). Considering the 
importance of retaining ash on the insulator for the duration of flashover 
tests (i.e. to ensure the conductive ash layer does not get washed away), 
and the common use of simulated mist, steam or fog for standardised 
artificial pollution tests (e.g. IEC 60507, 1991; IEEE Std 4, 1995), light-
moderate rain conditions (~6 mm/hr) were replicated using an air atomising 
nozzle (Figure 5.6). The spray nozzle used for the artificial wetting process 
was configured perpendicular to the test insulators, according to the 
guidelines prescribed by IEC 60507 (1991) and IEEE Std 4 (1995).  
Atmospheric conditions such as temperature (e.g. Ishii et al., 1984; 
Zaengl et al., 1991) and barometric pressure (e.g. Rudakova and Tikhodeev, 
1989; Hoch and Swift, 1992) have an influence on the flashover voltage of 
HV insulators (Mizuno et al., 1997). Thus, ambient (laboratory) temperature 
and barometric pressure were recorded at the beginning of each testing 
round to account for any major variations in flashover voltage. These results 
are presented in Section 5.6.  
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Figure 5.6: Top: A contaminated composite insulator being subjected to light rain during 
electrical tests, Bottom: External air + water mixing atomising spray nozzle (not to scale) 
used during the rapid flashover experiments. The insulator specimen was positioned in a 
vertical (string) position, within the atomised rain cloud, approximately 2 m (midway 
between distances C and D) from the nozzle.  
Similarly, temperature and conductivity of the simulated rain source 
(Christchurch, New Zealand tap water with a volume conductivity ~130 
μS/cm) varied slightly over the course of the testing programme. To account 
for these changes, 3 temperature and 3 conductivity measurements were 
taken, averaged and recorded before starting each scenario. These results 
can also be found in Section 5.6. 
5.5.3.4 Data analysis 
Clean-fog rapid flashover method 
Experimental determination of the flashover voltage for different insulator 
profiles covering a wide range of contaminated conditions is extremely time 
consuming (Sundararajan and Gorur, 1996). The standardised solid layer 
artificial pollution test uses an ‘up and down’ method to statistically 
determine the 50% flashover voltage (V50) of the insulator being tested (IEC 
60507, 1991; IEEE Std 4, 1995). To acquire a robust and extensive dataset in 
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a reasonable space of time, we adapted the clean-fog rapid flashover 
method first developed by Lambeth (1988) to determine the V50 of specimen 
insulators. The clean fog rapid flashover method follows a preparation 
procedure identical to that of standard pollution tests, but varies the 
applied voltage upwards or downwards in relatively small steps (e.g. 4-5%) 
to calculate V50 over an elapsed period of artificial wetting. Using the rapid 
flashover method, the V50 at a given pollution level (ash thickness and/or 
ESDD/NSDD) can be estimated in 1-2 hrs time. Results obtained from 
previous application of the rapid flashover method (e.g. Lambeth, 1988; 
Vlastos et al., 1991; Gutman et al., 2012) have shown good correlation with 
those reported in standard up and down tests. Thus, electrical tests were 
carried out according to the following procedure (adapted from Lambeth, 
1988): 
1. Install clean insulator in the configuration and location to be used 
for testing; 
2. Contaminate insulator in place with dry pseudo ash to desired 
thickness (ESDD/NSDD) and surface coverage; 
3. Preliminary tests discovered static-repellence of dry ash deposits 
with increasing applied voltage (Wardman et al., 2010; Mee et al., 
2012). To avoid this self-cleaning effect or dielectrophoresis (Pohl, 
1978), turn on light rain for 5 minutes to wet the ash layer before 
energisation; 
4. Energise insulators to desired 50 Hz voltage level; 
5. At constant 50 Hz voltage level, continue testing for 2 minutes or 
until flashover occurs; 
6. If no flashover occurs, raise voltage in 5% steps every 2 minutes 
until flashover; 
7. If a flashover occurs, re-energise the insulator at a voltage ~2.5 
steps below the last flashover value; 
8. This sequence is repeated for each scenario, with the flashover 
voltage values decreasing to a minimum during the period of 
maximum wetness (maximum conductivity). A round of tests may 
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stop once flashover values are consistently above the minimum or 
until 15 consecutive flashovers have been recorded.  
To ensure repeatability and reliability of results, three rounds of tests 
were performed per scenario. The series of flashover values should produce 
a U-shaped pollution performance curve, corresponding to the reduction of 
flashover voltage as attached soluble salts are dissolved from the ash and 
recovery as the electrolytic solution is washed off the insulator surface (e.g. 
Lambeth, 1988; Vlastos et al., 1991; Gutman et al., 2012).  
Rapid flashover method for composite insulators 
There are currently no standardised testing methods for polymer insulators 
(IEC 60815-3, 2008). Early artificial pollution tests for composite insulators 
found that polymeric surfaces tend to lose some of their hydrophobicity 
with each flashover; however, new insight suggests composite insulators are 
very rarely completely hydrophobic (or completely hydrophilic) in service 
(Farzaneh and Chisholm, 2009). The rapid flashover test therefore allows 
any potential pollution performance reduction due to loss of hydrophobicity 
to be detected and evaluated (Gutman et al., 2012).  
5.5.3.5 Determination of minimum flashover voltage and dielectric 
strength  
The performance criterion for the rapid flashover technique is the minimum 
flashover voltage value (Vmin). The Vmin can be determined in one of two 
ways: (1) if wetting time is short, the lowest flashover value may be used 
(Lambeth, 1988), or (2) to account for the random variation in flashover 
values, it is acceptable to use an average of the lowest flashover and the 
highest withstand values obtained during the 3 test rounds as the Vmin for 
the entire scenario (Gutman et al., 2012).  
Limitations in the voltage capacity of our testing transformer meant 
that each ceramic insulator string was limited to 3 units (discs). No 
transmission or distribution lines in New Zealand utilise 3-disc suspension 
insulators, thus, it is not possible to compare Vmin values obtained from this 
study to normal operating (service) voltages. However, Vmin data obtained 
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from rapid flashover tests are usually presented in terms of V50 (IEEE 
Working Group, 1979), which is an indication of the insulator’s dielectric 
strength (CIGRE Working Group 33.07, 1992). As a general rule, if the ratio 
of creepage distance to dry arc distance is not too large, clean fog test 
results tend to be linear with regard to the number of insulators in a string 
and, hence, to the creepage and dry arc distances (IEEE Std 1313.2, 1999). 
It is therefore common to express test results as a critical flashover gradient 
(V50), where the flashover stress (Vmin) is normalised to creepage distance 
(in units of kV rms of line-to-earth voltage per metre (kV/m) or unit 
(kV/unit) creepage distance). This corrects for much of the performance 
difference between insulators of different profiles (Farzaneh and Chisholm, 
2009).  
5.6 RESULTS 
Raw flashover data and averages of the results from the three rounds of 
tests per scenario are provided for each insulator type in the following 
sections (Figures 5.7-5.11, Tables 5.3-5.7).  
5.6.1 Standard porcelain 
The V50 of the standard porcelain insulator increased by 5% from scenario 1 
to scenario 2 (i.e. with the addition of dry volcanic ash to a dry insulator) 
(Table 5.3). There was a 12% reduction in V50 from scenario 3 to 4 and 
dielectric strength for scenarios 4-7 ranged from 93-102 kV/m. Scenarios 4 
and 6 (pseudo ash <0.1 mm particle diameter) displayed a 5% reduction in 
V50 while scenarios 5 and 7 (pseudo ash <1 mm particle diameter) showed no 
difference in V50 despite an increase in pollution severities (ESDD/NSDD). 
Scenarios 8 and 9 had the highest ESDD/NSDD and surface coverage of all 
scenarios and also displayed the lowest V50 values, with scenario 9 (pseudo 
ash <1 mm particle diameter) exhibiting the lowest (36 kV/m) of all 
scenarios.  
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Table 5.3: Test results for the standard porcelain insulator.  
  
SCENARIO 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Grain Size mm   <1   <0.1 <1 <0.1 <1 <0.1 <1 
Thickness (Top) mm   1   1 1 3 3 6 6 
ESDDt mg/cm
2   0.1   0.1 0.1 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.2 
NSDDt mg/cm
2   44.4   35.3 44.4 185 247 359 447 
Thickness (Btm) mm               1 1 
ESDDb mg/cm
2               0.1 0.1 
NSDDb mg/cm
2               35.3 44.4 
Ave. ESDD mg/cm2   0.02   0.02 0.02 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 
Ave. NSDD mg/cm2   10.7   8.5 10.7 44.7 59.6 113 142 
Surface Cover %   24   24 24 24 24 100 100 
Rain Conductivity μS/cm     128 133 117 113 108 127 107 
Lab Temp °C 13.5 14.0 17.5 14.0 16.3 16.0 14.8 14.7 16.0 
Baro. Pressure hPa 1010 1015 1005 1014 1018 1020 998 1003 1010 
Hi Withstand kV 170 180 120 105 95 100 95 45 35 
Lo Flashover kV 180 190 125 110 100 105 100 49 38 
Vmin kV 175 185 123 108 98 103 98 47 36 
V50 kV/m 165.7 175.4 117.0 102.3 92.6 97.5 92.6 43.9 34.1 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Flashover voltages for the standard porcelain insulator during scenarios 1-9.  
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5.6.2 Standard glass 
The V50 of the standard glass insulator increased by 3% from scenario 1 to 
scenario 2 and decreased by 9% from scenario 3 to scenario 4. Modest 
reductions in V50 were observed from scenario 4 to scenario 6 (5%) and from 
scenario 5 to scenario 7 (2%). A 100/148% increase in ESDD/NSDD from 
scenario 6 to 8, caused a 60% reduction in V50. Similarly, an ESDD/NSDD 
increase of 100/131% between scenarios 7 and 9 caused a 73% reduction in 
V50. The lowest dielectric strength displayed by the standard glass insulator 
was during scenario 9 (30 kV/m) and was the lowest V50 value observed over 
the testing programme.  
Table 5.4: Test results for the standard glass insulator.  
  
SCENARIO 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Grain Size mm   <0.1   <0.1 <1 <0.1 <1 <0.1 <1 
Thickness (Top) mm   1   1 1 3 3 6 6 
ESDDt mg/cm
2   0.1   0.1 0.1 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.2 
NSDDt mg/cm
2   44.4   35.3 44.4 185 247 359 447 
Thickness (Btm) mm               1 1 
ESDDb mg/cm
2               0.1 0.1 
NSDDb mg/cm
2               35.3 44.4 
Ave. ESDD mg/cm2   0.03   0.03 0.03 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 
Ave. NSDD mg/cm2   11.8   9.4 11.8 49.3 65.9 122 152 
Surface Cover %   27   27 27 27 27 100 100 
Rain Conductivity μS/cm     135 144 141 137 141 148 143 
Lab Temp °C 12.3 12.7 13.2 16.0 17.7 17.3 17.2 16.7 16.2 
Baro. Pressure hPa 1030 1028 1027 1022 1013 1010 1020 1014 1018 
Hi Withstand kV 165 170 110 100 110 95 110 45 30 
Lo Flashover kV 170 175 115 105 115 100 111 47 30 
Vmin kV 168 173 113 103 113 98 111 46 30 
V50 kV/m 159.4 164.3 106.3 96.6 106.3 91.8 106.3 43.5 29.0 
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Figure 5.8: Flashover voltages for the standard glass insulator during scenarios 1-9.  
5.6.3 Aeroform 
The V50 of the aeroform insulator remained the same from scenario 1 to 
scenario 2 but decreased by 33% from scenario 3 to scenario 4. A 12% 
increase in V50 was observed between scenario 4 and scenario 6 despite 
higher pollution severity in the latter. Contrarily, the 400/557% increase in 
ESDD/NSDD from scenario 5 to scenario 7 caused a modest 3% reduction in 
V50. From scenario 6 to 8, the V50 was reduced by 53% and by 55% from 
scenario 7 to 9. The lowest dielectric strength observed for the aeroform 
insulator was during scenario 9 (34 kV/m). 
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Table 5.5: Test results for the aeroform insulator.  
  
SCENARIO 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Grain Size mm   <1   <0.1 <1 <0.1 <1 <0.1 <1 
Thickness (Top) mm   1   1 1 3 3 6 6 
ESDDt mg/cm
2   0.1   0.1 0.1 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.2 
NSDDt mg/cm
2   44.4   35.3 44.4 185 247 359 447 
Thickness (Btm) mm               1 1 
ESDDb mg/cm
2               0.1 0.1 
NSDDb mg/cm
2               35.3 44.4 
Ave. ESDD mg/cm2   0.04   0.04 0.04 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 
Ave. NSDD mg/cm2   17.9   14.2 17.9 74.7 99.7 166 207 
Surface Cover %   43   43 43 43 43 100 100 
Rain Conductivity μS/cm     140 130 119 142 125 124 128 
Lab Temp °C 18.0 17.5 17.2 16.7 13.7 14.8 14.8 15.2 12.7 
Baro. Pressure hPa 1006 999 1004 989 1009 1001 1002 999 1003 
Hi Withstand kV 155 155 125 85 95 95 90 45 40 
Lo Flashover kV 160 160 130 88 98 100 95 47 43 
Vmin kV 158 158 128 86 96 98 93 46 42 
V50 kV/m 130.1 130.1 105.0 71.4 79.8 79.8 75.6 37.8 33.6 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Flashover voltages for the aeroform insulator during scenario 1-9.  
5.6.4 66 kV long-rod composite polymer 
The V50 of the composite insulator increased by 1% from scenario 1 to 
scenario 2 and decreased by 5% from scenario 3 to scenario 4. Scenario 5 
saw a 7% decrease in V50 from scenario 3 while scenarios 6 and 7 caused 26% 
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and 16% reductions in V50, respectively. Scenarios 8 and 9 produced the 
most critical V50 values, with 66% and 67% reductions from scenario 3, 
respectively. The composite insulator had the highest ESDD/NSDD values 
across all contaminated scenario.  
Table 5.6: Test results for the polymeric insulator.  
  
SCENARIO 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Grain Size mm   <0.1   <0.1 <1 <0.1 <1 <0.1 <1 
Thickness (Top) mm   1   1 1 3 3 6 6 
ESDDt mg/cm
2   0.1   0.1 0.1 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.2 
NSDDt mg/cm
2   44.4   35.3 44.4 185 247 359 447 
Thickness (Btm) mm               1 1 
ESDDb mg/cm
2               0.1 0.1 
NSDDb mg/cm
2               35.3 44.4 
Ave. ESDD mg/cm2   0.04   0.04 0.04 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 
Ave. NSDD mg/cm2   19.1   15.2 19.1 79.6 106 174 218 
Surface Cover %   32   32 32 32 32 100 100 
Rain Conductivity μS/cm     125 120 128 124 134 136 137 
Lab Temp °C 19.8 15.0 15.5 15.2 16.7 13.0 16.3 18.0 18.0 
Baro. Pressure hPa 996 989 1004 1002 993 1002 1013 1002 1003 
Hi Withstand kV 205 205 190 180 175 140 160 65 60 
Lo Flashover kV 207 210 195 185 180 145 165 68 65 
Vmin kV 206 208 193 183 178 143 163 66 63 
V50 kV/m 119.5 119.5 110.8 105.0 102.0 81.6 93.3 37.9 35.0 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Flashover voltages for the polymeric insulator during scenario 1-9.  
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5.6.5 RTV standard glass 
There was no change in V50 from scenario 1 to 2. Scenario 3 brought about a 
27% reduction in V50 from the dry scenarios (1 and 2), while scenarios 4 and 
5 saw a further 13% reduction. A 100/148% increase in ESDD/NSDD from 
scenario 6 to 8, caused a 62% reduction in the V50. Similarly, an ESDD/NSDD 
increase of 100/131% between scenario 7 and 9 caused a 65% reduction in 
the V50. The RTV insulator exhibited the highest V50 values for scenario 1 
and scenarios 3-6. Its lowest dielectric strength was observed during 
scenario 9 (33.8 kV/m).  
Compared with data acquired for the untreated standard glass 
insulator, the RTV coated specimen exhibited better pollution performance 
for scenarios 1-4. The V50 was equivalent for scenario 5 while the 
unmodified insulator displayed higher dielectric strength than the RTV 
coated specimen under heavier contamination levels in scenarios 6-8.  
Table 5.7: Test results for the RTV glass insulator.  
  
SCENARIO 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Grain Size mm   <1   <0.1 <1 <0.1 <1 <0.1 <1 
Thickness (Top) mm   1   1 1 3 3 6 6 
ESDDt mg/cm
2   0.1   0.1 0.1 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.2 
NSDDt mg/cm
2   44.4   35.3 44.4 185 247 359 447 
Thickness (Btm) mm               1 1 
ESDDb mg/cm
2               0.1 0.1 
NSDDb mg/cm
2               35.3 44.4 
Ave. ESDD mg/cm2   0.03   0.03 0.03 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 
Ave. NSDD mg/cm2   11.8   9.4 11.8 49.3 65.9 122 152 
Surface Cover %   27   27 27 27 27 100 100 
Rain Conductivity μS/cm     131 127 134 133 142 143 126 
Lab Temp °C 19.7 18.7 19.7 19.0 16.2 17.5 19.5 17.7 18.2 
Baro. Pressure hPa 1013 1013 1011 1009 1025 1026 1024 1015 1012 
Hi Withstand kV 175 175 130 110 110 105 100 40 35 
Lo Flashover kV 180 180 130 115 115 110 105 42 40 
Vmin kV 178 178 130 113 113 108 103 41 38 
V50 kV/m 169.1 169.1 125.6 106.3 106.3 101.4 96.6 38.6 33.8 
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Figure 5.11: Flashover voltages for the RTV glass insulator during scenarios 1-9.  
5.7 DISCUSSION 
Critical flashover voltages were only observed once top and bottom surfaces 
of insulator weathersheds were completely covered in ash. This suggests 
that significant deposits of ash must accumulate on the bottom surface of 
suspension insulators before flashover will occur in-service. The following 
sections (1) compare and discuss the pollution performance of the ceramic 
and non-ceramic insulators used in this study, (2) consider the most 
influential environmental, volcanological and electrical parameters on the 
flashover voltage, (3) provide comment on important insulator selection 
criteria for ashy environments.  
5.7.1 Pollution performance 
Trends in the plotted V50 data and associated lines of best fit indicate that 
the dielectric strength of the 5 insulators decreased with increasing 
pollution severity (ESDD/NSDD and/or ash thickness) (Figure 5.12).  
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Figure 5.12: Pollution performance curves for scenarios 3-9. The Red shaded area 
represents the range of average ESDD/NSDD values for scenarios 4 and 5 (Ave. ESDD/NSDD 
0.02/10.7 – 0.04/19.1 mg/cm2; 1 mm thicknesses on top surface); yellow represents those 
for scenarios 6 and 7 (Ave. ESDD/NSDD 0.1/60 – 0.3/106 mg/cm2; 3 mm thicknesses on top 
surface); blue for scenarios 8 and 9 (ESDD/NSDD 0.3/113 – 0.6/218 mg/cm2; 6 mm and 1 
mm on top and bottom surfaces, respectively). 
Performance curves for the porcelain, glass and RTV insulators are 
similar and may be explained by their comparable dimensions (e.g. 
creepage length, dry arc/connection length, and shed diameter), which, in 
turn, produce similar pollution (ESDD/NSDD) severities.  
Despite significantly higher ESDD values, the aeroform and composite 
insulators displayed equivalent dielectric strength to that of other models 
during the most critical scenarios (8 and 9). This suggests (1) insulators 
tested in this study have similar potential to flashover at rated line voltage 
during critically contaminated conditions (i.e. both top and bottom surfaces 
of sheds coated in wet ash), and (2) increasing contamination severity (i.e. 
thickness and/or ESDD/NSDD) has little effect on dielectric strength once 
the top and bottom surfaces of the insulator have been coated by ≥1 mm of 
ash.  
For the majority of insulators, there was little (e.g. <10%) to no change 
in V50 for scenarios 4-7. This suggests that moderate accumulations of 
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volcanic ash can accumulate on the top surfaces of insulator sheds (up to 3 
mm in this study) without severely reducing dielectric strength, provided 
the bottom surface of the insulator remains clean and dry. This is important, 
as in a low wind setting volcanic ash will most readily accumulate on the top 
of horizontal surfaces.  
5.7.1.1 Ceramic insulators 
Ceramic insulators used herein generally showed higher dielectric strength 
than those in Matsuoka et al. (1995) under light to heavy pollution severities 
(ESDD from 0.001 to 0.2 mg/cm2) (Figure 5.13). However, above this 
threshold, all known volcanic ash-flashover studies show similar 
performance data, with critical V50 values being ~10 kV/unit (Table 5.8).  
 
Figure 5.13: V50 (kV/unit) values for the ceramic insulators used in this study (scenarios 3-
9). The NaCl design curve and volcanic ash data from Matsuoka et al. (1995) have been 
added for comparison.  
With the exception of scenario 9, the aeroform insulator consistently 
displayed the lowest dielectric strength of all designs during contaminated 
scenarios. This is likely due to the reduced creepage distance on the 
underside of the insulator. As creepage distance is proportional to pollution 
performance, the relatively low performance of the aeroform specimen is 
likely due to a balanced distribution of creepage distance over the top and 
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bottom surfaces. Despite an absence of corrugation and 30-60% 
improvement in self-cleaning ability over the standard disc insulator (Akbar 
and Zedan, 1991), results in this study suggest that aeroform suspension 
insulators will not perform as well as standard disc profiles in ashy 
environments. However, the improved self-cleaning ability may be 
advantageous in the horizontal configuration, though more research is 
needed to investigate this.  
Table 5.8: Comparison of volcanic ash pollution performance results for three 
studies on standard ceramic suspension insulators.  
Lab Investigators Year 
# of 
Units/ 
discs 
Insulator 
Profile and 
Material 
Lowest 
V50 
(kV/unit) 
ESDD 
(mg/cm2) 
BPA Nellis & Hendrix 1980 6 Std Porcelain 11 0.3-0.6 
NGK Matsuoka et al. 1995 4 Std Porcelain 8* 3 
UC Wardman et al. 2013 3 Std Porcelain 11 0.4 
UC Wardman et al. 2013 3 Std Glass 10 0.4 
UC Wardman et al. 2013 3 Aeroform Glass 11 0.5 
*Estimation of V50 based on lowest withstand value of 7 kV/unit.  
5.7.1.2 Non-ceramic insulators 
The composite long-rod model most consistently displayed the highest 
dielectric strength of all insulators. As this specimen is rated for a 66 kV 
system, its single-phase operating voltage is ~38 kVrms. The lowest Vmin value 
recorded was 63 kV during scenario 9, which is 40% higher than the 
insulator’s normal operating voltage. This result suggests that composite 
insulators perform very well when subjected to volcanic ash contamination 
ranging from light to heavy pollution severity (Ave. ESDD/NSDD 0.04/15.2 – 
0.6/218 mg/cm2).  
Trends in the composite long-rod results differed from other insulators’. 
Scenarios 6 and 7 for the composite specimen produced anomalous flashover 
data – where one or more tests showed significantly lower Vmin values than 
anticipated. Inspection of the insulator following the inconsistent round in 
scenario 6 revealed that minor amounts (<20% surface coverage) of ash had 
accumulated on the underside of weathersheds (Figure 5.14). As these 
surfaces were free of contamination before the test, it was determined that 
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ash had splattered onto the underside of weathersheds from the force 
produced by flashover arcs. From this observation it can be said that even 
small deposits (e.g. <20% surface coverage, <1 mm thick) of wet ash on the 
underside of composite insulator sheds can greatly reduce the insulator’s 
pollution performance. 
 
 
Figure 5.14: Underside of the composite insulator (shed diameter = 170 mm, shed spacing 
= 85 mm) following the completion of scenario 7, Round 1. This round of tests produced an 
anomalously low Vmin value, which is likely the consequence of ash splattering onto the 
underside of weathersheds with each flashover, thereby reducing the protected creepage 
distance.  
5.7.1.3 RTV coating 
Pollution performance curves in Figure 5.15 suggest the RTV treated 
specimen slightly outperformed (had higher dielectric strength than) the 
unmodified glass insulator for most scenarios. However, a lack of available 
data for pollution severity classification of contamination with NSDD >4 
mg/cm2 in IEC 60815-1 (2008), and the knowledge that excessive deposits of 
pollution and/or excessive electrical stresses causing surface discharges can 
significantly reduce the performance of a RTV-coated insulator (IEEE 1523, 
2002), support the possibility that high NSDD of the pseudo ash 
overwhelmed the coating’s hydrophobicity. Hence, the minor improvement 
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(~10%) in pollution performance would not justify the benefit of using RTV 
coatings on HV insulators in ashy environments.  
 
Figure 5.15: V50 curves for the standard glass and RTV treated insulators for scenarios 3-9. 
The NaCl design curve and volcanic ash data from Matsuoka et al. (1995) have been added 
for comparison.  
5.7.2 Other considerations 
For contaminated scenarios, results generally show an initial reduction in 
the flashover voltage and the Vmin reached some time after. However, 
following a slight recovery of the dielectric strength as solubles were likely 
leached from the ash, flashover voltage values levelled off. This is probably 
due to the pooling/retaining of water within the ash deposit, as the 
simulated rain was not heavy enough to wash away the ash, even in light 
pollution scenarios (e.g. 4 and 5) (Figure 5.16). Rain water has an inherent 
conductivity. Thus, if ash is not washed naturally or anthropogenically from 
insulators, the ash will retain the moisture and, in turn, affect (1) the run-
off rate of soluble material, (2) the hydrophobicity of the insulator surface, 
(3) the evaporation rate of the wetted layer, and (4) the local electric field 
strength (Farzaneh and Chisholm, 2009).  
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Figure 5.16: Residual ash on (from left to right): porcelain, standard glass, aeroform, 
composite, and RTV standard glass following light pollution (1 mm thick deposit on top 
surface only) testing rounds (scenario 4 or 5).  
All insulators displayed equal or higher V50 values during scenario 2 
than in scenario 1. This suggests that dry volcanic ash will not reduce the 
flashover voltage of HVAC suspension insulators. While dry volcanic ash 
presents a low probability of flashover occurring immediately after 
deposition, there is still a latent risk of flashover as subsequent atmospheric 
moisture (e.g. fog, dew, rain etc.) will wet the deposit and render it 
conductive (Chapters 2, 3, and 4). Thus, if the insulator’s protected 
creepage distance has been sufficiently reduced, immediate cleaning of 
insulators in critical sections or nodes of the power system, such as 
generation yards and substations should be considered. 
The consistency of dielectric strength values across the range of 
insulators for these scenarios may be partially explained by limitations 
inherent in the artificial wetting process. Since the nozzle was configured 
perpendicular to insulator strings, the horizontal introduction of light rain 
meant little moisture could billow upwards and wet the underside of the 
specimen. Thus, high partial discharge activity and arcing, particularly on 
the underside of ceramic insulator sheds (closest to the pin), dried the ash 
layer significantly (Figure 5.17). The resulting high resistance of this dried 
ash layer effectively increases the protected creepage distance, which may 
have had a considerable influence on V50 values and thereby underestimated 
the vulnerability of the specimen insulators to ash contamination. Therefore, 
further laboratory tests should be carried out using a more robust artificial 
wetting system which can successfully wet the underside of weathersheds 
during test rounds.  
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Figure 5.17: Discharging and flashover across the a) standard glass and b) composite 
insulators, respectively. High heat generated from the plasma arcs dried ash deposits 
(lighter gray areas) on the underside of insulator sheds (c and d), effectively increasing the 
creepage distance and therefore the V50 values. 
Chapter 3 showed that uncompacted deposits of coarse-grained ash 
(e.g. >1 mm particle diameter) often had a higher conductivity than those 
of fine-grained (e.g. <0.1 mm). This was attributed to the superior ability of 
coarse-grained ash to allow more rapid and extensive infiltration of 
moisture. Results from this study show that, while the V50 between the two 
pseudo ash size fractions differed slightly with each scenario, the coarse-
grained ash most often produced the lowest Vmin values. For the most 
heavily contaminated scenarios (8 and 9), the <1 mm pseudo ash caused the 
lowest Vmin values for all insulators. Coarse-grained ash (e.g. >1 mm particle 
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diameter) may therefore present a higher flashover risk in the immediate 
instance.  
5.7.3 Surface degradation 
Superficial damage to ceramic insulator sheds was observed following each 
round of tests in scenarios 8 and 9 (Figure 5.18). Inspection of shed surfaces 
after cleaning revealed etching and gouging of small channels typically 1 
mm wide, 1-2 cm in length, and 1-2 mm deep, often embedded with ash 
particles. It appeared that ash particles partially melted and fused together 
to form a lustrous glass similar to obsidian, especially near the pin on the 
underside of weathersheds or the cap on the top. Considering the melting 
point of primary mineral constituents in a typical olivine basalt ranges from 
~1,000 °C to 1,300 °C (Cox et al., 1979), and discharges during the flashover 
process can reach temperatures >3000 °C (Farzaneh and Chisholm, 2009), it 
is possible that arcing from partial discharging and repetitive flashovers, 
particularly in areas of high discharge activity, generated heat in excess of 
1000 °C to melt and fuse ash particles to the insulators’ surfaces. This has 
implications for operational performance, as small voids or imperfections 
can propagate under stress and ultimately decrease the insulator’s 
electrical and mechanical strength (Rawat and Gorur, 2009).  
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Figure 5.18: Superficial damage to weathersheds from high discharging activity during the 
most heavily contaminated scenarios (8 and 9).  
5.7.4 Limitations in experimental design  
Due to some limitations in the UC test apparatus, implications arising from 
results in this study may be augmented by further testing. These should 
consider the following: 
1. Test supply should have a short-circuit current rating >6 A as 
prescribed by IEC 60507 (1991) and IEEE Std 4 (1995); 
2. An adequate artificial wetting process is required to wet both 
the top and underside of insulators so as to maintain high 
conductivity of the ash layer; 
3. Insulators of different orientation and profile (e.g. high-
creepage and hollow designs such as those intended for 
capacitors, surge arresters, circuit breaker chambers and 
supports, cable terminations, wall bushings, transformer 
bushings, instrument transformers and other measuring 
devices) should also be evaluated to better constrain their 
effect on the flashover voltage characteristics of HVAC 
insulators. 
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5.7.5 Ash hazard intensity measure  
Chapter 4 outlined several limitations in the ESDD method as a rapid 
means of assessing the pollution severity of freshly falling/fallen ash. 
Similarly, using the ESDD/NSDD method to interpret ash pollution severities 
within the laboratory is problematic. Increasing accumulations on the top 
surfaces of a suspension insulator will increase the total (top and bottom 
surfaces) ESDD/NSDD values despite the underside being shielded from 
ashfall. ESDD values taken only from the top shed therefore do not 
accurately represent the total pollution severity. Thus, the use of an 
average of ESDD/NSDD on both top and bottom surfaces of the insulator is 
recommended over individual top and/or bottom measurements as this 
study shows heavy ESDD levels (up to 0.6 mg/cm2) on just the top surfaces 
will not critically affect the pollution performance of a suspension insulator. 
Accordingly, there is need for a common measure of contamination severity 
during volcanic ashfalls. When considering the likelihood of flashovers 
occurring on HVAC suspension insulators following ashfall, we recommend 
the distribution and percentage coverage of the protected creepage 
distance is a more reliable and accurate hazard intensity parameter than 
other common metrics used, such as ashfall thickness or load. 
5.9 CONCLUSIONS 
Five different insulators were artificially contaminated with volcanic ash 
and put through a modified clean-fog rapid flashover testing programme. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from this study: 
1. All insulators tested in this study performed comparably when 
subjected to critical contamination scenarios (i.e. top and 
bottom surface coated in ash). However, the standard glass 
insulator displayed the lowest V50 value of all specimens, 29 
kV/m or 10 kV/unit (ESDD/NSDD = 0.4/152 mg/cm2), which is 
comparable to those observed in the historic investigations of 
Nellis and Hendrix (1980) (11 kV/unit) and Matsuoka et al. (1995) 
(8 kV/unit); 
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2. Results from this study provide insulator performance curves to 
aid the appropriate selection of HVAC insulators for ashy 
environments. The composite polymer insulator exhibited the 
highest dielectric strength (V50) for the majority of scenarios and 
is therefore likely to outperform ceramic equivalents in areas 
with a high ashfall hazard. However, anomalous Vmin values for 
this specimen during scenarios 6 and 7 suggest that minor 
amounts of volcanic ash contamination (<20% surface coverage, 
<1 mm deposit thickness) can significantly reduce pollution 
performance;  
 
3. With the exception of scenario 9 (6 mm top thickness, 1 mm 
bottom thickness, <1 mm particle size), the aeroform insulator 
consistently displayed the lowest dielectric strength of all 
specimens during contaminated scenarios. This is likely due to 
the balance (equivalence) of creepage distance on the top and 
underside of the insulator and implies that aeroform suspension 
insulators are more likely to flashover during ashfalls than other 
ceramic or non-ceramic equivalents. However, the superior self-
cleaning properties of the aeroform profile suggest it may be 
more effective in the horizontal configuration (e.g. strain, dead-
end, etc.);  
 
4. Our results indicate that a suspension insulator which protects 
the underside of weathersheds from ashfall and/or moisture will 
effectively minimise the likelihood of insulator flashover. Thus, 
while not examined in this study, high creepage models such as 
fog or bowl profiles are expected to perform well during ashfalls 
and should be a focus in future contamination experiments;  
 
5. Particle size has negligible influence on the Vmin of HV insulators. 
As volcanic ash particle size tends to fine with distance from the 
source volcano, HV insulators are therefore vulnerable to 
flashover at both proximal and distal locations from the volcano; 
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6. Moderate accumulations of volcanic ash (e.g. 3 mm deposit 
thickness) on the top of insulator sheds will not critically affect 
the flashover voltage of HV insulators. This is significant as it 
suggests hazard intensity parameters currently used by volcanic 
scientists such as thickness should be revised to better reflect 
the variables most influential in reducing the flashover voltage of 
HV insulators. Results herein imply that percentage coverage of 
protected creepage distance is the primary control on the 
reduction of flashover voltage and should be included in field 
assessments of power system assets during future volcanic 
eruptions;  
 
7. Results from this study provide insight into the performance of 
different insulator profiles and materials under varying degrees 
of volcanic ash contamination. Due to limitations in the UC 
testing apparatus, these tests should be repeated in other, more 
sophisticated laboratories to verify the effect of volcanic ash 
contamination on the flashover voltage of HV insulators and 
augment the data presented here.  
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OVERVIEW 
Real-time, live-line diagnostic techniques are increasingly being used in 
power systems engineering to monitor the condition of apparatus. This 
chapter assesses the potential of sinusoidal leakage current magnitudes and 
partial discharge pulses in providing a practical means of monitoring the 
state of high voltage (HV) insulators during volcanic ashfalls. Early 
notification of critical conditions during ashfalls could help identify affected 
areas, accelerate system restoration, reduce outage time, and improve 
system reliability. 
 
 191 
6.1 ABSTRACT 
Pollution flashovers can result in expensive and lengthy power outages. A 
relatively rare but severe form of airborne pollution, volcanic ash 
contamination reduces the dielectric strength (pollution performance) of HV 
insulators. Analysis of sinusoidal leakage current (LC) is a common 
technique used to assess the condition of energised insulators under 
contaminated conditions. This chapter presents a summary of results and 
observations from 50 Hz LC measurements on five different HVAC (High 
Voltage, Alternating Current) insulators artificially contaminated with a 
volcanic ash proxy. An exploratory analysis of the partial discharge (PD) 
activity is also investigated to augment existing LC flashover prediction 
practises. Results suggest large current surges associated with partial arcing 
are initiated once critically contaminated scenarios arise (i.e. ash covers 
top and bottom of insulator weathersheds). Cumulative charge from PD 
increases with increasing voltage, varies with contamination severity (e.g. 
wet or dry ash), and gradually decreases with time. Considerable 
differences in the spread of data between different insulators suggest other 
factors such as material, profile and dimensioning will have an effect on LC 
and/or PD. Further insight into LC and PD values gained from constant 
voltage (e.g. withstand) tests will complement the data herein to inform 
the development of a flashover prediction method for system operators and 
hazard managers looking to mitigate volcanic ash-induced impacts.  
6.2 INTRODUCTION 
Outdoor HV insulators are designed to withstand a range of mechanical, 
electrical and environmental stresses during intended service life. Despite 
decades of intensive research of HV insulators for use in different settings, 
the application of outdoor insulators has typically been learned by 
experience. Proper insulator design and maintenance depends on knowledge 
of the contamination flashover mechanism, operating environment, relative 
performance of each insulator type, and available maintenance methods 
(IEEE Working Group, 1979).  
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One of the most common sources of power disruption is the failure 
(dielectric breakdown) of polluted insulators (Farzaneh and Chisholm, 2009). 
Volcanic ash is a rare but severe form of airborne pollution capable of 
causing flashover across station and line insulators (Chapter 2). Ash-induced 
insulator flashover is the most common impact to electric power systems 
during and after ashfalls (Chapter 2). Soluble surface salts formed during 
particle-gas/aerosol interaction within the volcanic plume are responsible 
for providing ionic content to an otherwise electrically inert material 
(Chapters 3 and 4). The non-soluble component of volcanic ash (Chapter 4) 
also provides a binding material for water adsorption, which in turn affects 
the hydrophobicity of the insulator surface, evaporation rate of the wetted 
layer, and the local electric field strength (Farzaneh and Chisholm, 2009). 
Large volumes of ash may be deposited over extensive areas (hundreds to 
thousands of square kilometres) and in a short space of time (e.g. up to ≥10 
mm/hr) (Chapter 2). The high level of exposure of HV insulators to ashfalls 
and vulnerability to the ash flashover hazard thus makes it important to 
identify critical operating thresholds to avoid large-scale outages.  
A number of methods are used to assess pollution levels (severity) on 
energised insulators, however, monitoring fundamental frequency LC has 
been the most intensely studied (Lambeth et al., 1972; CIGRE WG 33.04 
1979; Looms, 1988). Three primary analyses can be performed on LC data 
(after CIGRE TF33.04.03, 1994):  
1. Surge counting, where the number of current pulses above a fixed 
amplitude is measured for a given period of time while the 
insulator is energised to its normal service voltage. This method is 
based on the fact that LC surges usually precede the final phase of 
pollution flashover (i.e. both the frequency and magnitude of 
pulses increases as flashover is approached); 
2. Determination of the highest peak current (Ih) recorded over a 
given period of time on an insulator continuously energised at its 
service voltage.  
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3. Charge measurements (ΣQ), where the LC is interpreted as a 
cumulative measure of charge over a set period of time.  
Of these, evaluating the magnitudes and rms (root mean square) values 
of sinusoidal (50 or 60 Hz) LC ‘surges’ during partial arcing activity leading 
up to flashover is the most common (e.g. Sforzini and Schneider, 1979; Li et 
al., 2009; Ramirez et al., 2012). Significant effort has been placed in 
developing LC analysis to forecast insulator flashover, however, the 
predominantly random process of pollution flashover and the stochastic 
nature of LC magnitudes makes its prediction a complex task (Amarh et al., 
2002; Li et al., 2009) and reliability questionable (Lloyd and Schneider, 
1982; Farzaneh and Chisholm, 2009). 
Related to LC monitoring, PD analysis is used to assess the condition 
and integrity of insulation on or within electrical apparatus. PD is defined as 
a localised electrical pulse, discharge or avalanche of charge that does not 
completely bridge the insulation between electrodes (IEC 60270, 2000). 
Each pulse consists of a voltage and current signal into the insulation, 
returning through a ground (earth) or other low impedance path. The 
number, magnitude and polarity of these PDs can be a direct indication of 
the condition of the insulation system. Accordingly, abnormal levels of PD 
may indicate (after Hardie, 2006): 
1. Voids in the insulator; 
2. De-lamination or deterioration of insulator surfaces; 
3. Cracks or fissures in broken insulators; 
4. Electrical treeing (a damaging process due to partial discharges 
progressing through the insulation, in a path resembling the 
branches of a tree (Olyphant, 1963)) in and/or on the surface of 
the insulator; 
5. Abnormal electrical stress areas due to improper manufacture or 
application. 
This form of dielectric monitoring is an effective technique for 
signalling imminent failure in power system apparatus (Ward and Lindgren, 
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2000) such as transformers (e.g. Bengtsson, 1996), cables (e.g. Smit et al., 
2002), motors (e.g. IEEE P1434 (2010)) and other system elements (e.g. 
switches, circuit breakers, capacitors, measuring transformers, generators, 
etc.).  
Previous LC studies have typically been on insulators contaminated by 
other types of airborne contaminants (e.g. those detailed in Chapter 1) and 
energised with a constant voltage (i.e. measurements were taken either 
from in-service insulators operating at normal system voltages or during 
withstand tests within a laboratory) (e.g. Li et al., 2009; Ramirez et al., 
2012). To augment the work in Chapter 5, this study focuses on LC and PD 
dynamics on contaminated insulators that were energised to successive 
voltage ‘steps’ leading up to flashover. Five different HV insulators (three 
ceramic, one composite polymer, and one RTV coated specimen) were 
chosen for analysis during a clean-fog rapid flashover testing programme 
(Lambeth, 1988). Insulators were artificially contaminated with a pseudo 
ash (Chapter 3) on the top or both top and bottom surfaces of weathersheds 
(i.e. the insulating surfaces). The aim was to see how increased levels of 
contamination severity and different ash parameters (e.g. electrical 
properties influencing ash conductivity such as particle size) would affect Ih 
and/or PD magnitudes. Based on these preliminary findings, the potential 
for real-time monitoring of sinusoidal LC activity and PD pulses on HV 
insulators during volcanic ashfalls is considered.  
6.3 EXPERIMENTAL SET UP AND PROCEDURES  
Three primary factors control the contamination discharge and amount of 
current flow across the surface of an insulator: (1) operating voltage, (2) 
contamination severity, and (3) weather conditions (Kumosa et al., 2005; Li 
et al., 2009). To perform a comprehensive analysis of the influence that 
these and other factors have on LC and PD, several electrical tests were 
carried out in the University of Canterbury HV laboratory on artificially 
polluted suspension insulators to represent volcanic ash contamination in 
either a dry or wet environment. Ohm’s law states that, for an electrical 
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circuit with a constant resistance, the flow of current is proportional to 
voltage. Thus, while the surface resistance of the insulator (with possible 
contamination) may vary with multiple factors such as moisture content and 
time, it is expected that increasing the applied voltage in steps during 
flashover tests will typically correspond with higher cumulative LC and PD 
values.  
The voltage source, insulator specimens and artificial wetting process 
used for the 9 different contamination scenarios are those described in 
Chapter 5. In summary, three rounds containing 15 or more rapid-flashover 
tests were conducted for each of the 9 contamination scenarios (Table 6.1).  
Table 6.1: The 9 different contamination scenarios used in this study (from 
Chapter 5).  
Scenario 
Replicated 
environment 
Wetting 
rate 
(mm/hr) 
Ash 
top 
(mm) 
Ash 
bottom 
(mm) 
Particle 
size (mm) 
1 
Clean insulator in a 
dry environment 
0 0 0 N/A 
2 
Light contamination 
in a dry 
environment 
0 1 0 <0.1 or <1 
3 
Clean insulator in a 
wet environment 
6 0 0 N/A 
4 
Light contamination 
in a wet 
environment 
6 1 0 <0.1 
5 
Light contamination 
in a wet 
environment 
6 1 0 <1 
6 
Moderate 
contamination in a 
wet environment 
6 3 0 <0.1 
7 
Moderate 
contamination in a 
wet environment 
6 3 0 <1 
8 
Heavy 
contamination in a 
wet environment 
6 6 1 <0.1 
9 
Heavy 
contamination in a 
wet environment. 
6 6 1 <1 
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Within each test, a specified voltage was applied across the insulator 
in a series of levels (steps). Each voltage step was maintained across the 
insulator for 2 minutes until a withstand or flashover resulted. While testing 
at each voltage level, a series of ten raw waveforms or ‘epochs’ were 
collected by an oscilloscope, each epoch containing 10 power cycles (or 0.2 
seconds at 50 Hz) of fundamental frequency data sampled at 5 MSa/sec 
(down-sampled from a ‘peak detect’ sample rate of 2 GSa/sec).  
Raw sinusoidal LC flowing through the earth path and PD pulses were 
measured using a shunt resistor (IEEE Std 4, 1995), with the oscilloscope 
connected to the shunt via a 10:1 HV probe (Figure 6.1). A calibrated sphere 
gap was used to protect measurement apparatus from any excessive voltage 
surges during flashovers. A personal computer was used to collect the data 
from each epoch.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Test circuit. CB is the circuit breaker (600 A), VR is the voltage regulator, TX is 
the test transformer, S is the insulator specimen, SG is the spark gap, R is the shunt resistor 
(R=0.2 Ω), OSC is the oscilloscope and PC is the personal computer used for data collection.  
6.3.1 Data processing 
Data processing was carried out using Matlab, a PC software package that 
provides an environment for numerical processing. Matlab also provided 
features for communicating with external instruments and thus controlled 
the oscilloscope during epoch collection. 
The raw waveforms from the shunt resistor and a reference 50 Hz 
voltage waveform were collected and filtered using analog filters to remove 
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narrowband sources above the anti-aliasing frequency. The magnitudes of 
the PD pulses, measured in pico-Coulombs (pC), were calibrated using a 
pulse charge calibrator when the circuit was de-energised. 
LC processing involved a Fourier Transform for determination of the 50 
Hz magnitude. For PD pulse processing, the shunt resistor raw waveforms 
had DC (Direct Current) and 50 Hz (and harmonics) components removed 
using a digital filter. Pulses were then counted using a voltage threshold. 
Processed LC and PD results were discarded from epochs that were 
determined to contain flashover or other erratic signals.  
6.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.4.1 50 Hz leakage current 
Figures 6.2-6.6 show LC recorded for 3 of the 5 insulators (aeroform, 66 kV 
composite long-rod, and RTV coated glass) across the range of scenarios (1, 
2, 3, 8, and 9), plotted against test number (time). A negligible difference 
in LC between scenarios 1 and 2 was observed for all insulators, suggesting 
that dry volcanic ash does not initiate abnormal LC activity before flashover. 
This also supports other research (e.g. Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Matsuoka et 
al., 1995; Chapter 3) which proposes dry volcanic ash is non-conducting, and 
therefore does not pose an immediate flashover hazard.  
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Figure 6.2: LC plotted against test number (time) for scenario 1 for the a) aeroform, b) 66 
kV composite long-rod, and c) RTV coated insulators.  
a) 
b) 
c) 
 199 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: LC plotted against test number (time) for scenario 2 for the a) aeroform, b) 66 
kV composite long-rod, and c) RTV coated insulators.  
a) 
b) 
c) 
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Figure 6.4: LC plotted against test number (time) for scenario 3 for the a) aeroform, b) 66 
kV composite long-rod, and c) RTV coated insulators.  
a) 
b) 
c) 
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Figure 6.5: LC plotted against test number (time) for scenario 8 for the a) aeroform, b) 66 
kV composite long-rod, and c) RTV coated insulators.  
a) 
b) 
c) 
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Figure 6.6: LC plotted against test number (time) for scenario 9 for the a) aeroform, b) 66 
kV composite long-rod, and c) RTV coated insulators. 
a) 
b) 
c) 
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The average LC was lowest during scenarios 8 and 9 (i.e. when both 
top and bottom surfaces of the insulator were coated in ash). Current-
voltage proportionality means this is primarily due to the lower applied 
voltage. Despite relatively low average LC values, however, Figures 6.5 and 
6.6 show the Ih value of LC surges which were due to partial arcing activity 
and high scintillation. As there were several seconds of inactivity in 
between epoch data collection, much of the partial arcing/arc discharges 
and associated current surges could not be captured. Nevertheless, the 
highest recorded current surge was 136 mA during scenario 8 for the 
aeroform insulator. This value is slightly lower than those typically observed 
for clean-fog tests, where studies on other forms of pollution have observed 
peak LCs of up to 200 mA (Farzaneh and Chisholm, 2009). Thus, the high LC 
values in scenarios 8 and 9 (>50 mA) together with the absence of large 
current surges in scenarios 1-7 (Table 6.2) suggest that partial arcing and 
coinciding current surges will play a primary role in initiating ash-induced 
insulator flashover. Monitoring should therefore concentrate on the 
magnitude of these LC surges, as this and other studies (e.g. Farzaneh and 
Chisholm, 2009 and references within) suggest they are an indication of 
imminent flashover.  
Table 6.2: Highest Ih values observed for each insulator 
and the corresponding scenario and round during which 
Ih occurred.  
Insulator 
Ih 
(mA) Scenario Round 
Std Porcelain 119 9 1 
Std Glass 26 8 2 
Aeroform 136 8 1 
66 kV Composite 114 9 2 
RTV Glass 30 8 2 
Dry scenarios (1 and 2) presented in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 showed little 
variation in LC throughout any one round, while wet contaminated scenarios 
often reached a maximum LC at some time during the testing round, and 
gradually decreased to a minimum. This trend may reflect the leaching 
process; where the ash layer absorbed moisture until a point of saturation 
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(i.e. maximum layer conductivity), and the corresponding LC was highest 
and flashover voltage lowest. It is likely that, as the soluble (ionic) content 
was washed away from the ash, the resistance of the ash layer increased 
and the LC decreased accordingly. Thus, increasing LC at constant voltage 
will indicate a decrease in the ash layer’s resistance and an increase in the 
likelihood of flashover (refer to Chapter 3 for more information on ash 
parameters affecting resistance). Similarly, the forces created by each 
flashover or partial arc often blew or removed some ash from the insulator 
surface (e.g. 5-10% of the total deposit). Removing part of the ash will 
create a higher resistance between conductive portions of the ash layer, 
which could cause a decrease in LC and/or PD activity.  
Figures 6.7-6.11 summarise the LC for each insulator across all 
scenarios. As observed in other studies (e.g. Suda, 2005; Douar et al., 2010), 
the LC magnitude increased with increasing applied voltage. In general, 
increasing contamination severity (i.e. each successive scenario number) 
lowered the flashover voltage of the insulator (Chapter 5), which, due to 
current-voltage proportionality, corresponded with a decrease in average LC. 
In contrast, the average LC on the aeroform insulator decreased from 
scenario 4 to 7 at a constant applied voltage of 90 kV, suggesting that 
increasing volcanic ash contamination severity (ESDD/NSDD) may decrease 
the LC. This conflicts with Montoya-Tena et al. (2005), who found that LC 
increases with increasing ESDD/NSDD, albeit the NSDD levels were 
comparatively low (≤4.4 mg/cm2 in Montoya-Tena et al. (2005) versus >30 
mg/cm2 for a 1 mm layer of volcanic ash in Chapter 4). Additionally, while 
scenario 4 contained the lowest flashover voltage for scenarios 4-7 (Chapter 
5), it also showed the highest LC. These anomalous results suggest that 
other parameters will have an influence on LC such as insulator profile, 
insulator conditioning (IEC Std 60507, 1991), form factor and/or ash layer 
conductivity (not explored here) (IEC 60815-1, 2008), and that volcanic ash 
may induce different LC characteristics and/or behaviour than that 
observed with other pollution.  
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Figure 6.7: LC against applied voltage for the standard porcelain insulator. 
 
 
Figure 6.8: LC against applied voltage for the standard glass insulator. 
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Figure 6.9: LC against applied voltage for the aeroform insulator. 
 
 
Figure 6.10: LC against applied voltage for the 66 kV composite insulator. 
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Figure 6.11: LC against applied voltage for the RTV coated insulator. 
Excluding current surges, the standard porcelain insulator consistently 
displayed the highest average LC across all scenarios and had a particularly 
varied LC level during scenarios 1 and 2. While some of the LC variation in 
scenarios 1 and 2 are due to oscilloscope quantisation noise, results from 
Chapter 5 showed that this insulator had a higher pollution performance 
than most. The increased LC for the standard porcelain insulator therefore 
suggests that other factors such as material, profile, dimensions, etc. may 
contribute to the amount of LC, irrespective of contamination severity.  
6.4.2 Partial discharge 
As with LC, PD activity most often decreased with time (epoch) (Figures 
6.12-6.14). This can be explained by changes in the ash layer’s properties 
(e.g. moisture content, distribution of ash with successive flashovers, etc.) 
throughout the testing round, where changing ash layer properties will 
dictate the points of discharge.  
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Figure 6.12: PD plotted against test number (time) for scenario 2 for the a) standard 
porcelain, b) aeroform, and c) RTV coated insulators.  
 
a) 
b) 
c) 
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Figure 6.13: PD plotted against test number (time) for scenario 3 for the a) standard 
porcelain, b) aeroform, and c) RTV coated insulators.  
 
a) 
b) 
c) 
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Figure 6.14: PD plotted against test number (time) for scenario 9 for the a) standard 
porcelain, b) aeroform, and c) RTV coated insulators.  
 
a) 
b) 
c) 
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PD pulses (i.e. the amount of charge) consistently rose with increasing 
applied voltage as a result of current-voltage proportionality. Individual 
points on each line in Figures 6.15-6.19 represent the cumulative charge 
that resulted at each applied voltage (step) within a specific contamination 
scenario (with the final point on each line indicating PD activity just before 
flashover). As the test voltages were within ~15% of flashover, the range or 
spread of each ‘cluster’ of PD values specific to each contamination 
scenario can therefore be interpreted as typical PD levels prior to flashover 
and the lowest final point values may be considered a critical operating 
threshold. However, these ranges varied considerably between different 
insulators. For example, increased levels of audible noise and visible corona 
discharge were noticed when testing the standard glass insulator. This 
corresponds with an increased level of PD pulsing over other specimens, 
suggesting that insulator properties (e.g. material and design) will affect 
the amount of PD. Thus, in order to holistically quantify the risk of flashover 
using PD monitoring, critical PD levels specific to each insulator type are 
required, and should be a major focus of future work.  
 
Figure 6.15: PD against applied voltage for the standard porcelain insulator. 
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Figure 6.16: PD against applied voltage for the standard glass insulator. 
 
 
Figure 6.17: PD against applied voltage for the aeroform insulator. 
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Figure 6.18: PD against applied voltage for the 66 kV composite insulator. 
 
 
Figure 6.19: PD against applied voltage for the RTV coated insulator. 
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Results show that the RTV coating significantly suppressed PD activity 
(similarly to suppressed LC) compared to the untreated standard glass 
specimen (Figures 6.16 and 6.19). Similarly, the 66 kV composite polymer 
insulator generally showed lower PD activity than the ceramic equivalents. 
This may reflect the ability of silicone polymer materials to minimise LC and 
PD activity (IEEE Std 1523, 2002) and thereby potentially increase the 
flashover voltage and overall performance of an insulator during ashfalls. 
The data suggests that LC and PD will be lower on polymeric insulators than 
ceramic insulators of similar rating. Despite lower LC and PD levels for the 
RTV coating, however, flashover voltages were comparable. This suggests 
that other physical, chemical, environmental and/or electrical factors may 
have more influence on LC and PD than previously thought.  
6.4.3 Predictive capacity of partial discharge analysis 
Since the applied voltage was constantly changing, it is difficult to compare 
the results herein to those collected from in-service conditions (i.e. where 
the voltage is constant). However, analogous to current LC monitoring 
practises, future studies should focus on variations in pulse count, 
amplitude and/or timing with reference to fundamental frequency phase 
angle, and may provide an indication of impending flashover. As already 
established, an increase in pulse amplitude is observed with increasing 
applied voltage. Pulse pattern variation requires further analysis, but it is 
believed that the PD monitoring method has potential for live-line 
application during ashfalls.  
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The problem of insulator contamination and subsequent flashover does not 
have a unique and simple solution. Live-line diagnostic techniques used to 
monitor the operational state of an insulator during volcanic ashfalls have 
potential to predict ash-induced insulator flashover. This study presents the 
results from an exploratory analysis of LC and PD on 5 different insulators 
subjected to varying ash contamination severities. The data suggest the 
following preliminary conclusions: 
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1. Dry scenarios (1 and 2) showed little variation in LC throughout any 
one round, while wet contaminated scenarios often reached 
maximum LC (lowest resistance) at some time during the testing 
round, and gradually decreased to a minimum (likely due to the 
leaching of soluble material, and associated increase in ash layer 
resistance). Increasing LC over time at constant (or normal operating) 
voltage will therefore indicate a decrease in the ash layer’s 
resistance (due to increasing moisture absorption) and an increase in 
the likelihood of flashover; 
 
2. A negligible difference in LC between scenarios 1 and 2 was observed 
for all insulators, suggesting that dry volcanic ash does not initiate 
abnormal LC activity before flashover. This is in agreement with 
other research which suggest dry volcanic ash is non-conducting, and 
therefore does not pose an immediate flashover hazard; 
 
3. Average LC was lowest when both top and bottom surfaces of the 
insulator were coated in ash, primarily because the applied voltage 
was lowest during these scenarios. Taking into account current-
voltage proportionality, increasing contamination does not appear to 
significantly increase LC. Anomalous results for the aeroform 
insulator here suggest LC slightly decreases with increasing 
contamination severity, however, more research is needed to 
understand the relationship between increasing NSDD and LC; 
 
4. High LC surges (>100 mA) due to partial arcing activity and heavy 
scintillation were only observed during critically contaminated 
scenarios (i.e. top and bottom surfaces coated in ash). The highest Ih 
value recorded was 136 mA during scenario 8 for the aeroform 
insulator, which is slightly lower than those typically observed for 
other forms of pollution, where peak LCs of up to 200 mA are possible. 
Thus, partial arcing and coinciding current surges are one key 
indicator of the initiation of ash-induced insulator flashover. 
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5. The PD analysis used in this study is a novel approach to monitoring 
the condition of energised HV insulators subjected to volcanic ash 
contamination. The data and methodology herein will complement 
contemporary LC practises; 
 
6. PD pulses (i.e. the total amount of charge) increase with increasing 
applied voltage. The range of PD values in each cluster of scenario 
data represent preliminary flashover thresholds for the insulators 
tested in this study. PD levels vary significantly for different 
insulators with the same voltage and scenario suggesting that PD 
levels are insulator specific;  
 
7. The RTV coated insulator and the 66 kV composite specimen 
significantly suppressed LC and PD activity compared to the ceramic 
equivalents. This supports the assertion that silicone polymer 
materials effectively minimise LC and PD activity. However, their 
comparable flashover performance (Chapter 5) to those of ceramic 
equivalents suggests that other physical, chemical, environmental 
and/or electrical factors may have more influence on LC and PD than 
previously thought; 
 
8. A standardised withstand test should be investigated so that the level 
of LC and PD can be observed at a constant voltage over an elapsed 
period of time (i.e. as the ash transitions from a dry (non-conducting) 
to wet (conducting) state). Emphasis should be placed on defining 
critical thresholds (e.g. Ih) before flashover and normalising the data 
to account for other influential factors such as insulator material, 
profile, dimensioning, etc. which may contribute to the levels of LC 
and/or PD, irrespective of contamination severity. 
Aspects of the size and location of the transmission system itself will 
be important considerations in choosing whether to monitor system 
insulators for increased or abnormal levels of LC and PD. ESDD, NSDD and/or 
resistivity methods represent comparatively low-tech pollution severity 
measuring techniques, which can be applied locally, easily and relatively 
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inexpensively. However, more sophisticated real-time methods such as LC 
and PD monitoring could be justified for extensive transmission networks in 
developed countries where a high reliability of supply is needed to maintain 
the functionality of critical infrastructure and the health and safety of 
communities. The underlying process of flashover is stochastic, and the 
magnitude of the LC at any chosen time cannot be precisely predicted, 
however, with further investigations and analysis, the LC and PD methods 
investigated here have the potential to provide some warning to system 
operators of imminent flashover and thereby enhance the capacity to 
mitigate flashover during ashfalls.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Discussion and Future Research 
 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the vulnerability of electric power 
systems to volcanic ashfall hazards. The research extended the work carried 
out by other studies (e.g. Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Blong, 1984; Matsuoka 
et al., 1995; Johnston, 1997; Bebbington et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2009) 
and considered changing requirements since these original investigations 
were undertaken. Using traditional scientific and engineering methods 
informed by international technical standards, this thesis quantified and, in 
turn, has contributed to reducing the vulnerability of electric power systems 
to volcanic ashfall hazards by: 
 Identifying and compiling information on the common impacts to 
electric power systems during and after volcanic ashfalls (Chapter 2); 
 Developing a first-order fragility curve (hazard intensity/damage 
ratio) to relate the probability of ash-induced insulator flashover with 
increasing thicknesses of wet or dry volcanic ash (Chapter 2); 
 Quantifying the chemical, physical and electrical properties of 
volcanic ash which are most influential in promoting electrical 
conductivity and therefore flashover on HV insulators (Chapters 3 and 
4); 
 Exploring the causes and mechanisms of ash-induced flashover by 
measuring the minimum flashover voltage and dielectric strength of 
commonly used outdoor high voltage (HV) insulators intended for 
alternating current (HVAC) systems subjected to a range of 
contaminated scenarios during artificial pollution tests (Chapter 5); 
 A real-time indicator of the hazard (pollution) severity was studied to 
monitor fundamental frequency leakage current (LC) and partial 
discharge (PD) pulses during contamination tests (Chapter 6). 
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Each of the body chapters in this thesis (Chapters 2-6) has its own 
discussion and conclusions section. This chapter puts these discussions into 
context and is split into four parts. The first identifies the elements at risk 
of ashfall impacts specific to the 3 components of a modern power system. 
The second examines the application and practicality of risk assessment 
methods developed in the thesis to assess the flashover hazard intensity at 
the onset of ashfalls. Recommendations for system planning and design to 
reduce the vulnerability of power systems during ashfalls are provided in 
part three and, finally, the chapter ends with specific suggestions for future 
avenues of research which will strengthen the results found herein.  
This thesis is a significant contribution to the fields of volcanic risk 
management and electrical engineering. Its findings will contribute to the 
readiness, response and recovery protocols for large electric power systems 
in volcanic disasters; which directly affects the functional operation and 
economics of industrial and commercial society. The vulnerability curves 
together with critical resistivity, equivalent salt deposit density (ESDD), 
non-soluble deposit density (NSDD), and creepage coverage values 
established within the thesis are benchmarks with which system operators 
can assess the flashover hazard during ashfalls. Thus, this thesis will be of 
direct benefit to relevant industries, institutions and vulnerable 
communities not only in New Zealand, but internationally.  
7.1 IDENTIFYING THE RISK 
The first phase of holistic volcanic risk management is risk identification 
(Blong, 2000). This thesis has shown that electric power networks are 
particularly vulnerable to disruption during ashfalls, and ash-induced 
insulator flashover is the most common failure mode across all sectors of 
the modern power network (Figure 7.1).  
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Figure 7.1: Flow chart diagram showing the potential impacts to electric power systems 
from volcanic hazards. Red colours signify immediate/short-term impacts while blue 
colours indicate possible latent/long-term effects.  
7.1.1 Generation 
Generation sites (hydroelectric, thermal, nuclear, etc.) are crucial to the 
power delivery process as the loss of generation renders the rest of the 
network (e.g. transformation, transmission, distribution, etc.) inactive. In 
general, generation facilities are vulnerable to the following impacts:  
1. Insulator flashover at generation yards containing step-up 
transformers could lead to a series of cascading impacts on the rest 
of the system. The decision to shut-down a site will depend on the 
acceptable level of risk as determined by system operators. Cleaning 
methods outlined in Chapter 2 will help reduce the flashover risk and 
minimise de-energised time, and therefore incurred costs. 
2. Ash ingress can block air intakes causing a reduction of air intake 
quality and quantity for turbines and cooling and heating, ventilation 
and air-conditioning systems at generation sites and substations 
(Chapter 2).  
The most common disruptor of power at hydroelectric power 
generation sites is controlled shut-down of turbines to avoid accelerated 
wear of submerged components. In the event of volcanic material entering 
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feed water, careful and constant monitoring of ash properties (e.g. 
angularity, hardness, soluble salt load, etc.) and water conditions (e.g. 
turbidity, pH, etc.) should inform the risk management decision to shut-
down or maintain operations. Alternatively, depending on the degree of ash-
settling in the HEP reservoir, plants with an in-take bypass system may 
choose to re-direct ash-rich water away from vulnerable elements. 
Nuclear sites are not explored in this thesis, however they may require 
considerable time to shut-down sensitive system components, such as 
reactors. The decision to stop operations at these facilities will require 
prompt and decisive action as improper crisis management could lead to 
significant reduction in plant functionality which leads to social and 
economic consequences. The devastating March 2011 Tohoku earthquake 
and tsunami is a pertinent example, when the resulting loss of off-site 
power initiated catastrophic event sequences which severely damaged the 
Fukushima-daiichi nuclear power station (Anzai et al., 2011).  
7.1.2 Transmission and distribution 
Transmission and distribution systems are most vulnerable to volcanic ash-
induced insulator flashover. Flashovers have been recorded during relatively 
small ashfalls (e.g. 3 mm during Ruapehu 1995/96). However, smaller 
deposits (≤1 mm) may have sufficient conductivity (ESDD) and NSDD to cause 
outages, provided a significant portion (>60% as reported in Chapter 5) of 
the protected creepage distance is contaminated with ash (Chapters 3, 4 
and 5).  
The risk associated with minor deposits of ash (<3 mm) on the top 
surface of insulator sheds may be retained by informed decisions to leave 
ash to be cleaned by rain and wind action (Chapters 2 and 5). If wetted, 
however, fine-grained volcanic ash (<0.5 mm particle diameter) can strongly 
adhere/cement to insulator surfaces. Even if the soluble material has been 
leached, the high NSDD of volcanic ash can pose a latent risk of flashover 
(Chapter 3), as the residual deposit will retain subsequent moisture (e.g. 
rain, fog, mist, dew, etc.) which has an inherent conductivity (Chapter 2). 
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Conductive (i.e. wet) ash deposits will cause tracking of current and 
corrosion and may burn and/or etch the glazing of ceramic insulators. Over 
time, these small cracks and voids will grow and may eventually lead to 
puncture of the insulator (Rawat and Gorur, 2009).  
Ash-laden foliage will not make contact with conductors, bridge phases 
and/or cause line breakages provided trees are pruned to meet 
appropriate/normal clearance distances from operating transmission and 
distribution lines.  
7.1.3 Substations and switchyards 
Past experience has shown that prompt shut-down and cleaning of 
substations will maintain the integrity of the power system, which suggests 
it may be the most appropriate action, despite some intrinsic 
system/functional, and thus economic, loss. Even minor ashfalls (≤1 mm) 
can result in outages, and the evaluation of acceptable risk will vary 
between system operators. As substations and generation sites are crucial to 
the continuity of supply, immediate risk assessment for these facilities at 
the onset of ashfall is paramount.  
7.2 ANALYSING AND EVALUATING THE RISK  
Analysis and evaluation stages of the risk management process within this 
thesis focussed on developing an understanding of the potential risks and 
impacts to specific power system elements from volcanic ashfall hazards. 
Impacts can range from minor nuisances such as increased audible noise 
from contaminated conductors, to major physical damage to critical 
components such as HEP turbines. Given insulator flashover is the most 
common impact, four quantitative forms of analysis were developed to 
analyse and evaluate the flashover risk at the onset of ashfall, and are 
discussed in the following sections.   
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7.2.1 Electrical properties of volcanic ash 
The electrical characteristics of volcanic ash are important controls on the 
ash flashover mechanism. Prior to this thesis, very little empirical data 
existed on the physical, chemical and electrical parameters of volcanic ash 
most influential in initiating ash-induced impacts such as insulator flashover.      
Well-established in the field of power engineering, ESDD and NSDD 
measurements produce valuable parameters for comparative purposes. The 
existing knowledge makes it an easily relatable measurement of hazard 
intensity for system operators and decision makers. For example, a uniform 
3 mm layer of volcanic ash on a HV insulator causes moderate to heavy 
pollution severity, and even light dustings (<0.5 mm) can be severe enough 
to significantly reduce the performance (flashover voltage) of HV insulators 
(Chapter 5). This highlights the high risk of volcanic ash contamination to 
the reliability of power supply.  
However, through the course of this thesis it was realised that the 
ESDD/NSDD method has several inherent limitations (Chapter 3) which make 
it unsuitable as an in-field mode of hazard intensity assessment. Primarily, 
the ESDD method does not account for the variations in electrical 
conductivity of the ash under different environmental, chemical and 
physical conditions, and the limited amount of data available for pollution 
with NSDD levels >4 mg/cm2 inhibits IEC 60815-1 (2008) pollution severity 
classification. Thus, a resistivity method was developed to measure the 
electrical properties of volcanic ash as an alternative to ESDD and other 
pollution monitoring techniques (Chapter 3).  
Resistivity analysis of volcanic ash samples is appropriate for small 
volume, rapid in-field analysis. If calculated early enough in the eruption, 
resistivity values can be compared to the database, started in Chapter 3, to 
dictate whether the ash is conductive enough to cause flashover. Areas with 
the highest risk of flashover can be identified from isopach maps (lines of 
equal ash thickness) and specific assets or elements within those zones 
targeted for mitigation, if necessary. Combined with fragility function 
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estimates particular to system elements/apparatus, a robust impact 
forecast can be generated. Persistent monitoring of ash properties (e.g. 
resistivity, ESDD/NSDD), live-line diagnostics (e.g. PD and/or LC), and the 
depositional patterns on HV insulators (e.g. % creepage coverage) will also 
be key steps in avoiding ash-induced impacts and minimising economic 
losses from unnecessary controlled outages.  
7.2.2 Forecasting flashover using fragility functions 
There is an increasing desire to use quantitative risk assessment methods to 
express power system vulnerability to volcanic hazards to define the risk 
posed by current or future volcanic events, and to better account for 
evolving eruption histories, incomplete and/or short eruption histories, and 
volcanoes with a range of possible future eruption magnitudes and/or styles 
(Smith, 2004). This may be achieved through further analysis of data in this 
thesis and future analogue laboratory experiments and field observations. 
This thesis provides a foundation for future vulnerability assessments during 
ashfalls. For example, using the fragility function proposed in Chapter 2, 
system operators can rapidly approximate the flashover risk on HV insulators. 
The vulnerability estimate is complemented by other analyses such as 
ESDD/NSDD, which define the ash’s electrical properties, and therefore 
hazard intensity.  
While the first-order fragility function in Chapter 2 provides a basis for 
flashover risk assessment, the function is limited by a binary, discrete end-
member data set and a lack of hazard intensity parameters. However, 
power-frequency test results in Chapter 5 can be used to refine the model. 
Although speculative, the following fragility models are informed by 
published work on volcanic ash impacts to electrical infrastructure (Chapter 
2), anecdotal information from experts in the fields of volcanic hazards and 
electrical engineering, observations made of the impact of insulator 
flashover during the 2010 eruptions of Tungurahua (Ecuador) and Pacaya 
(Guatemala) volcanoes (Appendices 1 and 2, respectively), as well as results 
and observations from this thesis. These are best-guess estimates which 
represent the current state of knowledge on some of the more important 
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factors promoting volcanic ash-induced flashover. Further development of 
these and other vulnerability models for power system equipment and 
apparatus will undoubtedly strengthen the reliability and efficiency of 
system response protocols during volcanic ashfalls.    
This thesis suggests that, for a standard porcelain insulator operating 
during ashfall in low wind conditions and light, misty rain, significant (e.g. 
>3 mm) ash deposits can accumulate on the top surface of insulator sheds 
without significantly reducing the flashover voltage (i.e. increasing the 
flashover potential), as long as the underside (bottom) surface remains 
clean and/or dry (Figure 7.2a). Since the bottom surface of the porcelain 
insulator contains the majority of creepage distance (~75%), and assuming a 
uniform coating of wet ash, the probability of flashover will increase 
significantly with increasing ash thickness on the bottom surface of the 
insulator (Figure 7.2b). Empirical evidence in this thesis therefore suggests 
that ash thickness alone is not an adequate measure of hazard intensity for 
forecasting the likelihood of insulator flashover, since several other 
environmental, volcanological and electrical factors will influence the 
insulator’s flashover voltage.   
 
  
Figure 7.2: Preliminary fragility functions relating the probability of insulator flashover to 
a) ash thickness on top surfaces only, and b) ash thickness on the bottom surface.  
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As creepage distance is the primary parameter responsible for reducing 
the flashover voltage, and therefore pollution performance of the HVAC 
suspension insulators used in this thesis (Chapter 5), it may be a more useful 
indicator of imminent flashover. Based on the 30% critical creepage 
coverage estimate made by Nellis and Hendrix (1980) and the 60% proposed 
in Chapter 5, Figure 7.3a illustrates a hypothetical model relating 
probability of flashover to increasing coverage of creepage distance. The 
ability of volcanic ash to cover protected creepage distance will be 
dependent on insulator material, orientation, and profile (discussed further 
in Section 7.3.3). Similarly, considering the environmental controls and 
pollution ranges for standard porcelain tests in Chapter 5, the numeric 
relationship between ESDD/NSDD and the probability of flashover is 
hypothesised in Figure 7.3b.  
 
  
Figure 7.3: Preliminary fragility functions relating the likelihood of insulator flashover to a) 
coverage of the protected creepage distance, and b) average ESDD/NSDD based on those 
obtained for the pseudo ash.  
7.2.3 Leakage current and/or partial discharge analysis  
Existing literature highlights the potential of fundamental frequency LC 
monitoring to indicate critical contamination levels on energised HV 
insulators (Farzaneh and Chisholm, 2009). Exploratory experiments in 
Chapter 6 showed that, due to current-voltage proportionality, sinusoidal 
power-frequency LC increases with increasing applied voltage and large 
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current surges due to partial arcing and discharges (e.g. a range from 26 mA 
recorded for the standard glass insulator to 136 mA for the aeroform 
specimen) will occur once critically contaminated conditions (e.g. complete 
surface area coverage) are reached. It is therefore expected that measuring 
the temporal change (increase) in current amplitudes (Ih) during ashfalls 
would be an effective indicator of impending flashover. 
A novel, real-time method for monitoring volcanic ash pollution 
severity on energised insulators using PD analysis was also proposed in 
Chapter 6. PD pulse magnitudes increase with increasing voltage but vary 
with contamination severity (e.g. wet or dry ash). While results indicate 
that several physical and environmental factors may influence PD, the 
summary plots presented in this thesis represent critical PD levels prior to 
insulator flashover for a range of ash contamination scenarios. Further 
refinement of the LC and PD analyses investigated in this thesis could 
provide a robust real time method for monitoring system response to 
increasing ash contamination.  
7.3 REDUCING THE RISK 
During an ashfall, the decision to reduce the risk of impacts by 
implementing mitigation strategies will depend primarily on the: (1) 
predicted area and volume of ash dispersal (isopach maps produced by 
volcanic scientists), (2) specific assets exposed to ashfall and their relative 
importance to maintaining system integrity, and (3) electrical properties 
(pollution severity) of the ash. Adequate hazard assessment and 
identification and quantification of system vulnerability at the onset of 
ashfall will provide a robust indication of the risk.  
Volcanic eruptions will vary in intensity and duration (seconds to 
decades) with each eruption. As a result, power system apparatus may be 
exposed to variable and potentially prolonged periods of ashfall. This 
becomes a critical design parameter for transmission or distribution circuits 
situated in historic fallout zones and will be an important consideration for 
lines requiring refurbishment or retrofitting to cope with frequent ash 
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contamination in the short or long-term. The following sections discuss some 
of the important short and long-term considerations for system design, and 
the criteria for selection of insulators with respect to volcanic ash 
contamination.  
7.3.1 Short-term: Planning for ashfalls  
Whilst it is not possible to completely eliminate the risk of impacts, 
emergency management (response) protocols should be established to 
maintain system integrity during volcanic ashfalls. Chapter 2 provides a 
preliminary response plan by which system operators can be guided when 
faced with the decision to maintain or cut power delivery to vulnerable 
sections of the network. Such decisions will benefit from situational 
awareness by actively monitoring warnings and advice from local volcano 
observatories or relevant agencies to obtain the most up-to-date scientific 
alert levels, eruption warnings, ashfall maps and forecasts.  
Figure 7.4 illustrates the role of this thesis in guiding the emergency 
response of power engineers and volcanic risk scientists through the 
identification, assessment, and reduction of risk from ashfall hazards during 
future eruptions. Critical hazard intensities identified herein, such as 
ESDD/NSDD, resistivity, LC and/or PD, are important indicators of the 
likelihood of component failure and should be quantified immediately in 
order to assess the level of risk. Based on the mitigation strategies proposed 
in this thesis, power engineers have a number of potential risk reduction 
actions through system design, maintenance, and/or palliative methods. 
Partnership and knowledge transfer between volcano hazard scientists and 
power engineers in identifying assessing and reducing the risk of impacts is 
crucial to effective risk reduction. In many instances, it may be more cost 
effective to develop response plans with a focus around shutting down 
versus maintaining operations, however, the decision to maintain operations 
will be dictated by the level of acceptable risk as dictated by the system 
operator(s). 
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Figure 7.4: Schematic diagram illustrating the role of vulnerability studies such as this 
thesis in guiding the emergency management response of power engineers and volcanic risk 
scientists through identification, assessment, and reduction of risk from ashfall hazards 
during future eruptions.  
Cleaning ash from critical system components such as generation sites 
and substations has been identified as an effective short-term treatment for 
reducing the risk of ash-related impacts (e.g. flashover, transformer 
overheating, reduction in resistivity of substation gravel, etc.) (Chapter 2). 
Both offline and online cleaning methods for volcanic ash contamination on 
station and line insulators were described in Chapter 2 (and are discussed 
further in Section 7.3.3.1). These methods and those detailed in IEEE Std 
957 (2005) may be easily adapted for other system elements.   
7.3.2 Long-term: System design 
7.3.2.1 Land-use planning 
Constructing a power system completely tolerant to ashfall hazards is 
economically and logistically impractical. An obvious way to minimise 
system vulnerability is to avoid the risk altogether by choosing not to place 
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system assets in areas exposed to a high ashfall hazard. Despite being an 
extreme measure, revising land-use planning is an effective means of 
reducing system vulnerability, particularly for areas prone to frequent 
ashfalls. With further quantification of specific component vulnerability to 
ash-induced impacts, and a cost-benefit analysis, acceptable levels of risk 
may be identified to better advise system expansion into these zones.  
7.3.2.2 System redundancy 
Critical system elements such as power transformers typically have a high 
capital cost, and can have long manufacturing lead times. Thus, unless the 
power system has been designed to include a sufficient level of redundancy, 
ash-induced damage to such apparatus may result in long-term outages and 
significant economic loss. As mentioned in Chapter 2, power systems are 
often designed to be ‘N-1 secure’ because it can cope with losing any one of 
its N components and continue to carry the demand load. In recent years, 
the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) has increasingly 
recommended retrofitting of systems to be N-2 or N-3 secure (NERC TPL Std, 
2005). While N-1, N-2 and even N-3 secure systems reduce the potential for 
loss of supply, they do not consider the far-reaching effects of ash, which 
can cause numerous faults on multiple system components over hundreds of 
square kilometres. Thus, cost-benefit analysis and risk assessments for 
assets with an unacceptable level of vulnerability should dictate the level of 
redundancy necessary to maintain functionality during ashfalls.  
7.3.3 Insulator selection for areas with a high ashfall hazard 
The performance of an insulator depends on complex interactions between 
it and the operating environment and ample information exists on the 
appropriate selection, dimensioning and maintenance of HV insulators 
intended for use in outdoor AC transmission systems (e.g. IEEE Std 957, 
2005; IEC 60815-1, 2, 3, 2008; IEEE Std 516, 2009; IEEE Std C62.82.1, 2010). 
This thesis has shown that, in general, there are two principal design 
criteria for HV insulators with respect to volcanic ash contamination: profile 
(shape) and dimensions (Figure 7.5).  
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The profile of an insulator will influence the rate and degree (pollution 
severity) of contamination. For example, intricate designs such as anti-fog 
or fog-bowl profiles can generate vortexes and wind flow patterns which 
may result in increased ash adherence. In turn, this could (1) lead to 
localised arcing and, consequentially reduce the effectiveness of these 
profiles, and (2) make cleaning more difficult during and/or after ashfalls. 
Other external environmental, volcanological and electrical influences such 
as wind speed, particle size, static charge and/or dielectrophoresis will 
directly affect the adherence of volcanic ash to insulator surfaces. 
Additionally, other insulator design parameters such as material, orientation 
and the amount of protected creepage distance exposed to fallout will also 
play a role. Insulator profile will influence the ability of moisture (e.g. rain) 
to wet insulator surfaces. Light rain, fog, dew, drizzle, etc. will not wash 
the ash off the insulator but will dissolve attached soluble salts and render 
the deposit conductive. The intensity of rain will determine whether the ash 
is wetted or washed away and, similarly, high winds will remove ash from 
the insulator.  
 
Figure 7.5: Schematic diagram showing how the profile and dimensions control the process 
of ash-induced insulator flashover. Additional environmental, volcanological and electrical 
parameters most influential in causing ash-induced insulator flashover are also presented to 
show the many factors contributing to the flashover mechanism.  
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Results from this thesis suggest that three design dimensions control 
the performance of an insulator: overall length (dry arc distance), creepage 
distance, and shed diameter (Chapter 5). These parameters regulate the 
amount of exposed surface area to ashfall and will control the extent of 
surface conductivity. The volcanological parameters most influential in 
controlling ash conductivity are the degree of compaction (bulk density), 
soluble content (ESDD), and moisture content of the ash (Chapter 4). High 
surface conductivity and the AC or DC electric field (induced by the 
operating voltage) will initiate a leakage current. Arcs will grow with 
increasing dry band zones and will ultimately bridge the entire insulator, 
causing flashover (Chapter 5).  
Considering the aforementioned processes, the ideal insulator for 
volcanic ashfall zones is therefore one with an appropriate balance between 
profile and dimensions, where maximum creepage distance is achieved in a 
profile with good self-cleaning properties. While not analysed in this thesis, 
high creepage designs such as fog or bowl-type insulators are expected to 
perform as well or better than the suspension specimens analysed in 
Chapter 5. The polymeric long-rod insulator tested in this study showed the 
highest dielectric strength across the majority of contamination scenarios 
and generally outperformed the ceramic comparators (Chapter 5). 
Polymeric insulators are therefore considered the optimal insulator material 
for HV circuits located in zones with a high ashfall hazard.  
7.3.3.1 Palliative measures for insulators at risk 
IEC 60815-1 (2008) provides several potential palliative measures for HV 
insulators intended for use in heavily polluted environments. Table 7.1 
places these risk treatment options into the context of volcanic ash 
contamination and, based on experimental results and observations from 
Chapter 5, assesses the capacity of these methods to mitigate ash-induced 
insulator flashover.  
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Table 7.1: Potential of the recommended IEC 60815-1 (2008) palliative measures for mitigating 
volcanic ash-induced insulator flashover. 
Increase 
creepage 
distance 
Our results suggest that, of the insulators tested, so long as ~60% of the overall 
creepage distance is protected from wet ash contamination, the V50 of will not 
be reduced to a level which would compromise system integrity. Thus, 
increasing creepage distance for insulators situated in areas receiving frequent 
ashfalls may be a simple and effective means of reducing the flashover risk.  
Non-ceramic 
insulators 
 
Results from this thesis support the assertion that non-ceramic insulators 
generally outperform ceramic designs (IEEE Std 987, 2001). However, there are 
a number of chemicals that may degrade polymer materials and cause swelling 
or even de-polymerisation (Farzaneh and Chisholm, 2009). Over 55 soluble 
components have been measured in volcanic ash leachates (Witham et al., 
2005). Thus, the influence of these volcanogenic solubles on the 
hydrophobicity and overall pollution performance of composite polymer 
insulators warrants further investigation. 
Washing/ 
cleaning 
 
If changing the creepage distance alone does not sufficiently improve the 
pollution performance of an insulator, then scheduled washing by field crews 
and/or fixed nozzles may be a viable alternative (e.g. Yasuda and Fujimara, 
1976; Cakebread et al., 1978). In particular, substation insulators may benefit 
from regular washing following volcanic ashfalls, especially if remobilised 
deposits are an issue.  
Hydrophobic 
coatings 
This thesis has shown that a standard glass suspension insulator coated with a 
layer of RTV coating performs ~5-10% better than that of an unmodified 
specimen when polluted with light to moderate ash pollution severities. 
However, under heavy contamination (e.g. ash on top and bottom of insulator 
sheds), the treated insulator’s performance was equivalent to that seen in 
other specimens, suggesting that little benefit is to be gained from its 
implementation. 
Hydrocarbon and silicone greases are not recommended for mitigation against 
ash contamination as, after a few years of service, the majority non-soluble 
component in volcanic ash will saturate the grease, requiring removal and 
reapplication (IEEE Std 1313.2, 1999).  
Semi-conductive 
glaze insulators 
The surface of semi-conductive glaze insulators is made of a thin layer of 
resistive glaze. The semi-conductive coating initiates a low-level leakage 
current which heats the insulator surface, preventing condensation and 
wetting. However, lab and field experience suggests that the main failure 
mechanism for semi-conductive glaze designs is extremely high pollution 
conditions (e.g. ESDD >1 mg/cm2) (Farzaneh and Chisholm, 2009). 
Nevertheless, this strategy may be applicable to volcanic ash contamination if 
(1) the wetting rate does not exceed the evaporation rate of the ash layer, and 
(2) contamination levels (ESDD/NSDD) of volcanic ash are sufficiently low so as 
to not cause excessive power dissipation.  
Installation of 
additive 
components 
While this thesis has focussed on suspension insulators, some mitigation 
applications have been devised for other insulation designs, such as those at 
substations. Booster sheds were first developed to improve insulator 
performance under heavy rain conditions (Ely et al., 1978) and are commonly 
designed as a flexible rubber shed which slips around a post insulator (or 
bushing, surge arrestor, etc.). Similarly, creepage extenders are designed to 
reduce the problem of pollution-induced flashover by increasing the shed 
diameter and therefore creepage distance of station insulators (Metwally et 
al., 2006). Both measures have potential to improve the volcanic ash 
performance of insulators, however, more research is needed to investigate 
this.  
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7.4 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In general, future research should continue to explore the vulnerability of 
electric power systems to volcanic ashfall hazards, particularly to those 
elements which are critical to the continuity of supply (e.g. power 
transformers) or require long shut-down times (e.g. nuclear facilities). 
Systematic documenting of the direct, indirect and intangible impacts 
should continue as part of holistic vulnerability analysis.  
Further research should be devoted to the following areas (detailed in 
the subsequent sections): 
 Repetition, expansion and standardisation of artificial pollution 
(volcanic ash) tests for HVAC insulators to augment the data collected 
for this thesis; 
 Detailed and standardised reporting of power system failure and 
tolerance during and/or following ashfalls to (1) improve our 
understanding of the processes of ash-induced impacts, (2) enhance 
the effectiveness of methods used within probabilistic volcanic risk 
assessment, and (3) inform emergency response planning and 
mitigation strategies; 
 Statistically derived scenario building and power system modelling to 
identify vulnerable components for future ashfalls.  
7.4.1 Augmenting flashover data 
Due to limitations in test power supply and equipment available during the 
rapid flashover tests, more data would augment the results and findings 
herein. Future contamination tests should include both rapid flashover and 
withstand measurements, be carried out in a fog chamber, use a test supply 
with a short circuit current >6 A, and investigate a range of insulator 
orientations, materials, and profiles. This will ensure the reproducibility of 
results in other laboratories.  
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The unusually high NSDD of volcanic ash makes it very different from 
typical airborne pollution. Thus, very little comparable flashover voltage 
data exists. Continued development of pollution performance curves for 
different insulators will inform the selection of appropriate models and 
strengthen the predictive capacity of vulnerability estimates (e.g. fragility 
functions). To create a more realistic outdoor scenario within the lab, an 
ash dispenser designed to simulate ashfall onto an insulator energised to its 
rated voltage should be considered. This would provide a more accurate 
means of identifying the critical contamination thresholds before flashover.  
7.4.2 Data collection practise 
There remains a need for standardised electrical testing protocol for freshly 
fallen/falling volcanic ash. In order to be effective, information for operator 
decision support must be provided immediately and from as many different 
localities as possible, to show how ash might vary in conductivity and other 
hazard intensity measures with place and time. If information regarding the 
pollution severity of the ash is known at the onset of ashfall, an operational 
response model which utilises damage estimates (forecasts), ground impact 
assessments, and insight on critical contamination conditions from this 
thesis could be initiated to reduce the potential for loss or damage. Critical 
infrastructure (e.g. transportation, water and waste water systems, 
telecommunications, etc.) and services (e.g. hospitals, schools, etc.) could 
also be targeted and advised to initiate their own emergency response plans 
(e.g. shutting-down, shedding load and/or switching to backup power, etc.) 
to minimise societal effects.  
One way to obtain rapid electrical data would be a monitoring scheme 
similar to that of New Zealand’s GEONET (Ground-based Earth Observing 
Network) system for earthquakes. Preferably, given the relative simplicity 
of the methods used here, locals could be instructed how to take their own 
ESDD/NSDD and/or resistivity measurements which could then be relayed to 
scientists, engineers and/or hazard managers. Alternatively, the general 
public could collect ash following specific guidelines, and send in the 
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samples for analysis. However, no single technique is the most appropriate 
for all situations and a range of low-cost, rapidly dispatched measures will 
likely provide the best results.  
7.4.3 Cascading failure and/or common-mode outages 
More research is needed to estimate the potential for cascading effects and 
common-failure mode outages induced by volcanic ashfall hazards. Due to 
the vast number of services which require electricity, large blackouts 
initiated by volcanic ashfalls could have disastrous consequences. Given the 
absence of large-scale power loss from ashfall in recorded history, there is a 
general lack of awareness for the likelihood of such an event (e.g. Hines et 
al., 2009). A set of two or more nearly simultaneous outages can initiate 
cascading failures and, as discussed in Chapter 2, volcanic ashfalls can 
trigger a series of events, eventuating with either the shut-down of one or 
more components or multiple outages across the power system within a 
short space of time.  
Power system modelling and statistical development of the most likely 
eruption scenarios will help to understand the holistic effects that numerous 
ash-induced impacts and interactions may have on the power network and 
on other public infrastructure systems (Entriken and Lordan, 2012). For 
example, estimates of the most likely eruption scenarios and areas of ash 
fallout could be devised from historic eruption behaviour (i.e. magnitude) 
and recurrence intervals. Depending on the conditions set by each eruption 
scenario and the potential range of impacts from ash contamination, power 
system modelling can assess the loading on major components of the power 
system and then identify the most likely failure modes during future events.  
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ABSTRACT 
This report summarises observations made on a field visit to areas affected by the May 2010 
eruption of Volcán Tungurahua, Ecuador. The focus of this trip, carried out in September 
2010 by a field team from the University of Canterbury and University College London, was 
to investigate both direct and indirect effects of ashfall on critical infrastructure, and the 
management of ashfall events. In particular we paid attention to less-studied areas of interest 
including electrical power and healthcare systems. All infrastructure topics explored aspects 
of resilience and adaptation, in the context of ongoing volcanic unrest at Tungurahua since 
1999. Research methods were largely qualitative and included semi-structured interviews, 
observation, water testing and informal conversations and meetings with locals.  
A good overview of ashfall impacts on electricity networks, healthcare services and 
emergency management issues was achieved during the trip. The information gathered adds 
to our knowledge of the possible effects of volcanic ashfall on infrastructure and public 
services. Further insights into impacts of water, wastewater, transportation and agriculture 
were gained. 
Overall, infrastructure seemed to function well during the 2010 eruption, with only minor 
problems reported. However, the May 2010 eruption generated only minor ashfalls (a few 
mm) in most locations. Over the past 11 years of volcanic unrest, other events have caused 
more serious impacts, particularly a VEI 3 eruption on 16-17 August 2006. 
Electrical supplies suffered few problems, with no reports of electrical flashover from ashfalls. 
Problems arising from contamination of open water supplies have led to an initiative to cover 
water supplies.  In the transport sector, the 2010 eruption resulted in a two-day closure of 
Guayaquil international airport due to risks to aircraft. Roads in the Tungurahua region have 
been frequently damaged by lahars over the past 11 years.  The 2010 eruption caused 
partial damage to 3740 ha of crops. Far more severe, although localised, damage to crops, 
livestock and rural communities was caused by the August 2006 eruption. 
Healthcare centres are well-organised and are able to prioritise essential services in the 
event of an ashfall, and so experience few major impacts, but a variety of minor impacts on 
facilities and equipment. A variety of public health pathologies have increased by small 
amounts in the short term after ashfalls, and psychological impacts in communities affected 
by eruptions have increased since activity began at Volcán Tungurahua in 1999, and have 
required increased attention from healthcare professionals in the long term. Emergency 
management insights provide lessons pertaining to the benefits of local engagement and 
involvement in risk management, including the influential role of the vigìas, who act as 
observers of volcanic activity and coordinators of voluntary civil defence within the 
community.   
The focus on adaptations and responses to the long-term volcanic activity has provided 
insights into the long-term effects of volcanic activity and helped identify possible mitigation 
and prevention measures. It is found that in general, increased maintenance of infrastructure 
now occurs widely across sectors, and cleanup methods for specific sectors have been 
developed to cope with ashfalls. The cleanup of ash at the municipal level is well organised, 
and is coordinated with the National Secretariat of Risk Management such that costs are 
shared with the proportions adjusted according to the severity of the situation. Increased use 
of personal protective measures (such as masks and goggles) has achieved a reduction in 
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public health impacts. Healthcare centres are also well organised, forming brigades for rapid 
response in affected areas, and having a clear hierarchy of health centres within each region 
so that patients can be transferred if necessary. They have good knowledge of the volcanic 
alert level system and the protocols required for each alert level change. Emergency 
management also appears organised. Emergency drills are run in at-risk communities, and 
contingency plans are updated and revised following eruptions. Hazard warning and shelter 
signage is also widespread in the Tungurahua volcanic hazard area. 
Overall, we found clear evidence for increased organisation and improved management 
procedures in the Tungurahua volcanic hazard area, which should have strengthened 
societal resilience. Additionally individual adaptive behaviour has included: increased use of 
personal protective equipment, which has reduced public health effects; farmers growing 
more ash-resilient crops including onions, and using greenhouses for crop growth; farmers 
only rearing livestock for a shortened period of time in the area, in order to prevent tooth 
abrasion; and an initiative to cover water supplies to protect them from contamination by 
ashfalls. 
Other examples of adaptations to infrastructure have included: widespread hazard signage; 
sirens in and around Baños for early warning (with an alternate power supply in case of 
power cuts, and a contingency emergency services siren system); floodgate design at 
Agoyan dam for bypassing turbulent water; and the development of plans to relocate 
electrical transmission towers away from valleys that have, in the past, been affected by 
lahars. 
Further studies in the Tungurahua volcanic area would be beneficial, to gain long-term 
understanding of volcanic ash consequences on a variety of sectors, including those 
explored in less depth in this study. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Ecuador is a country at risk from volcanic hazards (Table 1), with many populated areas 
located close to active volcanic centres and within range of volcanic ashfalls. The exposure 
of populated areas to volcanic ashfall warrants a greater understanding of the impacts of 
volcanic ash. Furthering our understanding of these impacts, to inform mitigation and 
emergency management procedures, is of critical importance to reducing the effects of 
volcanic eruptions on at-risk populations. 
Table 1 Eruption frequencies for selected countries (after Wilson et al. 2009). 
Selected countries Population (2008)1
(million) 
Average eruption frequency 
  VEI20-3 VEI 4-7 
Indonesia  239.9 6 months 15 years  
Iceland  0.3  6 years 10 months  43 years  
Japan  127.7 7 months 44 years  
Guatemala  13.7  4 years 9 months  53 years  
Philippines  90.5  1 year 4 months  59 Years  
Papua New Guinea 6.5 8 months 81 years  
Alaska, Kamchatka, Kuril Islands 1.1  5 months  100 years  
Ecuador  13.8 2 years 5 months 102 years  
Canada, Lower 48 states USA  335.8  1 year 6 months  143 years  
Italy  59.9  5 years  215 years  
Colombia  44.4 6 years 6 months 304 years  
Mexico  107.7  7 years 6 months  375 years  
New Zealand  4.3 11 months 394 years  
Chile  16.8 1 year 4 months 554 years  
Nicaragua  5.7  1 year 2 months  806 years  
Peru  27.9 14 years 2 months 832 years  
 1 2008 World Population Data Sheet, Population Reference Bureau  
2 The Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) is a classification scheme for volcanic eruptions, ranging from VEI 0-8, with 
VEI 0 the least explosive (Newhall and Self, 1982) 
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In 2004, a team from New Zealand visited Ecuador to study the impacts of volcanic ashfall 
on infrastructure and agriculture, and volcanic hazard emergency management. The focus of 
this trip was the 2002 eruption of Reventador and the eruptions of Volcán Tungurahua since 
1999 (Leonard et al., 2005).  
The current study has been designed to build on the findings of the previous one, and to add 
detail and knowledge on new areas of research on infrastructure. In particular, the aims were 
to further our understanding the impacts of ashfall on critical infrastructure facilities; 
infrastructure service provision; the knock-on effects of infrastructure lifeline disruption onto 
other facilities and on the public; the critical lifelines that support community infrastructure 
and social networks; and the progress in disaster planning and management. 
This report presents and discusses findings from a study tour of the regions of Ecuador most 
affected by the recent May 2010 eruption, and by the previous eruptions of Volcán 
Tungurahua. Field work in Ecuador was carried out between 5-18 September 2010 by a 
team representing the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, and University 
College London, UK. For a complete trip itinerary, refer to Appendix 1.  
1.1 Personnel 
The field work in Ecuador was carried out by the team of: Victoria Sword-Daniels (doctoral 
student, University College London), Johnny Wardman (doctoral student, University of 
Canterbury), Carol Stewart (research affiliate, Joint Centre for Disaster Research, Massey 
University/GNS Science) and Fiona Woods (translation support). The wider team that 
supports this work also includes: Tom Wilson (University of Canterbury), David Johnston 
(Massey University/GNS Science), and Tiziana Rossetto (University College London). A 
photograph of the field team is included below.  
 
Photograph of the field team, from left to right: Fiona Woods, Johnny Wardman, Carol Stewart, and 
Victoria Sword-Daniels. 
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1.2 Aims of the study 
The following were the specific areas of interest for our study:  
• Impacts on essential infrastructure (electrical supply and generation networks, water 
supplies, wastewater systems and transport and communication networks); 
• Impacts on healthcare facilities and healthcare service provision; 
• Activation of health facility emergency management plans; 
• Impacts on agriculture, including livestock evacuation; 
• Assessment of evacuation planning during a volcanic crisis; 
• Factors affecting evacuation of communities; 
• Socio-economic impacts, such as stresses and disruption due to evacuation; 
• Social and physical adaptations made to living with volcanic hazards. 
 
Due to limited field time and our research interests, it was not possible to cover all of these 
areas in equal depth. The topics covered in greater detail were: healthcare facilities, 
electrical transmission and generation sites and emergency management. Inquiry into the 
May 2010 eruption, together with a comparison of impacts from previous eruptions, allowed 
a greater longitudinal insight into the adaptations to, and the resilience of such infrastructure. 
1.3 Research methods 
Research methods utilised during this study trip included field observations and 
measurements, meetings and semi-structured interviews.  
Meetings and semi-structured interviews were conducted at infrastructure offices and 
facilities in affected areas, using a translator to conduct the interviews in Spanish. Ethical 
approval for the interviews was granted from the university institutions University College 
London and University of Canterbury prior to leaving (see Appendix 5). Interviewees were 
comprised mainly of facility managers, directors and operating professionals. Organisations 
of interest were identified beforehand, where possible, and attempts were made to set up 
interviews in advance of our visit.  
Interviews were semi-structured in nature to allow for freer exploration and discussion 
around the various topics that were touched upon in conversation. The interviews utilised 
prompt questions which were used to steer the conversation, and touched upon the main 
topics of interest for research including: the general impacts of volcanic ashfall on the sector; 
actions taken in response to ashfall; ash clean-up and any associated problems; emergency 
management plans and interrelated power, water and access impacts on the sectors. 
However, conducting interviews through a translator meant that some questions needed to 
be phrased in a proactive manner, to maintain the focus of the interview and to avoid 
misinterpretations as a result of translation.  
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In general, the interviewee was asked to speak freely following a prompt question, and the 
translator would summarise the comments when they had finished. This allowed the 
researcher to have some level of continued exploration of some of the aspects mentioned in 
dialogue by the participant. But detailed explanations at the time were not deemed 
appropriate in the interview, in order to maintain the interest of the interviewee and to reduce 
the interview time.  
Interviews were recorded and consent forms were signed by the interviewee(s) at the time of 
interview. A total of twenty recorded interviews were conducted during fieldwork in Ecuador, 
which varied in length from 25 to 105 minutes.  
Of the intended participants, key staff at two of the hospitals contacted could not be 
interviewed; one because the appropriate person was away, and the other declined to be 
interviewed. It was not possible to set up interviews with water utility companies in Guayaquil 
and Riobamba owing to the tight time constraints of the trip.  
Interviews were supplemented by the authors’ own field observations, and by informal 
conversations with local people. A copy of the inventory of additional data collected during 
fieldwork can be found in Appendix 2. River water testing for turbidity, conductivity and pH 
readings were undertaken additionally in the Baños area, the results are presented in 
Appendix 3. Additionally a copy of newspaper articles from the May 2010 eruption can be 
found in Appendix 4. 
1.4 Characteristics of the case study areas 
This section provides some background information on Ecuador followed by a brief overview 
of the case study settlements visited for this study. 
Mainland Ecuador has an area of approximately 256,000 km2 and consists of three distinct 
regions: the coastal region, the central Andean region and the Amazon basin. The most 
recent census was carried out in November and December 2010; the population was 
measured at just over 14.3 million, an increase of 14% since the previous census in 2001.  
Ecuador has substantial oil reserves and highly productive agricultural regions, and is a 
substantial exporter of bananas, other tropical fruit, sugar, flowers, cocoa and coffee, as well 
as petroleum, fish, shrimp, timber and gold. The GDP per capita is estimated at $USD 8,322.  
1.4.1 Quito 
Quito is located in the Guayllabamba river basin, in Pichincha province in the central Andean 
region of Ecuador (Figure 2). It is the second largest city in Ecuador, after Guayaquil, with a 
population of approximately 1.5 million. At 2850 m elevation, Quito is the second highest 
capital city in the world. The city sits on an extensive plateau that is part of the eastern 
slopes of Guagua Pichincha volcano. It is also adjacent to several other active volcanoes 
(Figure 2) and is vulnerable to ashfall. Both the 1999 eruption of Guagua Pichincha and the 
2002 eruption of Reventador supplied millimetre thicknesses of ash to the city (Leonard et 
al., 2005). Suburbs to the south of Quito are also subject to lahar hazards from Cotopaxi 
volcano.  
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1.4.2 Baños 
Named after the thermal springs located around the city, Baños de Agua Santa, commonly 
referred to as Baños, is located in Tungurahua province. It is the second-largest settlement, 
after Ambato, and has a population of approximately 16,000 (Lane et al., 2003).  Baños is 
located at an altitude of 1800 m on the northern base of Volcán Tungurahua (5023 m), a 
stratovolcano located on the border between Tungurahua and Chimborazo provinces  
(Figure 2). 
The economy of Baños is heavily dependent on tourism. Its features include a shrine 
dedicated to the Virgin of Baños, a mild climate, access to the Amazon basin, thermal 
springs and mountain scenery. In 1999, prior to the onset of volcanic unrest, 95% of 
economic activity in this community was dependent on tourism (Lane et al., 2003).  
Prior to 1999, unrest at Tungurahua last threatened Baños between 1916 and 1918; at least 
one pyroclastic flow and several major lahars descended river valleys immediately to the 
east and west of the town (Hall et al., 1999).  
While in Baños, the focus of our visit was on infrastructure impacts from ashfall, municipality 
volcanic hazard emergency strategies and volcano monitoring and warning systems. We 
also visited the nearby towns of Puyo, Ambato, Penipe, Quero and Cotaló to investigate the 
short and long-term impacts on infrastructure from volcanic activity since Tungurahua’s 
reactivation in 1999. 
1.4.3 Riobamba 
San Pedro de Riobamba is the capital of the Chimborazo province in central Ecuador, 
located at the Chambo River valley. Riobamba (elevation 2754 m) is located 200 km south 
of Quito and 30 km southwest of Volcán Tungurahua (Figure 2). The city is a major regional 
transport hub and, along with Ambato, one of the major population centres in central 
Ecuador. Its population is approximately 125,000.  
Riobamba’s economy is heavily dependent on agricultural produce from surrounding rural 
areas. In recent years, direct road access from Riobamba to Baños has been heavily 
restricted following extensive lahar damage (Figure 1).  
Several villages are dependent on this travel route for transporting goods and services 
elsewhere in the region. Plans to repair this road are indefinite. 
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Figure 1 Bridge on Rio Palitahua washed out by lahar from Volcán Tungurahua, near settlement 
of Penipe, on direct route between Riobamba and Baños. 
1.4.4 Guayaquil 
Guayaquil is the largest city in Ecuador with a population of 2.6 million in 2009. It is the 
capital of Guayas province and is the centre of Ecuador’s business and manufacturing 
operations. The city sits on the western bank of the Guayas River, close to the Pacific Ocean 
and is Ecuador’s main port (Figure 2). Guayaquil received ashfall from Volcán Tungurahua 
during the May 2010 eruption. 
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2.0 VOLCANIC HAZARDS IN ECUADOR 
2.1 Overview of volcanic hazards in Ecuador 
Ecuador lies to the east of a subduction zone, where the Pacific plate is being subducted 
beneath the South American plate. The subduction zone dips to the east underneath the 
South American continent. The tectonic setting has formed a terrain of approximately north-
south trending mountain chains, collectively forming the South American Andes. In Ecuador 
these mountain chains include: the Cordillera Real, Cordillera Central, and Cordillera 
Occidental, which pass through the centre of Ecuador, from west to east respectively. Partial 
melting of the subducting plate has formed a broad chain of volcanoes within this 
mountainous zone (Figure 2). These volcanoes form the highest peaks in Ecuador. 
There are 21 Holocene age (<0.01 ma) volcanoes listed for Ecuador on the Smithsonian 
Institute website (SI, 2010). The volcanoes of Ecuador vary in type and include: calderas, 
compound volcanoes and stratovolcanoes. The erupted magmas vary in composition from 
fluid basalts through to viscous rhyolites.  
The tectonic setting of Ecuador renders it at risk from both earthquake and volcanic hazards. 
The volcanic hazards vary in accordance with the volcano type and magma composition. 
Large caldera-forming eruptions are highly explosive but infrequent. More frequent eruptions 
occur from stratovolcanoes with intermediate magma compositions that are associated with 
the following hazards: pyroclastic flows, explosions, ashfalls, lava flows and lahars. 
 
Figure 2 Map of Ecuador’s volcanoes and chart of eruptive history (from Leonard et al. 2005 and 
IGEPN brochure). 
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2.2 Volcán Tungurahua: eruption history and volcanic hazards 
Volcán Tungurahua is an andesitic-dacitic stratovolcano which rises to an altitude of 5023 m 
above sea level (SI, 2010). It is situated in the Cordillera Central of Ecuador; a mountain 
chain forming part of the Andes. Tungurahua lies approximately 140 km south of Quito, and 
around 8 km south-south-west of the city of Baños (Section 1.4.2). Many other small towns 
and villages occupy the slopes of the volcano and are at risk from volcanic activity. 
Tungurahua is formed of three historic edifices: Tungurahua I, Tungurahua II and 
Tungurahua III. Tungurahua II was built after the collapse of Tungurahua I, but itself suffered 
a sector collapse and created a horseshoe-shaped crater, which is open to the west (SI, 
2010). This feature is dated at 2955± 90 years old (Hall et al., 1999). Tungurahua III formed 
inside the Tungurahua II crater, undergoing two phases of construction: Phase I, 2300-1400 
years ago, and Phase II, 1300 years ago until present. This construction of Tungurahua III 
has been characterised by andesitic lava flows, andesite and dacite pyroclastic flows and 
andesitic plugs (Hall et al., 1999). 
All of the historical eruptions observed at Tungurahua have come from Tungurahua III; the 
youngest of the volcanic structures (SI, 2010). This youngest structure is referred to as 
Tungurahua or Volcán Tungurahua. Historic and recent activity of Tungurahua is shown in 
Table 2 and a map of Tungurahua’s geology in Figure 3. 
Volcán Tungurahua has been in a state of unrest since 1999, with many minor eruptions and 
also major eruptions in 2006, 2008 and 2010. The main styles of activity are Strombolian 
and Vulcanian. Volcanic hazards from the recent period of unrest have included: strong 
explosions, tephra falls, pyroclastic flows, lava flows and lahars, some of which have 
reached populated areas at the base of the volcano. These relatively frequent volcanic 
hazards directly threaten 25,000 people, as well as the Agoyan hydroelectric dam, which is 
located close to Baños (Hall et al., 1999). 
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Table 2 Summary of historic and recent activity of Volcán Tungurahua (sources: Hall et al. 1999; 
Barba et al., 2008; Lane et al., 2003; Samaniego et al., 2011; Arellano et al., 2008). 
Date Event 
1641-1646 Historical reports of eruption exist, but there is a lack of reliable eyewitness 
accounts and stratigraphic confirmation.  
1773-1781 Andesitic ashfall and dacitic pumice lapilli fall followed by large andesitic lava 
flow down NNW flank to Juive Grande; dammed Pastaza River for several 
days.  
1797 Crater explosions coinciding with M8.3 earthquake that destroyed Riobamba. 
1886-1888 Pyroclastic flows down W flank, particularly on NW where they partially buried 
1773 lava flow, followed by lava flow down NW flank towards Cosua where it 
dammed the Chambo River. 
1916-1918 Pyroclastic flows down NW and N flanks to Las Juntas and Vascún valley. Lava 
confined to crater.  
October- 
November 1999 
Onset of current cycle of eruptive activity.  
Elevated seismicity and SO2 fluxes in September led to an eruption on 5 
October. Evacuation of Baños ordered on 18 October. Townspeople returned 
on 5 January, clashed with authorities and won the right to stay in Baños at their 
own risk. Activity continued on cyclical basis with small to moderate explosive 
eruptions leading to ash emissions in August 2001, September 2002, October-
November 2003 and May-July 2004.  
July-August 
2006 
14-16 July: VEI 2 eruption. Pyroclastic flows towards NW, threatening Cosua 
and Juive Grande villages, and NNE, down upper Vascún valley. 
16-17 August: VEI 3 eruption, largest in recent phase. Pyroclastic flows down 
NW and N flanks. During paroxysmal phase, there was a powerful lava fountain 
up to 1000 m above the crater, a 15 km high eruption column and pyroclastic 
flows down the N, NW, W and SW flanks with runout distances >8 km. Tephra 
fallout extended to the SW as far away as Guayaquil.  
February 2008 Incandescent rocks and ashfall (Red Alert status). 
May 2010 28 May: strong explosion with eruption column to 15 km altitude. Pyroclastic 
flows to NW, W and SW with runout 3 km down flanks. A lava lake formed in 
the crater. Ash plume extended to WSW as far as Guayaquil.  
 
1 Volcanic Explosivity Index (Newhall and Self, 1982) 
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Figure 3 Geological map of Tungurahua, from Hall et al. (1999). 
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2.2.1 Volcanology of the 2006 Tungurahua eruption 
Since the onset of volcanic unrest at Tungurahua in 1999, the eruptive activity was 
characterised from 2000-2005 by low to moderate explosiveness. These phases were 
strombolian with short duration explosions, plumes up to 7 km above the summit, and ash 
fallout on a regional scale (Samaniego et al., 2011). There were also periods of quiescence, 
such as between February to December 2005. However, in April 2006, IG-EPN monitoring 
detected deep seismic activity beneath the summit and an increase in SO2 emissions. 
Increasing shallow seismic activity culminated in the 14 July (VEI 2) and 16-17 August  
(VEI 3) eruptions.  
Activity on 14 July generated a 3-4 km high eruption column initially. The paroxysmal phase 
occurred between 19h40 on 14 July and 01h00 on 15 July, and gave rise to an eruption 
column over 20 km in height. At least 11 pyroclastic flows were generated, which descended 
the NW flank and the Vascún valley. Activity decreased on 15 July, but there were at least 
six small to moderate pyroclastic flows on 16 July (Barba et al., 2008).  
On 16 August, activity increased again. The paroxysmal phase began at 00h15 on  
17 August and involved a powerful lava fountain up to 1000 m above the crater, a 15 km 
high eruption column and the generation of major pyroclastic flows which descended 17 
ravines on the north, northwest, west and southwest flanks. These flows travelled up to  
8.5 km from the crater, and formed deltas in the valley of the Rio Chambo, which was 
blocked for several hours. The Puela and Pastaza rivers were also dammed by pyroclastic 
flows. The ash plume drifted to the west and deposited an ash and lapilli layer in the 
Interandean valley, with an uncompacted bulk volume estimated to be 40 x 106 m3. Together 
with the pyroclastic flow volume of 10-15 x 106 m3, this eruption is ranked as VEI 3, or 
approximately an order of magnitude greater than the 14 July eruption (Samaniego et al., 
2011).  
2.2.2 Volcanology of the 2010 Tungurahua eruption 
In 2010, activity at Tungurahua increased and IG reported that on the 26th May there was a 
strong explosion from Volcán Tungurahua that sent an ash plume to 12km altitude, with 
ashfalls reported to the south and southwest. This explosion also generated pyroclastic flows 
that flowed north, northwest and west down the flanks of the volcano with run-out distances 
of <1 km. 
On the 28th May another strong explosion occurred at Tungurahua that generated an ash 
plume to 15 km altitude. This was the strongest explosion of the 2010 eruption sequence. 
The plume travelled southwest and primarily affected the provinces of Bolivar, Los Rios and 
Guano (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4 GOES-13 Satellite imagery of the eruption on 28th May 2010 (NOAA). 
Thin (1-2 mm) ashfalls were received in Guayaquil, approximately 180 km southwest of 
Volcán Tungurahua. During this event, pyroclastic flows were generated to the northwest, 
west and southwest, with run-out distances of 3km down the flanks of the volcano. Pumice 
blocks also fell within 6-8km from the vent (IG, 2010). A map of the areas affected by the ash 
plume is reproduced as Figure 5, with the kind permission of the National Secretariat.  
Activity continued on the 28-30th May, with 5-10 eruptions recorded per hour, and reports of 
“cannon shot” noises that caused windows to vibrate in the local area. Steam and ash 
plumes reaching <10km altitude, with ashfall reported in areas within around 8km to the 
northwest, west and southwest continued, and “cannon shot” noises and bombs ejected 
within 2km of the summit, continued to characterise the activity of this eruption into the 
month of June (IG, 2010). On 2nd June another pyroclastic flow occurred to the northwest, 
and on 5-7th June ashfall was reported at a greater distance of 23km from the vent (IG, 
2010). 
Ashfalls resulting from this eruptive period were found to be coarse grained in Cotaló, 
proximal to the volcano, reducing in grain size to a very fine powder in Guayaquil. At the time 
of writing there was no data available to quantify the ash grain size or composition. 
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Figure Error! No text of specified style in document.5 Ash plume from May 28 2010 eruption of 
Tungurahua (reproduced with the permission of the National Secretariat). 
 
During the unrest in May 2010 IG produced four hazard scenarios for the National 
Secretariat which are shown here as Figure 6 to Figure 9 (reproduced with permission from 
the National Secretariat).  
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Figure 6 Hazard scenarios produced by IG during volcanic unrest at Volcán Tungurahua in May 
2010. Scenario: pyroclastic flows. 
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Figure 7 Hazard scenarios produced by IG during volcanic unrest at Volcán Tungurahua in May 
2010. Scenario: gas and ash eruptions.  
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Figure 8 Hazard scenarios produced by IG during volcanic unrest at Volcán Tungurahua in May 
2010. Scenario: Lava lake overflow. 
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Figure 9 Hazard scenarios produced by IG during volcanic unrest at Volcán Tungurahua in May 
2010. Scenario: Decrease in activity. 
During this period of unrest, some of the small villages were evacuated ahead of the 
pyroclastic flows on the 28th May 2010. Five hundred families in five communities close to 
the volcano were reported to have been evacuated by the authorities, with an unknown 
number of people self-evacuating from the area (Silva, 2010). However, in the city of Baños, 
an evacuation order was not given by the local government (see Section 0 for more details 
about the history of evacuation in Baños). Despite the lack of official evacuation order in 
Baños, the National Secretariat told us that many people from the nearby area, including 
Baños, auto-evacuated. Schools in Baños were also closed so that children could remain 
with their families in case of an evacuation order.  
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Activity following the 28th May 2010 eruption has also included lahars, which affected the 
Penipe-Baños road between 28th May and 14th June 2010 and caused the road to close. 
Mudflows have also occurred in the area between 4th and 6th September 2010. This road 
was inaccessible at the time of fieldwork. 
2.3 Volcano monitoring and warnings 
The monitoring of volcanoes in Ecuador is carried out by Instituto Geofisico Escuela 
Polytechnica Nacional Apartado (IGEPN, or IG), which is based in Quito.  The IG also runs 
the Tungurahua Observatory, which is located in Guadeloupe, 14km north of Volcán 
Tungurahua. Seventeen volcanoes are actively monitored in Ecuador. Different monitoring 
networks are installed at each volcano; elements include seismic stations, ground 
deformation and pressure sensors, thermal, geochemical and visual data.  
The Tungurahua Observatory provides daily reports on activity at Volcán Tungurahua and 
operations at the Observatory. In addition, they also produce ‘special reports’, which include 
data from the monitoring network (seismic stations, GPS and gas emission data).  
The monitoring equipment and data collection from the Tungurahua Observatory includes: 
seismometers, tiltmeters, COSPEC and DOAS monitoring, two lahar detection stations, 
thermal imagery, ash collection and chemical analyses (WOVO, 2005). This monitoring is 
supplemented by observations from the Observatory, and from “vigìas”, who are trained 
local volcano watchers with radio communications to the Observatory. 
When unrest manifests at the volcano, IG inform the National Secretariat of Risk 
Management (otherwise known as the “National Secretariat”) and provide hazard scenarios 
for the likely progression of activity. The National Secretariat makes contingency plans, 
based on the likely hazard scenarios provided by IG, which are then given to the local 
government. 
It is the decision of the local government to assign the alert level, and to give evacuation 
orders if necessary. 
At the time of writing, the alert level system and contingency plans were under review by the 
National Secretariat, and new procedures were being developed. There are plans to: 
develop the contingency plans to better fit with the hazard scenarios provided by IG and to 
provide information on what actions people should take in each scenario; alter the alert level 
system, which currently varies between municipalities; and train local government officials to 
be able to lead in emergencies. The plans are intended to be complete by the end of 2010. 
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3.0 INFRASTRUCTURE IMPACTS AND RESPONSES TO RECENT 
ASHFALL 
Infrastructure impacts were investigated in Guayaquil, and also in several centres in the 
Tungurahua area (Figure 10). Additionally, meetings were carried out informally with IG staff, 
and informal conversations were opportunistically undertaken with local people when visiting 
the affected area.  
Time constraints allowed focus on a few main topics of interest, to unravel the complexities 
of impacts across these areas. Unfortunately it was difficult to arrange interviews within the 
time frame, and little information was gained on water, wastewater, and transportation and 
communication infrastructure directly. However other interviews provided insights into the 
impacts on these sectors, particularly since the focus of the trip was to look at both direct 
and indirect effects of ashfall on critical infrastructure. Indirect effects included how access, 
power, water and communications affected the operation of critical facilities. 
Figure 10 Map of the towns visited in the Tungurahua area to investigate the impacts of volcanic 
ash. 
Impacts are discussed in the following sections, by sector.  
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3.1 Electricity supply 
3.1.1 Organisational and operational structure of the electrical network in 
Ecuador 
The company CELEC EP (La Empresa Publica Estrategica Corporacion Electrica Del 
Ecuador) is responsible for operating the nation’s electricity transmission network. Formed 
on January 14 2010, CELEC EP is the single entity that oversees several businesses within 
the nation’s wholesale electricity market. These businesses manage different facets of the 
energy supply process such as generation and distribution.  
The total electricity demand for Ecuador is approximately 2800 MW. The city of Guayaquil is 
the nation’s largest energy demander consuming roughly 700 MW, while Quito follows 
closely behind with a demand of about 600 MW. A centralized, double-circuit power 
transmission network forms a ‘ring’ that is capable of generating and transmitting a 
maximum of 4000 MW to provide consumers with a constant and reliable power supply 
(Figure 11). Ecuador’s electricity transmission network is comprised of 32 substations 
connected by some 3,000km of transmission lines operating at either 230 kV or 138 kV 
(Transelectric, 2011). Electricity is generated through the transformation of energy from fuel 
combustion, hydro systems, steam, natural gas and wind (only on the Galapagos). 
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Figure 11 Map illustrating the Ecuadorian transmission network. Image courtesy of CELEC EP. 
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3.1.2 Generation sites 
The Agoyan hydroelectric dam, situated on the Pastaza River, is located five kilometres east 
of the city of Baños. This dam generates 156MW and each generator produces a voltage of 
33kV. This voltage is then stepped up to 138kV for integration into the national grid. The 
dam and its reservoir are the second most important in Ecuador (Hall et al., 1999).  
Over the last 11 years of intermittent volcanic activity from Tungurahua, very little ash has 
fallen at the dam site. This is mainly due to the predominant wind direction of the region 
which tends to carry ash south and west of the volcano (a scientist1). On the few occasions 
when ash has fallen at Agoyan, the dam has operated as normal unless the local 
municipality deems the community risk too great; as occurred during August 2006 and 
October 1999 when large volumes of ash fall threatened the security of Baños, which 
resulted in the closure of local utilities. The dam is equipped with a regularly updated 
contingency plan covering major disasters such as a large volcanic eruption from Volcán 
Tungurahua. Daily communication is maintained between dam operators and the 
Observatorio Volcánico Tungurahua (Tungurahua Volcano Observatory) to ensure 
preparedness for volcanic events.  
The lahar hazard from Tungurahua is more threatening to the Agoyan hydroelectric project 
than direct ashfall (an Agoyan Dam Operator). Intake mechanisms such as wicket gates, 
turbine covers and blades are particularly at risk of abrasion from ash-laden water. Severe 
pitting of the metallic components (Figure 12) has accelerated their degradation; Agoyan has 
had to replace four turbines in the last 21 years.  
To reduce the impacts from the intake of highly turbid water, Agoyan is specially designed to 
cope with high levels of sediment. A floodgate system has been devised so that the intake 
flow can be diverted away from generation components and directly flushed out into the river 
via flood gates (Figure 12). In the event of heavy rain, when there is an increased risk of 
ash-laden floodwaters and lahars being generated, the dam has systems in place to monitor 
water levels and turbidity to trigger the protective bypass system.  
                                                 
1 Interviewees have been anonymised, and generalised terms relating to their employment has been used to indicate where 
interviews have been referenced, in accordance with ethical guidelines 
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Figure 12 Above: a severely pitted turbine that has been removed from service. Below: the Agoyan 
Dam and its orange floodgates. 
3.1.3 Substations 
Ashfall from the May 28 2010 eruption instigated no faults on Ecuador’s transmission 
network and created only minor cleaning issues. The city of Guayaquil received 1-2 mm of 
fine-grained ash during this eruption, a rare event for the city (Figure 13). The ash fell during 
dry conditions and no instances of flashover (the unintended discharge of electrical current 
across insulators) were reported. This coincides with earlier work which suggests that dry 
volcanic ash is non-conducting and will not cause immediate problems (e.g. flashover) to 
high voltage transmission equipment (Nellis and Hendrix, 1980; Sarkinen and Wiitala, 1981, 
Matsuoka et al., 1995). The risk of flashover is believed to be greater in light wet weather 
conditions (dew, fog, drizzle or light rain) (Wilson et al., 2009).  
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Immediately following this ashfall, crews were dispatched to survey substations. Substations 
identified as most affected were cleaned to prevent ash-induced failure of high voltage 
equipment.   
The Guayaquil substation (Pasquales) is of critical importance to the continuity of the power 
supply to the city, and it required the most attention from line maintenance and cleaning 
crews. During the cleaning process, all personnel were required to wear a mask and 
goggles. To avoid interruption to supply, the substation remained energised while insulated 
batons (rated for 230 kV) were fitted with brush heads and rags as the cleaning crew 
manually cleaned the surfaces of all substation equipment except for transformers (e.g. 
switches, bus bars, conductors, etc.). ‘OMYA’ brand ceramic cleaning detergents were used 
to aid in the primary cleaning stage (applied by rag or brush) before high-pressure power 
washers were brought in to thoroughly rinse away any remaining ash. To avoid permanent 
damage to the power transformers, each of the three transformer banks at the Pasquales 
substation had to be taken offline individually while these sections of the yard were cleaned. 
Only eight hours of total de-energized time was allowed by CELEC EP for this procedure. 
The substation was re-energized once drying of substation equipment (following high 
pressure washing) was complete. While remobilization of the ash was an inconvenience to 
substation workers for about a month following the initial ashfall, no further cleaning of 
equipment was required.  
Disconnect switch contacts were especially difficult to clean and required scrubbing with a 
rough sponge to remove the contact grease in which the ash became embedded. This 
protective grease was then reapplied (Figure 13). 
Immediately following the May 28 2010 eruption, a separate live-line cleaning crew was 
dispatched to Babahoyo substation, located approximately 125 km WSW of Tungurahua in 
Los Rios province (Figure 5). This station is equipped with only one three-phase transformer 
that feeds several distribution circuits. Special care and attention was given to this small 
station, as transmission failure here would have likely caused cascading failure elsewhere 
on the grid.  
While the May 2010 eruptions of Volcán Tungurahua caused only minor and short-term 
problems for substations, the August 2006 eruptions caused more problems (a CELEC EP 
Linesman.). Substations affected by ashfall from these events (Riobamba, Totoras, Pucara 
and Babahoyo) required extensive controlled-outage cleaning. CELEC EP personnel noted 
that fine-grained ash was the most difficult to clean, especially when it became wet and 
cemented to the surfaces of substation gear.  
Despite significant ashfalls to substations during Tungurahua’s eleven-year period of recent 
activity, no issues or concerns have been raised about the reduction of step-touch potentials 
in substation gravel contaminated with volcanic ash, nor have any issues of corrosion or 
abrasion been reported. 
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Figure 13 Above: 138 kV transformer bushing coated in 1-2 mm of fine-grained ash at a Guayaquil 
substation. Below: a contaminated disconnect switch. (Photos Courtesy of Transelectric, Ecuador). 
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3.1.4 Transmission and distribution equipment 
Following the May 28 2010 eruption of Volcán Tungurahua, transmission conductors (lines), 
insulators and towers were not cleaned because previous experience with ashfall suggested 
that minor quantities of ash would unlikely cause problems and that wind and rain action 
would provide sufficient cleaning of transmission equipment. This conforms to advice 
provided by Wilson et al., (2009) whereby small volumes (<5 mm) of dry volcanic ash will 
have a low probability of causing failure (flashover) across the insulator.  
In general, Ecuadorian transmission equipment is more susceptible to flashover from other 
contaminants such as industrial emissions, salt spray, fertilisers and mould than from 
volcanic ash (a CELEC EP substation supervisor). However the investigations of Sarkinen 
and Wiitala (1980) have highlighted the extremely high potential of volcanic ash to cause 
flashover on high voltage transmission equipment due to the large amounts of attached 
soluble salts which become conductive when dissolved by a source of moisture (rain). The 
decision to not clean transmission conductors, insulators and towers should therefore be 
revised to avoid flashover on high voltage insulators which can cause cascading failure 
elsewhere on the power system.  
When asked for their views on the vulnerability of different configurations of insulators, 
CELEC EP staff thought that vertical configurations would be more susceptible to flashover 
due to the higher surface area for ash to adhere to (a CELEC EP Linesman; a CELEC EP 
substation supervisor). This is interesting to note as other anecdotal evidence suggests the 
contrary, whereby horizontally strung insulators allow ash to adhere to the underside of 
insulator sheds more readily and are therefore more likely to bridge the distance between 
electrodes (conducting elements). While the majority of high voltage insulators in Ecuador 
are made from red porcelain, glass insulators with larger creepage distances (distance 
between the conducting elements on an insulator or string of insulators) are recommended 
for heavily polluted regions, and those at risk of ashfall. Glass is also preferential because it 
is easier to tell over the red porcelain when the insulators are contaminated and require 
cleaning from lines crews (a CELEC EP Linesman).  
Transmission equipment located on the northern flank of the volcano has had to be re-routed 
due to lahar hazards (Transelectric officials). Lahars in 2006 came within metres of a 138 kV 
transmission tower, initiating a plan by CELEC EP to relocate the tower to avoid future lahar-
induced interruption to the high voltage supply around the volcano (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14 Above: 138 kV transmission tower (E50) situated in a 2006 lahar path. Below: Proposed 
re-design of the 138 kV transmission circuit showing relocation of towers and conductors (lines) to 
avoid lahars (Photo’s courtesy of Transelectric, Ecuador). 
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3.1.5 Summary of impacts and adaptations to electrical supply 
The Agoyan dam is vulnerable to lahar hazards, and turbine blades suffer increased 
abrasion as a result of the water turbidity. Risks of lahars are higher in the rainy season; 
dam operators monitor turbidity of the water and floodgates have been designed to bypass 
turbid water away from the generation equipment to prevent damage. While no major 
failures have occurred at Agoyan the dam stopped its operations due to the risk posed by 
large eruptions at Volcán Tungurahua in 1999 and 2006. The risk is managed with daily 
communication between the Agoyan dam and TVO. Transmission towers on the northern 
flanks of the volcano are also vulnerable to lahar hazards and CELEC EP has identified an 
alternative site for the towers to mitigate the risk. 
Overall the Ecuadorian electricity transmission network performed very well during the May 
2010 ashfall. Because the ash 1) fell in small amounts (1-2 mm in Guayaquil) and 2) fell in a 
dry state during dry atmospheric conditions, the ash was non-conducting (Nellis and 
Hendrix, 1980; Sarkinen and Wiitala, 1981) and therefore posed a low risk of causing 
flashover (Wilson et al., 2009). Had it been raining or very humid conditions at the time of the 
event, the risk of flashover would have increased and more immediate actions would have 
been necessary (e.g. de-energisation of critical circuits for controlled outage cleaning or 
immediate ‘hot’ (energised) cleaning of both contaminated substations and transmission 
equipment). In general, flashover events are more common from other contaminants in 
Ecuador, such as salt spray, industrial contaminants and guano. Pre-existing knowledge of 
the risks posed by these alternative contaminants has influenced the strategies taken by 
Ecuadorian electricity personnel to mitigate adverse impacts to the power system from 
volcanic ash fall contamination.  
Our findings highlight the heightened vulnerability of substation equipment (e.g. transformer 
insulation (bushings) and switchgear) over transmission hardware (conductors, insulators, 
towers) during a light ash fall event such as occurred in May 2010.  Extra care should 
therefore be given to these components to ensure a constant and reliable supply of 
electricity. Effective cleaning methods have been developed by CELEC EP in response to 
ashfalls in order to prevent damage. CELEC EP identified vulnerable substations and these 
were assessed and cleaned as a precaution. Transmission equipment was not cleaned 
following the light ashfalls in May 2010, as the ash was considered too thin to pose a risk of 
failure and it was considered that rain and wind action would clean the equipment 
sufficiently. The unfailing provision of electricity to affected areas during the May 2010 
eruption was largely due to sensible decisions made by Ecuadorian electricity managers but 
the performance of the system should be brought to the attention of international power 
suppliers as an example of resiliency during a minor volcanic ash fall.  
Larger ashfalls in 2006 prompted controlled outage cleaning to a few substations in the 
affected area. Lessons learned from adverse impacts during this and other regional volcanic 
eruptions (e.g. Reventador 2002) have helped electricity managers prepare for and make 
sound assessments during volcanic ashfall events, such as in May 2010. However, large 
scale events (e.g. 2006) require different and more complex mitigation strategies.  
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3.2 Water supplies 
Investigations of impacts on water supplies were not a focus of this field visit as within the 
tight time frame available only one interview was unable to be arranged. Good information 
on the range of adaptive measures adopted by the water supply agency EMAAP in Quito to 
mitigate against the frequent ashfalls experienced by the city is provided by Leonard et a. 
(2005).  
3.2.1 Guayaquil 
We interviewed an environmental monitoring officer at the Municipality of Guayaquil about 
the impacts of the ashfall on the city’s lifelines. The city received approximately 1 mm 
ashfall, with lesser quantities being received towards the south of the city. The ashfall lasted 
around two hours, and was ‘very fine, dry and dark grey in colour’. The officer made the 
point that as Guayaquil already has a high baseline of environmental quality problems (such 
as air and water quality) any additional impacts from the ashfall could not be differentiated 
from this baseline. The municipal water supply implemented short-term service outages (up 
to one day per sector) to allow filters to be cleaned or changed as necessary. The municipal 
cleanup was reportedly a minor operation mostly performed by residents using brooms 
(known as ‘mingas’). No water shortages were reported as a result.  
3.2.2 General vulnerability of water supplies in Ecuador 
According to the National Secretariat, of all of the lifeline services in Ecuador, water supplies 
are generally the most affected by volcanic ashfalls. However further details of the way in 
which they are affected by ashfalls is not known. However, a supporting insight was provided 
by PAHO staff, who told us that there is a new health ministry initiative to protect drinking 
water from ashfall, and to provide filters in affected areas. 
Hospitals interviewed during this study reported that their water supplies were unaffected 
during the 2010 eruption. However local communities suffered digestive system problems 
from drinking contaminated water and eating contaminated food. In response to an open 
question about the consequences of ashfalls in the Penipe area, a hospital manager told us: 
“…we have a greater incidence of diarrhoeal problems and skins problems, dermatitis, 
allergies … parasitic infections, parasitic diseases that are caused because, well because 
the water is contaminated, and also because people are ingesting foods that have ash in 
them. I’m talking about fruits and vegetables, and pretty much everything that is harvested 
here in the region.” 
Local volcano watcher (vigìa) recommended that home water supplies be covered to protect 
them from contamination.  
Measurements made of stream water quality in the Tungurahua area are included in 
Appendix 3.  
3.3 Healthcare facilities and services 
This section gives an overview of: the structure of the healthcare system in Ecuador; the 
reports and observations gained from visiting healthcare centres in Ecuador; and a summary 
of the types of socio-physical system adaptations noted during fieldwork, drawn from 
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interviews and observations. This report provides the preliminary findings of this study. 
Further analysis of the interviews and data is ongoing. 
3.3.1 Structure of the healthcare system in Ecuador 
The health sector is comprised of public and private institutions as well as non-profit and for-
profit institutions. The public sector tends to the needs of approximately 59% of the 
population, private for-profit institutes cover 10% of the population, armed forces and police 
tend to1% of the population, and 30% of the population do not receive any formal medical 
care (PAHO, 1998). 
The healthcare system is decentralised in Ecuador, comprising centres of variable sizes with 
a chain of progression of services, leading up to regional centres of health. The Ministry of 
Health’s decentralisation model is based on creating small service networks with 
decentralised technical capabilities, each with defined geographic and population 
catchments (PAHO, 1998). Hospitals are the largest centres with the most services, followed 
by centres of health, and then sub centres of health, which are for primary healthcare 
services. During emergencies, mobile groups are formed of medical professionals, known as 
“brigades”. These groups attend the “Albergue’s” (shelters) in the affected area during times 
of eruption, and are typically formed of: assistant nurses, nurses, doctors (GP’s) and 
psychologists. 
In 2001 the annual spend on public health as a proportion of GDP was 4% (PAHO, 2001). 
However, according to a PAHO official interviewed at the time of fieldwork, the budget for 
health has increased by 300% with the new government and constitution in place since 
2008. 
3.3.2 Impacts on the healthcare system 
The impacts of volcanic ashfall on healthcare systems and services were investigated during 
the fieldwork in Ecuador, in both Guayaquil and in the Tungurahua area. The data collection 
comprised interviews at several centres including in: Guayaquil, Puyo, Baños, Riobamba, 
Quero, Pelileo and Penipe. These sites are a various distances from Volcán Tungurahua 
and located at different compass orientations; from the east, through to the north, northeast 
and southwest (See Figure 10). 
Because the private healthcare sector serves a small percentage of the population, the focus 
was placed on public sector health centres, to gain a fuller understanding of the problems 
associated with ashfall across a greater proportion of the population. Two private centres 
and six public health centres were included in the interview pool, plus an interview with the 
Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO). 
3.3.3 Overview 
There were varied reports of the effects of volcanic ashfall on several healthcare systems in 
the Tungurahua volcanic area, and one hospital in Guayaquil. Overall, health centres further 
from the volcano reported few problems with ashfall in terms of: ash ingress into buildings, 
and demand for, and changes to, the healthcare services provided. However prolonged 
working hours were required by staff as health centres increased their operating hours. 
Additionally, few protective actions were deemed necessary to protect patients or hospital 
equipment in these more-distant ashfall areas.  
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The closest health centres to Volcán Tungurahua reported various effects of volcanic ash on 
the health centres, the population and on the services provided. However, none of the 
impacts affected the ability of the hospitals or centres to function, or to provide essential 
services. Ashfalls in general have not been sufficiently thick to cause roof or gutter damage 
at these locations from past eruptions.  
The following passages discuss the consequences of ashfall on healthcare centres in the 
Tungurahua volcanic area, to highlight the variety of issues that arose during oral accounts. 
The amount of ashfall has varied across these locations, due to distance from Volcán 
Tungurahua and the orientation of the plume. The facilities and services provided at each of 
the health centres are also variable; scaling up from health subcentres, to centres of health 
and basic hospitals. 
3.3.4 Lifeline utilities 
Overall there were no reported access problems associated with travel to and from health 
centres, there were no power cuts caused directly by ashfall that threatened the provision of 
essential services, and communications systems were not generally affected. However the 
private clinic in Baños recalled a loss of power when lahars impacted power lines at the base 
of the volcano in 2006. Water supplies at hospitals and health centres for the most part are 
covered or piped from reservoirs distant from the volcano and so remain largely unaffected 
by ashfall. However, on a country-wide scale, a PAHO official said that in general 
wastewater systems are not covered, and would therefore be susceptible to blockages from 
ashfalls. There have been no reports of blockages of wastewater systems at the health 
facilities, although in past eruptions drains have been said to have become blocked and 
required clearing of ash in order to prevent problems. 
3.3.5 Impacts on public health and healthcare service provision 
Discussions with healthcare professionals revealed that local populations have been found 
to suffer from digestive problems related to drinking ash-contaminated water and eating ash-
contaminated food in region affected by ashfall. Centro de Salud Riobamba is a regional 
health centre and so has an overview of the effects of ashfall both in the city, and in several 
smaller towns within the region. According to the healthcare professionals interviewed, 
ashfall has caused a variety of skin, abdominal, digestive, psychological and respiratory 
problems. This is also found within the literature, where ashfalls have resulted in increased 
instances of short-term respiratory health effects in affected populations (Horwell and Baxter, 
2006; Baxter, 1983). 
In Penipe a hospital manager told us of a small increase in respiratory effects, skin allergies, 
conjunctivitis, and also problems associated with contaminated water and food, caused by 
ashfalls. In Pelileo a healthcare professional noted increases in respiratory effects and skin 
allergies from ashfall. The public hospital in Baños also noted in increase in nose, mouth and 
throat problems and respiratory effects for 2-3 months after the 1999 eruption. This hospital 
estimated that three out of every ten people visiting the facility were affected by these 
symptoms at this time. In the Baños private clinic patients had to wear ash masks inside the 
building at one point during the 2006 eruption, as ash was suspended in the atmosphere 
both inside and outside the building. Quero health centre noted that the service demand was 
higher in the early years for respiratory problems, but said that they no longer experience 
this kind of demand as people know now how to protect themselves. Healthcare managers 
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in Guayaquil reported no increase in public health effects caused by the ashfall. However 
anecdotally, a non-health professional in Guayaquil said that there were about two days 
when people suffered respiratory irritation in Guayaquil following the eruption of May 28, 
2010. 
In addition to the short-term public health effects noticed from ashfalls, longer term 
psychological effects have been observed by medical professionals to have increased since 
eruptions began in 1999. A hospital manager in Riobamba estimated that there had been 
around a 50% increase in psychological problems since the eruptions began in 1999. There 
are additional reports in Baños, Puyo, Penipe and Pelileo that there has been an increase in 
anxiety and depression since eruptions began. This has been attributed to family stress 
caused by crop losses, evacuations and anxiety, by the healthcare professionals 
interviewed. Different clinics treat these conditions differently; some use medical treatments, 
others have started community work with their in-house psychologist, or counselling 
sessions. 
Interviewees mentioned that during ashfalls there is an increased demand for GP services at 
hospitals, from respiratory effects and for optometry, and also that community counselling 
sessions that needed to carried out more often. There is also more demand for health 
information at the Baños hospital, and for basic medical supplies from the hospital pharmacy 
such as: vaseline, vitamin C, and personal protective equipment. A healthcare manager at 
Baños public hospital noted that increased attention was needed for some already-
hospitalised patients during active times, as some vulnerable groups including pregnant 
women, children and the elderly, need more care at this time. In recent eruptions, 2006 and 
2010, the public health impacts in Baños have been much less, as the population were more 
experienced in protecting themselves and more prepared for an ashfall (a hospital manager).  
Despite an increase in public health effects from ashfalls noted by a healthcare professional 
in Penipe, the overall demand for health services reportedly decreased in this particular area 
during active periods. This was attributed to the population having other immediate concerns 
during eruptions; in particular farmers worried about their crops (a healthcare professional). 
And many people are thought to worry about a possible evacuation from the area during 
eruptions (a healthcare professional). 
3.3.6 Impacts on buildings and equipment 
Approximately 1-2mm of fine ash fell in Guayaquil during the 2010 eruption of Volcán 
Tungurahua. This was the most significant ashfall ever received in Guayaquil.  
In Guayaquil, due to time constraints only one private hospital was visited, but there were no 
reported incidences of disruption to healthcare systems, or ash ingress into hospital 
buildings. However the hospital manager informed us that only 10% of the population would 
attend this hospital, and that most people would attend the public hospitals, which may have 
observed some consequences of the ashfall.  
The only known incident of gutter replacement as a result of ashfall loading occurred in 
Pelileo following the 1999 eruption. In Baños public hospital, exterior roofs, gutters and 
drains have previously needed to be unblocked of ash (Baños hospital manager). 
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In Puyo, east of Tungurahua, there has been very little ashfall received over the years, and 
just a light fall was noted in 1999. In general there have been no reported problems at the 
health facility associated with ashfall. In Quero, west-north-west of Tungurahua, there is said 
to have been minimal ash received at the health centre during the 2010 eruption, but ash 
has ingressed into buildings during past eruptions and doors are now kept closed as a 
preventative measure (windows are already sealed at this centre). Occasionally protective 
masks or scarf’s need to be worn in the Quero health centre to protect staff and patients 
from ashfalls.  
In Pelileo ash does not ingress much into the building; windows and doors are closed and 
damp rags are placed under doorways, but no actions are required or taken to protect 
particular equipment. In Cotaló cardboard was placed under doors in the 2010 eruption to 
reduce ash ingress into the building, and other healthcare professionals have reported that 
protective measures were taken in Cotaló to reduce the impacts of ashfall. However no 
doctor or manager was available at Cotaló to interview at the time of our visit, and so more 
information about the effects of ash in this very proximal area to Volcán Tungurahua was not 
gained. 
In Quero, computing and electrical equipment have been affected by ash blockages, but are 
covered in plastic for protection against ash during eruptive periods. No increased corrosion 
of equipment was observed or noted in association with any of the past ashfalls. In 1999 the 
ash was fine and entered into computers and photocopiers in Baños public hospital.  Here, 
microscopes have been observed to become scratched by ash in the past, and are now 
cleaned by blowing air and using contact lens solution. Dental motors, compressors and 
electrical equipment have suffered blockages from ashfalls in past eruptions in Baños.  
3.3.7 Ashfall clean-up 
In 2006 approximately 50-75 mm of ash fell in Riobamba and since this event there has 
been an increase in communication and prevention, such that in 2010, “mingas” (groups of 
the general public in the community,) worked together to solve problems before they 
occurred and cleaned up the ashfall in the town. Ashfall received in Riobamba in 2010 was 
approximately 1cm thickness. All essential services in Riobamba have continued to function 
during ashfall events. In Penipe health centre, not much ash has come inside the building 
but a specialist cleaner is contracted to clean the roof after an ashfall. In Baños public 
hospital increased cleaning was needed following ashfalls and medical equipment was 
maintained by cleaning and vacuuming, which is carried out daily to weekly in active times 
compared to every 2-3 months normally. In Quero ash infiltration into the health centre 
required increased cleaning efforts on a daily basis during ashfalls. 
3.3.8 Economic impacts 
During eruptions there are economic impacts on the health service. These arise as hospital 
staff has had to work increased hours, as hospital operating hours lengthen during 
heightened volcanic activity. This incurs increased salary costs. Additionally the moving and 
rationing of food for shelters incurs increased costs. Money is also spent in non-eruptive 
times on advice campaigns for recommended actions to take during ashfalls and eruptions 
(Riobamba hospital manager). Increased supplies of masks and preventative and protective 
equipment also incur additional costs to health facilities. 
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3.3.9 Physical back-up systems and energy use rationing 
All facilities visited during fieldwork had back-up generators, although many were not 
sufficiently large to serve the entire health centre. Power supplies are prioritised during 
power cuts for essential services including emergency rooms and operating rooms. There 
were also reports of the number of lamps in use being reduced during power cuts in order to 
conserve energy consumption by the generator(s) (Baños hospital manager).  
A knock-on effect has arisen from concern over power failures and their effect on 
refrigerated vaccines and medical supplies. During the 2006 eruption power lines were cut 
off by lahars and power to the facility was temporarily lost. No refrigerated supplies were 
unusable as a result of this, but this occurrence has led to the Baños private clinic no longer 
stocking temperature-dependent supplies. The medications are expensive and the risk to 
them is considered too high to warrant stockpiling supplies (a healthcare professional). 
3.3.10 Building and physical modifications 
A healthcare professional in the private clinic in Baños said that ash ingress had occurred in 
the past during eruptions when the clinic had a zinc roof. However the clinic has replaced the 
old zinc roof with a concrete construction. The healthcare professional attributed the ash 
ingress to the previous roofing style and reported no further ash ingress occurrences after 
the roof was changed to concrete. 
Physical protective measures are undertaken at some centres including taping windows to 
protect glass from shattering as a result of volcanic sound waves. Additional protective 
measures include closing windows and doors, and in some cases using damp rags or 
cardboard under doorways to reduce ash ingress. 
In Riobamba there is now an allocated “safe hospital”, which is a teaching hospital, to which 
people are encouraged to go during eruptions. This hospital has reportedly been evaluated  
and certified within Latin America as well equipped to cope with disasters (details of the 
evaluation criteria or certification body are unknown to the authors). 
3.3.11 Protective equipment 
Many health centres supply personal protective equipment to local residents including: 
masks, goggles, and vasoline, as well as creams, eye drops and asthma inhalers. In Quero, 
scarfs have been supplied instead of masks as a protective measure, as the masks are thin, 
get damp from breathing and do not last for re-use.  
In general medical professionals in Baños reported that the population was now more 
prepared for ashfalls; they wore protective masks, goggles and caps in the 2006 eruption 
(some people also wore hard hats), compared to the 1999 event. Good community 
preparedness was also reported in the same way for the 2010 event. 
3.3.12 Cleaning and maintenance 
Cleaning methods for preventing scratches to microscopes have been developed at Baños 
hospital, including the use of contact lens solution. Routines for maintaining equipment 
during active times has been developed and vulnerable equipment has been identified, such 
as dental motors, which become blocked by ash getting into the operating mechanism. In 
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Quero equipment is covered in plastic sheeting for protection against ash. Other health 
centres mentioned that they had to increase the normal cleaning and maintenance of 
buildings during ashfalls. 
3.3.13 Contingency plans and community work 
The hospitals and clinics visited do have emergency or contingency plans in place. However 
in Baños hospital, the contingency plans are eventually overridden by the local emergency 
management plan, as the hospital would not evacuate unless the local government gave the 
order to do so. Precautionary steps are taken in the hospital in accordance with the activity 
level, with corresponding contingency plans, including; taping windows to prevent glass 
shattering from sound waves (slow onset, minor eruption), and wearing masks and 
protective gear if necessary. But if the evacuation order is not given then the hospital will 
remain open. Other health centres have several emergency plans; one for the health centre, 
one for the cantonal (a ‘cantón’ is an area smaller than a province,) and one for the province. 
Staff at the health centres visited are aware of the volcanic alert levels and the changes in 
routine required when alert levels are altered. They are generally well organised and there is 
a clear hierarchy of health centres in each region, to which patients would be transferred if 
necessary. 
In most centres staff members are trained in disasters and form “brigades”, a group of 
medical professionals who work in the affected communities at the shelters or by assisting 
health centres in the most affected areas. These Brigades are formed by staff at most of the 
health centres visited in the Tungurahua volcanic area. Education in schools is also carried 
out by some health centres. There has also been an increase in counselling sessions in 
some areas to provide psychological assistance to the affected population.  The Red Cross 
also started a programme in high risk areas called “Back to Happiness”, after a peak in 
depression was noted in affected populations 3 years after the 1999 eruptions (Risk 
Manager in Baños). 
The hospital manager in Baños said that by the time of the 2010 eruption there were 
evacuation plans, people conserved food and they had undergone training in skin and eye 
care. There appears to have been a general trend of greater community preparedness over 
time in the affected areas. 
3.4 Transportation networks 
3.4.1 Roads 
In general, ashfalls from eruptions of Volcán Tungurahua since 1999 have caused few 
problems for road transport networks. However, frequent lahars from Tungurahua have 
caused road and bridge washouts, particularly during the rainy season (February to 
September). During these months, heavy rains fall on the Ecuadorian highlands. These can 
entrain unconsolidated volcanic material deposited on the upper slopes of the mountain 
which can form lahars. Roads traversing the base of the mountain are particularly 
vulnerable. The road from Penipe to Baños was cut at the time of fieldwork as a result of 
mudflows. Another vulnerable location is the area called Juive Chico, immediately west of 
Baños. Major lahars in 2006 buried houses, covered the road and washed out a bridge 
(Figure 15).  
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Figure 15 Area of lahar damage in Juive Chico, west of Baños (GPS 16). Upper photo: new section 
of road replacing lahar-damaged section. Lower photo: in same area, house buried by lahar deposits. 
3.4.2 Aviation 
The May 28 2010 eruption of Volcán Tungurahua deposited approximately 1-2 mm of fine-
grained ash on the city of Guayaquil. This city rarely experiences ashfall and was therefore 
not well prepared. This ashfall was sufficient enough to warrant closure of José Joaquín de 
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Olmedo International Airport for two days as flights were grounded. Cleaning crews were 
dispatched to sweep up ash into piles where it was bagged and then taken to a landfill site 
located 16 km outside of the city. Unofficial reports suggest that approximately one thousand 
bags of ash were collected during the cleaning efforts (Instituto Geofísico, pers. comm.2). 
Unfortunately we were unable to schedule an interview with the airport management to 
obtain further details.  
3.5 Municipal clean-up and ash disposal 
The National Secretariat discussed general approaches to ashfall clean-up across ash-
affected regions. In general, brooms are used for clean-up of streets if the grain size of the 
ash allows. Once swept up, a truck provided by the local mayor will collect the ash. The 
National Secretariat assist the local level authorities by providing bags for ash collection; ask 
mask supplies, and goggles and brooms to assist the clean-up. Groups of the local 
population called ‘mingas’ generally maintain infrastructure and roads within the community, 
and will clear ash within their neighbourhood. However for the clearance of roads that run 
between villages, the provincial level are responsible for the clean-up. The municipality and 
the National Secretariat share the cost of clean-up, by an agreed proportion that depends on 
the situation; the cost is split so that 50% is paid by the Municipality and 50% by the National 
Secretariat for routine maintenance (this may include landslides, mudflows or lahars), but in 
emergencies the National Secretariat will pay 80% of the total cost, with the municipality 
making up the remaining 20% of the cost. 
Some information on cleanup operations in Guayaquil was obtained (Municipality of 
Guayaquil environmental scientist). The municipal cleanup was reportedly a minor operation 
performed mostly by residents using brooms. No extra water demand was created. At the 
international airport, cleaning crews were dispatched to sweep up ash into piles where it was 
bagged and then taken to a landfill site located 16 km outside of the city. Unofficial reports 
suggest that approximately one thousand bags of ash were collected during the cleaning 
efforts (Instituto GeofísicoGeofísico, pers. comm.). For the city of Guayaquil, ash was 
disposed of at a landfill site outside the city (Las Iguanas) and an island off the coast. 
3.6 Telecommunications 
Recounts from the last 11 years of volcanic activity at Tungurahua suggest that 
telecommunications are vulnerable to hindrance from volcanic ash plumes. In particular, 
Instituto GeofísicoGeofísico Volcano Observatory noted radio attenuation and reduction of 
broadcast signal strength when receivers located on the volcano became coated in ash. 
However the phenomena is not well understood nor well documented in other eruptions.  
There have been numerous examples of telecommunications transmissions continuing to 
work during volcanic ash falls and a recent analysis by telecommunications engineers for the 
New Zealand-based Auckland Engineering Lifelines Group concluded that impacts on 
electromagnetic signal transmissions would probably be limited to low frequency services 
such as satellite communications (Wilson et al., 2009). Conversations with electricity 
personnel revealed that fiber optic communication systems perform flawlessly during ash 
events unless damaged directly by falling volcanic bombs.   
                                                 
2 Comments made by individuals that were not recorded during formal interviews have been referenced anonymously and 
noted as personal communications (pers. comm) 
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4.0 IMPACTS ON AGRICULTURE 
Owing to the tight time constraints of the field visit, determining agricultural impacts of the 
2010 eruptions of Tungurahua was not a major focus of the field work. However, general 
information on impacts on agricultural production was obtained from the National Secretariat 
and was mentioned by others interviewees. A field visit was made to the town of Cotaló, 
which received ashfall during the 2010 eruptions, as well as during the previous decade of 
volcanic unrest, particularly in 2006.  
4.1 Overview of agriculture in the Tungurahua area 
Volcán Tungurahua is surrounded by high-density agricultural land (Figure 16). Locally-
grown crops include maize, beans, potatoes and onions (these four constitute approximately 
80% of the crops in the Tungurahua region), as well as citrus fruit, avocadoes, bananas, 
flowers, and sugar cane. Livestock activities include dairying and intensive chicken farms 
(Leonard et al., 2005). Most farms are smallholdings (80-90% of farms in the region are 
estimated to be less than10 ha).  
 
Figure 16 Intensive land use on lower slopes of Volcán Tungurahua (photo taken from near 
Cotaló). 
In Ecuador, the growing season is virtually continuous throughout the year due to its 
equatorial location and climate. Plants are harvested when mature, which can be at any time 
of year. Thus, in the event of an eruption there will be crops at varying stages of maturity, 
which in turn affects their vulnerability to ashfall (Wilson et al. 2006). These authors note that 
there is, however, no general relationship between stage of development and vulnerability to 
ashfall damage. For instance, rice was found to be more vulnerable during mature stages 
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with seed heads easily damage, but corn was vulnerable during early to mid-stage 
development and relatively resilient when mature. Other plants such as tobacco are 
vulnerable throughout their life cycle. 
These authors also noted that different crops have markedly different vulnerability to ashfall. 
In general, root and low-growing vegetables such as carrots, onions, potatoes and cabbages 
are the least vulnerable to ashfall. Plants with shiny or waxy leaves, such as cabbages, 
appear to be able to shed ash easily. Plants with large leaves, such as bananas and corn, 
are particularly vulnerable, as are plants with sticky or hairy leaves such as tobacco and 
tomato plants. These leaves are thought to be efficient traps for ash.  
4.2 Impacts of ashfall and adaptations in the Tungurahua area 
The National Secretariat provided us with the following summary data on the impacts of the 
2010 eruption of Tungurahua on agricultural land (Table 3). 
Table 3 Impacts of on agricultural land. 
Province Canton Area partially-
damaged (ha) 
Total damage (ha) 
Tungurahua Baños  1086 5 
 Pelileo 475 20 
 Quero 300 0 
 Mocha 1207 0 
Chimborazo Puela 672 0 
TOTAL  3740 25 
According to the National Secretariat, impacts of the 2010 eruptions were minor in 
comparison to the impacts experienced in 2006. In 2006, maize and banana crops were 
particularly affected. It was also found that plants that had been sprayed with insecticide 
were more vulnerable to ash damage as the ash adhered to the spray. These crops were 
ruined, but were put to further use both as animal feed and by being mixed with soil to make 
compost.  
Some of the adaptations implemented in response to the volcanic unrest are: farmers 
moving towards planting more resilient crops such as onions; livestock are only reared in the 
region for short periods of time to limit problems with tooth abrasion; and greenhouses have 
been constructed in Cotaló and other centres to protect crops.  
4.3 Case study: Cotaló 
The village of Cotaló is located approximately 8 km NW of the summit of Volcán 
Tungurahua, on the opposite bank of the Rio Chambo (Figure 10, Figure 17 and Figure 18).  
During our visit we spoke informally to the owner of a chicken farming business and to a 
local government official.  
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Figure 17 General view of Cotaló (at far end of terrace) and surrounding area. 
 
Figure 18 Entrance to village of Cotaló. 
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A wide range of crops are grown in this area, including pasture grass, potatoes, carrots, 
maize, onions, lettuce, cabbage, beans, guavas, peaches, apples, tamarillos, ‘claudias’ and 
‘capolitas’.  
Due to its location immediately downwind of Tungurahua, Cotaló has experienced impacts 
from volcanic activity since 1999. It suffered the most significant damage in 2006. Cotaló is 
comprised of 9 smaller sub-communities; two of these (Pillate and San Juan, located on 
terraces above the river to the south of Cotaló) were the worst-affected. Sometimes, during 
our conversations with local people, it was difficult to differentiate which events were being 
referred to.  
4.4 Impacts of earlier eruptions 
Local people estimated that 20-40 cm of ash was deposited in Cotaló during the 2006 
eruptions. Incandescent blocks also fell on the village, and caused major damage to roofs, 
and building collapses (Figure 19 and Figure 20). A local farmer estimated that 50% of roofs 
in the town were damaged and needed to be replaced. She also mentioned that the ashfall 
caused some corrosion damage to roofs. 
 
 
Figure 19 Ballistic block damage to shed roof, Cotaló, 2006 (photo courtesy of Carlos Fernando 
Perez). 
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Figure 20 Ashfall on ground, Cotaló, 2006 (photo courtesy of Carlos Fernando Perez). 
There were apparently few problems with the town’s water supply, which is piped from 
nearby hills. There was a power outage on the day of the eruption, but it lasted less than a 
day.  
In terms of agricultural impacts, local farmers reported that ‘animals died’ from ingesting ash. 
However we were not able to obtain further details about the nature of the impacts of the 
ash, the type of livestock affected or how many died. Impacts on crops were severe with 
almost all crops lost. Very little could be grown in the following two years; seeds were 
planted but failed to thrive. Nothing could be grown for two years afterwards. The ash was 
tilled into the soil using cattle-drawn ploughs, to about 40-50 cm depth. Larger blocks were a 
problem initially but apparently they are quite friable and break down readily in the soil.  
We spoke to a local chicken farmer who has 12,000 birds housed in four sheds (Figure 21). 
They produce on average 10,200 eggs per day. In 2006, the business had three sheds, of 
which two collapsed following the eruption. The long span of the roofs was apparently a 
problem; when the sheds were rebuilt, beams were reinstalled with more closely-spaced 
crossbeams (1.5 meter spacing, reduced from three metre spacing). Minor ballistic damage 
was patched up (Figure 22). The birds were uninjured by the eruption despite the damage to 
their sheds, but were apparently unnerved by it to the point where egg-laying ceased entirely 
for one month. During this time they were given sedatives and extra vitamins.  
This farmer suffered a 60% loss in income for the year following the eruption. This was 
mostly due to the costs of repairing the buildings, and the disruptions caused by having to 
clean all the debris out of the sheds. They had to survive on their savings, but were ‘back on 
their feet’ by 2008. There were no loans available from the government to help rebuild.  
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Figure 21 New sheds (rebuilt after 2006 eruption) housing chicken farm, Cotaló. 
 
Figure 22 Ballistic damage to the roof of a chicken shed. 
4.5 Impacts of the 2010 eruption 
The 28 May 2010 eruption deposited some ashfall on the Cotaló area. Estimates by locals of 
the quantity of ashfall ranged from 3-4 cm to 3 mm. It did not cause any physical damage to 
buildings.  
Livestock was pre-emptively evacuated to Pelileo so animals could have uncontaminated 
feed; there was no supplementary feed available for them in Cotaló. This was paid for by the 
municipality using emergency funds. Cattle were apparently fed on ruined fruit (bananas) 
shipped up from the coast. There was some damage to crops, but local farmers were able to 
harvest approximately 70% of crops. Some were found to be more resilient, particularly 
potatoes and pasture grass.  
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5.0 VOLCANIC EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN ECUADOR 
5.1 Emergency management structure 
This section gives an overview of the structure of emergency management from the national 
through to the local level in Ecuador. This section also discusses the plans for change in the 
emergency management system. 
Much has changed with regard to emergency management since the previous GNS 
research trip to Ecuador in 2004 (Leonard et al., 2005). 
The Secretariat Nacional de Gestation de Riesgos (National Secretariat of Risk 
Management), otherwise referred to as the ‘National Secretariat’, was formed in 2008. It was 
created as an umbrella agency that incorporated Civil Defence, but broadened its scope 
from the traditional emergency response role, to include risk management and disaster risk 
reduction. Civil Defence remains as a small role within the agency to deal with emergency 
response, and includes mainly volunteers (vigìas) who are linked at the local level. 
As discussed in Section 0, the procedure for emergency management involves a three-step 
process. In a state of volcanic unrest, IG monitors the activity and develops hazard 
scenarios, which are passed on to the National Secretariat. The National Secretariat uses 
the hazard scenarios and develops contingency plans that are then passed on to the local 
government. It is the local government mayor who makes the decision regarding the 
appropriate alert level, and also whether or not to order evacuations.  
There are procedures in place to assist the mayor or local government in decision making, 
which are outlined in “Emergency Plan of Action” documents. Emergency plans of action at 
the local level include four main components (translated and summarised from: National 
Secretariat, Emergency plan for the cantonal of Pelileo, post 2006): 
1. The COE (Committee of Emergency Operations*) is the executive level of decision 
making at the Cantonal or Provincial level, depending on the severity of the situation. 
The COE works with the Secretariat of Risk Management technical office and provides 
needs and damage assessments, as well as evaluating local resource capabilities. 
2. The Technical Area is occupied by the Position of Unified Command, which organises 
and allocates functions and work streams to each area of action necessary, depending 
on the capability of each institute. These institutes and areas of work include: evacuation 
areas and areas for shelter, security, food, engineering, water, communications, 
infrastructure, fire brigade, Civil Defence, the Red Cross, and the army, The Position of 
Unified Command works with the COE, exchanging information and executing the 
decisions of the COE. 
3. The Administrative Area works on the economics and finances, and coordinates 
operations and logistics. This area also distributes external aid/ funds. 
4. Coordination Units correspond to the provincial Secretariat of Risk Management 
technical office that provides experienced operating and administrative personnel to act 
as coordinators across the COE and the Position of Unified Command. 
*The COE used to stand for the ‘Centre of Emergency Operations’, however the National 
Secretariat has changed this to the ‘Committee of Emergency Operations’. This was done to 
emphasise that engagement and communication at the local level are key to the decision-
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making process, and that these actions are not tied to a physical location (or centre) - 
meetings will occur at the local level, wherever that may be. 
The emergency plan provides the following guidelines and protocols for action:  
• Guidelines for activating of the COE, which include: receiving information from IG 
informing the mayor about volcanic activity; the mayor will form a local COE and assign 
the alert level; the capacity of local resources will be assessed and if exceeded, the 
mayor will request assistance from the provincial governor, who will act in accordance to 
the Plan of Action; the provincial COE will be formed from the directors of different work 
areas, and the Position of Unified Command will be set-up. 
• Decision trees for allocating the alert level based on information from IG, and with 
guidelines for assigning each coloured alert level (yellow, orange, red) depending on the 
hazards faced. 
• Guidelines for actions to be taken for certain hazard scenarios. 
• Protocols for action in each of the functions or work streams (e.g. for setting up shelters, 
managing security, food etc.). 
The Emergency Plan of Action for Pelileo contains specific guidelines for actions to be taken 
during ashfall (National Secretariat, post 2006). These are outlined as follows: 
“To provide to the population the necessary supplies to reduce the effects of these 
phenomena [ashfall] such as: water, food, masks, scarfs, eye drops for the eyes, and to 
distribute information about the precautions to take for their protection and that of their 
goods.  For the case of the animals fodder for its diet will be delivered and/or transfer to less 
affected zones.” (National Secretariat, Emergency Plan for the cantonal of Pelileo, post 
2006). 
A local risk manager in Baños reported that the contingency plan is being revised following 
the May 2010 eruptions and that these plans are always being revised to keep them up-to-
date. 
In practice, the process of emergency management is less fluid, and the decisions made at 
local level are affected by socio-political circumstances. Accounts have been given during 
fieldwork of red alerts being assigned in local areas, but no actions taken with regard to 
evacuations or access restrictions. These actions are outlined as the appropriate response 
in a red alert according to the Emergency Plan of Action (Medical Professional in the Penipe 
area). Other reports have been made of local road clearances being carried out by mayors, 
on high risk roads that have been blocked by landslides, lahars or mudflows, in order to keep 
the fastest routes to market open. These are examples of complex decision-making driven 
by local needs and pressures. 
Local level decisions are also constrained by resources and experience in emergency 
management decision-making. To this end, the National Secretariat is setting up training 
programs for decision-makers in emergencies, to better enable them to take the lead in 
emergency situations (National Secretariat manager). 
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The National Secretariat is revising its procedures following recognised short-falls in the 
current alert levels and contingency plans. It has been noted that alert levels are inconsistent 
across municipalities, and Volcán Tungurahua itself is divided into two provinces: 
Tungurahua and Chimborazo. Plans are being made to unify the alert level system and 
connect appropriate decisions, actions and procedures to the alert level. It has also been 
identified that the current contingency plans do not link the hazard scenarios well enough to 
guideline actions at the local level. This results in local government decisions being made 
but without appropriate actions being taken. These revisions to the current procedures are 
expected to be updated by the end of the year 2010. Additionally, the National Secretariat 
wants to set up relocation exchange programmes between towns, so that people know 
where to go to in the event of an evacuation (National Secretariat manager). 
5.1.1 The role of vigìas in the area around Volcán Tungurahua 
Vigìas (volcano observers and local voluntary civil defence) perform essential tasks during 
heightened activity and are key to both hazard assessment and emergency management in 
the area surrounding Volcán Tungurahua. 
One of their duties is to report their observations of hazards to Instituto Geofísico (IG). Vigìas 
are equipped with radio communications and call signs, to report any hazard observation to 
IG at Tungurahua Volcano Observatory (TVO), Guadeloupe. There has been a code 
developed to communicate the observations and hazards effectively and with correct 
terminology. Vigìas ground-truth activity with their observations and report this to IG. 
In addition to their voluntary roles, vigìas are also paid on an ad-hoc basis by IG to clean 
solar panels at the monitoring stations when these become covered in ash. This is an 
essential service to ensure continued monitoring capabilities at the observatory (TVO) and 
vigìas are paid a fixed sum per panel cleared of ash. 
The main role of vigìas is voluntary civil defence. They are usually community leaders, who 
have been trained in emergency preparedness and response. The vigìas train with the 
emergency services and Red Cross, and communicate with the army, police, fire brigade 
and IG as appropriate. They are equipped with radio communication systems, personal 
protective equipment and are trained to give advice to the local community about 
preparedness and emergency actions. 
Vigìas are considered essential to the process of assisting the community in preparation and 
in emergencies. IG at Tungurahua Observatory said that vigìas help with communications 
and evacuations, and that their status as community leaders ensures that evacuations are 
more successful as more members of the local communities respond and self-evacuate. 
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5.2 Emergency management practice around Volcán Tungurahua 
Since the reactivation of Volcán Tungurahua in 1999, emergency shelters have been set-up 
in safer areas, close to the communities at risk. The shelters provide food, a place to sleep, 
and are visited by medical professionals to provide basic medical care, medicines and 
psychological support. A photograph of a shelter near Penipe is shown in Figure 23.  
 
Figure 23 Emergency shelter near Penipe, Tungurahua area. 
 
The National Secretariat has organized signs and evacuation routes to inform local 
populations where the nearest shelters are located in emergencies (see Figure 24 and 
Figure 25).  
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Figure 24 Emergency muster point signage in Penipe. 
 
Figure 25 Evacuation route signage in Cotaló. 
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5.3 Community response to volcanic unrest 
This section discusses the community response of communities close to the volcano when 
volcanic unrest occurs. Many of these communities have received ashfalls intermittently, and 
been at risk from other volcanic hazards such as pyroclastic flows and lahars, since the 
reactivation of Volcán Tungurahua in 1999.  
The response of people at the local level is driven by their everyday needs as well as by the 
risks that they face. In general, some communities have been known to auto-evacuate 
during times of unrest, particularly noted during the 2010 eruption of Volcán Tungurahua 
(National Secretariat). However, a healthcare professional informed us that farmers in 
particular will return to their homes during the day to tend to crops and animals, and others 
will also return to check on their properties. At night, most people will sleep outside the high 
risk area, returning only in the daytime. As a consequence of this, healthcare professionals 
in the region generally attend the shelters in the evenings, between about 5-7pm, which is 
when most people arrive for food, shelter or medical attention. 
The National Secretariat provided a table of the capacities of local shelters, and the data of 
how many families attended the shelters from 28th May-14th June 2010. This is reproduced in 
Table 4. Each of the Cantons has several shelters, each with varying capacities according to 
their size. Small villages attend the shelters in the nearest larger village or town that is 
outside of the evacuated area. 
Table 4 Capacity of shelters in the provinces and cantóns close to Volcán Tungurahua, and the 
number of families staying in the albergues (shelters) from 28th May to 14th June 2010. Reproduced 
courtesy of the National Secretariat of Risk Management, Ecuador. 
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5.3.1 Baños: a unique case of preparedness and social response 
On the 18th October 1999 the city of Baños and surrounding farmlands were ordered to 
evacuate by authorities following the reactivation of Volcán Tungurahua and advice from the 
scientific community that the city was at risk from volcanic hazards. The city was forcibly 
evacuated and remained guarded by the army and police to prevent people from returning to 
their homes and into the area at risk. 
However, after many weeks of evacuation and despite several eruptions from Volcán 
Tungurahua, there was no significant damage in the city of Baños or its surrounds. The local 
inhabitants wanted to return to their homes and their livelihoods, having suffered severe 
socio-political disruption from the evacuation orders (Tobin & Whiteford, 2002). On the 5th 
January 2000 the townspeople marched to Baños and clashed with the army to try to win the 
right to return home (Lane et al., 2003).  
Following this, provincial mayors then signed a document allowing people to return to their 
homes but at their own risk. Local people from Baños responded by forming a group to 
inform people of what they should do in emergencies – this was the start of the vigìa system 
and the voluntary civil defence (Risk Manager in Baños).  
For a more detailed account of the Baños evacuation in 1999 and the subsequent recovery, 
see Leonard et al. (2005). 
There have been no evacuation orders issued in Baños since the 1999 eruption. This is 
despite heightened activity and significant eruptions in 2006, including ballistics falling in the 
Baños area. The volcanic activity in 2006, in the opinion of some interviewees, should have 
prompted an official evacuation of the city. 
Following the reactivation of Volcán Tungurahua in 1999, the local population painted yellow 
arrows on the roads in Baños with donated paint, to mark evacuation routes. Since this, the 
National Secretariat has altered the Baños signs to correspond to those in other areas 
around the volcano. The old yellow road markings are now painted green, and as in other 
areas, there are signs with distances to shelters and ISO signs to indicate the area at risk 
from volcanic hazards.  
A vigìa in the Baños area explained that the evacuation plan used to be simple, but now it is 
complex and possibly confusing. 
In Baños new warning sirens were installed in September 2010, following the May 2010 
eruptions. These sirens were trialled by local people and have two distinct sounds; one for a 
drill (intermittent siren), and one for a real event (continuous siren). The sirens also have 
batteries that are connected to electrical transformers so that they are always charging. This 
ensures that these are fully charged should a power cut occur (Risk Manager in Baños). This 
back-up power supply to the sirens has been a recent adaptation, as a risk manager told us 
that in 2006 the sirens would not have worked in some lower risk areas of Baños, due to a 
power cut and a lack of back-up power supply to the sirens. As a result of this, there is now a 
back-up plan written into the contingency plan, where police and firemen will drive around 
the city sounding their sirens to alert the public should the sirens fail. The risk manger 
clarified that it is the mayors’ decision to sound the sirens, and the mayor did not initiate the 
use of this system in 2006. 
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In general the evacuation routes are clearly marked with signs and road markings 
throughout the city, although many shelters are some distance from the town at more than  
2 km away. A photograph taken in Baños of the routes to emergency shelters is shown in 
Figure 26. Drills are also carried out in the town to ensure that people are practiced in 
emergencies.  
The designated safer area in Baños is to the east of the city, and in drills it takes 16-17 
minutes for the population to reach the area where the shelters are located. Approximately 
80% of Baños towns-people are said to be trained for evacuations and know, for example, 
not to cross bridges over rivers in times of eruption (a Vigìa in the Baños area). However the 
vigìa also remarked that the safer area in the east of Baños is still very close to a river valley 
that could potentially carry pyroclastic flows or lahars from the flanks of the volcano. Each 
family is also said to unofficially have their own family contingency plans (a vigìa in the 
Baños area). Thus despite evacuation planning and drills, individual or family actions may 
differ from the officially planned scenarios. 
Family actions in emergencies include shutting windows and doors and locking-up their 
houses. Additionally turning off the electricity, and covering water supplies for protection 
against ash ingress and contamination (a vigìa in the Baños area). 
Some of the population of Baños auto-evacuated during the increased volcanic activity in 
May-June 2010, returning only in the daytime to check on their property or animals, and 
sleeping outside the high risk area at night. This auto-evacuation of the population is a 
positive step in emergency management, where awareness and responsibility are carried by 
the owners of the risk – the population.  
However, there is a downside to the auto-evacuations. It has been known that hotel owners 
have locked visitors inside the hotels during periods of heightened activity, and auto-
evacuated themselves from the area (a scientist). This reportedly occurred during heighted 
volcanic activity in both 2006 and 2008, as owners attempted to protect their income so that 
people could not leave without paying. As a result of these actions, civil defence was forced 
to rescue trapped visitors from hotels using ladders. 
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Figure 26 Signs marking the routes to emergency shelters, taken in Baños (September 2010). 
In general the population have adapted well to ashfalls and wear protective clothing 
including: masks, goggles and caps, and some people wear hard hats during eruptions. 
A hospital manager in Baños said that people generally feel safe in the city, as no event has 
been significant enough to cause damage in Baños itself. People tend to assess their risk 
based on their observations of the volcano and act accordingly. Care should be taken that 
the community does not become complacent about their risk, or the risk to visitors, based on 
past experience of limited physical impacts in the town.  
The history of the evacuation in 1999 and the success of a rebellion against the evacuation 
order has strengthened community ties in Baños (a vigìa in the Baños area). People are 
aware that they are living in Baños at their own risk, and reports of auto-evacuations of 
communities at times of volcanic unrest testify to this awareness. Overall ownership of the 
risk by the town members appears to have prompted an organised and more prepared 
society in Baños. However, comments made by locals about the potentially confusing 
changes to the evacuation plans as they become more complex, and doubts as to the safety 
of the Baños refuge area, should be taken into consideration by local officials and 
emergency managers. 
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND KEY FINDINGS 
The key findings of this report are as follows: 
• Since its reactivation in 1999, activity at Volcán Tungurahua has been mostly 
characterised by eruptions of low to moderate explosiveness. However, in 2006 there 
was a sudden increase in explosiveness leading to two pyroclastic flow-forming 
eruptions on 14 July (VEI 2) and 16-17 August (VEI 3).  
Infrastructure impacts key findings 
• Ecuador’s 4000 MW electricity transmission did not experience any faults from volcanic 
ash contamination during the May 28 2010 Tungurahua eruption.  
• The city of Guayaquil was coated in 1-2 mm of fine-grained ash and local substations 
had to be cleaned to prevent unplanned interruptions from insulator flashover.  
• Cleaning of substations was performed strategically so that power supply was not 
interrupted for the city of Guayaquil. This was achieved by cleaning transformer banks 
individually, allowing all circuits to remain online. 
• Insulators, towers and conductors were not cleaned as it was believed that rain and wind 
action would sufficiently clean these components and thereby avoid flashover.  
• It was commonly believed by Ecuadorian power personnel that vertically configured 
insulator strings are more vulnerable to ash-induced insulator flashover over those in the 
horizontal position.   
• Conversations with electricity personnel revealed that fiber optic communication systems 
perform flawlessly during ash events unless damaged directly by falling volcanic bombs. 
• The Agoyan dam facility did not suffer any adverse effects from the May 2010 ash fall 
but has systems in place to monitor water levels and turbidity to trigger a protective 
bypass system in the event of a lahar.  
• The ashfall reportedly caused problems with water supplies in the depositional area, 
which in turn led to health problems such as digestive upsets. However, the cause of 
these health problems was not clear. There is a new health ministry initiative to cover 
and protect water supplies from ashfall. In Guayaquil, 1-2 mm ashfall did not cause any 
problems for the municipal water supply, although supply outages of up to one day in 
each sector were implemented for precautionary cleaning of filters.  
• Transport – ashfalls have caused few problems for road networks, but lahars have 
caused major problems particularly for direct route between Penipe and Baños. No 
particular impacts arose from the 2010 ashfall. However the 1-2 mm of fine-grained ash 
that fell on Guayaquil was enough to warrant closure of José Joaquín de Olmedo 
International Airport for two days as flights were grounded. 
• Radio attenuation and reduction of broadcast signal strength was noted when receivers 
located on the volcano became coated in ash.  
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• The National Secretary helped the local mayor in each affected municipality by providing 
bags for ash, ash masks, goggles and brooms to affected areas.  
• Ash collected by trucks was taken to a landfill site outside of Guayaquil (Las Iguanas) 
and to an island off the coast of Guayaquil.  
Agriculture and rural communities 
• The 2010 eruption caused partial damage to 3740 ha and total damage to 25 ha of 
farmland in the depositional area.  
• In the case study settlement (Cotaló), impacts on livestock were minimal as animals 
were pre-emptively evacuated out of the affected area so they could have 
uncontaminated feed. There was some damage to crops but farmers were able to 
harvest approximately 70%. Estimates of ashfall depth in Cotaló in 2010 ranged from 3 
mm to 3 cm.  
• Cotaló suffered much more severe impacts from the 2006 eruptions. Many buildings 
were damaged by ballistic blocks (and, to a lesser extent, ashfall) with 50% of roofs in 
the town requiring replacement. Estimates of ashfall depth ranged from 20-40 cm. 
Livestock died from ingesting ash. Almost all crops were lost and nothing could be grown 
for two years afterwards. A chicken farmer lost 60% of their income in the year following 
the eruption, with most of the costs arising from having to repair buildings.   
• Some of the adaptations implemented in response to the volcanic unrest in the local area 
are: farmers moving towards planting more resilient crops such as onions; livestock are 
only reared in the region for short periods of time to limit problems with tooth abrasion; 
and greenhouses have been constructed in Cotaló and other centres to protect crops.  
Healthcare key findings 
• Healthcare systems have shown preparedness in their development of emergency 
management plans and in the organisation of ‘brigades’ of medical professionals who 
attend shelters and carry out community work in affected areas. 
• Physically healthcare systems have conveyed that there are limited impacts of ashfall to 
their essential service provision and to their critical utility providers. As such 
interdependency between impacts, which can cause indirect impacts on systems, has 
been minimal. However, as many health centre generators are not large enough to 
provide full services during power cuts, non-essential services are not prioritised and 
may be affected. 
• Smaller effects of ashfall related to ash ingress have occurred in some locations, and 
measures are being taken to reduce ingress, protect windows, protect equipment, and to 
maintain and clean elements within healthcare buildings. 
• Increases in respiratory effects, skin allergies, eye infections and digestive problems 
have been noted in most locations. Many public health pathologies have been reduced 
over the years as the population has taken preventative measures such as wearing 
goggles, and either masks or scarf’s during ashfalls. 
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• Increases in anxiety and depression in the affected population has been noted at most 
health centres as a long term impact of volcanic activity. This has been attributed to 
family stress, relating to loss of crops and income and from the concern over 
evacuations. This has prompted increased psychological support, which is provided by 
the healthcare centres, through medications, clinical psychologists or community work in 
the shelters. 
Emergency Management 
• The population is well adapted to the risks posed by the volcano; auto-evacuations and 
measures taken to protect themselves, such as wearing masks, goggles and hats, are 
testament to this. 
• The participatory role of vigìas in both hazard identification and in civil defence, appears 
to have a positive effect on communication and risk management in the Tungurahua 
area. 
• The National emergency management system is working towards improvement in the 
communication of risks between agencies and to the public. The changes to be made 
are not known at the time of writing. 
• Officials in Baños have recently implemented a back-up power supply to the warning 
sirens, in case of a power cut during emergencies. There has also been an addition to 
the contingency plan for Baños, such that if the sirens failed to work, then the emergency 
services would drive around the city and sound their sirens to alert the public. This has 
been implemented following the power cut in 2006 that left the sirens unable to work, 
should the mayor have ordered the sirens to sound. 
• Officials in Baños need to consider the concerns of locals about the complexity and 
confusion that may be caused by changing emergency management plans. Emergency 
managers should also consider the likelihood that in reality, individuals may choose 
alternative evacuation routes to those practiced during emergency drills. 
General outcomes 
• A good overview of ashfall impacts to electrical power and healthcare services, and 
emergency management issues were achieved during the trip. The information gathered 
adds to our knowledge of the possible effects of volcanic ashfalls on infrastructure and 
public services that have yet to be studied in depth in the literature. Emergency 
management insights may provide lessons pertaining the benefits of local engagement 
and involvement in risk management. Supporting insights and data were also found on 
other areas including: water and wastewater systems, agriculture and transportation 
networks. Focus on adaptations and responses to the long-term volcanic activity have 
provided insights into the long-term effects of volcanic activity and some possible 
mitigation and prevention measures. 
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7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ASHFALL IMPACT STUDIES 
Some lessons have been learned from fieldwork that can be taken forward into future, and 
recommendations are as follows: 
• Overall there is benefit in returning to the Tungurahua volcanic area to accomplish 
ongoing research goals on volcanic ashfall impacts. There is rich data to be gained, and 
many areas of exploration that warrant further attention. Each sector of interest has its 
own methods and timeframes and not all can be explored in a single trip. More can be 
gained in several sectors from longitudinal studies in this area, in particular focussing on 
resilience and adaptations to ongoing volcanic activity. 
• Timing of field trips is important to get right, to gain insights into the impacts of ashfall 
after the emergency response period is over, and before the effects lose resolution. It 
became evident during this fieldwork that the population considered the eruption in May 
2010 to be minor, and therefore recalling the impacts and effects had lost some 
resolution by the time of fieldwork, some 4 months after the eruption. However, this is not 
the case in all events. It appears that for ongoing volcanic eruptions, unless a much 
larger event occurs than is considered to be ‘normal’, then the timing of fieldwork should 
be advanced, so as not to lose resolution on the data, particularly for qualitative data 
collection. 
• In general, and particularly when there is a language barrier, field visits should be 
extended to allow more time to set-up interviews and meetings. More time in the field, 
particularly for long term volcanic eruptions and exploration of the adaptations  made 
over time, will allow more observation time and a better understanding of the local 
context. 
• Team size is critical, and more can be achieved by working in pairs, rather than as a 
whole unit. This requires more language support when working in foreign countries so 
that each pair of researchers is supported by a translator or interpreter. 
• Financial support for fieldwork should be ring-fenced and determined pre-fieldwork.  
Whatever can be should be paid in advance of fieldwork. Working with ‘one budget for 
all’ considerably reduces unnecessary financial complications during fieldwork. 
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APPENDIX 1 TRIP ITINERARY 
INSTITUTION VISITED CITY LOCATION DATE 
Instituto Geofísico (IG) Quito 06.09.10 
TRANSELECTRIC head office Quito 06.09.10 
Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) Quito 07.09.10 
Secretariat Nacional de Gestation de 
Riesgos (National Secretariat) 
Quito 07.09.10 
Baños Clinic [private] Baños 08.09.10 
Tungurahua Observatory Guadeloupe, 
Baños 
08.09.10 
Local Risk Management, Baños Baños 08.09.10 
Agoyan Hydroelectric Dam, Baños Baños 09.09.10 
TRANSELECTRIC substation Puyo 09.09.10 
Ministerio de Salud Publica – Hospital “Puyo” 
[public] 
Puyo 09.09.10 
Ministerio de Salud Publica – Hospital de 
Baños [public] 
Baños 10.09.10 
Centro de Salud, Quero Quero 10.09.10 
TRANSELECTRIC substation Ambato 10.09.10 
Vigìa Baños 11.09.10 
TRAVEL TO GUAYAQUIL                                                                                                 12.09.10 
TRANSELECTRIC substation Guayaquil 13.09.10 
Hospital in Guayaquil [private] Guayaquil 13.09.10 
Transelectric substation  Santa Elena 14.09.10 
Ministerio del Ambiente (Ministry of the 
Environment) 
Guayaquil 14.09.10 
Ministerio de Salud Publica Subcentro de 
Salud de Penipe [public] 
Penipe, Baños 15.09.10 
Agriculture (general) Cotaló 15.09.10 
Ministerio de Salud Publica Centro de Salud 
Pelileo [public] 
Pelileo, Ambato 15.09.10 
Centro de Salud Riobamba Riobamba 16.09.10 
TRAVEL TO QUITO                                                                                                           17.09.10 
FLY TO GUATEMALA                                                                                                       18.09.10 
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APPENDIX 2 DATA INVENTORY: RESOURCES GATHERED DURING 
FIELDWORK 
Donated by Type of 
resource 
Details 
Local administrator from Cotaló Photos Photos of earlier activity at Tungurahua in 
2006 and 2007, photos of crop damage and 
roof damage 
Baños public hospital PowerPoint Health plan for Area 4 (Baños) and Area 5 
(Pelileo) 
Data Annual summary of hospital admissions for 
types of illness (2001-2009) 
Report Health plan for Chimborazo by Secretariat 
General 
Riobamba Centro de Salud Report Emergency plan for Chimborazo 
Riobamba Direccion de Salud Data Hospital admission statistics for 2007-2010 
Private hospital in Guayaquil News articles 
(HARD 
COPIES) 
Articles on the 2010 eruption 
Local Government Baños Video Lahar video (June 21st 2007) 
Map Risk map of Baños 
Report Red Cross guidance document for 
community volunteers on psychosocial 
support 
Report Red Cross guidance document for 
community work to improve water quality and 
access to safe water 
Report Red Cross action plan for a malaria epidemic 
and its consequences (Valle Hermosa area) 
National Security and Risk 
Management (Secretariat 
General) 
Presentation Draft alert levels 
Presentation Activity of Tungurahua 28th May 2010 
Report Emergency plan for Pelileo region “cantonal” 
PAHO Report covers Photocopies of report covers to find  useful 
health guidance information online (HARD 
COPIES) 
Pelileo Centro de Salud 2-pages 
Scanned 
2-pages covering alert levels in a risk book 
Private clinic Baños Report Emergency plan for the private clinic (HARD 
COPY) 
Transelectric Quito Map Map of electrical transmission network 
Report Emergency plan for volcanic eruptions for 
Transelectric 
Photos Photos of ash cleaning 
2011 
 
GNS Science Report 2011/24 62 
 
APPENDIX 3 STREAM WATER QUALITY DATA, TUNGURAHUA REGION 
 
GPS Location Description 
Date 
sampled Temperature pH Conductivity Turbidity 
    ºC  μS/cm NTU 
2 
1º 31’ 11.0’’ S 
78º 29’ 27.4 ‘’ W 
Rio 
Palitahu
a 
15/9/2010 12.1 7 109.5 4.3 
15 
1º 24’ 21.6’’ S 
78º 25’ 58.7 ‘’ W 
Rio 
Vascún 16/9/2010 17.4 7.5 884 24.6 
19 
1º 24’ 3.7’’ S 
78º 24’ 1.14 ‘’ W 
Rio 
Chama
na 
17/9/2010 15.7 6.4 57.9 3.6 
20 
1º 23’ 44.5’’ S 
78º 23’ 57 ‘’ W 
Rio 
Ulba 17/9/2010 14.5 6.8 154 6.6 
 
 
Figure A1 Rio Palitahua (GPS 2) 
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Figure A2 Rio Vascún (GPS 15) 
 
Figure A3 Rio Chamana (GPS 19) 
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APPENDIX 4 SCANNED NEWSPAPER ARTICLES FROM THE MAY 2010 
ERUPTION OF VOLCÁN TUNGURAHUA 
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ABSTRACT 
This report summarises the field observations and interpretations of a reconnaissance trip to 
Guatemala in September 2010. The purpose of this trip was to investigate the impacts of the 
27 May 2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano, located approximately 30 km SSW of Guatemala 
City. This eruption was of particular interest as it presented an opportunity to study an event 
with parallels to an eruption of the Auckland Volcanic Field and its consequences for the city 
of Auckland. A further interesting feature of this event was that a major tropical storm arrived 
immediately after the eruption, providing an opportunity to study the interaction between two 
co-occurring natural disasters.  
The 27 May 2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano began shortly after 14h00. The paroxysmal 
phase started shortly after 19h00 and lasted approximately 45 minutes. This phase 
generated a plume that was directed towards the north. At Cerro Chino, 1 km from crater, 
large ballistic fragments (up to half a metre in length) fell, killing one news reporter, injuring 
many others and destroying buildings, vehicles and equipment. This took local communities 
and civil defence by surprise as previous tephra falls had been to the west and southwest of 
the crater and preliminary civil defence efforts had been focussed on those areas. Three 
communities located 2.5-3.5 km to north of crater were particularly badly affected by the fall 
of ballistic clasts. Roofs in these towns were extensively damaged by ballistic blocks and to a 
lesser extent by tephra accumulation. The tephra plume travelled to the north, and 
Guatemala City was covered in an estimated 2-3 cm of coarse basaltic tephra which local 
residents described as being like ‘black sand’.   
The majority of the report is concerned with describing impacts of the tephra fall on 
Guatemala City. A prompt and efficient citywide cleanup was initiated by the city’s 
municipality to remove tephra from the 2100 km of roads in the capital. An estimated 
11,350,000 m3 of tephra was removed from the city’s roads and rooftops. The possibility of 
using the tephra for aggregate in cement production was investigated, but it was found to be 
too friable (low mechanical strength). It was disposed of in landfills around the city. Despite 
the cleanup operations, considerable quantities of tephra were washed into the city’s 
underground drainage network from where it was very difficult to remove. Blockages of 
stormwater drains led to surface flooding of the city’s road network which persisted for 
months afterwards. Tephra also entered the city’s many wastewater treatment plants, both 
by direct deposition and through sewer lines. There was no option but to clean out all these 
systems, an expensive and time-consuming job.  
A number of accidents happened during the cleanup operations. Limited data available from 
hospital emergency department admission records indicates that most of these were caused 
by people falling from their roofs, and other heights, while cleaning up the tephra. The 
eruption did not cause any discernible increase in respiratory illnesses above normal 
wintertime levels. This is probably due to several factors: the grain size of the tephra was 
coarse, with no material present in very fine fractions that can penetrate into the lungs, and 
the eruption happened in the evening and in rainy conditions and thus most people were 
indoors. The eruption appeared to have minimal effect on the functioning of two of 
Guatemala City’s large public hospitals, other than exacerbating pre-existing drainage and 
flooding problems for one of them as tephra blocked downpipes, gutters, drains and sumps.  
For electricity and water supplies, effects of the eruption on continuity of supply were minor, 
although problems were experienced. A geothermal plant close to the volcano was badly 
damaged by falling ballistic clasts, and had to be closed for repairs and cleaning for three 
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weeks. Flashover was also a problem for distribution lines. Cleaning of tephra from 
substations was mostly unnecessary because of the arrival of the tropical rainstorm shortly 
afterwards. For the city’s water supplies, a large storage tank was contaminated by tephra 
and had to be cleaned out, and there was also abrasion damage to air-cooled motors and 
groundwater pumps, but generally there was little overall disruption to the continuity of supply 
beyond normal variations.   
Probably the most significant disruption caused by the tephra fall was the closure of the 
international airport for five days, to allow cleanup of the runway and apron. A complication of 
the cleanup operation was that the tephra was extremely abrasive, and in the process of 
cleaning a new bituminous runway surface was destroyed and all markings on the runway 
and apron were removed also. A similar, though more minor problem, was reported while 
cleanup of the large flat roofs of one of the public hospitals was underway, when a 
waterproof coating was damaged by abrasion. Development of cleaning methods to minimise 
abrasion damage may be worth considering for future eruptions of this type.  
The arrival of a major tropical storm immediately after the eruption generally added to the 
difficulties experienced by organisations and individuals involved in the response. The storm 
had a much larger and more widespread impact on the country, resulting in 160 deaths and 
over 168,000 people requiring evacuation, compared to two deaths (plus two more indirect 
deaths due to accidents while clearing tephra) and just over 3,000 people evacuated as a 
result of the eruption. While the heavy rains made some of the impacts of the eruption worse 
(in particular, it washed the tephra into underground drainage networks before the cleanup 
was complete, which has in turn worsened drainage problems in the city), it also dampened 
down the tephra, minimised the corrosive potential of the tephra by washing away its 
chemically active surface coating), and suppressed fires.  
KEYWORDS 
Guatemala, Pacaya volcano, Strombolian eruption, impact assessment, infrastructure, 
electricity supply, water supplies, healthcare services, cleanup, ashfall. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The mitigation of volcanic hazards requires good knowledge of the styles of eruption that can 
occur, the range of hazards that can be generated and the potential impacts that these may 
cause. Furthering our knowledge of overseas experiences of eruption styles, impacts, 
monitoring, mitigation and adaptation will help New Zealand prepare for and respond to 
future volcanic events (Leonard et al., 2005).  
This report summarises the field observations and interpretations of a reconnaissance trip to 
Guatemala in September 2010. The purpose of this trip was to investigate the impacts of the 
27 May 2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano, located approximately 30 km SSW of Guatemala 
City. The eruption deposited 2-3 cm of tephra on Guatemala City (population 1.1 million, 
although the greater Metropolitan Region of Guatemala (centred on Guatemala City) has a 
much larger population of 3.6 million (Cerezo, 2003)). This presented our research group 
with a good opportunity to investigate the impacts of a low explosivity, basaltic eruption close 
to a major urban environment.  
1.1 Personnel  
Fieldwork in Guatemala was carried out between 18-26 September 2010 by a team from the 
University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, and University College London. For a 
complete trip itinerary, refer to Appendix 1.  
The field team consisted of: Johnny Wardman (doctoral student, University of Canterbury), 
Victoria Sword-Daniels (doctoral student, University College London), Carol Stewart 
(research associate, University of Canterbury) and Fiona Woods (translation support). The 
wider team that supports this work also includes: Tom Wilson (University of Canterbury), 
David Johnston (Massey University/GNS Science), and Tiziana Rossetto (University College 
London).  
1.2 Aims of study 
The research group was particularly interested in:  
• Impacts on essential infrastructure (e.g. electrical supply and generation networks, water 
supplies, wastewater systems and transport and communication networks); 
• Impacts on healthcare service provision; 
• Impacts on hospital facilities and clinics; 
• Activation of hospital emergency management plans; 
• Socio-economic impacts, such as stresses and disruption due to evacuation; 
• Impacts to agriculture, including livestock evacuation; 
• Hazards caused by remobilisation of tephra deposits; 
• Assessment of evacuation planning during a volcanic crisis; 
• Factors affecting evacuation of communities; 
• The role of local, central government and NGOs in a volcanic crisis.  
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Our aim on this trip was to gather as much information on these topics as possible within the 
constraints of a very brief field visit.  
1.3 Research methodologies 
Research methods for the fieldwork included: field observation, field-testing, meetings, and 
semi-structured interviews. 
Prior to our arrival in Guatemala, we identified relevant agencies and attempted to contact 
them to arrange interviews. This proved difficult and most interviews were organised in the 
course of our visit, and by using referrals from interviewees.  
Meetings and semi-structured interviews were conducted at infrastructure offices and 
facilities in affected areas, using a translator to conduct the interviews in Spanish. Ethical 
approval for the interviews was granted from the University of Canterbury and University 
College London prior to leaving (Appendix 4). The interviewees were mainly managers, 
directors and operating professionals for each infrastructure system. The sectors that were 
investigated during fieldwork were: power, water and wastewater, airport, healthcare, 
municipality, agriculture and emergency management at the national level. 
The interviews followed several prompt questions which were used to steer the 
conversation, and touched upon the main topics of interest for research including: the 
general impacts of volcanic tephra fall on the sector; actions taken in response to tephra fall; 
tephra ingress and any associated problems; emergency management plans; interrelated 
power, water and access impacts on the sectors. 
Interviews were semi-structured in nature to allow for freer exploration and discussion 
around the various topics that were touched upon in conversation. However, conducting 
interviews through a translator meant that some questions needed to be phrased in a 
proactive manner, to maintain the focus of the interview and to avoid misinterpretations as a 
result of translation. In general the interviewee was asked to speak freely following a prompt 
question and the translator would summarise the comments when they had finished. This 
allowed the researcher to have some level of continued exploration of some of the aspects 
mentioned in dialogue by the participant. But detailed explanations at the time were not 
deemed appropriate in the interview, in order to maintain the interest of the interviewee and 
to reduce the interview time.  
Interviews were recorded by dictaphone and consent forms were signed by the 
interviewee(s) at the time of interview, in accordance with ethical guidelines. A copy of the 
inventory of audio recordings and other data collected during fieldwork can be found in 
Appendix 2. 
A total of twelve interviews were conducted within the fieldwork period of two weeks, which 
varied in length from 27 to 110 minutes. All sectors had a 100% uptake rate when contacted 
for interview. 
Interviews were supplemented by the author's own field observations, and by informal 
conversations with local members of the population. 
2012 
 
GNS Science Report 2012/09 3 
1.4 Characteristics of study areas 
1.4.1 National overview 
The Republic of Guatemala is located on the Central American Isthmus and is bordered by 
Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras and Belize, as well as the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean 
Sea (Figure 1.1). It has an area of 108,890 km2 and a current population of approximately 
14.4 million (Population Reference Bureau website, accessed March 2011). Its estimated 
population growth rate of approximately 2% is greater than the current global average of 
approximately 1% per annum (CIA World Factbook, accessed March 2011). 
Administratively, Guatemala is divided into eight regions, 22 departments and 331 
municipalities.  
 
Figure 1.1 Map of Guatemala (source: http://www.worldmapnow.com) 
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According to a United Nations series of reports on human settlements (Cerezo, 2003); in 
1999 Guatemala ranked 117 out of a total of 174 countries in 1999, with a per capita GDP of 
US$1,690 compared to the average GDP for Latin America and the Caribbean of $US4,127. 
Income distribution was reported to be very uneven, and approximately 70 percent of the 
population then lived on less than $US2 per day. More recent estimates of GDP provided by 
the International Monetary Fund, shown in Table 1.1, indicate that Guatemala still languishes 
well below the global average per capita income. Poverty is more strongly associated with 
rural than with urban populations (Cerezo, 2003).  
Table 1.1 Recent estimates of per capita GDP for Guatemala, New Zealand and a world average 
(data: International Monetary Fund). 
 2009 (US$) 2010 (US$) 2011 (US$) 
Guatemala 2,689 2,888 3,154 
World 11,064 11,342 11,822 
New Zealand 27,284 32,145 34,701 
Geographically, there are three main regions in Guatemala: the Pacific coastal plains, the 
mountainous interior dominated by the Sierra Madre, which forms the main drainage divide 
between river systems draining south towards the Pacific Ocean and north and east towards 
the Caribbean (Figure 1.1). There are extensive lowlands to the north, in the Petén region. 
The tectonic setting is described further in Section 2.1.  
1.4.2 Guatemala City 
Guatemala City is located in the southern central highlands. It is the capital of Guatemala 
and its largest city. Its current population is approximately 1.1 million. However, the greater 
Metropolitan Region, centred on the city, has a much larger population of 3.7 million 
(approximately 26% of the total population of Guatemala). Guatemala City is the largest city 
in Central America (this excludes Mexico), and is the centre of political, economic and 
industrial power in the country. It is also the main point of entry into the country, with La 
Aurora International Airport located in the city (figure 1.2).  
The city was founded by the Spanish in 1776, after a major earthquake in 1773 destroyed 
much of the old capital city of Antigua. At the beginning of the 20th century, the city had 
about 100,000 inhabitants. Since then, there have been several waves of migration from 
rural areas. In 1954, the state put an end to an agrarian reform programme, prompting an 
acceleration in migration such that the city’s population grew from 285,000 inhabitants in 
1950 to 573,000 in 1964. Many immigrant families were forced to live on unoccupied urban 
land which produced new slums (or ‘precarious urban settlements’). In 1976, a magnitude 
7.5 earthquake centred 160 km northeast of Guatemala City led to a death toll of over 
23,000 and caused severe damage to housing and infrastructure across the whole country, 
leaving over a million people homeless. This caused a further exodus from rural areas.  
Armed conflict and a civil war between 1960-1996 also caused further waves of migration of 
displaced people.  
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In the 2003 United Nations Report on Human Settlement, Cerezo (2003), in his case study 
report on Guatemala City, said that: 
At the beginning of the 21st century, the city is characterised by a large horizontal expansion, 
with peripheral commercial subcentres, an inefficient public transport system, a proliferation 
of precarious settlements, a free market economy and a decrease in state attention to 
housing needs. Of its 2.5 million inhabitants, approximately a third live in precarious 
settlements.  
 
Figure 1.2 Location of Guatemala City relative to Pacaya volcano (source: Smithsonian Institute 
Global Volcanism Program). 
1.4.3 Settlements around Pacaya volcano 
According to Matias Gomez (2009), approximately 9000 people live in communities close to 
Pacaya volcano, within 5 km of the active cone (Table 1.2, Figure 1.3). The following 
population data on communities surrounding Pacaya is courtesy of Rudiger Escobar Wolf 
(Escobar Wolf, 2011). Administratively, all are in Escuintla department, and within the 
municipality of San Vicente Pacaya.  
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Table 1.2 Communities surrounding Pacaya (2010 projections of population data). 
Settlement Total population 
San Vicente Pacaya 7990 
El Cedro 1020 
San Francisco de Sales 820 
Calderas 960 
Mesillas Altas y Bajas 2710 
Los Rios 370 
El Patrocinio 1620 
El Rodeo 150 
El Caracol 10 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Location of Pacaya volcano and nearby settlements. The hachured line indicates the 
caldera rim. The contour interval is 100 m (source: Smithsonian Institute Global Volcanism Program). 
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2.0 VOLCANIC HAZARDS IN GUATEMALA 
2.1 Overview of volcanic hazards in Guatemala 
Guatemala lies between the North American, Cocos and Caribbean tectonic plates. The 
Cocos plate is subducting beneath the Caribbean plate along the Middle America Trench, to 
the west of the Guatemalan mainland (Spence and Person, 1976). This has produced a NW-
SE oriented chain of volcanoes in western Guatemala. There are 22 volcanoes of Holocene 
age (<0.1 m.a.) listed for Guatemala on the Smithsonian Institute website (SI, 2010). Major 
volcanoes are shown in Figure 2.1. The plate boundary between the North American and 
Caribbean plates is a transform boundary (left-lateral), and runs approximately E-W through 
the centre of Guatemala, forming a triple junction with the Cocos plate to the west of the 
Guatemalan mainland. 
The tectonic setting of Guatemala renders it at risk from both earthquake and volcanic 
hazards (Table 2.1). The volcanic hazards vary in accordance with the volcano type and 
magma composition. Guatemala has stratovolcanoes, lava domes and complex volcanoes 
(SI, 2010). Large caldera-forming eruptions are highly explosive but infrequent. More 
frequent eruptions occur from stratovolcanoes with intermediate magma compositions that 
are associated with the following hazards: pyroclastic flows, explosions, tephra falls, lava 
flows and lahars. 
 
Figure 2.1 Location of major volcanoes of Guatemala (source: USGS). 
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Table 2.1 Eruption frequencies for selected countries (after Wilson et al. 2009a). 
Selected countries 
Population (2008)
1 
(million) 
Average eruption frequency 
  VEI20-3 VEI 4-7 
Indonesia  239.9 6 months  15 years  
Iceland  0.3 6 years 10 months  43 years  
Japan  127.7 7 months  44 years  
Guatemala  14.4 4 years 9 months  53 years  
Philippines  90.5 1 year 4 months  59 Years  
Papua New Guinea  6.5 8 months  81 years  
Alaska, Kamchatka, Kuril 
ds 1.1 5 months  100 years  
Ecuador  13.8 2 years 5 months  102 years  
Canada, Lower 48 states USA  335.8 1 year 6 months  143 years  
Italy  59.9 5 years  215 years  
Colombia  44.4 6 years 6 months  304 years  
Mexico  107.7 7 years 6 months  375 years  
New Zealand  4.3 11 months  394 years  
Chile  16.8 1 year 4 months  554 years  
Nicaragua  5.7 1 year 2 months  806 years  
Peru  27.9 14 years 2 months  832 years  
1 2008 World Population Data Sheet, Population Reference Bureau  
2 The Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) is a classification scheme for volcanic eruptions, ranging from 
VEI 0-8, with VEI 0 the least explosive (Newhall and Self, 1982). 
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2.2 Pacaya volcano: eruption history and volcanic hazards 
Pacaya volcano is a large volcanic complex located approximately 30 km south of 
Guatemala City (Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3). The Pacaya volcanic complex comprises an 
ancestral andesitic Pacaya stratovolcano, rhyodacite and andesite domes, and the modern 
Pacaya basaltic composite volcano (Kitamura and Matias, 1995). Pacaya volcano collapsed 
around 1100 years ago, producing a debris avalanche deposit that reaches to the Pacific 
coast, and forming a horseshoe-shaped caldera which is open to the southwest (Conway et 
al., 1992). The modern Pacaya volcano is MacKenney Cone, 2552 m in height (Figure 2.4). 
This cone is around 800 years old and formed within the caldera. A smaller parasitic scoria 
cone called Cerro Chino also formed and lies on the northern edge of the caldera. It was last 
active in the 1800s (SI, 2010). 
In historic times, many eruptions of Pacaya volcano have been recorded (Table 2.2). The 
first recorded eruption was in 1565; heavy tephra fall was recorded in Antigua (Kitamura and 
Matias, 1995). The next recorded unrest commenced in 1651 and unrest continued 
intermittently until about 1700. In 1775, another strong eruption caused tephra fall and 
darkness in Antigua, and was thought to occur at the Cerro Chino crater. There were further 
small eruptions in the mid-19th century.  
 
Figure 2.2 Pacaya volcano seen from Guatemala City. MacKenney Cone is the second from the 
right, with Cerro Chino immediately to its right (photo: Smithsonian Institute).  
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Figure 2.3 Topographic map of Fuego, Agua and Pacaya volcanoes (source: Smithsonian 
Institute Global Volcanism Program).  
 
Figure 2.4 MacKenney Cone in 2006 (photo: Gustavo Chigna, INSIVUMEH). 
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From 1860 to 1961, Pacaya volcano was in repose (Conway et al., 1992). On 10 March 
1961, the volcano erupted without warning and it has been intermittently active since then. 
Recent activity has all originated from MacKenney Cone, and has been characterised by 
continued strombolian activity and lava flows, some as large as 106 m3. During Strombolian 
eruptions, incandescent bombs are typically ejected hundreds of metres into the air, and 
small volume a’a lava flows stream down from the summit. The historical and recent activity 
of Pacaya volcano is discussed in further detail in Table 2.2.  
The principal volcanic hazards at Pacaya volcano include lava flows, tephra fall, ballistic 
blocks and to a lesser extent pyroclastic flows and debris avalanches (Conway et al., 1992). 
Approximately 9000 people live within 5 km of the active cone, in the villages of El Caracol, 
El Rodeo and El Patrocino on the southern side, and San Francisco de Sales and San José 
Calderas on the northern side. The volcano and its surroundings were declared a national 
park in 1963 and it is a source of income for the local population through tourist ventures. 
There have been 10 evacuations of the population from these towns since 1987 (Matias 
Gomez, 2009).  
Until 2006, the main hazard for people living on the slopes of Pacaya volcano has been 
tephra fall and ballistic bombs. Lava flows and pyroclastic flows have mostly been confined 
by topographic barriers formed by an old collapse scarp, and have thus been restricted to 
the slopes of MacKenney Cone. However, in 2006, accumulation of lava on the northern 
side overtopped the topographic barrier such that new lava flows on this side could threaten 
the resident population. The village of San Francisco de Sales is particularly at risk from lava 
flows as it is sited only 3 km from the crater, on the northern side.  
Table 2.2 Historical and recent activity of Pacaya volcano. Lava flows and intermittent activity have 
occurred throughout the period 1961-2010 and have not been delineated as separate events. 
(Sources: Kitamura and Matias, 1995; Matias Gomez, 2009; Conway et al., 1992; Smithsonian 
Institute Global Volcanism Program; Gomez et al., 2012).  
Date Event 
1565 VEI 3 explosive eruption, heavy tephra fall reported in Antigua, damage to property, lava flows. Probably originated from Cerro Chino cone.  
1623 VEI 3 explosive eruption, damage to property. 
1651 VEI 2 explosive eruption, tephra fall and lava flows. 
1655 VEI 2 explosive eruption. 
1664 VEI 3 explosive eruption. 
1668 VEI 2 explosive eruption. 
1671 VEI 2 explosive eruption. 
1674 VEI 2 explosive eruption. 
1678 VEI 2 explosive eruption. 
1687 VEI 2 explosive eruption. 
1690 VEI 2? explosive eruption. 
1693 VEI 2? explosive eruption. 
1699 VEI 2? explosive eruption. 
1775 VEI 3 explosive eruption from Cerro Chino cone. Caused tephra fall and darkness for several days in Antigua, and a basalt lava flow that travelled 6 km to the southwest.  
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Date Event 
1805 VEI 2 explosive eruption. 
1846 VEI 2 explosive eruption from Cerro Chino cone.  
1885 VEI 2 explosive eruption. 
1961 10 March 1961: VEI 2 explosive eruption. Damage to property, lava flows.  
1964 VEI 3 explosive eruption from MacKenney Cone. Damage to property, pyroclastic flows, lava flows, lava lake, evacuation.  
1987 
January: ‘unusually explosive eruptions destroyed 63 homes and forced 3000 people to 
evacuate’. A shower of bombs and cinders destroyed a forest 1 km to north of MacKenney 
Cone.  
June: Large explosive eruption destroyed top of MacKenney Cone, tephra fall 8-10 cm 
thick up to 5 km SW of Pacaya volcano. Lava flows caused villages of El Caracol, El 
Rodeo and El Patrocino S-SW of the cone to be evacuated.  
1991 
June-August: pyroclastic flow-forming eruptions threatened nearby communities, leaving 
2000 people homeless, 1-4 cm tephra fall reported more than 20 km west of the cone, with 
>1 cm deposited on Escuintla City.  An estimated tephra volume of 1-8 x 107 m3 implies 
VEI 2-3.  
1996 November: eruption that distributed tephra to southwest, with approximately 0.5 cm deposited on Escuintla City. An estimated tephra volume of 2-6 x 106 m3 implies VEI 1-2.  
1997 
May: eruption distributed tephra to NNE, depositing 1-5 mm tephra on Guatemala City. A 
smaller plume also travelled to the SW. The estimated tephra volume was 2-3 x 106, or 
VEI 1. 
2000 
The build-up to this eruption started in December 1999 with Strombolian activity that built 
a 50 m high cinder cone. In January, there were lava flows to the north, southwest and 
south. On 16 January, there was spectacular fire fountaining to 800 m above the crater, 
which was seen from Guatemala City. Tephrafall to the south of the vent (up to 30 cm 
tephra) caused the evacuation of 1000 people, and the hazard to airspace caused the 
closure of La Aurora international airport. 
There was a further eruption on 29 February with a tephra column 2 km high and tephra 
fall on the towns of Escuintla and Siquinala. The National Disaster network declared a Red 
Alert and surrounding towns were evacuated.  
2001 VEI 1 explosive eruption.  
2002 VEI 1 explosive eruption. 
2004 VEI 1 explosive eruption, lava flows. 
2006 
March-April: lava flows from MacKenney Cone to the north. Accumulation of lava next to 
scarp on northern side implies that the scarp wall no longer confines future lava flows 
down north flank.  
2010 
27 May: Largest eruption since 1964. A plume 3 km high was produced, along with a 
directed blast to the north. Ballistic blocks fell up to 6-7 km from the vent. The eruption 
plume travelled to the north and northeast, depositing 2-3 cm coarse tephra on Guatemala 
City.  
Michigan Tech (2010) have produced a detailed map of the eruptions of Pacaya volcano 
from 1961-2010, including information about the dates and locations of lava flows. This is 
included as Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5 Volcanological map of the Pacaya volcano eruptions from 1961-2010 (source: Gomez, 2012). 
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2.3 Chronology of May 2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano 
The following summary is derived from the Smithsonian Institute’s Global Volcanism 
Program weekly reports and from a report prepared by Instituto Nacional de Sismologia, 
Vulcanologia, Meterologia, e Hidrologia (INSIVUMEH) or the National Institute of 
Seismology, Volcanology, Meteorology and Hydrology (Report Erupción Pacaya volcano 
1402-11). Note that further information on civil defence aspects of the eruption is 
summarised in Table 5.2 of this report.  
The eruption that commenced on 27 May 2010 was the largest since 1964. The current 
activity period is considered to have started in 2006, when a series of radial cracks formed 
around the active cone which may have led to an increased level of effusive activity on the 
north, west and south flanks.  
There was increased seismicity 36 hours prior to the onset of the eruption, giving some 
warning. Access to the summit had been closed to the public for two days before the 
eruption; tour guides had been taking tourist parties to see lava flows and this was judged to 
be too dangerous.  
2.3.1 27 May 2010 eruption 
At 14h15 on 27 May, Strombolian eruptions began at MacKenney crater. These reached 
heights of 500 to 600 m above the crater. Tephra plumes rose 1.5 km above the crater and 
drifted west and southwest. The community of El Patrocinio (Figure 1.3) evacuated, and 
residents in nearby El Rodeo were ordered to evacuate (see section 5.3.1 for further detail). 
Authorities instructed residents to clear tephra from their roofs and to avoid driving. Between 
14h00 and 17h00 there were two pyroclastic flows to the south. The most violent paroxysmal 
phase of the eruption began at 19h09 and lasted for 45 minutes. The eruption generated a 3 
km high column. The west side of MacKenney crater collapsed, resulting in a directed blast 
to the north. The wind was also blowing to the north and debris were thus distributed mostly 
on the northern side (Figure 2.5). This came as a surprise as previous recent experience has 
been that tephra has fallen to the south and southwest of the volcano. Heavy tephra falls 
combined with the threat of ballistic bombs and blocks lead to approximately 1600 people 
being evacuated from communities from the western, northwestern and northern sectors 
(see section 5.3.1 for further detail).  
2.3.1.1 Tephra dispersion 
We received estimates of tephra dispersion and deposition from two sources: a report by 
Escobar Wolf (2011), and from staff of INSIVUMEH. According to Escobar Wolf (2011), 
tephra was dispersed to the north and northeast of the volcano over an area greater than 
1000 km2, and the measured thicknesses of tephra deposits were 47 cm at a distance of 1 
km from the vent, to a few mm at distances of over 70 km. A map provided by INSIVUMEH 
(Figure 2.6) shows ash dispersion to the northeast coast of the country, a distance of 
approximately 350 km. Staff of INSIVUMEH provided the following estimates of tephra fall 
thicknesses: San Francisco de Sales, located less than 3 km north of the crater, received 20 
cm tephra fall; Lago Amatitlán (Figure 1.2) received ‘15 cm hot tephra fall’. This reportedly 
caused significant damage to crops; In San Vicente Pacaya, a resident we interviewed 
reported that approximately 2.5 cm of tephra fell over 45 minutes. The tephra was mostly 
sand-sized with occasional larger clasts (Figure 2.7), and was ‘red and black’ in colour.  
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Figure 2.6 Map of tephra dispersion and deposition (source: INSIVUMEH). 
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In Guatemala City, tephra fell mixed with rain. Escobar Wolf (2011) reports that ‘the grain 
size of the tephra that fell in Guatemala City ranged from sub-mm to cm size and the clasts 
consisted of black to dark brown vitric (crystal-poor) scoria’ (Figure 2.7). Many interviewees 
in the current study described the tephra as arena or sand (Figure 2.8). Thicknesses 
reported by Escobar Wolf (2011) ranged from 10 cm on the shores of Lago Amatitlan, to 0.5 
cm in the central city. This author states that thicknesses exceeding ‘a few cm’ at these 
distances (~30 km from the volcano) should be regarded with caution, and he considers it 
most probable that the south part of the city may have received up to 3 cm tephra fall 
whereas the rest of the city probably received in the region of 1-2 cm. These estimates are in 
accordance with depths reported by interviewees for our study. The Airport Manager 
estimated that a total of 2-3 cm of tephra fall was received at the airport. Similarly, the 
Maintenance Manager of the hospital B San Juan de Dios, located in the northern sector of 
the city, estimated a similar total thickness of 2-3 cm tephra fall. A map prepared by the city’s 
municipality showing relative impacts is shown in Figure 2.9. 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Grain size distributions for volcanic tephra samples collected from Villa Canales  
(13 km from vent) and La Aurora International Airport in Guatemala City (27 km from vent). N.B. 
samples were collected ~4 months after the eruption and may have been altered by external 
processes (e.g. crushing from human traffic, environmental factors, etc.). 
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Figure 2.8 Coarse, ‘sand-sized’ tephra deposited in Guatemala City. 
 
Figure 2.9 Impacts of tephra fall on Guatemala City, with worst-affected areas shown in red and 
least-affected areas in yellow (source: Municipality of Guatemala City). 
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2.3.1.2 Ballistic clasts 
The report by Escobar Wolf (2011) includes a thorough assessment of the impacts of 
ballistic clasts ejected during the paroxysmal phase of the eruption. At Cerro Chino crater, 
approximately 1 km from the vent, clasts exceeding 0.5 m in size (long axis) fell, smashing 
concrete roofs, destroying vehicles both by impact and by starting fires, and knocking down 
radio towers (Figure 2.10). A news reporter in the vicinity at the time was killed, and others 
injured. 
Figure 2.10 Ballistic clast damage to radio masts, building and vehicle in vicinity of Cerro Chino 
(photos: Gustavo Chigna, INSIVUMEH).  
Further afield, the villages of El Cedro, San Francisco de Sales and Calderas (Figure 1.3) 
were all significantly affected by ballistic block fall. These villages are all located between 2.5 
and 3.5 km from the vent, to the north. The maximum distance at which ballistic impact 
damage was reported was 4 km (Escobar Wolf, 2011). Damage caused by the fall of ballistic 
clasts is described further in Section 4.0.  
The range that ballistic blocks were thrown is somewhat greater than the typical reported 
range for Strombolian eruptions (Parfitt and Wilson, 2008); for instance, these authors report 
that for the 1973 Heimaey eruption blocks of 0.2 m diameter were thrown 500 m. This may 
be because the eruption may not have been vertically directed, but directed towards the 
north due to partial collapse of the crater (INSIVUMEH staff; Escobar Wolf, 2011).  
2.3.2 Activity from 28 May onwards 
The eruption continued on 28 May, with a further large eruption generating a column of 1 km 
height. On 29 May, a 90 m wide lava flow travelled SSE at an estimated rate of 100 m per 
hour and burned three houses. The flow also disrupted an access road between El Caracol 
and Los Pocitos (See Figure 1.3). The energy liberated during the eruption (RSAM, or Real-
Time Seismic Amplitude Measurement) is shown in Figure 2.11, and various phases of the 
eruption are illustrated in Figure 2.12.  
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Figure 2.11 Energy liberated during 27-28 May 2010 eruptions of Pacaya volcano (source: 
INSIVUMEH). 
27 May 15h31 27 May 16h31 
27 May 20h09 28 May  
Figure 2.12 Phases of eruption of Pacaya volcano commencing 27 May 2010 (photos: 
INSIVUMEH). 
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Strombolian activity at MacKenney Cone continued into June and July, decreasing in 
magnitude. On 13 July an explosion generated a tephra plume that rose 300 m above the 
crater and drifted southwest. On 22-25 July there was further Strombolian activity. A plume 
rose to an altitude of 4.6 km causing tephra fall up to 10 km distant, and ejected blocks fell 
on the flanks of the cone. Over time the activity became predominantly effusive (Figure 2.13) 
with a major new lava flow to the south.  
The May 2010 eruptions created a new NNW-trending trough on the flank of MacKenney 
Cone (Figure 2.14). Considering both the maximum height of the plume of 3 km above the 
vent and a minimum estimated tephra volume of 1.3 x 107 m3 (Escobar Wolf, 2011), the 27 
May 2010 eruption of Pacaya can be classed as VEI 2-3. 
 
Figure 2.13 Lava flows from Pacaya volcano in June 2010. The red line marks the boundary of 
the 4th June flow, the blue line marks the edge of the flow on the 8th June and the green line marks the 
extent of the 15th June lava flow. The yellow shaded areas show the total area affected by the flows 
(adapted from INSIVUMEH report 1402-11). 
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Figure 2.14 Post-May 2010 NNW trending trough on MacKenney Cone (compare to Figure 
2.4)(photo: INSIVUMEH). 
2.4 Tropical storm Agatha 
On 29 May 2010, Guatemala was hit by a major tropical storm (Figure 2.15).  
 
Figure 2.15 Tropical storm Agatha approaches Guatemala, 29 May 2010. 
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This storm caused major damage across central and southern Guatemala (Figure 2.16). 
According to CONRED Information Bulletin No. 1673 (2010), issued to mark the one-year 
anniversary of the combined eruption/tropical storm disaster, the storm affected 395,291 
people, caused 168,059 people to be evacuated and left 111,020 people in temporary 
shelters. One hundred and sixty people were killed, 79 wounded, 37 were reported missing 
and more than 38,000 homes were damaged. There was also heavy damage to 
infrastructure, particularly the highway system, with numerous landslides and road and 
bridge washouts. The impacts of the storm in conjunction with the eruption are discussed for 
each sector in the remainder of this report.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.16 Municipalities affected by tropical storm Agatha (source: Municipality of Guatemala 
City). 
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3.0 INFRASTRUCTURE IMPACTS AND RESPONSES TO RECENT 
TEPHRA FALL  
3.1 Electricity supply 
Electricity supply systems are vulnerable to interruption from volcanic tephra fall hazards. 
Previous studies suggest that volcanic tephra contamination of electricity transmission (e.g. 
> 69 kV) and distribution equipment (e.g. < 69 kV) can disrupt the provision of electricity to 
society in the following ways (after Wilson et al., 2009b):  
• Tephra accumulation on HV (e.g. > 33 kV) insulators can lead to flashover (the 
unintended electric discharge over or around an insulator), which often leads to the 
disruption of service. When flashover occurs on transformer insulation (bushings), this 
can cause damage to the apparatus and will most certainly result in the disruption of 
power supply.  
• Line breakages and damage to towers and poles due to tephra loading, both directly 
onto the structures and by causing vegetation to fall on to lines, particularly in heavy, fine 
tephra fall events.  
• Snow and ice accumulation on lines and overhanging vegetation will further exacerbate 
the risk.  
• Breakdown of substation and generation facility control equipment; such as air 
conditioning/cooling systems due to tephra penetration which can block air intakes and 
cause corrosion. 
3.1.1 Organisational structure of the electrical network in Guatemala 
The Comision Nacional de Energia Electrica (CNEE) supervises the energy wholesale 
market in Guatemala. Under CNEE is the self-financing government entity titled Instituto 
Nacional De Electrificacion (INDE) whose job is to ensure the constant and safe supply of 
electricity at a transmission level. Empresa de Transporte y Control de Energia Electrica 
(ETCEE) is a subsidiary company of INDE that is in charge of managing, operating and 
maintaining the electricity transmission (>69 kV) and distribution (<69 kV) in terms of quality 
prescribed by the General Electricity Law. Several privatized companies have been 
established to physically transmit energy at a distribution level (e.g. Empresa Electrica de 
Guatemala (EEGSA)), but these companies ultimately look to the CNEE for direction.  
Guatemala’s electricity network traverses a diverse terrain to provide energy to its 14.4 
million inhabitants. Guatemala operates its transmission system at voltages of 69, 138, 220 
and 400 kV to meet a national demand of 1450 MVA. As it stands, the total generation 
capacity for Guatemala’s electricity network is approximately 1700 MVA. Thirty percent of 
the 1450 MVA network demand is generated by hydro facilities, while the other 70% is 
produced by thermal (combustion and geothermal) enterprises. Guatemala sometimes buys 
electricity from Mexico and on-sells to El Salvador.  
This section provides a summary of the information gathered from interviews with personnel 
from ORMAT’s Amatitlán geothermal plant, EEGSA, INDE and ETCEE.  
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3.1.2 Generation sites: impacts on Amatitlán geothermal plant 
In Guatemala, the geothermal development company ORMAT Technologies Inc. owns and 
operates several geothermal plants. The Amatitlán plant is located on a geothermal field 
situated immediately north of San Francisco de Sales, and approximately 3 km north of the 
active vent of Volcán Pacaya (Figure 3.1). The plant currently generates 18 MVA at a 
voltage of 13.8 kV. This voltage is then stepped up to 138 kV for integration into the national 
grid via the Palin substation.  
During the 27 May 2010 eruption, the San Francisco de Sales area received an estimated 
20 cm of tephra, ranging from coarse (e.g. >1.5 mm) to lapilli-sized. Ballistic bombs and 
blocks (up to 25 cm diameter long axis) also fell in this area, and extensive damage was 
caused locally. At the Amatitlán plant, the worst damage was to steam condenser fans and 
roofs. As the fans were uncovered, fan blades suffered abrasion damage from tephra fall as 
well as denting and bending from falling blocks which rendered the damaged units 
nonoperational (Amatitlán plant operator). Three fan blades needed to be replaced. Cleaning 
of fans was slow (days to weeks), as it required the use of vacuum cleaners to remove 
particles from the intricate arrangement of fan blades, cooling fins and condenser coils. 
Operations were discontinued immediately after the eruption and the plant remained offline 
for three weeks while cleaning and repairs were carried out.  
Other issues encountered by plant personnel were minor denting of the intake and outlet 
pipe cladding (Figure 3.2) and the removal of tephra from the switchyard gravel. No pipes 
required replacement or repair and no reduction in thermal efficiency was observed. 
Removal of tephra from switchyard gravel required complete sieving over a several day 
period to separate it from the volcanic material. Tephra was removed from the switchyard 
gravel due to health concerns over the material being broken up further and creating a fine 
dust that could have caused respiratory problems. No issues of corrosion were reported. 
Also, no ceramic insulation (insulators and bushings) was damaged by the ballistics.  
 
Figure 3.1 Amatitlán geothermal plant. 
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Figure 3.2 Superficially damaged pipe cladding at the Amatitlán geothermal power plant (dent is 
approximately 20 cm wide).   
The arrival of tropical storm Agatha on 29 May 2010 (two days after the initial eruption) did 
not cause any further issues for the Amatitlán plant as staff had already been evacuated and 
the plant’s operations suspended because of the bombardment of volcanic debris.  
The El Reigno hydroelectric dam, located some 10km from Pacaya volcano on Lake 
Amatitlán, was also reported to have suffered damage following the 27 May eruption 
(EEGSA network operator). Details of the damage were not obtained on this reconnaissance 
trip.    
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3.1.3 Transmission and distribution equipment 
EEGSA is a distribution supply (<69 kV) company that provides electricity to three of 
Guatemala’s 22 departments (Figure 3.3).  
 
Figure 3.3 Guatemalan administrative departments. Highlighted departments represent those 
supplied with power by EEGSA. The approximate location of Pacaya volcano is denoted by the red 
triangle.   
Although they comprise only four percent of the nation’s total land area, the departments of 
Guatemala, Sacatepeguez and Escuintla and their 940,000 inhabitants consume nearly 50% 
(roughly 625 MVA) of the nation’s total energy demand. Within these departments, EEGSA 
owns and operates 53 distribution substations and 6 transmission stations. 
EEGSA reported numerous issues due to volcanic tephra contamination. Rain during the 
eruption added to the risk of tephra contamination of high voltage equipment flashing over, 
and several earth faults occurred. Specifically, there were six 69 kV circuits that endured 
continual flashover despite several attempts to re-close the circuits. Of these, Guadelupe 
lines 1, 2 and 3 were particularly problematic (we suspect that this was most likely due to 
increased tephra thicknesses at their location(s)) (EEGSA network operator). On 28 May 
2010 (the day after the eruption) a 25.88 MW load was shed from a 69 kV circuit causing a 
two-hour long outage (EEGSA Operations Manager). Despite several reports of faulting on 
the system no burning or physical damage of transmission equipment was noted, thus no 
replacement or repair of equipment was required.  
Porcelain or composite polymer are the most common insulator materials used on 
Guatemalan transmission circuits with composite polymers rapidly becoming preferred due 
to their low cost and weight and superior hydrophobic properties (Okada et al., 2002).    
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3.1.4 Substations 
While INDE reported no faults with Guatemala’s transmission system following the 27 May 
eruption, distribution substations responsible for stepping down transmission voltages 
experienced several adverse events. Several EEGSA substations received coarse tephra fall 
out during the 27 May eruption, particularly those substations located south of Guatemala 
City closest to Pacaya volcano.  
 
Figure 3.4 Coarse tephra deposited at Laguna substation (see Figure 3.5 for location)(photos: 
EEGSA) 
The EEGSA substations that received the most tephra fall were scheduled for extensive 
offline cleaning on May 29 and 30. However, the onset of tropical storm Agatha hindered the 
cleaning procedure and large amounts of tephra remained on substation equipment during 
the early hours of the storm. The combination of tephra contamination, together with heavy 
rain from the storm, caused further faulting (flashovers) on the system, with several 
interruptions occurring throughout the event (29-30 May)(EEGSA network operator). With 
the passing of Agatha it was found that the rains had sufficiently cleaned all substation 
equipment and none but the Laguna substation (located ~5 km from the vent) required 
further cleaning (Figure 3.4). Power transformer bushings were said to be the most important 
components to clean, as flashover across the bushing would likely cause irreparable 
damage to the transformer. The transformers themselves were described as being the most 
problematic and difficult apparatus to wash free of tephra because of the intricate array of 
cooling fins and sensitive components vulnerable to further damage from abrasion or 
water/tephra ingress. As a preventive measure, tephra was cleaned from transformer 
radiator fins to allow sufficient heat transfer and cooling of the apparatus. 
ETCEE manages two large (230 kV) substations which were affected by the eruption. These 
stations (Guate Sur and Guate Este) required offline cleaning shortly before the arrival of the 
tropical storm (Figure 3.5). One of four transformer banks was de-energised at a time and 
each bank remained offline for a period of two hours. Cleaning involved the sweeping and 
brushing of tephra from substation hardware and surrounding yards. This tephra was 
shovelled and trucked away to a nearby area to serve as landfill. Substation gear was 
subsequently washed using high-pressure water pumps.   
Historically, no electricity supply company in Guatemala has observed reduced resistivity 
(increased conductivity) in substation gravels (and therefore no increase in step-touch 
potentials) due to tephra contamination (EEGSA network operator). Thus no effort was made 
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to perform resistivity measurements, sieve out the tephra or to replace the gravel. At the time 
of our visit tephra was still mixed in with the substation gravel at Amatitlan plant.   
There were no reports of abrasion or corrosion damage at any of the affected substation 
sites. 
 
Figure 3.5 Isopach map of 27 May 2010 eruption showing approximate location of affected 
substations. Blue stars represent substations and their names are juxtaposed (adapted from 
INSIVUMEH map).   
3.1.5 Summary 
ORMAT’s Amatitlán geothermal plant received ~20 cm of mostly lapilli-sized tephra. Ballistic 
bombs and blocks also bombarded the plant, causing extensive damage to the plant’s roof 
and condenser fans. Fan blades were dented, bent and also suffered damage from 
abrasion. Minor denting of the intake and outlet pipe cladding was also reported however 
these impacts were superficial and did not require repair. Removal of tephra from the plant’s 
surface gravel was carried out to avoid health concerns over the material being broken up 
further and creating a fine dust that could have caused respiratory problems. Operations 
were discontinued immediately after the eruption and the plant remained offline for three 
weeks while cleaning and repairs were carried out. The onset of Tropical Storm Agatha had 
little impact on the plant, as it was not operating at the time.  
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Guatemala’s transmission network (>69 kV) did not experience any issues from the May 
2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano. However, EEGSA experienced numerous issues of 
flashover on its distribution circuits due to volcanic tephra contamination combined with rain 
at the time of fall out. Six 69 kV circuits were unable to be brought online due to continual 
flashover on 27 May and, on the following day, a 25.88 MW load was shed from a 69 KV 
circuit causing a two-hour long interruption of supply.  
Several EEGSA substations received coarse tephra fall out during the 27 May eruption, 
particularly those substations located south of Guatemala City closest to Pacaya volcano. 
Laguna, the closest substation to the volcano, was immediately shut down as a 
precautionary measure. An extensive cleaning program originally scheduled for May 29 and 
30 was halted due to the onset of Tropical Storm Agatha which caused further instances of 
flashover on EEGSA’s distribution network. ETCEE’s Guate Sur and Guate Este substations 
were cleaned (offline) immediately following the 27 May eruption by sweeping and brushing 
tephra from substation hardware and surrounding yards.  
There were no reports of corrosion, abrasion or increase in step-touch potentials at any of 
the affected transmission or distribution facilities.  
3.2 Water supplies 
3.2.1 Overview 
Guatemala has an abundance of freshwater, with 18 major rivers originating in the volcanic 
highlands. While there is adequate water to meet water demands for the population overall, 
the major population centre (Guatemala City and the Metropolitan Region) is under water 
stress as it is located on the Continental Divide and surface water resources in this area are 
scarce and vulnerable to contamination.  
An assessment by the US Army Corps of Engineers (2000) concluded that the water supply 
sector in Guatemala at that time was characterized by low and inconsistent service 
coverage, especially in rural areas; unclear allocation of management responsibilities; and 
little or no regulation and monitoring of service provision. A more recent report (Pagiola et 
el., 2007) for the World Bank also noted that Guatemala was at that time the only Central 
American country not to have a national public corporation to manage domestic water 
supply. Since then, a National Water Commission (CONAGUA) has been established to 
implement the mandates of the National Water Law.  
Access to water and sanitation services has slowly risen over the years in Guatemala. 
However, particularly in rural areas, the rate of households with a piped water supply 
remains below development goals (Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1 Household water and sanitation coverage in Guatemala (%) (data: 2002 census). 
 Total Urban  Rural MDG
1
 
Water supply  74.6  89.5  59.5  82  
Sanitation  46.9  76.7  16.8  66  
1 Millennium Development Goals 
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Guatemala’s drinking water standards are based on the World Health Organisation 
standards. Their implementation is overseen by the COGUANOR committee which is 
attached to the Ministry of Economy. COGUANOR is a member of the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO).  
3.2.2 Guatemala City 
In 1972 the Municipality of Guatemala created a municipal water company (EMPAGUA) to 
manage the city’s water services. EMPAGUA serves 85 percent of the city’s water users, 
with the balance being provided by a private firm, Aguas de Mariscal ((Pagiola et al., 2007) 
which supplies about ten percent of Guatemala City and some smaller firms and private 
groundwater wells which supply the remaining five percent.  
The following discussion refers only to information obtained from interviewing the technical 
director of EMPAGUA.  
For Guatemala City, there are two sources of water: surface water and groundwater, each 
supplying about 50 percent of production capacity. EMPAGUA’s average production rate is 
4000 litres per second. The system serves 1.8 million people. There are major problems with 
the quality of surface water due mostly to agricultural runoff and poor sewage disposal 
practices. Contaminants include turbidity, BOD, COD, nutrients, pathogenic microorganisms, 
iron, fluoride and sulphate. Turbidity is a major challenge for water treatment plants; in winter 
it can be as high as 15,000 NTU (Nephelometric Turbidity Units) in surface waters whereas 
in summer it is typically 10-30 NTU. There are fewer problems with groundwater quality 
although contamination with iron and manganese can be a problem and the temperature of 
the groundwater resource is high (37ºC) and it has to be cooled. The two sources are fed 
into the same distribution network.  
There are five treatment plants of varying ages. One of the older plants can only treat raw 
water with turbidity <400 NTU, but other plants can cope with higher levels in intake waters. 
Water treatment consists of the addition of chemical flocculants (alum, lime, 
polyelectrolytes), pH adjustment with lime, sedimentation for 3-4 hours, then chlorination. 
Parameters measured in raw water are temperature, colour, turbidity and pH. 
3.2.2.1 Problems caused by the eruption 
Previous eruptions of Pacaya volcano have not caused any issues for EMPAGUA, but the 
eruption of 27 May did cause them a number of problems. The eruption deposited coarse 
(sand-sized) basaltic tephra on Guatemala City (Figure 2.6). The tephra caused abrasion 
damage to air-cooled motors and they stopped straight away. Tephra was also deposited in 
the open-air tanks. One tank in particular had a volume of 7000 m3 and was open, so was 
contaminated by the airfall deposits. Turbidity increased, with larger particles sinking to the 
bottom, but some smaller particles remaining in suspension. The tephra fall also affected the 
groundwater wellhead pumps. 
EMPAGUA did not attempt to treat the water, but opted to clean out the tanks. Thus there 
was no need to increase chlorination levels to compensate for increased turbidity. The 
cleaning operation took three days. Production rates were affected, with tanks that were 
being cleaned being bypassed. However the director said that an erratic water supply is not 
unusual in Guatemala and that the public have adaptations to this situation such as on-site 
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home storage tanks. Thus his view was that disruption would probably have been minimal to 
end-users.  
The director’s overall assessment was that the main impacts of the eruption were that it 
necessitated increased maintenance of storage tanks, and cleaning filters. There were no 
real water quality problems because contaminated tanks were cleaned out rather than 
treated.  
EMPAGUA’s approach to site cleanup was to sweep up tephra from roads and parking 
areas to stop the tephra being crushed and remobilised by vehicle traffic. Roofs and gutters 
had to be cleaned out as gutters broke under the weight of the tephra.  
When asked what lessons they had learned and what they might do differently in the future, 
the director said that they would cover up equipment. It could be a challenge for them to 
cover large tanks (their largest tank is 70 m diameter) but he thought it would be worthwhile 
to prevent future episodes of contamination by volcanic debris. He also said that they would 
cover the groundwater wellhead pumps.  
EMPAGUA are critically dependent on the electricity supply for pumping groundwater. They 
often experience problems with their power supply in winter anyway due to tree fall on lines 
during stormy weather. EMPAGUA’s personal substations had to be cleaned to prevent 
flashover following the tephra fall. The eruption also caused widespread line damages and 
breakages which affected the electricity supply. There are three large plants in Guatemala 
City that have their own on-site substations, as it requires large amounts of power to pump 
water 500 metres uphill. These substations provide a voltage of 69 kV however there are 
also smaller plants that only require 13.8 kV and 4.64 kV.  
The municipal cleanup, following the tephra fall, was prompt and efficient (Section 3.5.1). 
EMPAGUA was asked to be a member of an emergency committee coordinated by the 
municipality to oversee the cleanup and disposal of the tephra. The director was unsure 
whether the cleanup created extra water demand; it is difficult to measure water use 
because the citizens are already accustomed to an erratic water supply (access varies from 
six hours to 24 hours service per day) and many people have adapted to this uncertainty by 
installing extra storage tanks on their properties.  
3.2.3 Impacts in San Francisco de Sales 
The town of San Francisco de Sales is located approximately 3 km from the active vent of 
Pacaya volcano, on the northern slopes of the volcano (Figure 1.3). Its water supply comes 
from springs and streams higher on the mountain, and is piped to the town using an above 
ground distribution network of PVC piping (3/4” diameter, 250 psi). The pipework suffered 
extensive damage from ballistic blocks and bombs during the eruption and the town lost its 
water supply for eight days while the damaged pipes were replaced.  
3.3 Wastewater systems 
Volcanic tephra fall can cause damage and disruption to wastewater systems (both sewage 
and stormwater). Tephra can enter and block pipes and sumps, can cause accelerated wear 
on motors and pumps, and can cause serious damage to wastewater treatment plants 
(Wilson et al., 2011a). Tephra can enter treatment plants both via sewer lines (particularly if 
these are combined with stormwater lines), and by falling directly on treatment facilities. 
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The following information was obtained primarily from interviewing the General Manager of 
the company Mapreco. This company was founded 25 years ago, and has the maintenance 
contracts for 90 percent of wastewater systems in Guatemala City. They also advise on 
wastewater treatment plant design and maintenance.  
This section covers only sewage treatment systems. Impacts of the tephra fall on the city’s 
stormwater drain system are described in Section 3.5.1.  
3.3.1 Overview of wastewater disposal in Guatemala City 
Guatemala City is located on a drainage divide which runs approximately through the middle 
of the city along a NW/SE axis. In the north of the city, there is a combined stormwater-
sewage system for household water plus stormwater which drains to the Las Vacas and 
Motagua rivers then to the Gulf of Honduras. To the south, surface waters drain to Lago 
Amatitlan (Figure 1.4) and then to the Pacific Ocean. Contamination of surface waters by 
untreated sewage is a major problem in Guatemala, and the Las Vacas and Villalobos rivers 
and Lago Amatitlan are considered to be severely contaminated.  
There has been international pressure to improve environmental management in Guatemala, 
particularly with respect to the disposal of untreated sewage. A law mandating the quality of 
waste disposed to the environment has been in force since approximately 2002, but specific 
regulations to enforce this law were only introduced in 2006 (MARN, 2006). Domestic and 
industrial wastewater discharges must now meet environmental quality standards. Systems 
in the north of the city were allowed an extra decade to comply with the new standards as 
this is the oldest part of the city and the infrastructure is correspondingly older. These 
standards are not prescriptive about what treatment methods should be used; they monitor 
the end results.  
3.3.2 Wastewater treatment systems in Guatemala City 
Guatemala City has hundreds of wastewater treatment plants ranging in size from those 
serving just a few households to larger facilities such as the plant serving the University of 
San Carlos. This system utilises an Imhoff tank (a combined sedimentation and sludge 
digestion tank, see Figure 3.5).  
Some of the larger plants were constructed by EMPAGUA in the early 1990s; these are now 
considered old in design, and their treatment capacity is routinely exceeded. The largest 
plant (Belo Horizonte) receives ten times more wastewater than its capacity, and has to 
bypass the plant and discharge to the environment. The Nimajuyu plant located west of 
Zone 11 processes approximately 800 m3 of wastewater per day.  
Most of the larger wastewater treatment plants have coarse static screens that are bars 
spaced approximately 2.5 cm apart, rather than using fine mesh screens which would 
require too much maintenance. Mapreco staff were unaware of any plants which have pre-
screening treatment with moving parts such as bar, step or rotating drum screens. Most 
systems are thus relatively simple and robust. Plants generally have a primary sedimentation 
tank followed by secondary treatment using either aerobic or anaerobic waste stabilisation 
ponds. They may then have a polishing step using rocks or gravel filter beds. In some cases 
the waste is treated with calcium hypochlorite to disinfect it.  
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Figure 3.6 Cleaning out Imhoff tank at University of San Carlos, Guatemala City (photo: 
Mapreco). 
3.3.3 Impacts of the eruption 
The 27 May tephra fall had widespread impacts on Guatemala City’s wastewater treatment 
facilities. The tephra received in the southern part of the city was coarser and sandier in 
texture, whereas the northern part received finer ash. Mapreco reported that for wastewater 
treatment plants it was a ‘double problem’ having the heavy rains brought by the tropical 
storm after the tephra fall as more tephra washed into wastewater systems before they had 
a chance to clean it up.  
Tephra entered wastewater treatment systems both via sewer lines and by direct deposition 
into ponds. Mapreco staff described the impact on one particular system (the system at the 
University of San Carlos, shown in Figure 3.6) in some detail. Approximately 4-5 metres of 
tephra accumulated in the Imhoff tank. The removal process consisted of mixing the tephra 
with the sludge so that the heavy tephra sank to the bottom. Then sludge pumps (15 cm 
internal diameter piping) were used to remove the lighter material on top, and the rest was 
dug out manually. There was heavy wear and tear on this equipment due to abrasion 
damage to propellers (Figure 3.7). Their normal lifetime of two years was reduced to 15 
days. It was generally difficult cleaning out tephra-contaminated sludge as the tephra was 
reportedly very dense and ‘hard to shift’ with a hose. The same approach (using a suction 
pump to remove the lighter material then shovelling out the denser material) was used for 
many different types of treatment plants, such as small aerobic plants used to service 
condominiums (Figure 3.8).  
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In general, the tephra was difficult to handle. It was heavy and abrasive and could not be 
moved with a hose very easily. It was also heterogeneous in grain size (Appendix 3).  
 
Figure 3.7 Sludge pump propeller of the same type that suffered severe abrasional damage from 
volcanic tephra.  
Wastewater systems generally took between 2-3 days and a week to clean out, depending 
on their size and difficulty of access. At the time of our visit, Mapreco were still receiving 
calls. The company estimated that additional business generated by the eruption increased 
their profits by 20%.   
The company noted that blockages of storm drains and sewers continued to be a problem 
for months after the eruption, and was still causing flooding at the time of our visit.  
 
Figure 3.8 Aerobic digestion tank, small-scale wastewater treatment plant serving condominium 
development (photo: Mapreco). 
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3.3.4 Lessons learned 
Even though Guatemala City is within range of several recently active volcanoes, Mapreco’s 
view was that it was not ready for an eruption and that people did not really know what to do 
in terms of tephra disposal/cleanup. They suggested that the provision of timely advice 
would be useful, in particular to clean up the tephra quickly and keep it out of drains. They 
noted that once the tephra enters drains it is difficult to remove as normal hosing treatment 
does not work well. It is much better to keep as much tephra as possible out of wastewater 
treatment systems. The company also noted that the cleanup was hindered by poor record-
keeping; there were not good plans showing affected areas.  
The company did not think it worthwhile to invest in specialised equipment or design for an 
event that occurs once every few decades in Guatemala City, despite the high level of 
vulnerability of the hundreds of small, open wastewater treatment plants in the city.  
3.4 Healthcare systems and services 
This section gives an overview of the structure of the healthcare system in Guatemala, 
impacts of the eruption gained from visiting healthcare centres in Guatemala City, and a 
summary of the response actions taken. This report provides only the preliminary findings of 
this study. Further analysis of the interviews and data is ongoing. 
3.4.1 Background on healthcare system in Guatemala 
The health sector is comprised of both public and private institutions as well as a large 
traditional medicine sector. The public health system supports about 25% of the population, 
the private sector serves 10%, the Guatemalan Social Security Institute (IGSS) supports 
17%, and NGOs meet the needs of 2.5% of the population in Guatemala (PAHO, 2001). The 
remainder of the country’s population (over 40%) do not receive any form of healthcare 
coverage (PAHO, 2001). In 2001 the annual spend on public health, as a proportion of GDP, 
was 5.4% (PAHO, 2001). 
However, a verbal account given by the Ministry of Health provided different statistics from 
the PAHO (2001) results. As the PAHO (2001) figures have not been updated since the 
report was published (2001) and since we are unable to validate either sources, both sets of 
information have been included to ensure complete reporting of the data collected on this 
trip.  According to the Ministry of Public Health, 3-4% of the population are treated by private 
health institutes, 12% are covered by Social Security (which covers people who work and 
pay taxes), and 10-15% of the population are not covered by the health system (they have 
their own community system, called ‘traditional medicine’, which is a mixture of religion, 
health, cultural, social, and anthropological influences). Health coverage is not universal as 
the public health system would have to cover the remaining population (around 70-75%), but 
only 0.9-1% of the national GDP is spent on health (Ministry of Heath epidemiologist). The 
Ministry of Health epidemiologist estimated that the national expenditure on public health 
should be around 4-5% of GDP (New Zealand spends 8.1% GDP on healthcare as a 
comparison (OECD, 2003)), which results in permanent shortages in resources (Ministry of 
Heath epidemiologist). Additionally many people do not have access to the health system. 
Guatemala has a large indigenous population (around 45% of the total population), and a 
large percentage of people living in poverty and also in rural areas, far away from health 
centres which are usually only open Monday to Friday from 8 am to 4:30 pm (Ministry of 
Heath epidemiologist). 
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The health sector underwent economic reform in 1994, and of the government budget given 
to the municipalities, 90% is supposed to be spent on education, health, infrastructure and 
public services (PAHO, 2001). Further improvement of the health sector was incorporated 
into health policies for 1996-2000, including increasing health coverage and the quality of 
health services. To deal with the lack of healthcare coverage to the population, a 
Comprehensive Health Care System was designed, aimed at using volunteers and 
community participants to bring healthcare services to the entire population (PAHO, 2001). 
The community-based health delivery service is structured as follows. There are 1500 
centres in total, stepping down in size and facilities from hospitals to municipal health 
centres (doctors, nurses, technicians) to health posts in villages (midwives and auxiliary 
nurses) to local ‘centres of convergence’ (community health workers, visited once monthly 
by medics). Depending on the severity of the illness, patients are moved upwards through 
the system or transferred as necessary. 
However, the healthcare system is still largely centralised in Guatemala, with three large 
public hospitals and most of the healthcare resources and services located in Guatemala 
City (Ministry of Health epidemiologist). There are 43 public hospitals in the whole country, 
generally one in each department (province). However staffing and equipment shortages are 
problematic, and are not sufficient to meet the health needs of the country (Ministry of Health 
epidemiologist). There is also very little communication and coordination between the 
various facets of healthcare in general (e.g. public, social security, private, community care) 
(Ministry of Heath epidemiologist). But in an emergency situation by law, Guatemala has a 
national commission for disaster relief (CONRED), which is the national representative of all 
institutions in a state, whether public or private. 
Staffing and equipment shortages and lack of financial resources are persistent problems in 
the healthcare system, which struggles to meet the needs of the population. Dengue fever is 
the major public health problem in Guatemala (Ministry of Health epidemiologist). It became 
epidemic in 2009 and cases continued to increase in 2010. At the national level, pneumonia 
is the primary cause of death in Guatemala. 
3.4.2 Healthcare response to eruption 
Normal service at health centres is Monday to Friday, 08h00 to 16h30. The Ministry of Public 
Health’s response to tephra fall was to increase service at health centres to 24 hours a day, 
and to set up albergues (shelters), to provide health services to outpatients and for 
surveillance. Medical staff visits the shelters once or twice a day and write a daily report that 
is circulated among the government authorities. In parallel to this, the Emergency Committee 
also runs 24 hours a day, 7 days a week during the emergency period, based at the Ministry 
of Public Health. No additional resources were available to cover this increase in service, 
and so there was no relief cover for shifts (Ministry of Heath epidemiologist). 
Informal discussions with a local farmer in the village of San Francisco de Sales revealed 
that the public health department arrived in the area 1-2 months after the eruption, and 
installed a temporary clinic which remained for eight days.  
The epidemiologist at hospital A also discussed the shelters, and said that they were set up 
in affected areas. Their capacity was generally insufficient, which resulted in overcrowding, 
and the shelters themselves were supplied with only improvised basic services such as 
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potable water. As a result of the overcrowding and communal living, the HIV programme 
also distributed condoms in the shelters. Multi-disciplinary teams visited the shelters, 
comprised of nurses, doctors, psychologists, environmental health inspectors and social 
workers (hospital A epidemiologist). 
3.4.3 Impacts of the eruption on public health 
During fieldwork, interviews were undertaken in two large public hospitals in Guatemala City 
and also with a senior official within the Ministry of Health. In general, the hospitals reported 
high patient attendance at all times, and an inability to cope with levels of demand under 
normal circumstances. 
3.4.3.1 Ministry of Public Health experience 
According to the Ministry of Public Health there is no data to support a direct link between 
respiratory effects and the tephra fall. The Ministry of Health epidemiologist informed us that 
San Carlos University had undertaken an analysis and found that there was no impact on 
the health of the population from the tephra fall. However, this study was unavailable to us. 
Two tephra samples were sent to Durham University (UK) by Professor Bill Rose, of 
Michigan Technological University (USA). A summary of the results (reproduced here with 
the kind permission of Dr Claire Horwell) is included in Appendix 6. The tephra deposited in 
Guatemala City was described by many interviewees as being ‘sandy’, and this is borne out 
by the grain size analyses which show no material in the <63 μm size fraction, and therefore 
not in the respirable size fraction (<4 um). Overall, the lack of respiratory effects caused by 
the tephra fall is probably due to a range of factors: the coarse grain size of the tephra, the 
rainy conditions during the eruption, which dampened down the deposited tephra, and the 
fact the eruption occurred in the evening when people were generally indoors.  
It should also be noted that any association between the event and impacts on public health 
would probably be difficult to detect because of the general lack of documentation and 
reporting of health cases in Guatemala, and the normal seasonal trends in respiratory 
diseases which may make it more difficult to detect impacts. However, there was apparently 
a small reduction in dengue fever cases during the period of the eruption and tropical storm 
(Ministry of Health epidemiologist) which could have been due to the heavy rains cleaning 
out mosquito breeding grounds.  
The hospital epidemiologist also discussed the local crop damage from tephra fall, which led 
to food shortages and said that in the future this may result in cases of undernourishment as 
a long-term impact.  
3.4.3.2 Public hospital experience  
Interviews were conducted with staff at two of the three large public hospitals in Guatemala 
City (referred to hereafter, to protect participants’ privacy, as ‘hospital A’ and ‘hospital B’). 
Regions closer to the volcano also suffered a range of effects on public health, but within our 
brief visit we were unable to visit other health centres. Some data on civil defence aspects of 
the eruption is presented in Section 5.3.1.  
We were fortunate to be given a database of statistics on hospital Admissions to the adult 
emergency department of hospital A during the period immediately after the tephra fall (28 
May – 7 June 2010), with cases specifically associated with either the Pacaya eruption or 
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the tropical storm (Appendix 5). A total of 74 cases caused by these two natural disasters 
were recorded during this time period, including two deaths due to traumatic brain injury. 
Both deaths were caused by falls from roofs while cleaning tephra (hospital A 
epidemiologist). Overall, 69 admissions were related to the eruption and the remaining five 
to the tropical storm. The diagnoses were divided into broad categories and broken down by 
gender (Figure 3.9). For the time period 31 May – 7 June, a greater level of detail was 
available about the causes of admissions related to the eruption and tropical storm (Table 
3.2). 
 
Figure 3.9 Admissions to adult emergency department at hospital A, by gender and diagnosis, 
during period 28 May-7 June 2010, specifically related to natural disasters (the Pacaya eruption or 
tropical storm Agatha) (n=74). 
Of the total 74 admissions related specifically to the eruption or tropical storm (Figure 3.9), 
the majority of cases were categorised as ‘multiple trauma’ (63 cases, or 85%). These were 
mostly fractures, with smaller numbers of dislocations and cases of severe bruising, from a 
range of causes including falling from roofs, other falls and traffic accidents (Table 3.2). 
There were six cases (8%) of respiratory illness, including asthma and pharyngitis, and three 
cases (4%) of burns, with two being from high voltage lines and one from being struck by an 
incandescent ballistic bomb (this person also suffered multiple trauma).  
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Table 3.2 Causes of injury and illness among admissions to adult emergency department at 
hospital A, 31 May-7 June 2010 (n=22). 
Event and diagnosis 
Number 
of cases 
% Comments 
Fall from roof – multiple trauma  9 41 Cleaning tephra from roofs and gutters 
Fall (unspecified) – multiple trauma 7 32  
Traffic accident – multiple trauma 2 9 Vehicle slid on tephra 
Respiratory problems 4 18 Asthmatic crisis, pharyngitis, two workers exposed to gas leak while underground 
Thus, multiple trauma was the most common ‘indirect’ impact recorded in Guatemala City, 
with men twice as likely to be admitted to the Emergency Department as women (Figure 
3.9). The low incidence of respiratory disease is consistent with factors described in Section 
3.4.2.1. While only partial data is available on specific causes of accidents, the data 
presented in Table 3.2 suggests that falls from roofs and other heights were primarily 
responsible.  
Staff at hospital A reported that the main demands for services as a result of the eruption 
were in the Operating Room (OR) and the trauma unit. The hospital did not discern an 
increase in respiratory cases as a consequence of the tephra fall; however any increase may 
have been masked by a natural wintertime increase in acute respiratory cases. Staff 
generally concurred with the Ministry of Health assessment that the exposure of the city’s 
population to the tephra fall was generally low because it occurred at night time, and also 
was raining. Staff had expected an increase in respiratory cases and conjunctivitis, and 
cases related to water contamination, but these did not materialise.  
At hospital B, a doctor offered the opinion that this hospital would probably have received 
fewer cases related to the eruption due to its location in the north of the city, which was less 
severely affected than the south (Figure 2.8). Unlike hospital A, this hospital did not record 
admission data in relation to impacts of the eruption and tropical storm. However there were 
some trauma injury cases admitted to the hospital, which apparently were caused primarily 
by falls from roofs, through roofs or from other heights as the cleanup began. A further issue 
was complaints of back pain, particularly among the elderly, caused by sweeping up or 
shovelling the heavy tephra. Overall, the eruption did not cause a discernible increase in 
patient numbers and no additional staff resources were required aside from those required 
for cleanup operations (see Section 3.4.4). 
In terms of affected services at hospital B, staff had already arrived at the hospital for the 
shift change at 19h00, which was prior to the heaviest tephra fall thus there were no issues 
with staff being able to get to work. The next day the tephra fall was lighter and did not cause 
significant access problems for hospital staff (hospital B maintenance staff). However, the 
tephra fall on the hospital’s roofs required many members of staff to assist on the first day of 
cleanup, which meant that few services (other than emergencies) were offered at the 
hospital on this day. 
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3.4.3.3 Experiences of the public 
A farmer in San Francisco de Sales told us that, in his experience, the eruption caused an 
increased incidence of diarrhoea, respiratory and psychological problems in the local 
population. The timings of these impacts were not discussed and so the cause of diarrhoea 
is uncertain. The farmer added that he still has dreams about the event. He also said that 
masks were sent for the population but were not given out for free, and so most people did 
not purchase and wear them. 
3.4.4 Buildings, equipment and infrastructure 
Hospital A is located close to the drainage divide that runs in an approximately NW-SE 
direction across Guatemala City. This hospital is over 50 years old, and pipework is suffering 
from scale deposition problems, with sumps and tanks regularly backing up and overflowing, 
as well as the underlying drainage network being old, chaotic and poorly maintained. The 
tephra fall exacerbated this hospital’s pre-existing drainage problems. The deposited tephra 
was washed into drains where it caused further blockages and flooding. Basements flooded 
and three water pumps were ruined so that the hospital was reduced to using one 
emergency water pump. Gutters also became blocked with tephra, causing flooding in 
through ceilings. The cleanup of tephra from the hospital roof also caused abrasion damage 
to a waterproof coating on the roof, which added further to leakage problems.  
Some other impacts to hospital buildings, and effective mitigation measures were also 
reported: 
• Other problems at Hospital A included the blocking of air conditioning filters by tephra. 
Water tanks were covered, and so were unaffected by tephra deposition. The hospital 
did not suffer any power loss as a result of the eruption, and has its own back-up power 
source that starts automatically when there is an outage. Although power cuts did occur 
city-wide, lasting for approximately three hours, the hospital had sufficient back-up 
generation capacity to cope for this length of time. 
• Mats were placed on the floors at entrance points, to prevent slipping and to prevent 
tephra from being trampled further into the hospital. There are restricted areas for 
surgery, paediatrics and emergency procedures, away from normal foot traffic areas. In 
these areas, staff are required to change their clothing and clean the wheels on gurneys 
before wheeling them through. As a result of these normal routines, these sensitive 
areas remained free of contamination from tephra.  
• Tephra was trampled into Hospital B by the flow of people, so cardboard was placed at 
entrances to the building to mitigate this problem (hospital director). Despite this 
measure, internal flooring was noticeably abraded by tephra (hospital maintenance staff). 
As with Hospital A, the normal routines of the doctors, such as changing their clothes 
before accessing restricted areas, prevented tephra ingress issues in sensitive units 
(hospital maintenance staff). At the time there was an increased demand for the 
pulmonary ventilators (artificial respirators), and the hospital has had to rent additional 
equipment, but this demand is typical for that time of year so cannot be attributed to the 
eruption (hospital doctor).  
• Hospital B is located in the northern part of the city, and suffered a different range of 
problems than Hospital A. This hospital was in the process of painting a waterproof 
coating onto its roofs to prevent leakage when the eruption happened. This coating was 
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damaged in some areas during the cleanup operations as the tephra was extremely 
abrasive (described in Section 3.4.4, and shown in Figure 3.11). However, flooding was 
not a serious issue for this hospital as it was for Hospital A.  
• Air conditioning units on the second floor, which are specifically for the operating rooms, 
became blocked by tephra and required cleaning, but were undamaged (hospital 
director). The hospital has its own covered water tanks for water supply, and these were 
unaffected by the tephra, and this hospital did not suffer power loss during any part of 
the eruption. The tephra fall alone did not have significant effects on transport to and 
from the hospital or around the city, but the tropical storm did add to the city’s transport 
problems as it washed the tephra into drains and created widespread surface flooding 
(see Section 3.5.1).  
3.4.5 Cleanup operations 
Hospital A did not make specific comments about the demands of the cleanup operations 
following the tephra fall, but did note that flooded basements required cleaning out.  
The extensive roofs of hospital B (an estimated 10,000 m2, hospital maintenance staff) were 
covered in 2-3 cm coarse tephra. These roofs are largely flat, and thus tephra was not 
washed off. The rainfall received mostly served to dampen the tephra. The quantity of wet 
tephra involved meant that the cleanup was too major for the normal cleaning team. On the 
following day, all available staff were assigned to help with the cleanup and a further 25 
Army personnel were also brought in to help (hospital maintenance staff). Internal cleaning 
was also suspended to focus on the external cleanup; as a result two additional cleaners 
were hired for a month afterwards to assist with internal cleaning.  
Cleanup efforts were directed towards the roofs, to prevent further rains from washing it into 
drainpipes and blocking them. It took three to four days to clear tephra from the roof. 
Maintenance staff kindly provided us with photos of the cleanup (Figures 3.10 and 3.11).  
 
Figure 3.10 Roof of hospital B covered in tephra.  
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Figure 3.11 Cleanup of tephra from roof in progress (left), and abrasion damage to surface 
coating on roof (right). 
3.4.6 Financing issues 
At hospital A there is a committee for the disposal of solid hospital waste and for facilitating 
the emergency management of the hospital. The committee organises the priorities for 
funding investment in the hospital and is comprised of the epidemiological department, the 
risk management department and the maintenance department. However, the financial office 
itself allocates the funds and has the final say on investment (hospital A epidemiologist). The 
Strategic Planning Unit is external to the hospital at the level of the Ministry, who verify and 
approve the infrastructure projects presented by the state institutions (hospital A worker). At 
the time of the eruption the hospital budget was in deficit, and so the additional costs 
associated with the emergency and the demand on resources exacerbated this situation. As 
a result, the financing issues and liquidity of the hospital hindered their capabilities and the 
response. 
The risk management committee at hospital A has a ‘disaster room’ for emergencies, which 
is a virtual environment for anticipating the supplies that may be needed in an emergency 
(hospital A epidemiologist). There is a risk management manual, which is the hospital’s 
integral plan for any type of disaster. In the hospital manual there are plans for evacuation, 
mitigating fires, and a sanitation plan, but no plans specifically related to volcanic eruptions. 
There is a risk management plan, relating to internal hospital risks (such as the hospital’s 
infrastructure), and the intention is to integrate the risk management and emergency manual 
plans so that they work together. However, this is difficult to achieve in practice because 
there is no one solely dedicated to risk management at the hospital. The risk management 
committee all have hospital day jobs to attend to, and since normal work is continuing at the 
hospital it is difficult to make progress on the plans (hospital A doctor). The missing element 
is putting the existing plans into practice (hospital A worker). Externally, there is a Ministry of 
Health plan for treating patients relating to volcanic eruptions, but this is separate from the 
hospital manual. 
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In terms of hospital emergency management at hospital B, there is a risk management 
committee. When the tephra fall happened the committee met and this resulted in getting the 
army to help with the cleanup. In general the hospital emergency plan is medical 
emergency-focussed, rather than disaster-focussed and does not include volcanic eruptions 
(hospital B doctor).  
The investment required for maintaining and upgrading infrastructure (e.g. for drainage) has 
no allocated budget from the Ministry, and so this has to come out of the operating budget 
(hospital B doctor). There is also no policy for construction to mitigate disasters (for example 
for seismic design), and construction standards in Guatemala are poor, even for hospitals 
(hospital B doctor). 
There is emergency funding available from the government that was provided by 
international donors and ECLAC. However, the funding is difficult to obtain, as hospitals 
must provide documentation of their needs to apply for funding through CONRED and the 
government. They must prove their need through statistics, photos and documentation. 
Some of the effects are hard to prove, such as over-demand on certain components 
resulting from the damage to others. This process also typically takes too long to be useful 
(hospital B doctor). 
3.4.7 Summary 
Data on admissions (specifically attributable to either the volcanic eruption or the tropical 
storm) to the adult emergency department for the period 28 May -7 June 2010 was obtained 
from one of the two main public hospitals in Guatemala City. A total of 74 cases were seen 
by the ED during this period, of which 69 were related to the eruption and five to the tropical 
storm. Two deaths were recorded. The majority (85%) of cases were categorised as 
‘multiple trauma’ from a range of causes including falling from roofs, other falls and traffic 
accidents. There were more minor incidences of respiratory illnesses and burns. However, 
compared to normal demands on healthcare services, these numbers are small.  
Overall, the direct effects of the 2010 tephra fall event on hospitals appeared minimal. Any 
increase in demand on services was too minor to be distinguishable from normal seasonal 
trends. There was little tephra ingress into buildings and the tephra fall was generally viewed 
by hospital staff as a single event that had to be cleaned up to resume operations. For 
hospital A, the tephra fall exacerbated pre-existing drainage problems and led to flooding of 
basements, which required extra effort to cleanup. For hospital B, cleanup of tephra 
deposited on the roof required extra assistance from the Army. The continuity of critical 
infrastructure services was not a problem for either hospital, with water supplies covered and 
unaffected by the tephra fall, and backup generators providing continuous power during 
power outages. The tephra fall did cause widespread disruption to the city’s transport 
networks, particularly when it was washed into drains and caused widespread surface 
flooding. The extent to which this affected access to and from these hospital is not known.  
In general the health system is hindered in its response to emergency events by being 
chronically under-resourced on a permanent basis. Within the country context, it is not 
surprising that tephra fall is perceived to be a relatively minor problem for healthcare, given 
its relative rarity, and given the chronic social and economic constraints, together with 
epidemic dengue fever occurrence in 2009-10.  
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3.5 Transport networks and the municipal cleanup 
3.5.1 Disposal and possible re-use of tephra 
This section summarises the findings on impacts on transport networks obtained from 
interviews with staff from the municipality of Guatemala City, and DGAC (Direccion General 
de Aeronautica Civil, or Civil Aviation, who manage the international airport).   
3.5.2 Impacts on roads and the municipal cleanup 
Between 2-3 cm of tephra was deposited on Guatemala City during the paroxysmal eruption 
of Pacaya volcano on 27 May 2010. The nature of the tephra fall varied across the city, with 
the southern part receiving greater thicknesses of coarser, sand-sized tephra (Figures 2.7, 
3.12, 3.13) while the northern part received lesser amounts of finer tephra.  
As the city generates 70 percent of Guatemala’s GNP, there was a strong motivation to 
initiate a prompt and efficient city-wide cleanup to enable critical transport lifelines to be 
restored as quickly as possible. The cleanup was organised by the municipality, and was 
initiated on the night of the first tephra fall (27 May). All available municipality staff, from the 
mayor to the administrative staff, were involved, along with additional personnel from the 
army. The total quantity of tephra deposited on the city was estimated to be 11,350,000 m3, 
and 2,100 km of roads required cleaning. 
 
Figure 3.12 Coarse, sand-sized basaltic tephra covering a paved area in Guatemala City. (photo: 
Gustavo Chigna, INSIVUMEH). 
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Figure 3.13 Coarse, sand-sized basaltic tephra covering vehicle (photo: Gustavo Chigna, 
INSIVUMEH). 
For the cleanup, the municipality utilised a pre-existing earthquake emergency plan, which 
had been drawn up as a local response to the devastating earthquakes in Haiti and Chile 
earlier in 2010. This plan contained provisions such as arrangements with contractors to 
supply heavy machinery. It also set up a clear command structure with four levels in a 
pyramid structure: at the top the mayor, then 14 district mayors, then 54 delegates, then 760 
local committees.  
As well as the ready access to heavy machinery, another factor in the success of the 
cleanup was the clear communication with the public. The public were instructed to clear 
tephra from their own properties (roofs and yards), and to pile the bags up on the street 
frontage or to take them to designated collection points. Collection bags were donated by 
sugar and cement companies. Streets were cleaned with street sweepers or by people using 
brooms and shovels. The tephra was loaded onto lorries either by hand or using small 
excavators.  The cost of heavy machinery hire is shown in Table 3.1, and photos illustrating 
the cleanup operations are shown in Figure 3.14. The cleanup lasted three weeks.  
Table 3.3 Costs of heavy machinery hire for cleanup (Data: Director of Works, Municipality of 
Guatemala).  
Description Quantity hired Cost 
Trucks 128 Q1,246,000 
Excavators 8 
Q400,000 
Bobcats 9 
Total  Q1,646,000* 
*Approximately $US 0.2 million, converted from Guatemalan quetzales (Q) 
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Figure 3.14 Cleanup of Guatemala City (photos: Director of Works, Municipality of Guatemala City 
and Gustavo Chigna, INSIVUMEH). 
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The tephra posed a traction hazard for drivers. One interviewee reported that during the 
evening of the 27 May, it was very hard to drive to his home 12 km away from the airport due 
to the poor visibility and the slippery surface. His impression was that driving conditions 
would have been even worse if it had not been raining, as the rain helped consolidate the 
fallen tephra. Staff at Roosevelt Hospital reported a higher than usual incidence of trauma 
due to traffic accidents at this time (see Table 3.2). Motorists were also advised by local 
authorities not to use their windscreen wipers due to the abrasive nature of the tephra. 
However, the Director of Works of the Municipality reported that the tephra caused few 
problems for street sweeping equipment, other than normal wear and tear, and that the 
tephra did not generally cause problems for vehicles as it was cleared quickly and then the 
heavy rains washed it off the streets.  
While fresh volcanic tephra can be corrosive due to its typically acidic surface coating, 
corrosion was not a widely reported problem after this eruption. An INSIVUMEH staff 
member reported that on some vehicles, paint blisters corresponding to the position of 
individual tephra particles formed, including on his own vehicle. However, we did not see any 
photos of this phenomenon, and corrosion was not mentioned as being a problem 
associated with the tephra fall by the Director of Works at the municipality, or by hospital 
maintenance staff. Heavy rains that followed the tephra fall probably would have acted to 
dilute and flush any initial surface acidity.  
The tephra was removed to landfill sites on the edge of the city, and at the time of our visit, 
tests were being conducted by Mapreco to determine whether the tephra could be suitable 
for any forms of beneficial re-use. Initial results were not promising (Appendix 3), with the 
tephra being too friable (lacking mechanical strength) for use as an aggregate. The Director 
of Works reported that the tephra was ‘not chemically suitable’ but he did not have further 
information on this. The Director also noted that from their perspective there was an 
information gap on possible reuses for the tephra, and that any information from international 
case studies would be very helpful to them. Chemical testing of the tephra was reportedly 
also carried out by American Airlines, who concluded that the tephra was not acidic (Airport 
Manager).  
While the heavy rains that followed the tephra fall did wash the tephra from the streets, 
tephra then blocked drains all over the city, and widespread surface flooding occurred 
(Figure 3.15). The tropical storm, described briefly in Section 2.4, caused serious flooding on 
a wide scale across Guatemala. The civil defence impacts caused by this storm can be seen 
as Appendix 3 to this report. In Guatemala City, surface flooding was widespread, with 
underpasses being particularly affected.  
The Director of Works acknowledged that the blocked drains have caused continual flooding 
problems since the eruption. There have been incidences of flooding in areas that have not 
previously flooded, and existing flood-prone areas have become worse. During our field visit, 
heavy rains caused surface flooding, and caused an underpass to flood and become 
impassable (Figure 3.16). The municipality would like to be able to clean out the drains but 
currently lack the funds.  
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Figure 3.15 On left, surface flooding in Guatemala City; on right, an underpass is closed in heavy 
rains (both in September 2010). 
 
Figure 3.16 Flooded underpass, Guatemala City, early June 2010 (photo: Director of Works, 
Guatemala City municipality). 
3.5.3 Impacts on El Cedro-San Francisco de Sales road 
The road linking the small settlements of El Cedro and San Francisco de Sales (Figure 1.3) 
received approximately 20 cm of tephra fall, ranging in size from sand-sized up to 
approximately 3 cm diameter. According to a local guide in San Francisco de Sales, there 
was no vehicle access to the town on the day after the eruption as the road was too slippery. 
The road was not cleared, but eventually the surface compacted down and a new road 
surface was formed on top of the tephra layer (Figure 3.17).  
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Figure 3.17 Road to San Francisco de Sales, showing compacted tephra road surface. 
3.5.4 Impacts on La Aurora International Airport  
Guatemala City’s international airport (La Aurora) received its first warning of impending 
tephra fall at 18h30 on 27 May 2010. The warning came from American Airlines staff in 
Dallas Fort Worth, who had seen the tephra plume on satellite images, and were worried 
about two AA flights due to arrive at La Aurora at the time. The flights arrived approximately 
5-10 minutes prior to the arrival of the tephra plume, and were immediately grounded (Figure 
3.18). Airport staff also received a phone call around 19h00 from a colleague in Villa 
Canales, located approximately halfway between Pacaya volcano and Guatemala City, who 
reported that it was ‘raining sand’. The airport was officially closed at 19h23 the same 
evening, and re-opened at 13h18 on 1 June (Airport Manager, Direccion General de 
Aeronautica Civil).  
 
Figure 3.18 American Airlines flight at La Aurora airport following eruption of Pacaya volcano 
(photo: Gustavo Chigna, INSIVUMEH). 
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Approximately 2-3 cm of coarse basaltic tephra fell on La Aurora airport. The main reason 
for the airport closure was to allow for cleanup of the airport, rather than because of airborne 
tephra hazards to aircraft (which was limited by the short duration of the tephra fall). There 
was also a high level of concern about the impacts of remobilised tephra on jet engines. 
The cleanup began shortly after the airport closure, at 20h00. However, progress was slow 
during the first night due to a lack of equipment. The personnel requirements for the cleanup 
were 30 staff from DGAC plus an additional 500 staff loaned by the army and air force. A 
staged cleanup of the runway and apron involved firstly using bulldozers and graders to 
scrape tephra into piles which they then shovelled into trucks and removed to an on-site 
storage location. In an attempt to prevent damage during the cleanup, areas were 
designated to be cleaned manually, or using the heavy machinery. For instance, manual 
cleaning was carried out around runway lights. An estimated 56,000 m3 of tephra was 
removed from the runway and apron. Finer tephra left behind after the initial cleaning was 
further cleaned up using either manual sweeping or with street sweepers, and finally, air 
compressors were used to blow away any remaining tephra. The heavy rains helped wash 
away the tephra and suppress remobilisation, but made conditions for the cleanup workers 
miserable.  
During the airport closure, military flights continued to operate out of the airport delivering aid 
to communities affected by the tropical storm. It was a complex task coordinating the 
cleanup and the military flight schedule.  
Tephra was deposited in the grass surrounding the runways, but did not kill the grass. 
Airport management have let the grass grow longer and are hoping the tephra will be 
washed into the soil over time. They remain concerned about the potential for remobilisation 
of tephra from this source, possibly re-contaminating the runway, in windy conditions.  
The new bituminous runway surface (which cost $1.7 million USD in December 2009) was 
destroyed by abrasion damage caused by the cleanup. Markings on the runway and apron 
were also severely damaged by abrasion and had to be completely repainted before the 
airport could re-open.  
Costs of the airport closure were estimated to be $250,000 USD in loss of income to 
businesses based at the airport. The airport buildings were also damaged by the tephra fall. 
Gutters and downpipes were clogged with tephra and caused leaks in the ceiling which were 
continuing some four months later, and the paint coating on the roof suffered abrasion 
damage. Tephra did enter the airport terminal buildings through being trampled inside, but 
did not cause particular problems. Some problems were experienced with the operation of 
air bridges and software malfunctioning.  
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3.6 Telecommunications 
Physical impacts of tephra on telecommunication systems were not observed first-hand on 
this trip. However, EEGSA reported very high frequency (VHF) radio interference between 
substations during the 27 May tephra fall. This primarily occurred south of Guatemala City, 
particularly to those substations close to the Volcano such as Laguna, Mayan Golf and San 
Miguel Petapa (Figure 3.5).  
Images acquired from INSIVUMEH show a collapsed telecommunications tower in the area 
of Cerro Chino (see Figure 1.3 for location) due to ballistics (Figure 3.19). 
 
Figure 3.19 A radio communications tower on Cerro Chino that buckled from ballistic and block 
impacts (photo: Gustavo Chigna, INSIVUMEH). 
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4.0 IMPACTS ON AGRICULTURE AND RURAL COMMUNITIES 
This section summarises the findings from interviews conducted during a brief field visit to 
the community and surrounds of San Francisco de Sales, located approximately 3 km from 
the active vent of Pacaya volcano (Figure 3.1). Interviewees were a local tour guide, a 
resident and a farmer.  
4.1 Background 
Guatemala’s economy is heavily dependent on the nation’s agricultural produce. According 
to the Nation’s Encyclopaedia (2010), agriculture contributes about 23% of Guatemala’s 
GDP, makes up 75% of export earnings, and employs 50% of the labour force.  
Approximately 9000 people live in communities close to Pacaya volcano, within 5 km of the 
active cone (Section 1.4.3). The area is primarily a subsistence economy and produce is 
consumed locally. The main crops in the area are maize, beans and avocadoes, coffee, 
bananas and peaches. 
4.2 Impacts on crops 
Up to 20 cm of coarse-grained lapilli fell on San Francisco de Sales and Calderas. After 
compaction, tephra deposits were approximately 10-12 cm thick at the time of our visit 
(Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1 Ground cover of coarse lapilli (tephra layer is ~10 cm thick), San Francisco de Sales, 
19/9/2011). 
The lapilli fall caused extensive damage to crops in this region (Figure 4.2). The area also 
received larger ballistic clasts (lower right of Figure 4.2), some of them incandescent. The 
local farmer reported that crops suffered both crush damage and burn damage. There may 
also have been acid damage but no further information was available on this topic. No crops 
could be harvested after the 27 May eruption.  
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Figure 4.2 Farmer surveys his damaged maize crops, San Francisco de Sales (19/9/2011). 
Further north around Lago Amatitlan (Figure 1.2), approximately 15 cm ‘hot tephra’ was 
received. There were significant effects on crops, with extensive burn damage (Gustavo 
Chigna, INSIVUMEH).  
As this area is primarily subsistence agriculture, the heavy damage to crops caused local 
food shortages. The farmer we interviewed reported that his own family suffered hardship 
and that this was widespread in the district. Both Guatemalan and international aid agencies 
provided assistance in the form of food supplies and building materials.  
4.3 Impacts on livestock 
Only limited information on impacts on livestock was collected. Livestock in the area include 
cows, horses and poultry. Livestock reportedly had to be evacuated out of the immediate 
area because of a lack of feed. Some had to be sold, at reduced prices.  
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4.4 Impacts of the eruption on settlements 
As described in Section 2.3.1.2, during the paroxysmal phase of the eruption on 27 May, 
ballistic clasts were ejected from the vent up to 6-7 km away (INSIVUMEH staff). The 
settlements of San Francisco de Sales, Calderas ad El Cedro (Figure 1.3), located between 
2.5 and 3.5 km north of the vent, all suffered significant damage from ballistics, which 
reached a maximum size of approximately 25 cm (long axis) in this area. These settlements 
also received approximately 20 cm tephra fall (Figure 4.3). 
Widespread damage was inflicted on roofs in the settlements of Calderas, San Francisco de 
Sales and El Cedro. Incandescent ballistic clasts larger than 20 cm (long axis) pierced 
corrugated iron and fibro-cement roofs (Figure 4.3) and set houses on fire. One family told 
us of having to huddle in a door frame to avoid being harmed by ballistic blocks crashing 
through their roof. According to INSIVUMEH staff, five houses were burned down, and there 
would probably have been more widespread fire damage if it had not been raining at the 
time. Damage varied widely depending on roof type. Concrete slab roofs withstood damage, 
but metal roofs were highly vulnerable to damage. The condition of roofing metal was also 
important with older and more corroded roofs being more susceptible to damage (Escobar 
Wolf, 2011).  
While damage to roofs was primarily caused by ballistic impacts, the tephra fall also caused 
some damage. Some long span roofs collapsed due to tephra loading (Figure 4.4), and 
gutters and drains became blocked which caused flooding damage to buildings. Overall, 
approximately 90% of roofs in the town were badly damaged and needed to be replaced. 
Buildings damaged included the public school, several churches and the Park visitors’ centre 
(Escobar Wolf, 2011). At the time of our visit, building of new roofs was well underway.  
 
Figure 4.3 Ballistic damage to roof, San Francisco de Sales (located approximately 3 km north of 
the vent). Ballistics in this area reached 25 cm in diameter (long axis) (photo: Gustavo Chigna, 
INSIVUMEH). 
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Figure 4.4 Roof collapse due to tephra loading, San Francisco de Sales (photo: Gustavo Chigna, 
INSIVUMEH). 
At the time of our visit, on 19 September 2010, large ballistic clasts of up to approximately 20 
cm long axis were still visible (Figure 4.5). While roof repair was underway, several severely 
damaged roofs remained (Figure 4.6).  
Figure 4.5 Ballistic clasts in vicinity of San Francisco de Sales, 19 September 2010. 
(approximately 20 cm long axis). 
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Figure 4.6 Tephra deposition and ballistic damage to roofs, San Francisco de Sales,  
19 September 2010. 
4.5 Other impacts on rural infrastructure 
After the eruption, there were ten days of power outages in the area around the volcano. 
This was primarily due to ballistic damage to lines and poles, and also treefall onto lines. 
Some 90% of lines in San Francisco de Sales, El Cedro and Calderas were damaged 
(Gustavo Chigna, INSIVUMEH). Damage to the road linking El Cedro with San Francisco de 
Sales and Calderas was described in Section 3.5.2. The arrival of the rainstorm also caused 
landslides and bridge washouts, which closed the main access road to the volcano for three 
days. Damage to water supplies was described in Section 3.2.3, and damage to 
communications equipment in Section 3.6.  
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5.0 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN GUATEMALA 
This section outlines the emergency management structure and the process, problems and 
lessons learned in emergency management practice. The social response to tephra fall is 
also included here, with respect to social adaptations developed from tephra fall experience 
and from increased access to information. 
5.1 Volcano monitoring 
The monitoring of natural hazards in Guatemala is carried out by INSIVUMEH which is 
based in Guatemala City. INSIVUMEH monitors all natural hazards including volcanic 
activity.  
INSIVUMEH monitors activity at the three most active volcanoes in Guatemala: Pacaya, 
Fuego and Santiaguito. There are two seismic stations on Pacaya volcano, four on Fuego 
and six on Santiaguito. INSIVUMEH also use COSPEC monitoring on all three volcanoes, 
and DOAS monitoring on Fuego and Santiaguito. There is no permanent observatory for 
Pacaya volcano, but there is an observatory for Santiaguito in Guatemala (WOVO, 2003). 
When activity increases, INSIVUMEH inform the emergency management department, who 
are the Coordinadora Nacional para la Reducción de Desastres (CONRED, or the National 
Disaster Reduction Coordinator). INSIVUMEH are the lead agency for hazards. CONRED 
respond to the information provided by INSIVUMEH, and act at several different levels to 
manage disasters from the national to local level.  
5.2 Emergency management structure 
CEPAL (La Comisión Económica para América Latina) [Translated: Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (English acronym: ECLAC)] is one of the five regional 
commissions of the United Nations. CEPAL acts as an umbrella agency, under which are 
regional organisations, and beneath this, each country in Latin America has its own systems 
for emergency management. 
In Guatemala, the Coordination Centre for the Prevention of Natural Disasters in Central 
America (CEPREDENAC) is the regional agency, which encourages the incorporation of risk 
management into development. CONRED (National Disaster Reduction Coordinator) is the 
coordination agency within Guatemala for Disaster Risk Management. 
CONRED is traditionally a response organisation, however they are trying to evolve to 
incorporate preparedness, mitigation and risk management. The emergency management 
structure is outlined in a chain of local to national level response agencies, as follows: 
CONRED - National Level 
CODRED - Department [province] Level 
COMRED - Municipality Level 
COLRED - Local Level  
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In this disaster reduction structure the municipalities are autonomous and can decide how to 
subdivide tasks at the local level. As an emergency evolves, the response departments 
should step-up in stages, from local, to municipal, to departmental, up to the national 
response level. 
In an emergency the municipality manages the sewage, water and rubbish, CONRED 
provide food and shelter, the police provide security and they all work together on the 
Emergency Operations Committee. 
5.3 Emergency management practice  
Emergency management practice has improved over the years, and in particular CONRED 
and INSUVUMEH have learned to trust each other and work together more closely. This 
relationship has developed since the 1999 Fuego eruption, when CONRED asked the USA 
for scientific help, instead of INSIVUMEH. The USA then asked INSIVUMEH for local 
information on volcanic activity. This process wasted valuable response time. This 
experience also taught CONRED to trust INSIVUMEH as a scientific organisation (CONRED 
personnel). 
In practice, during emergencies the local COLRED can become overwhelmed and 
incapacitated, which results in the mid-levels of the emergency management structure 
becoming bypassed and the response going straight to the national level – CONRED 
(Ministry of Health official). However, local governments are improving their performance 
and are now taking on responsibility until their capacity is exceeded. 
There have also been difficulties in defining the responsibilities of each agency within the 
CONRED system, particularly when emergencies transcend municipality boundaries. In 
these cases, in practice the national level need to respond immediately but the municipal 
level feel that their authority is being overridden. This is particularly true of volcanic 
emergencies, as the municipal level does not have local monitoring agencies and the 
information comes straight from INSIVUMEH to CONRED at the national level (CONRED 
personnel). 
INSIVUMEH have the lead role for hazards, but there are only two volcanologists. In the 
recent 27 May 2010 eruption, both volcanologists went to locate and monitor activity at 
Pacaya volcano (from Cerro Chino) while CONRED set up a meeting with decision-makers 
to start preparations for response (CONRED personnel). 
The protocol requires the national government level to contact the local agency (San Vicente 
Pacaya) to start preparing themselves for an evacuation. They also discuss local capabilities 
and the local COLRED can request assistance in areas that are lacking. If the municipal 
level can’t find areas to relocate people to in an emergency, then the national government 
level would step-in.  
5.3.1 Emergency management response to the eruption 
During our interview CONRED personnel remarked on complications during this volcanic 
emergency, associated with getting the local authorities to take responsibility and respond to 
their full capacity.  
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When tephra fall began to fall in San Vicente Pacaya (15h30-16h00) on the 27 May 2010, 
the departmental level had already issued road traffic warnings and bulletins by radio and 
television. A summary of advice contained in CONRED information bulletins is presented in 
Table 5.1. These bulletins are available from the organisation’s website http://conred.gob.gt/ 
Table 5.1 CONRED information bulletins, 27 May 2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano (information 
also derived from Escobar Wolf, 2011). 
Date 
(2010) 
Bulletin # Summary 
17 May 708 Recommendation to the National Park authority to restrict visitor access to the lava flows.  
26 May 726 
Eruptive activity increased during the day, generating plumes of 1 km 
above the vent that dispersed fine tephra onto neighbouring villages. 
Recommendation made to close access to Park, warn air traffic 
authorities about risks to aviation.  
27 May 729 
CONRED began to mobilise staff to villages near volcano around 
15h00, to implement pre-emptive evacuation. This was met with some 
resistance despite fine tephra being dispersed over villages. Seven 
shelters were prepared in San Vicente Pacaya to accommodate 
refugees.  
When the paroxysmal phase of eruption started (after 19h00), 
evacuation of villages to the west (El Rodeo and El Patrocinio) was 
already underway, however, tephra and ballistics were dispersed 
primarily to the north and the villages of El Cedro, San Francisco de 
Sales and Calderas were the most severely affected.  
28 May 731 
CONRED declared a Red Alert. As of 12h39, over 1600 people had 
been evacuated from the villages of San Francisco de Sales, El Rodeo, 
El Patrocinio, El Cedro, Calderas and Caracolito, to San Vicente 
Pacaya.  
Civil Aviation authorities closed La Aurora International Airport due to 
tephra fall. The Ministry of Education closed schools in Escuintla, 
Sacatepequez and Guatemala departments. Access to the National 
Park remained restricted.  
COMRED was activated in Villa Canales, and set up shelters in the 
municipal auditorium, a church and the municipal hall, in which 330 
people were accommodated.  
Advice for citizens in managing the tephra fall was also given.  
28 May 734 Thus far the eruption had injured 59 people, killed one and prompted the evacuation of nearly 2000.  
29 May 748 
By this time, a total of 2635 people were in shelters due to the eruption, 
some 400 houses had been slightly damaged and 375 severely 
damaged.  
27 May 
2011 1673 
One year on. Summary of civil defence responses to eruption and 
tropical storm (see Table 5.2) 
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After 29 May 2010, the attention of the emergency shifted from the eruption to the tropical 
storm, as both disasters merged into one continuous emergency. A year on from the 
eruption, CONRED issued a special bulletin to mark the event, which includes final civil 
defence statistics from both events (Table 5.2).  
Clearly, from Table 5.2, the civil defence impacts of the tropical storm were far more severe 
than the impacts of the eruption. The effects of the storm were also far more widespread 
(see Figure 2.14) with a quarter of the country’s municipalities affected by the tropical storm, 
whereas the impacts of the Pacaya eruption were quite confined.  
Over 100 times more people were affected by the storm, which also caused substantially 
more fatalities, evacuations, missing persons and damage to homes. The only statistic which 
is approximately comparable is the number of injuries. The relatively high number of injuries 
caused by the Pacaya eruption is thought to be due to the fallout of ballistic clasts on the 
villages immediately north of Pacaya. Although the communities of El Cedro, San Francisco 
de Sales and Calderas had been partially evacuated before the most intense phase of the 
eruption, several hundred people may have been directly exposed to the ballistics (Escobar 
Wolf, 2011).  
It is important to note that this is likely to be only a partial data set on the impacts of the 
eruption and tropical storm; it does not include data on admissions to the emergency 
departments in major public hospitals in Guatemala City (see Section 3.4.2.3). The impacts 
summarised in Table 5.2 could be categorised as ‘direct’ impacts whereas impacts such as 
injuries sustained while cleaning up ashfalls could be classed as ‘indirect’.  
Table 5.2 Civil defence data for 27 May 2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano and tropical storm 
Agatha (data: CONRED Information Bulletin 1673). 
Numbers of people Pacaya eruption Tropical storm Agatha 
Affected 3614 395,291 
Evacuated/in public shelters 3093 168,059/111,020 
Missing persons 3 37 
Injured 59 79 
Dead 2 160 
Homes damaged ~800 38,000 
During our field visit to San Francisco de Sales, we spoke to a local farmer who reported that 
from the perspective of local people, the evacuation of this area was not particularly smooth. 
On 27 May the road into the town was difficult to negotiate because of ashfalls. Most people 
were evacuated on 28 May, to San Vicente Pacaya, where they stayed for 10-15 days. 
During this time some returned home to tend crops and animals and check houses.  
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5.3.2 Lessons learned 
The Ministry of Health epidemiologist said that for future events, training in environmental 
risk management was needed for both the authorities and the communities. The last tephra 
fall in Guatemala City was 20 years ago and so there was a lack of preparedness for this 
type of event overall. There was an earthquake drill scheduled, for dates that happened to 
coincide with Tropical Storm Agatha, which the authorities had been preparing since the 
beginning of the year (a one-time event). The drill plans were modified for the eruption. 
However, despite this, the response was thought to be inadequate. The response, although 
modified for an eruption context, also did not take into account multiple events, so when the 
eruption was followed 24 hours later by Tropical Storm Agatha, the authorities were 
unprepared.  
In general the emergency response in Guatemala is reactive and not proactive, and so 
preparedness and training is generally not undertaken. We were also told that this is true of 
annual hazard events, such as heavy rainfall, and so there appears to be a culture of 
response rather than prevention and preparedness. This is across both communities and the 
authorities (Ministry of Heath epidemiologist). This situation is further worsened by the 
chronic lack of resources.  
5.4 Public response to volcanic unrest 
The last widespread tephra fall (i.e. tephra reported in Guatemala City) was in 1998 from 
Volcán Santiaguito and resulted in public fear and many people calling INSIVUMEH for 
advice. However experience of this event meant that people were not as scared during the 
2010 tephra fall. Global access to information has also contributed to people being more 
informed and therefore more relaxed and both INSIVUMEH and CONRED have websites 
with updated information. Since the 2006 increase of activity at Pacaya there has been 
increased focus on, and interest in volcanic activity, which has resulted in the population 
feeling more connected with the hazard and less like it is a remote risk (CONRED 
personnel). 
In the southern areas surrounding Pacaya volcano that are accustomed to receiving tephra 
fall, the communities were prepared for the 27 May 2010 eruption. But in the northwest they 
were unused to the hazard and the local government did little to help. The communities had 
to mobilise and take the lead in the emergency (CONRED personnel). The evacuees did 
respond to the evacuation and were relocated, although some returned to tend to crops or 
check on property throughout the period of the evacuation (local farmer). 
2012 
 
GNS Science Report 2012/09 62 
 
6.0 DISCUSSION 
6.1 Impacts of two natural disasters occurring at once 
The arrival of Tropical Storm Agatha immediately after the 27 May 2010 eruption of Pacaya 
volcano led to a ‘complex emergency’ (IASC, 1994) in which it is difficult to separate the 
effects of the individual phenomena (Escobar Wolf, 2011). The impacts of the storm were 
clearly far more severe in civil defence terms (Table 5.2) for the country as a whole. Most of 
the impacts of the eruption were confined to a relatively small area immediately north of the 
volcano, although there was also widespread disruption caused by the tephra fall across 
Guatemala City, of which the five-day closure of the international airport was probably the 
most significant. The heavy rains caused severe damage to the country’s road networks, 
including road and bridge washouts and landslides, hampering movement around the 
country. One consequence of this was that a planned sampling programme of the tephra 
blanket, by members of the Guatemalan Geological Society, had to be abandoned (Escobar 
Wolf, pers. comm., 2011). The heavy rains also reworked most of the thinner tephra blanket. 
As a result there were considerable difficulties in obtaining reliable measurements of tephra 
thicknesses in distal areas.  
Specific ways in which the tropical storm and eruption interacted are discussed in the 
following sections.  
6.1.1 Proximal areas 
The towns of El Cedro, San Francisco de Sales and Calderas, located between 2.5 and 3.5 
km north of Pacaya’s active vent, sustained the most severe damage in the 27 May 2010 
eruption. In San Francisco de Sales, an estimated 90% of buildings had their roofs 
destroyed by ballistic impacts, with more minor impacts from tephra loading. However, just 
five houses burned down; INSIVUMEH staff commented that it was fortunate that it was 
raining during the eruption as this almost certainly prevented more fires and may have also 
prevented fire damage to crops and forests. However, this rain was not specifically part of 
the tropical storm event. Tephra blocked gutters and drains, and thus probably exacerbated 
flood damage and surface flooding when the tropical rainstorm did arrive. Although rain can 
saturate tephra and increase roof loading, this did not appear to be a problem in this town as 
the tephra was very coarse (Figure 4.1). The combination of tephra deposition and heavy 
rainfall may have increased the likelihood of debris flows being generated but we do not 
have any information on this topic.  
6.1.2 Electricity networks 
At the Amatitlán geothermal plant, the arrival of tropical storm Agatha did not cause any 
further issues for the plant as staff had already been evacuated and the plant’s operations 
suspended because of the bombardment by volcanic debris. For transmission and 
distribution lines, the rainy conditions during the eruption added to the flashover risk, and 
several earth faults occurred. Managers of substations reported that the tropical storm’s 
heavy rainfall washed most equipment clean, with the coarse grain size also contributing to 
the tephra being easy to remove.  
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6.1.3 Healthcare services 
In Guatemala City, most accidents resulting from the tephra fall requiring admission to 
hospital were a result of falls from roofs and other heights during cleanup operations, and 
from traffic accidents (Table 5.2). Traffic accidents reportedly resulted from drivers ‘sliding on 
tephra’ (Appendix 5), but it is difficult to establish whether the rainy conditions made the 
roads more or less hazardous for drivers. The rain probably added to the hazards of 
cleanup, particularly of roofs. The lack of respiratory effects was a notable feature of this 
eruption and was thought to be due to several factors: the lack of very fine tephra in health-
relevant size fractions, and that people were generally indoors during and immediately after 
the eruption because it occurred in the evening and was raining at the time. In the days 
following the eruption, the heavy rains helped dampen down the tephra.  
At one of the city’s public hospitals, the tephra blocked gutters, drains and sumps, and the 
heavy rains caused severe flooding problems through ceilings and in basements.  
6.1.4 Water supplies 
No particular issues associated with the co-occurrence of the eruption and tropical storm 
were identified for water supplies.  
6.1.5 Wastewater 
It was a ‘double problem’ having the tephra fall and the heavy rains, as tephra was washed 
into storm drains before it could be cleaned up from paved surfaces and disposed of 
appropriately, and once it was in the drains it became very problematic as it formed 
intractable and unpumpable masses. Cleaning out drains, sumps and wastewater treatment 
systems was a major, expensive and time consuming job, and was only partially successful. 
Although many parts of the city appeared to have pre-existing drainage problems, the 
residual tephra deposited in underground drainage networks has led to longer term 
problems, and surface flooding has reportedly worsened in the city since the eruption.  
6.1.6 Transport networks 
The heavy rains assisted the municipal cleanup by washing tephra from roofs and paved 
surfaces, but as mentioned above, the tephra was washed into underground drainage 
networks, which has led to persistent flooding problems.  
The lack of reports of corrosion damage to vehicles or roofs following the eruption is very 
likely due to the heavy rains, which would have washed the surface coating (which can be 
acidic and contain soluble salts) from the tephra.  
For the cleanup operations at the international airport, the heavy rains helped wash away the 
tephra from the runway and apron, and suppress remobilisation, but made conditions for the 
cleanup workers miserable. Tephra was deposited in the grass surrounding the runways, but 
did not kill the grass. Airport management have let the grass grow longer and are hoping the 
tephra will be washed into the soil over time. They remain concerned about the potential for 
remobilisation of tephra from this source, possibly re-contaminating the runway, in windy 
conditions. The heavy rains were helpful at the time in helping bed the tephra into the soil. 
As for other buildings, the airport buildings’ downpipes and gutters were clogged with tephra 
and caused leaks in the ceiling.  
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6.2 Lessons for New Zealand 
6.2.1 Relevance of 27 May 2010 Pacaya eruption to predicted activity of 
Auckland Volcanic Field 
Auckland is New Zealand's largest urban centre, with over 1.5 million residents. The city lies 
entirely within the Auckland volcanic field. This field, covering an area of 360 km2, has over 
50 individual eruptive centers of basaltic composition, which have displayed a range of 
effusive, Strombolian, Hawaiian and phreatomagmatic eruptive styles (Houghton et al. 
2006). The eruptions have produced a large number of volcanic cones ranging in radius from 
230 to 580 m (average 400 m) and area from 17 to 54 ha together with a lesser number of 
maars and tuff rings. Each cone formed during episodes of Strombolian and/or Hawaiian fire 
fountaining commonly accompanied by phreatomagmatic episodes. The largest and most 
recent eruption formed Rangitoto lava shield less than 800 years ago (Allen and Smith, 
1994).  
Despite the small size and intensity of Auckland eruptions (typically Strombolian and 
Hawaiian eruption styles), the risk of proximal flow hazards and tephra fall at longer 
distances is high because of the high density of buildings and lifelines. Rapid cone growth 
during future eruptions will define a region of some 30 to 100 ha where complete destruction 
will occur on a time scale of hours (Houghton et al. 2006).  Avoidance and evacuation are 
the only likely mitigation options.  However, for tephra fall in medial and distal locations 
application of mitigation strategies may reduce potential impacts. 
It is thus essential to understand the likely impacts of proximal basaltic tephra fall on a city.  
The May 2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano, Guatemala, offers a useful analogy to a dry 
magmatic eruption from the Auckland Volcanic Field.    
6.2.2 Planning for multiple hazards  
Planning scenarios should take into account that hazard events may not occur in isolation, 
particularly weather hazards. As described in Section 6.1, heavy rains can modify the 
impacts of volcanic eruptions, exacerbating some impacts and mitigating others. 
6.2.3 Ballistic fallout 
Impacts from ballistic block fallout are extremely destructive and dangerous in the event of a 
VEI 2-3 Strombolian eruption from the Auckland Volcanic Field. The distribution of fallout is 
typically symmetrical if the eruption is vertically directed, but a directed eruption (such as the 
27 May 2010 Pacaya eruption) may result in an asymmetric fallout distribution which may 
not be well predicted by hazard zone maps based on concentric zones.  
Damage to roofs was dependent on two factors. Preliminary data from Escobar Wolf (2011) 
suggested that fragments larger than 20 cm (long axis) pierced roofs. The roof construction 
was the other important factor. Concrete slab roofs withstood ballistic fragments in the 
affected settlements, but metal (corrugated iron) and fibrocement roofs were vulnerable. The 
condition of metal roofs was also important, with older and more corroded roofs being more 
vulnerable. Other factors such as the orientation of roof surfaces relative to the volcanic vent 
may also be important. Secondary fires are also a likely consequence of incandescent 
ballistic block fall.  
2012 
 
GNS Science Report 2012/09 65 
 
The main lesson to be learned from the eruption of Pacaya volcano is that it is vitally 
important for public safety to establish and enforce an exclusion zone around the vent as 
there is little that can be done to protect against the destructive properties of ballistic fallout.  
6.2.4 Tephra impacts on infrastructure 
For impacts on electricity networks, even coarse-grained tephra is capable of increasing 
flashover potential on electrical insulators (Wardman et al., 2011). Immediate cleaning of 
substations and transmission and distribution lines is vital to minimise network disruption.  
The coarse basaltic tephra deposited across Guatemala City was highly abrasive, and 
considerable damage was sustained when it was removed from surfaces such as a 
waterproof coating on a hospital roof and the main runway of the international airport. In the 
latter case the bituminous coating was destroyed. It may be worthwhile developing methods 
for cleanup of highly abrasive tephra that will minimise damage (e.g. suction pumps). The 
tephra was also relatively dense (refer to Appendix 3) which made it difficult to clean out of 
underground pipework. Remobilisation by wind, which has been a major feature of other 
eruptions such as the 1991 eruption of Hudson volcano (Wilson et al.,2011b), is unlikely due 
to the coarse and dense nature of the tephra, although the highly friable tephra may be 
crushed into smaller fragments which may be more readily remobilised. We recommend that 
specific guidelines be developed for cleaning coarse, dense tephra. Additionally, it is unlikely 
this style of eruption will lead to respiratory health hazards, but it still appears to be slippery 
and the risk of accidents during cleanup is high.  
The eruption deposited 2-3 cm tephra across Guatemala City. As the city generates 70 
percent of Guatemala’s GNP, there was a strong motivation to initiate a prompt and efficient 
city-wide cleanup to enable critical transport lifelines to be restored as quickly as possible. 
The cleanup was organised by the municipality, and was initiated immediately, on the night 
of 27 May. This cleanup was based on the activation of an emergency plan which was not 
specific for volcanic tephra, but which had been drawn up as a local response to the 
devastating earthquakes in Haiti and Chile earlier in 2010. This plan contained provisions 
such as arrangements with contractors to supply heavy machinery. It also set up a clear 
command structure with four levels in a pyramid structure: at the top the mayor, then 14 
district mayors, then 54 delegates, then 760 local committees. As well as the ready access 
to heavy machinery, another factor in the success of the cleanup was the clear 
communication with the public. The public were instructed to clear tephra from their own 
properties (roofs and yards), and to pile the bags up on the street frontage or to take them to 
designated collection points. Collection bags were donated by sugar and cement companies. 
Streets were cleaned with street sweepers or by people using brooms and shovels.  
However, despite these efforts, the heavy rains that followed the eruption washed 
considerable quantities of tephra into the city’s underground drainage networks where it 
became difficult and intractable to deal with, and continues to cause drainage problems. It is 
also relevant to note here that modern wastewater treatment plants (such as the Mangere 
WWTP) are highly vulnerable to tephra ingress through sewer lines, as it will overload 
equipment designed to trap solid debris. Mechanical pre-screening equipment such as 
rotating bar screens are highly vulnerable as tephra can abrade moving parts and block 
screens which can cause motors to burn out (Wilson et al., 2011a). Stormwater and sewage 
networks are largely separate, but Auckland City has approximately 10% of combined 
stormwater and sewage lines. Tephra can also enter sewer lines through illegal cross 
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connections (e.g. roof downpipes connected to sewer lines), around manhole covers, and 
through household gully traps. Even if street cleanup efforts are timely and effective, it is 
probably still advisable to consider measures such as bypassing treatment plants and 
discharging untreated sewage (or preferably utilising a holding pond) to avoid doing major 
damage to treatment plants, given the difficulty in preventing tephra from entering sewer 
lines.  
General recommendations to decrease the vulnerability of infrastructure to volcanic 
eruptions have been made elsewhere (www.aelg.org.nz) and are not repeated here.  
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7.0 SUMMARY  
The 27 May 2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano began shortly after 14h00. The most violent 
phase started shortly after 19h00 and lasted approximately 45 minutes. This paroxysmal 
phase generated a plume that was directed towards the north. At Cerro Chino, 1 km from 
crater, large ballistic fragments fell (up to -0.5 m long axis) killing one news reporter, injuring 
many others, and destroying buildings, vehicles and equipment. This took local communities 
and civil defence by surprise as previous tephra falls had been to the west and southwest of 
crater and preliminary civil defence efforts were focused on communities located in these 
areas. Three communities (El Cedro, San Francisco de Sales and Calderas) located 2.5-3.5 
km to north of crater were particularly badly affected by the fall of ballistic clasts. Roofs in 
these towns were extensively damaged by ballistic blocks and to a lesser extent by tephra 
accumulation. The tephra plume travelled to the north, and Guatemala City was covered in 
an estimated 2-3 cm of coarse basaltic tephra that was described by local residents as being 
like ‘black sand’.  
Impacts of this event on specific sectors are described under the following headings.  
Electricity supply systems 
• The only power generation site affected by the 27 May 2010 eruption was ORMAT’s 
Amatitlán geothermal plant which suffered damage to its roof and condenser fans. 
Operations were discontinued immediately following the eruption and the plant remained 
offline for three weeks while repairs were made and tephra was cleaned from equipment 
and surface gravel.  
• No problems occurred for Guatemala’s transmission equipment. However, two of 
ETCEE’s large substations (220 kV) required cleaning immediately after the tephra fall to 
prevent tephra-induced failure of the substation apparatus.  
• Distribution companies endured many faults on their supply equipment (e.g. lines 
operating at <69 kV) for several days following the eruption. EEGSA reported multiple 
flashover events on six medium voltage circuits (69 kV), three of which had to be taken 
offline despite repeated efforts to reclose the circuits. 
• Several EEGSA substations received coarse tephra fallout during the eruption, 
particularly those substations located south of Guatemala City closest to Pacaya volcano 
(e.g. Laguna, Mayan Golf and San Miguel Petapa). Cleaning of these substations, 
scheduled for May 29 and 30 was suspended due to the onset of Tropical Storm Agatha 
and the combination of heavy rains together with tephra contamination resulted in further 
electrical faults (flashovers) following the tephra fall out.  
• No instances of corrosion, abrasion or increased step-touch potentials at any of the 
affected transmission or distribution facilities were reported. 
Water supplies 
• The municipal water company EMPAGUA supplies 85% of Guatemala City’s residents. 
Its production rate is 4000 L/s.  
• The eruption caused several problems for EMPAGUA’s treatment plants. Airborne tephra 
caused abrasion damage to air-cooled motors and they stopped straight away. Tephra 
was also deposited in open air tanks, with most settling quickly but some smaller 
particles remaining in suspension and increasing turbidity. The tephra also affected 
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groundwater wellhead pumps. Increased cleaning of tephra from EMPAGUA’s own 
substations (used for pumping groundwater) was necessary.  
• EMPAGUA opted to clean storage tanks and filters rather than attempt to treat the water. 
The cleaning operation took three days and affected production rates. However, an 
erratic water supply is not unusual in Guatemala City, and many residents have adopted 
adaptive measures such as on-site storage tanks, so disruption to end users was 
probably minimal.  
• The director of EMPAGUA thought that it would be worthwhile covering equipment such 
as the open storage tanks and groundwater wellhead pumps, to increase resilience in 
the event of future eruptions.  
• In San Francisco de Sales (approximately 3 km north of the vent of Pacaya), the water 
supply was disrupted for eight days due to ballistic block fall damage to pipework.  
Health care systems 
• Despite healthcare reform and the development of a community care system, the 
healthcare service is still largely centralised in Guatemala City rather than available to 
the whole population. There are generally insufficient healthcare resources in the country 
to meet the health needs of the population. 
• The Ministry was unprepared for a tephra fall and were slow to respond, taking one 
month to arrive in the most affected area of San Francisco de Sales. 
• Data on admissions (specifically attributable to either the volcanic eruption or the tropical 
storm) to the adult emergency department for the period 28 May -7 June 2010 was 
obtained from one of the two main public hospitals in Guatemala City. A total of 74 cases 
were seen by the Emergency Department during this period, of which 69 were related to 
the eruption and five to the tropical storm. Two deaths were recorded. The majority 
(85%) of cases were categorised as ‘multiple trauma’ from a range of causes including 
falling from roofs, other falls and traffic accidents. There were more minor incidences of 
respiratory illnesses and burns. However, compared to normal demands on healthcare 
services, these numbers are small.  
• The tephra fall in Guatemala City appeared to have limited impacts on the provision of 
essential healthcare services.  
• The main impacts to hospital infrastructure were caused by blocked drains which caused 
secondary flooding. This affected some hospital facilities and caused widespread 
disruption to the city’s road network. The incidence of secondary flooding highlights the 
impacts of inter-related infrastructure and the need to account for interconnected 
networks when assessing facility functionality. 
• Roof clearance of tephra was a priority, and hospital B worked together with the army to 
clear the hospital roof quickly. Minor effects caused by tephra ingress into hospitals 
included the need for additional cleaning, abraded flooring, and blocking of air 
conditioning filters. 
• Overall mitigative actions at hospitals prevented tephra ingress and normal hospital 
procedures prevented further contamination within hospitals. There was no structural 
damage to either hospital. Back-up generation power and covering water supplies 
critically prevented problems with hospital operability by ensuring the security of lifelines 
and preventing cascading impacts to hospital functions.  
Transport networks and municipal cleanup 
• A prompt and efficient city-wide cleanup was organised by the city’s municipality. All 
2012 
 
GNS Science Report 2012/09 69 
 
available municipality staff, from the mayor to the administrative staff, were involved, 
along with additional personnel from the army. The cleanup lasted three weeks. 
• According to the municipality the total quantity of tephra deposited on the city was 
estimated to be 11,350,000 m3, and 2,100 km of roads required cleaning. Clear 
communication with the public and access to heavy machinery helped to expedite the 
cleaning process.  
• The public were instructed to clear tephra from their own properties and to pile up bags 
(donated by sugar and cement companies) on the street frontage or to take them to 
selected collection points.  
• Tephra fallout posed traction and abrasion hazards for motorists. However, the tephra 
caused few problems for street sweeping equipment and did not generally cause 
problems for vehicles as it was cleared quickly and subsequent heavy rains from tropical 
storm Agatha washed it off the streets.  
• Tephra was removed to landfill sites on the edge of the city. Plans to re-use the tephra 
for other purposes (e.g. aggregate in concrete production) were abandoned due to the 
unsuitable properties (e.g. friability) of the tephra.  
• Widespread surface flooding occurred across the city due to the blocking of drains by the 
tephra. This continued for months afterwards.  
• Approximately 2-3 cm of coarse basaltic tephra fell on La Aurora airport, requiring the 
grounding of all aircraft at the time. Closure of the airport occurred at 19h23 on 27 May 
and was re-opened at 13h18 on 1 June. The main reason for the airport closure was to 
allow for cleanup of the airport, rather than because of airborne tephra hazards to 
aircraft. Costs of the airport closure were estimated to be $250,000 USD by loss of 
income to businesses based at the airport.  
• The airport’s new bituminous runway surface (which cost $1.7 million USD in December 
2009) was destroyed by abrasion damage caused during the cleanup. Markings on the 
runway and apron were also severely damaged by abrasion and had to be completely 
repainted before the airport could re-open. Airport buildings were also damaged by the 
tephra fall where gutters and downpipes were clogged with tephra and caused leaks in 
the ceiling which were continuing some four months later. 
Telecommunications 
• VHF radio attenuation was reported by EEGSA’s substations located south of 
Guatemala City, especially those close to the volcano.  
• Photos acquired from INSIVUMEH indicate ballistic damage to telecommunication 
towers located close to the volcano (Cerro Chino). 
Impacts on proximal communities 
• Main crops in the rural settlements surrounding Pacaya volcano include maize, coffee, 
beans, bananas and avocados. All agricultural produce in the area immediately to the 
north of the volcano was lost to the 27 May 2010 eruption. As it is largely a subsistence 
economy, local food shortages resulted.  
• There was major damage to buildings in San Francisco de Sales. Five houses were 
burned by incandescent ballistic blocks; if it had not been raining at the time the fire 
damage throughout the town would have undoubtedly been much worse. Approximately 
90% of roofs in the town were badly damaged, primarily by ballistic impacts, and needed 
to be replaced.  
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• After the eruption, there were ten days of power outages in the area around the volcano. 
This was primarily due to ballistic damage to lines and poles, and also tree fall onto lines. 
Some 90% of lines in San Francisco de Sales, El Cedro and Calderas were damaged.  
• San Francisco de Sales also lost its water supply for eight days as pipework suffered 
extensive damage from ballistic clasts.  
• The access road into San Francisco de Sales and Calderas was impassable except by 
4WD, until the tephra compacted into a new surface.  
Emergency response 
• INSIVUMEH and CONRED have built a working relationship that relies on trust and 
communication flow, which worked well during the last eruption. 
• The emergency management system is improving with time and experience, although 
information flow from local to national level is not yet fluid and responsibilities at each 
level require further definition. 
• The communities with previous experience of eruption impacts and tephra falls are 
aware of the risks posed by the volcano and respond to evacuations or tephra falls with 
less panic than in previous events.  
• Available civil defence data suggested that the impact of Tropical Storm Agatha was 
much greater and more widespread than the impact of the eruption of Pacaya volcano.  
• Emergency response was slow in the proximal village of San Francisco de Sales; with no 
cleanup help from the municipality and delays in deploying medical teams. 
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APPENDIX 1 TRIP ITINERARY 
Institution Visited City Location Date 
ORMAT Geothermal Plant San Francisco de Sales 19.09.10 
Empresa Municipal de Agua (Guatemala) (EMPAGUA) Guatemala City 20.09.10 
Instituto Nacional de Sismologia, Vulcanologia, 
Meteorologia e Hidrologia (INSIVUMEH) Guatemala City 20.09.10 
Ministerio de Salud Publica (Ministry of Public Health) Guatemala City 21.09.10 
Empresa Electrica de Guatemala (EEGSA) Guatemala City 21.09.10 
Mapreco Waste Services Guatemala City 22.09.10 
Coordinadora Nacional para la Reducción de Desastres 
(CONRED) Guatemala City 22.09.10 
Hospital A [public] Guatemala City 23.09.10 
Instituto Nacional de Electrificacion (INDE), Empressa de 
Transporte y Control de Energia Electrica (ETCEE) Guatemala City 23.09.10 
Municipality Guatemala City 23.09.10 
Hospital B [public] Guatemala City 24.09.10 
Basurero Guatemala City 24.09.10 
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APPENDIX 2 DATA INVENTORY: RESOURCES GATHERED DURING 
FIELDWORK 
 
Donated By Type of Resource Details 
Instituto 
Nacional de 
Sismologia, 
Vulcanologia, 
Meteorologia 
e Hidrologia 
(INSIVUMEH) 
Photos Photos of May 2010 activity and of tephra impacts on nearby communities 
Report Preliminary eruption of Pacaya volcano on 27 May, 2010 
Presentation Overview of the impacts from May 2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano (in English) 
Report Overview of the impacts from May 2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano(in Spanish) 
Report Eruption of Volcán  Santiaguito, April 2010 
Data Real-time seismic amplitude measurements (RSAM) for Volcán  de Pacaya during May 26-June 1, 2010 
Empresa 
Electrica de 
Guatemala 
(EEGSA) 
Photos Photos of EEGSA substations contaminated in Volcanic tephra. 
Data 
EEGSA system faults logged between 27 May - May 30, 
2010. Many of these faults are attributed to tephra 
contamination. 
Mapreco 
Waste 
Services 
Photos Photos of tephra cleaning at major waste water facilities. 
Municipality Presentation Overview of eruption, impacts from tephra fall and restoration efforts. 
Hospital B 
[public] Photos Photos of tephra cleaning. 
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APPENDIX 3 ANALYSIS OF PACAYA TEPHRA FROM 27 MAY 2010 
ERUPTION 
This information was supplied by Alvaro Zepeda, the General Manager of Mapreco. It has 
been translated from Spanish. The analysis was commissioned by a company who were 
interested in the re-use potential of the tephra as aggregate for concrete production.  
Chemical analysis 
SiO2 49.1% 
Fe2O3 14.3% 
Al2O3 18.48% 
CaO 8.85% 
MgO 3.65% 
K2O 0.82% 
Na2O 2.79% 
 
Physical analysis 
Mean grain size:  2.01 Φ  
Tephra had a highly heterogeneous grain size distribution. 
Relative density:  2.45 g/cm3 
% Absorption:  2.22 
Organic matter:  0 colour 
Compacted unit weight: 1053 kg/m3 
Loose unit weight:  944 kg/m3 
Wet loose unit weight: 747 kg/m3 
The concrete company concluded that the tephra was unsuitable for use as aggregate, 
because it was heterogeneous with respect to grain size, and also that its reactivity made it 
potentially harmful in concrete production. No information on leachate chemistry was 
obtained.  
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APPENDIX 4 ETHICS APPROVAL NUMBERS 
University College London - 2327/001 
University of Canterbury - 2010/118 
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APPENDIX 5 REPORT ON ADMISSIONS TO THE ADULT EMERGENCY 
DEPARTMENT OF HOSPITAL A, DUE SPECIFICALLY TO THE 
PACAYA VOLCANIC ERUPTION OR TROPICAL STORM 
AGATHA  
 
28-30 May 2010 
No. AGE SEX ORIGIN DIAGNOSIS DATE STATE1 EMERGENCY TYPE2 
1 13 M 5ta. Ave. 1-46, zona 12, Guajitos 
Fracture, left arm 
28/05/2010 V V 
2 56 M Prados de Villa Hermosa PTM, second degree burns 28/05/2010 V V 
3 17 M 12 Calle 18-82, zona 12 
TCE exposure 
28/05/2010 V V 
4 15 F Zona 7 
Multiple injuries, post-
traumatic back pain  
 
28/05/2010 V V 
5 29 M Avenida Petapa, 53 calle , zona 12 
Traumatic brain injury 
28/05/2010 M V 
6 18 F 
Calzada Justo 
Rufino, Barrios, 
Zona 21 Dislocated elbow 
28/05/2010 V V 
7 40 F Villa Nueva, zona 7 
Multiple trauma 
28/05/2010 V V 
8 48 M Ciudad Quetzal 
fractured wrist 
28/05/2010 V V 
9 38 M Zona 7 
Fracture of left foot  
28/05/2010 V V 
10 47 F Zona 11 
Multiple trauma 
28/05/2010 V V 
11 58 M Zona 19 
Multiple trauma 
28/05/2010 V V 
12 48 M Villa Nueva 
Hip contusion 
28/05/2010 V V 
13 14 M Zona 19 Multiple serious injuries, bruised eye (?) 28/05/2010 V V 
14 16 M Zona 12 Bruised forehead + ?? 28/05/2010 V V 
15 35 M Zona 7 Dislocated left shoulder and finger 28/05/2010 V V 
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16 24 F Zona 19 Dislocated elbow, fractured radius 28/05/2010 V V 
17 64 F  
Traumatic brain injury 
28/05/2010 M V 
18 57 M Zona 21 Herida Cortocontundente en MII  28/05/2010 V V 
19 72 M San Miguel Petapa 
Fracture of right foot 
28/05/2010 V V 
20 57 F Villa Nueva 
Fractured fibula 
28/05/2010 V V 
21 26 M  
Injury to chest and back 
28/05/2010 V V 
22 14 M  
Bruises  
28/05/2010 V V 
23 52 M Ciudad Quetzal Electrical burns and fractured pelvis 28/05/2010 V V 
24 33 M Zona 11 
Multiple trauma 
28/05/2010 V V 
25  M  
‘Herida Cortocontundente’  
28/05/2010 V V 
26  M  
Multiple trauma, head 
trauma Grade 1 28/05/2010 V V 
27 32 M Zona 12 Fracture of left leg 28/05/2010 V V 
28 16 F Zona 6 Bronchial hyper-reactivity  28/05/2010 V V 
29 65 M Zona 6 Bronchial hyper-reactivity  28/05/2010 V V 
30 47 M Zona 12 Allergic reaction 28/05/2010 V V 
31  M  
Multiple trauma 
28/05/2010 V V 
32 22 M Zona 7 
Multiple trauma 
28/05/2010 V V 
33  M  
Multiple trauma 
28/05/2010 V V 
34 32 M  
Dislocated shoulder 
28/05/2010 V V 
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35 20 M  
Bruises  
28/05/2010 V V 
36 23 M Boca del Monte, Villa Canales Fracture of knee,  tibia (?)  29/05/2010 V-A V 
37 36 M 
22 Ave. 16-60, zona 
10, colonia 
Concepción Hip fracture  
29/05/2010 V V 
38 39 F San Pedro Sacatepéquez 
Grade III fracture 
29/05/2010 V A 
39 74 F Colonia 1ro. De Julio 
Hip fracture  
29/05/2010 V V 
40 67 F 
5a. Ave. 3-72, zona 
8 de Mixco, San 
Cristóbal Fractured tibia 
29/05/2010 V V 
41  M  
burns from high tension 
power lines 29/05/2010 V A 
42 34 F 
Kilómetro 16,5 
Carretera a el 
Salvador 
Fracture of left shoulder in a 
fall 29/05/2010 V V 
43 30 F 
Zona 1 de Boca del 
Monte, Villa 
Canales L1 fracture, compound (?) 
30/05/2010 V V 
44 47 F Villa Canales 
Distal radius fracture 
30/05/2010 V V 
45 18 M Zona 7 
Fracture of tibial plateau  
30/05/2010 V V 
46 36 M Zona 10 Dislocated finger, acetabular fracture  30/05/2010 V V 
47 40 M San Miguel Petapa 
Displaced skull fracture 
30/05/2010 V V 
48 48 M  
Fracture of distal radius 
30/05/2010 V V 
49 50 M Villa Canales 
L1 fracture, compound (?) 
30/05/2010 V V 
50 35 M 12 calle B, 20-69, zona 11 
Fracture of tibia at MII  
30/05/2010 V V 
51 14 M Villa Canales 
Hand fracture 
30/05/2010 V V 
52 55 F Zona 19 Left lower limb fracture 30/05/2010 V V 
31 May onwards 
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No. AGE SEX ORIGIN DIAGNOSIS DATE STATE EMERGENCY TYPE 
1 33 M Los Próceres, Zona 10 
Multiple trauma and 
head trauma from falling 
from roof 
31/05/2010 V V 
2 18 M 
6a.  Ave. 4-20, 
zona 1, El 
Porvenir, Villa 
Canales 
Multiple trauma, a fall 
from roof 31/05/2010 V V 
3 59 M Nueva Monserrat, zona 3 de Mixco 
Multiple trauma, head 
injury and wrist fracture 
from falling 
31/05/2010 V V 
4 15 M 
Colonia los 
Alamos, zona 6, 
San Miugel 
Petapa 
Multiple trauma caused 
by fall 31/05/2010 V V 
5 37 M 
Calle C 4-4, 
colonia Seis de 
Octubre, 
Guatemala 
Multiple trauma caused 
by fall 31/05/2010 V V 
6 50 F Colonia primero de Julio 
Sprained right ankle 
caused by fall 1/06/2010 V V 
7 24 F Villa Canales Scaphoid fracture - fall 1/06/2010 V V 
8 50 F San Miguel Petapa 
Distal radius fracture, 
falling from roof 1/06/2010 V V 
9 40 M 
Obelisco, 
viaducto entre 
zona 9 y zona 10, 
ciudad Guatemala 
Poisonous gas inhalation 
and contaminated water 
while carrying out 
underground work for 
municipality 
1/06/2010 V A 
10 43 M 
Obelisco, 
viaducto entre 
zona 9 y zona 10, 
ciudad Guatemala 
Poisonous gas inhalation 
and contaminated water 
while carrying out 
underground work for 
municipality (rescued 
from well) 
1/06/2010 V A 
11 32 M 
5a. Avenida y 5ta. 
Calle, zona 9, 
ciudad Guatemala 
Multiple trauma, a fall 
from roof 1/06/2010 V V 
12 13 M 
Trasladado del 
Hospital Nacional 
de Antigua 
Guatemala 
Multiple trauma caused 
by fall while cleaning 
tephra from gutter 
 
1/06/2010 V V 
13 25 M 
Avenida la 
Castellana y 40 
calle, zona 9, 
Ciudad 
Multiple trauma from 
traffic accident, slid on 
tephra 
 
1/06/2010 V V 
14 24 M 
Avenida la 
Castellana y 40 
calle, zona 9, 
Ciudad 
Multiple trauma from 
traffic accident, slid on 
tephra 
 
1/06/2010 V V 
15 44 F Zona 7 de San Miguel Petapa 
Multiple injuries falling 
from roof 2/06/2010 V V 
16 27 F Zona 8 de Mixco, Guatemala 
Multiple injuries falling 
from roof 2/06/2010 V V 
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17 12 M zona 9, de San Miguel Petapa 
Multiple injuries falling 
from roof 2/06/2010 V V 
18 17 M Villa Canales, Guatemala 
Multiple injuries falling 
from roof 2/06/2010 V V 
19 16 M Villa Lobos, I, zona 12 Multiple injuries from fall 03/062010 V V 
20 19 F villa Nueva Asthmatic crisis 3/06/2010 V A 
21 49 M 
San Miguel 
Petapa, 
Guatemala 
Multiple injuries from fall 7/06/2010 V V 
22 18 M 
Boca del Monte, 
Villa Canales, 
Guatemala 
Pharyngitis from 
breathing tephra 7/06/2010 V V 
1 V = vivo (alive); M = muerto (dead) 
2 V = volcanic crisis; A = Agatha (tropical storm) 
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APPENDIX 6 ANALYSIS OF ASH FROM PACAYA VOLCANO FOR THE 
ASSESSMENT OF HEALTH HAZARD 
Claire J. Horwell and David E. Damby 
 
[Reproduced here with the kind permission of Claire Horwell] 
 
19 January 2011 
 
Introduction 
Two ash samples from the eruption of Pacaya volcano were sent to Durham University (UK) 
by Dr Bill Rose on 27 May 2010. We have carried out basic analyses to test for potential 
health hazard. Sample information is as follows: 
 
Table 1 
Sample # Grid location Distance 
from 
Pacaya 
Bearing Info Collector 
PAC2010_01 14°35’32.34”N 
90°29’8.82”W 
26.7 km 208° Part of a 3 mm thick layer, 
collected dry, unaffected by 
rain 
Samuel Bonis 
PAC2010_02 15°28’14.80”N 
90°22’20.09”W 
122 km 192° Wet but not soaked  
 
 
Methods 
The following analyses were carried out: 
1. Grain size distributions by laser diffraction using a Malvern Mastersizer 2000 with 
Hydro Mu. 
2. Major element analysis (bulk composition) using X-Ray fluorescence. 
3. Crystalline silica quantification (cristobalite and quartz) using X-ray diffraction with 
static position-sensitive detection (XRD-sPSD). 
 
Results 
Bulk composition analyses confirmed that the ash samples are basaltic (51.6 and 50.8 wt. % 
SiO2; 3.9 and 4.8 wt. % Na2O and K2O). 
Grain size analyses showed that there is no respirable or inhalable ash in either sample (Table 
2). It is possible that some minor fines component had been lost from PAC2010_02 given 
that the 63 μm contained 7.89 vol. % material (which would give a predicted value of ~0.44 
vol. % <4 μm and ~1.9 vol.% <10 μm material according to Horwell (2007).  
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Table 2 Quantity of material in health-pertinent size fractions in vol.%. 
 
Bin Fraction PAC2010_01 PAC2010_02 
<1 μm Ultrafine 0.00 0.00 
<2.5 μm “ 0.00 0.00 
<4 μm Respirable 0.00 0.00 
<10 μm Thoracic 0.00 0.00 
<15 μm Inhalable 0.00 0.00 
<63 μm Sievable 0.00 7.89 
 
 
There was negligible crystalline silica in the samples, although PAC2010_02 has 3.41 wt%, 
indicating that there are small quantities of cristobalite in the ash.  
 
Table 3 Amount of crystalline silica in the samples, 1-3 wt.% error 
 
Sample # Cristobalite wt% Quartz wt% 
PAC2010_01 0.00 0.79 
PAC2010_02 3.41 0.00 
 
Discussion 
From a health perspective, this basaltic ash is not likely to cause significant respiratory issues. 
Neither sample contained any material that could penetrate into the respiratory system. In 
addition, as expected for a basaltic eruption, crystalline silica content was negligible. The 
small amount of cristobalite observed may have been sourced from altered edifice rock 
entrained into the eruption column. There is the possibility that the ash could be reactive in 
the lung due to iron-catalysed hydroxyl radical generation, as observed for ash from previous 
eruptions of Pacaya and other basaltic volcanoes. However, as the ash is not inhalable, we did 
not carry out these experiments.  
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